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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the economic plans of Siam and the 
evolution of economic nationalism in Siam in the 1930s, but particularly the 
period from the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in June 1932. The 
opening chapter outlines the main themes of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides 
an outline of the main features of the Siamese economy in the 1920s and 
1930s, and examines the main analyses by Thai and foreign scholars of the 
origins of Siamese economic underdevelopment. Chapter 3 is concerned 
with the economic plans of Mangkorn Samsen, Pridi and Phra Sarasas, 
while chapter 4 is concerned with a number of the less important economic 
plans introduced at that time. These plans were submitted by various groups, 
not only the Siamese elite but also the middle class. Chapter 5 examines 
more analytically all these plans, in the context of the evolution of economic 
nationalism in the inter-war decades. There are three views on the origin of 
economic nationalism in Siam: that it developed in the reign of Rama 6 
(1910-1925), in the constitutional revolution in 1932, or as part of Phibun’s 
nationalism in 1939. These views ignore the relationship between the three 
periods of economic nationalism. This study shows the continuity and 
discontinuity in economic nationalism between these periods. Chapter 5 
further examines the role of the middle class. Chapter 6 considers the 
development of the co-operative movement in Siam from 1917, while chapter 
7 focuses on the various plans and proposals in this period to establish a 
central bank. Chapter 8 is the conclusion.
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1Introduction
There are three main aims of this thesis. Previous studies of economic plans 
and economic nationalism in Siam after 1932 have focused mainly on Pridi. 
In particular Pridi’s plan has been examined by many Western and Thai 
scholars, which might suggest that the main economic arguments after 1932 
concerned only Pridi’s plan. But there was very considerable economic 
discussion and Pridi’s plan was simply one, if perhaps the most important, 
plan. Drawing attention to other plans and authors would make some 
contribution to an understanding of the economic discussion which took 
place after 1932.
Earlier studies of Pridi’s plan included those by Landon (1939), Siam 
in Transition: A Brief Survey of Cultural Trends in the Five Years since the 
Revolution of 1932, New York: Greenwood; Thak Chaloemtiarana (1978), 
Thai Politics: Extracts and Documents 1932-1957, Bangkok: Social Science 
Association of Thailand; Duan Bunnag (1974), Than Pridi ratthaburut awuso 
phu wang phaensethakit Thai khonraek (Pridi, Elder Statesman and First 
Planner of the Thai Economy), Bangkok: Samakkhitham Publications. They 
reproduced the plan in full as an appendix or in a document.1 The main
reasons why Pridi’s plan has attracted so much attention are Pridi was one
1 Kenneth Perry Landon, Siam in Transition: A Brief Survey of Cultural Trends in the 
Five Years since the Revolution of 1932, New York: Greenwood, 1968, see Appendix III, 
pp.260-323. Thak Chaloemtiarana (ed), Thai Politics: Extracts and Documents 1932-1957, 
Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1978, pp.108-237. Duan Bunnag, Than 
Pridi ratthaburut awuso phu wang phaensethakit Thai khonraek (Pridi, Elder Statesman end 
First Planner of the Thai Economy), Bangkok: Samakkhitham Publications, 1974.
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of the most influential leaders of the People’s Party, he tried to introduce new 
ideas into Siamese society and his plan was so radical that it was attacked 
by the king, conservatives and foreign advisers. Many books on Pridi 
Phanomyong see his economic plan as his major achievement.2
Firstly the thesis will consider several other plans in addition to that of 
Pridi. Why did these plans appear after 1932? What were their contents? My 
study will focus not only on several important plans or ideas which have 
been found in the Thai National Archives but also on their authors. The plans 
and their authors should be examined more carefully for their new ideas. 
For example, Pridi introduced the concept of social insurance in his plan. 
Other important ideas were economic nationalism, state intervention in the 
economy and how to deal with the effects of the world depression. This will 
show why and how Siamese intellectuals, including the middle class, 
became aware of economic issues after the 1932 revolution. These people 
came from various social classes: not only government officials, M.Ps,
lawyers, but merchants, clerks, journalists and farmers. Men such as 
Mangkorn Samsen and Phra Sarasas had much influence. Though their 
ideas were not fully implemented in the 1930’s, later on some of their ideas, 
such as Phra Sarasas’ argument for state intervention in the economy, were 
adopted. Pridi may have been one of the most important Thai intellectuals of 
that time but other figures should also be examined.
Recently other scholars have given attention to Mangkorn Samsen 
and Phra Sarasas but they do not fully describe their plans. For example,
Pasuk and Baker (1995), Thailand: Economy and Politics, Kuala Lumpur:
2 They include Vichitvong Na Pombhejara, Pridi Banomyong and the Making of 
Thailand’s Modern History, Bangkok: 1979; Pierre Fistie, Sous-deveiopment et utopie au 
Siam\ le programme des reformes presentne en 1933 par Pridi Phanomyong, Paris and The 
Hague: 1969; Duan Bunnag, Than Pridi ratthaburut awuso phu wang phaensethakit Thai 
khonraek (Pridi, Eider Statesman and First Planner of the Thai Economy), Bangkok: 
Samakkhitham Publications, 1974; Suphot Dantrakun, Chiwaprawat ratthaburut awuso Pridi 
Phanomyong (A Biography of Pridi Phanomyong, the Elder Statesman), Bangkok: 
Prachakanphim, 1972-73; Supot Dantrakun, Chiwit lae ngan khong Dr. Pridi Phanomyong 
(Life and work of Dr. Pridi Phanomyong), Bangkok, 1971.
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Oxford University Press, mention Mangkorn Samsen’s economic plan: ‘Nai 
Mangkorn Samsen proposed a national economic development plan which 
advocated an import-substitution strategy through devaluation of the baht 
and measures to promote indigenous firms.’3 Batson assesses the role of 
Phra Sarasas and mentions his economic plan in 1934, but only briefly.4
A more serious controversy was generated when Phra Sarasas attempted to put 
forward a form of national economic plan, reviving memories of Pridi’s abortive plan of the 
previous year. Phra Sarasas’ economic philosophy has been described as a combination of 
nationalism (reflecting economic doctrines adopted in many countries in the early 1930s) and 
socialism, and he strongly denied suggestions that his “General Economic Plan” was a return 
to a Pridi-type scheme; in particular, he rejected the fairly sweeping nationalisation of the 
means of production that Pridi had proposed and instead advocated a reliance on 
cooperatives and a limited amount of central planning of the economy.5
After the 1932 revolution, there were many suggestions from the public
on political, economic and social matters, although their ideas were hardly 
implemented. Even so, after 1932, a much wider range of people contributed 
to public discussion of economic, political and social issues.
The second aim of the thesis is to explain why economic policy­
making was so slow, in spite of the appearance of so many plans. Several 
political, economic and social factors caused the underdevelopment of Siam 
(this will be discussed in Chapter 2). For example, as a political factor, there 
was political instability in the 1930’s, because of continuous conflict among 
various groups, conservative, moderate and extremist. This instability was 
caused in part by Pridi’s economic plan in 1933, which sparked a fatal 
political conflict between the conservative and Pridi’s group. The 
conservative group of Phraya Mano, the prime minister, could gain support 
from the senior military faction, led by Phraya Song, in opposing Pridi’s plan 
as communistic. A committee that met to consider national economic policy
3 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.115.
4 Benjamin A. Batson, ‘Phra Sarasas: Rebel with Many Causes’, Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies , 27, 1 (March 1996), p. 153.
5 ibid.
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on 12 March 1933 had a serious discussion of Pridi's plan and, in spite of 
opposition from a few conservatives, the majority of the members supported 
the plan.6 A power struggle took place between the State Council, 
dominated by the conservatives, and the People’s Party and the National 
Assembly, which supported Pridi's plan. The conservative group was so 
afraid that the Assembly would pass Pridi's plan, that it issued a royal degree 
to prorogue the Assembly on 1 April 1933. On 2 April 1933, an ‘Act 
Concerning Communism’ was proclaimed. This act punished those who 
advocated communism with severe penalties, imprisonment for up to ten 
years. Section 3 defined communism as follows:
(1) “Communism" means the economic system or theory, which rests 
upon the total or partial abolition of the right of private property, actual 
ownership being ascribed to the community as a whole or to the State.
(2) "Communistic doctrine” means any doctrine which implies the 
advocation of nationalisation of land, or nationalisation of industry, or 
nationalisation of capital, or nationalisation of labour.7
The new government, formed by excluding the leading members of
the civilian group including Pridi, advised Pridi to leave the country. Pridi left
6 14 members attended; they were 1, Luang Kahakan Bodi, Secretary of the People’s 
Assembly; 2. Luang Det Sahakon, Member of People’s Assembly, 3. Luang Dechatiwong 
Wararat, Member of People’s Party, 4, Phraya Song Suradet, Member of the State Council, 5. 
Thawi Bunyaket, Member of People’s Assembly, 6. Naeb Phahonyothin, Member of State 
Council, 7. Luang Pradit Manutham, Member of State Council, 8. Prayoon Phamonmontri, 
Member of State Council, 9. Phraya Manopakon Nitithada, President of the State Council, 10. 
Phraya Ratchawangsan, Minister of Defence and member of State Council, 11. Wilat 
Osathanon, Member of People’s Assembly, 12. Phraya Siwisan Wacha, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and member of State Council, 13. H.S.H. Prince Sakon Warawan, Adviser to Ministry of 
Interior, 14. Luang Athasan Prasit, Member of People’s Assembly. See Kenneth Perry 
Landon, Siam in Transition: A Brief Survey of Cultural Trends in the Five Years since the 
Revolution of 1932, New York: Greenwood, 1968, see Appendix III, p.303-318. Thak 
Chaloemtiarana (ed), Thai Politics: Extracts and Documents 1932-1957 , Bangkok: Social 
Science Association of Thailand, 1978, pp.161-185. Duan Bunnag, Than Pridi ratthaburut 
awuso phu wang phaensethakit Thai khonraek {Pridi, Elder Statesman and First Planner of the 
Thai Economy), Bangkok: Samakkhitham Publications, 1974.
7 Kenneth Perry Landon, Siam in Transition: A Brief Survey of Cultural Trends in the 
Five Years since the Revolution of 1932, New York: Greenwood, 1968, see Appendix III, 
pp.251-2.
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on 12 April 1933. The fear of losing power to the conservative group 
encouraged the People’s Party to carry out a second coup to get rid of the 
conservatives who would bring back the absolute monarchy. The coup on 20 
June 1933 was a success, and Phraya Mano, the conservative leader, was 
exiled to Penang.
A counter-revolution was attempted in October 1933, by the
conservative group headed by Prince Boworadet, a grandson of King
Chulalongkorn who had been Minister of War under Rama 6. The main
reason for this attempted counter-revolution was the strong dissatisfaction of
the royal favourites.
Most of these men were pensioned off by the new regime; others, while being 
retained in government service, were subsequently reduced to powerless positions. Hence, it 
was not surprising that these people harboured strong resentment against the new regime, 
and thus readily agreed to join the counter-revolution plot8
This counter-revolution was a serious challenge to the new government 
because the rebels took Korat and several provincial army garrisons, such 
as Ayudhya, Saraburi, Nakorn Sawan, Ubon, Prachinburi and Petchburi. 
The rebels seized Don Muang airfield on 12 October and severe fighting 
took place between the rebels and the government between 13 October and 
16 October in Bangkok. The quick and well-organised response by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Phibun brought victory for the government. Prince 
Boworadet fled to exile in French Indochina, and the other leaders were 
killed or escaped.9
The success in suppressing the rebels brought about several 
important changes in the government. First, the junior military group, 
particularly those around Phibun, increased their power dramatically. This 
means that the senior military group, notably Phraya Song, Phibun’s main
rival, lost power. As a hero of the People’s Party, Phibun was promoted to
8 Thawatt Mokarapong, History of the Thai Revolution: A Study in Political Behaviour, 
Bangkok: Thai Watana Panich, 1972, pp.196-7.
9 Ibid. See details on pp.196-214.
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Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and in 1934 was made Minister of 
Defence.
Second, the Boworadet rebellion provided an opportunity to wipe out 
the conservative-royalist opponents of the regime. Furthermore it brought 
about a further decline in royal power. Although there is no evidence that the 
King supported the Boworadet rebellion, his neutral attitude put him in a 
difficult position. After the King’s departure abroad for an eye operation in 
January 1934, the conflict between the King and the government over the 
constitution grew. The King demanded the right to appoint second category 
members of the National Assembly, the right to grant pardons, and a royal 
veto over any laws which did not secure more than a two-thirds or three- 
quarters majority in the National Assembly. As there was no compromise on 
this issue the King finally abdicated on 2 March 1935. Political turmoil made 
it more difficult to fashion a coherent economic strategy.
Besides political instability, another reason for the slow 
implementation of economic policies was the absence of clear ideology 
within People’s Party. The People’s Party’s only goal was to put an end to 
the absolute monarchy. The People’s Party consisted of various groups, 
such as the army, the navy, the civilian junior factions and the army senior 
faction. The junior civilian group was led by Pridi Phanomyong, the 
ideological leader; the main leader of the junior army faction was Phibun; 
and the leaders of the junior navy faction were Luang Sinthu Songgramchai 
and Luang Suphachalasai. In the senior army faction there were four 
leaders; Phraya Phahon, Phraya Song Suradet, Phra Prasas Pitthayayudh 
and Phraya Ritthi Akaney. Because of their various educational and career 
backgrounds it was difficult to find a common ideology among them.
Dissatisfied with the inefficiency of the absolute regime, they found “democracy1' the 
solution to every problem. To them, the word "Prachatipatai" (democracy) promised everything 
- a wonderful system which could work miracles, and a panacea for every defect in the
13
government. They spoke much about democracy even though they did not clearly know what 
kind of democracy they were taking about. They were less concerned with its political 
implications, such as the problems of liberty and equality, than with the economic 
consequences which they believed would follow democracy. To them, democracy meant only 
one thing - modernisation and prosperity - which have been experienced by many democratic 
nations and which they professed to give to the nation.10
Concerning the economic factors, the political economy group, 
represented by Chatthip Narsupha and Suthy Prasartset, point to such 
internal factors as the existence of the sakdina system and to external factors 
such as imperialism as the long-term causes of underdevelopment. The 
sakdina system, meaning ‘field power’, had played an important role in 
Siamese society since the fifteenth century. In theory, perhaps initially, but 
then not literally, it allocated everyone from the royal family to slaves a 
number of units of measured rice fields, that is rai (2.5 rai = 1 acre). This 
came to represent the social hierarchy. For example, the allocation of 
sakdina varied from slaves, 5 rai, to the heir-apparent, 100,000 rai. In other 
words, the system showed each position and status by the amount of 
sakdina marks. The exploitation of the economic surplus of the farmers was 
carried out by the sakdina classes (the royal family and nobility). 
Furthermore, the King dominated the means of production (land, labour and 
capital) and economic initiative remained almost solely in the hands of the 
royal family and the elite, the sakdina elite-classes. Therefore it was difficult 
to generate a strong bourgeoisie as in Europe, who secured the economic 
surplus as well as political power. Chinese merchants mainly belonged to 
the bourgeoisie, but the crucial point is that they depended on the sakdina 
system to survive and pursue economic profit, because they lacked the 
political power. On the other hand, the King made use of the Chinese as tax 
farmers to collect the various taxes for him. This meant that Chinese tax 
farmers were absorbed into the sakdina system, and in some cases Chinese
10 Ibid., p.84.
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merchants were appointed governors in the south of Siam, with fiscal 
authority, and some administrative and judicial power. Chatthip and Suthy 
note:
The politico-economic institutions in Siam were characterised by the existence of 
exploitation and the slow pace of institutional change. Exploitation of the surplus was the result 
of the monopolisation of the means of production, fertile land and capital funds, by the royalty, 
Sakdina lords and Chinese merchants.11
The lack of fiscal autonomy and the presence of extraterritorial rights
since the time of the Bowring Treaty in 1855 diminished government
revenues even in the 1930s. Fixing import duty at 3 percent for all articles
except opium and bullion, and setting specific export duties left the
Siamese government with no control of its customs. Ingram explains why the
government later tried to revise the treaties:
Thailand’s efforts to reform her fiscal system centred around the campaign to revise 
the import duties. The government was convinced by foreign advisers and critics that a modern 
state should not receive 30 to 40 percent of its revenue from gambling and opium, and it was 
aware that the many export and inland-transit duties were harmful as well as inefficient. Yet if 
these taxes were to be abolished, something had to replace them. And not only more and 
more revenue was required. Increased duties on imports seemed to be the ideal solution. 
Such duties were easy to collect, their yield would rise as trade increased, and the duties 
would tend to fall on those who purchased the imported goods. Furthermore, in view of the 
importance of subsistence agriculture in Thailand, and the small amount of domestic 
production for sale locally, no satisfactory alternative form of tax existed. Direct taxation (land 
and capitation taxes) was as high as was practicable, and other taxes were precluded because 
they would violate some treaty provision, discourage domestic production, or prove impossible 
to collect.12
The breakthrough in the treaty negotiations came in the mid 1920s. In 
March 1927 a new tariff, with a general rate of 5 percent, came into force.13 
However, against Siam’s most important trading partner, Britain, the rate
remained 5 percent ad valorem on cotton goods, iron and steel
11 Chatthip Nartsupha, Suthy Prasartset, The Political Economy of Siam, 1850-1910, 
Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1981, p.22.
12 James C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, 1850-1970, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1971, p. 179.
13 Ibid.,p. 183. Special ad valorem duties were put on: beer and wine (12 percent); 
manufactured tobacco (25 percent), and motor cars and equipment (10 percent). Kerosene,
benzine, matches and sugar also faced specific duties.
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manufactures and machinery for ten years. In other words, Siam could not 
impose a duty of more than 5 % on British imports until 1937, when Siam 
would gain full fiscal autonomy. It is thus important to note that during the 
1930s, even after the constitutional revolution in 1932, Siam was not in a 
position to make full use of its custom revenues for economic development.
These reasons can explain Siam’s economic underdevelopment in 
the 1930’s. Besides political instability, a lack of ideology in the People’s 
Party, and the lack of fiscal autonomy, there were other factors, such as a 
shortage of official experts and an inadequate system of government 
administration. In spite of sending many Siamese students to study overseas, 
the lack of sufficient men of talent in the government persisted in to the 
1930s. Vichitvong points out:
The other factor which would have made any attempt (at development) a flop even 
before taking off, was the almost complete absence of scientific and technical manpower: the 
engineers, the scientists, the technicians, the accountants etc. In 1932 there could not be 
more than a few hundred people in this category, and practically all of them were engaged in 
government service. The acute shortage of these personnel was to continue for many years, 
perhaps until the 1960’s. Thailand was late in recognising the significance of science and 
technology for economic development.14
Another problem was the misallocation of manpower and budget 
expenditure, and a slow response to the need for economic development.
The third aim of the thesis is to examine the origins of economic 
nationalism in Siam. It attempts to show that 1932 was a turning point in 
Thai economic history, for it marked a new beginning for Thai economic 
nationalism. There is an argument here regarding the relationship between 
political nationalism and economic nationalism in Siam. The problem is that 
economic nationalism did not appear as clearly as political nationalism in 
Siam. Moreover there are several views about the origins of political 
nationalism. That it appeared in the reign of Rama 6 (1910-1925), at the
14 Vichitvong Na Pombhejara, Pridi Banomyong and the Making of Thailand's Modern
History, Bangkok: 1979, p.29.
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constitutional revolution in 1932, or in the ‘Rathaniyom’ of the Phibun 
government from 1939. in these three periods, economic nationalism 
appeared as part of political nationalism. Although several scholars mention 
economic nationalism in these periods, there is no detailed analysis of the 
continuity or discontinuity between economic nationalism in each period.15 
Harry Johnson defines nationalist economic policy in three points:
In the first place, nationalist economic policy will tend to foster activities selected for 
their symbolic value in terms of concepts of ‘national identity’ and the economic content of 
nationhood; in particular, emphasis will be placed on manufacturing. Secondly, nationalist 
economic policy will foster activities offering prestigious jobs for the middle class and/or the 
educated class. Thirdly, nationalism will tend to favour both extensive state control over and 
extensive public ownership of economic enterprises: state control provides employment for 
the educated directly, in the central control system, while both the control system and public 
ownership give the government social control over the allocation of jobs to nationals.16
Some scholars argue that the origins of economic nationalism can be
traced back only to 1939, when Phibun was in power. For example, Kobkua 
suggests that:
The economic policy introduced during Phibun's first administration and more or less 
continued throughout his two premierships has been labelled as the policy of economic 
nationalism. Basically, it was an alternative programme to Pridi’s Economic Plan which was 
rejected by the combined forces of the conservative wing of the People’s Party and the old
ruling clique in March 1932(3) the promise given by the 1932 Promoters concerning the
economic betterment of the people remained unfulfilled until Phibun emerged as Premier in 
December 1938. The new Prime Minister considered it a prime duty of the government to 
come up with an economic programme that would fulfil the economic pledge of the 1932 
Revolution.17
It is a fact that Phibun promoted economic nationalism, but Kobkua 
does not explore its relationship to two earlier forms of economic
15 For example, economic nationalism in each period is considered as follows: in Rama 
6, Walter F. Vella, Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism, 
Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, pp. 167-175; in 1932, Suehiro Akira, Capital 
Accumulation in Thailand 1855-1985, Tokyo: Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1989, 
pp. 106-109; in 1939, Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun 
through Three Decades 1932-1957, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp.144- 
151.
16 Harry Johnson, 'Economic Nationalism in New States’ in John Hutchinson and 
Anthony D. Smith (ed), Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p.239.
17 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun through Three 
Decades 1932-1957, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp.144-5.
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nationalism, that of Rama 6 and of the constitutional revolution in 1932. B.J. 
Terwiel raised a fundamental question as to how political nationalism should 
be analysed in Thai history.
It has also been argued that historians of Thailand have tended to describe nationalism 
as being a feature of specific reigns and rulers, and that this practice appears to have had a 
detrimental effect on the study of Thai nationalism as a whole. The history of the various stages 
of an ideology such as Thai nationalism is not served by this 'on-off approach. It is much better 
studied as a phenomenon that, once arisen (and we have argued for its origins to be placed in 
1893), moves, changes and develops as one of a range of competing ideologies.18
Following TerwiePs point, this thesis traces the evolution of economic
nationalism in Thailand through these periods. Terwiel raised an important
question about economic nationalism in 1932:
Deignan and other contemporary analysts have rightly identified the advent of 
economic nationalism with the outcome of the 1932 revolution. The setting up of state 
enterprises, such as the import organisation of the Ministry of Defence (the Fuel Division) and 
the Siam Cotton Mill in 1933, are the first practical results of this policy. They have failed to 
observe, however, to what extent this new economic nationalism was linked up both with the 
much-publicized propaganda of the Sixth Reign and also with the development of a radical 
form of Thai nationalism.19
But although Terwiel identified a fundamental question, he did not fully 
explain it.
The main point here is to explore how the economic nationalism of 
Rama 6 changed from 1932. Rama 6 initiated political nationalism during his 
reign and economic nationalism was embedded in his political nationalism. 
For example, his anti-Chinese stance was clear. However, there should be 
more consideration of change and continuity in economic nationalism before 
and after 1932. Elite driven economic nationalism became mass-driven by 
various social groups after 1932. Did 1932 bring about a drastic change in 
the formation of public opinion? The crucial difference before and after 1932 
is the change in the political system. Before 1932, under an absolute
18 B.J. Terwiel, Thai Nationalism and Identity: Popular Themes of the 1930s', in Craig J. 
Reynolds (ed), National identity and its Defenders: Thailand, 1939-1989  Chiang Mai' 
Silkworm Books, 1993, p. 144.
19 Ibid., p .137.
18
monarchy, the political institutions were dominated by the royal family and 
the established Sakdina elites. Change took place after 1932, by 
establishing a constitution and the Assembly. In the Assembly, two types of 
MP, one elected, the other appointed, played an important role in 
discussing various political, economic and social issues. At the same time, 
the key members of the government were no longer from the royal family but 
were the promoters of the People’s Party and competent bureaucrats of the 
old regime.20 As a result members of the Party held ten of the fifteen seats in 
the Mano cabinet and had 33 of the 70 appointed members of the Assembly. 
This is referred to by Nakharin as the Samai Mai (New Age), before 1932 
was the Samai Gao (Old Age).21 The new state (Rat Samai Mai) was a 
Nation-State. The reforms under Rama 5 (1868-1910) did not mark a break 
because the king controlled salaries, rank and the promotion of civil 
servants.22 The differences between the two periods are crucial to an 
understanding of the changing nature of economic nationalism in the 1930s.
Before moving to consider the Siamese intellectual ferment after 
1932, the middle class must be examined in order to understand their 
background. Nakharin pointed to the emergence of various strands of the 
middle class before 1932. Using official statistics on occupation, he notes the 
spread of the middle class but he does not define them.23 Further analysis of 
the educational and family backgrounds, salaries and occupations is 
necessary in order to illustrate the role of the middle class. According to the 
Thailand Statistical Yearbook of 1929/30, the number engaged in
20 Eiji Murashima, 'Democracy and the Development of Political Parties in Thailand 1932- 
1945’. in Eiji Murashima, Nakharin Mektrairat, Somkiat Wanthana, The Making of Modern Thai 
Political Parties, Tokyo; Institute of Developing Economics, 1991, p.6. Among the 99 
promoters, 32 were army officers, 21 were naval officers, and the remaining 46 were civil 
officials.
21 Nakharin Mektrairat, Kanpatiwat sayam ph.s.2475 (The 1932 Revolution in Siam), 
Bangkok; Mun nithi khrongkan tamra sangkhomsat lae manutsayasat, 1992, pp.6-18.
22 ibid., pp.6-7.
23 ibid., p. 12. He used Yotkanliangcip phonlamuang 17 Monihon ph. s. 2454  and 
Thailand Statistical Yearbook 1929.
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commerce was 503,839, in services 367,105, in industry 164,526, and in 
the professions 93,967.24 Nakharin shows that new occupations, such as 
builder, mechanic, foundry worker, photographer, welder, car repairer, 
brokers, tanners, had become more important after 1911.25
There was Siamese intellectual ferment following the 1932 revolution. 
From the early 1930s petitions to the king paved the way for wider 
discussions. Before 1932, petitions were concentrated on how to deal with 
the effects of the world depression on Siam. The sharp drop of rice export 
prices in the early 1930s pushed the farmers into economic difficulty. In the 
early 1930s there were requests to reduce or postpone some taxes, such as 
the capitation tax and interest on debts, expansion of co-operatives and 
establishment of loan facilities for farmers.26 This indicates that in the early 
1930s, farmers and some of the middle class felt that the government must 
intervene in the economy.
After the 1932 revolution the contents of petitions became more 
diversified and a wider social class, particularly the middle class, now freely 
expressed their ideas. This was a reflection of their hopes for the new 
government. Their topics covered politics, administration, education, law, tax, 
religion, social and economic issues. After 1932, there were more 
constructive suggestions and ideas. For example, in political matters, the 
People’s Party, the constitution, elections and the abolition of conferred titles 
were discussed. There were interesting suggestions on the dress code for 
civil servants.27
In Phibun’s government (1938-1944), Rattha Niyom (Cultural 
Mandates) was another movement to develop nationalism. The 12 Rattha
24 Constance M. Wilson, Thailand: A Handbook of Historical Statistics, Boston, G.K. Hall 
Co., 1983, p.86.
25 Nakharin Mektrairat, Kanpatiwat sayam ph.s.2475 (The 1932 Revolution in Siam),
Bangkok; Mun nithi khrongkan tamra sangkhomsat lae manutsayasat, 1992, p. 12.
26 ibid., pp. 120-123.
27 Ibid., pp.129-130,
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Niyom were:
(1) the name of the country, people and nationality; (2) preventing danger to the 
nation; (3) the name of the Thai people; (4) saluting the national flag, the national anthem and 
the royal anthem; (5) the use of Thai produce; (6) the tune and words of the national anthem; 
(7) persuading the Thais to build their nation; (8) changing the word 'Siam’ to ‘Thailand’ in the 
royal anthem; (9) the Thai language and the duty of good citizens; (10) the dress of the Thai 
people; (11) the routine work of the Thai people and (12) the treatment of children, the aged 
and the handicapped,28
This top to bottom cultural nationalism was clearly different from earlier ideas 
and suggestions. Phibun’s political aim was to educate the people to be 
‘civilised’.
Charnvit described the motivation of Phibun’s nation building as 
follows:
As one of the original members of the 1932 coup Phibun inherited the general 
outlook and the political problems of the new elite. But within the group he was associated with 
the more radical activist factions. These people tended to see themselves as building a new 
society in Siam; in other words, Siam was, in their view, entering a period of “nation building”. 
Since this period of “nation building" coincided with a time of world crisis, the Army must 
provide strong leadership for solving the problems facing the country. Phibun’s own thinking, 
as suggested by his writings, focused on the need for powerful and authoritarian leadership.29
Rattha Niyom can be said to have been a mixture of West and East.
While preserving the glory of the Thai past, the West was clearly seen as the 
model. A typical example was in dress: there was the expectation for a man 
to wear a hat, jacket and long trousers, shoes and socks, and for a woman to 
wear a hat, skirt, blouse and shoes. Besides dress, the old habit of chewing 
betel-nut or sitting on the floor or on the ground was now considered 
outmoded, not suitable for a new Thai society: sitting on chairs and using 
forks and spoons was recommended.
Phibun’s justification for this movement was to prevent 
‘Japanification’:
28 Thak Chaloemtiarana (ed), Thai Politics: Extracts and Documents 1932-1957, 
Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1978, pp.244-254.
28 Charnvit Kasetsiri, The First Phibun Government and Its Involvement in Word War II’, 
The Journal of the Siam Society, volume 62 part 2, July 1974, p.35.
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Pibul wrote to all newspapers saying that the real reason behind his whole ultra- 
nationatist programme was to forestall the Thais from coming under "Japanification" and to 
show the world that the Thais were not at all alarmed by the wartime conditions.The primary aim 
behind the establishment of the National Cultural Council was to prevent the spread of 
Japanese culture into Thailand. According to him, he had specified the European style 
dresses because he feared that before long the Thais might all start wearing Japanese 
kimonos, and out of fear that the chopsticks would become the national implements for eating 
he had emphasized the use of forks and spoons.30
In spite of Phibun’s account, in May 1944 the government proclaimed
a national code of valour of Thai heroism, which stressed military and cultural
bravery along the lines of Bushido, the Japanese traditional feudal samurai
ethic. The movement aimed to justify the need for a strong leader.
The effects of the world depression on Siam must briefly be examined
here. One of the main features of the world depression was the collapse in
commodity prices.
It is well known that the depression was marked by a collapse of commodity prices. Tin 
and copper prices fell, and so did prices of rubber, cotton, coffee, tea, sugar and rice. The 
developing world, by increasing its output of these commodities, created the overproduction 
which forced prices down. Prices began to fall as early as 1925 in many cases and continued to 
fall slowly until 1929, the year normally assumed to mark the beginning of the depression. 
Then they collapsed, and remained low until 1933 when recovery gradually took place.31
Latham argued that overproduction in two main foodstuffs, wheat in
the West and rice in the East, caused the collapse of prices.32 Wheat
production expanded from the mid-1920s as did rice. Therefore, their prices
began to fall from the middle of the 1920s.
Siamese trade was always in surplus in the 1920s and 1930s, except
30 Thamsook Numnonda, ‘Pibulsongkram’s Thai Nation-Building Programme during the 
Japanese Military Presence, 1941-1945', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 9, no.2, 
September 1978, p.242.
31 A.J.H. Latham, The Depression and the Developing World, 1914-1939, London: 
Croom Helm, 1981, pp.175-6.
32 Latham described the relation between wheat and rice as follows; ‘What seems to have 
happened is that up to 1927 world rice production and wheat production tended to move 
inversely, good rice harvest offsetting bad wheat harvests and good wheat harvest offsetting 
bad rice harvests. But from 1927 the inverse relationship disappeared and production of both 
grains moved in the same direction, throwing vast quantities of essential foodstuffs onto the 
world market and forcing down prices.’ Ibid., p. 178.
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in 1920-21, because of a prohibition on the export of rice as a result of a 
failure of the crop. In the 1920’s, exports and the trade surplus reached their 
peak in 1927-28. However, a trade slump developed in the late 1920’s. 
When the world depression hit Siam in 1930, export values fell rapidly in 
1931-32 to 51 % of the peak of 1927-28.
Regarding rice, expansion in the major exporting countries like Siam, 
Burma and French Indo-China took place through good harvests; self- 
sufficiency plans in many of the importing countries pushed down the price in 
the 1930s. For example, in 1934, the markets of the Netherlands East Indies 
and of Japan were closed, and import duties were imposed on Siamese rice 
entering the Kwangtung province in China. The effect of the world depression 
was severe on Siam. Rice exports accounted for about 70 percent of 
Siamese exports. The volume hit bottom in 1930-31 and value in 1931-32 
(See Table 1-1). Comparing these figures to their peak in 1927-28, the drop 
was 40 percent in volume and 61 percent in value. The important point is 
that the volume of rice exports then expanded over the first half of the 1930s 
but the value was stagnant. To put it another way, the average value of rice 
per ton was lower in the 1930s than in the second half of the 1920s.
In addition to the immediate effect of the world depression, the 
Siamese government's decision to remain on the gold standard after Great 
Britain left it in September 1931 caused serious damage to rice exports, 
through the high exchange value of the baht against sterling, until May 1932 
when Siam also went off gold.
The consequences to Siam's trade of this adhesion to gold were serious. Exports 
were badly hit. Produce prices, already low owing to the world depression, fell further as an 
indirect result of the exchange policy adopted. The value of rice sent abroad during the first 
five months of the season {December, 1931 to April, 1932) averaged about Ticals 54.0 per 
ton, a figure which allowed no profit to the farmers who, in many cases, were unable to meet 
their commitments or to pay their taxes.33
33 Department of Overseas Trade, Economic Conditbns in Siam at the close of the third 
quarter, 1932, London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1933, p.9.
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The purchasing power of the farmers fell because of the sharp drop in 
rice export value, so imports were also badly hit. Concerning government 
revenue and expenditure, the year 1930-31 ended with a deficit of 8.5 million 
baht. The government sought to cope with these difficulties by increasing 
revenue and reducing expenditure. The following were raised: the customs 
tariff in November 1931 and February 1932; port and light dues; postal rates 
and immigration fees. New sources were created: excise duties on matches 
and cement, and a salaries tax. There was a reduction in the number of civil 
servants and navy and army officers, a reduction in their salaries, 
amalgamation and re-arrangement of government departments, a reduction 
in ministries’ budgets and postponement of non-urgent capital expenditure. 
The British Department of Overseas Trade noted:
All these efforts were, however, unsuccessful in balancing the budget. The high tariff 
kept out imports; the low price realised for their padi made it impossible for the farmers to pay 
their padi land tax which was reduced early in 1932 by 20 per cent34 
The attempt to increase revenue was continued by the new government after
1932. New taxes, such as the income tax, a business tax, a banking and
insurance tax, and stamp duties were introduced, custom duties and the
excise duty on matches were increased.35 The Siamese government’s
policies to deal with these economic difficulties were conservative, and a
balanced budget was given priority, even in the worst period. There was no
expansion of public expenditure which relied on internal or external loans.
Public discussion of the farmers' financial difficulties, such as indebtedness,
was keen. However, there was no positive response from the government.
The development of local industries and the encouragement of the growing of other 
crops besides rice have received wide public discussion and have engaged the serious 
attention of the Government, but lack of capital has thus far allowed only a few preliminary steps
34 Ibid., p.10.
35 in spite of introducing new taxes, the government helped the farmers by reducing the 
paddy and orchard land taxes by 50 per cent and abolishing the garden tax.
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to be taken.36
In spite of unstable rice exports, a steady increase in the value of tin and 
rubber exports from 1933-34 offset the stagnant rice trade in the second half 
of the 1930s to some extent. Siam gained some advantage in joining 
international commodity schemes for rubber and tin. Siam was a small 
producer in the world market. This meant that Siam aione could not influence 
prices, although it had to be included in the schemes in order to secure 
control over all producers. Siam was therefore able to demand larger quotas 
than its production really justified.
The last part of this section considers government intervention in the 
economy throughout Southeast Asia in the 1930s. In Siam, the government 
invested in the manufacture of paper, textiles and sugar, as well as in rice 
mills from the mid-1930s. Brown and Booth both pointed to government 
intervention in the inter-war period:
the inter-war period saw a marked increase in the level of government intervention in 
the economy. In part this was an immediate response to the economic problems brought by 
those troubled decades. Thus government was forced to take a central role in the negotiation 
and implementation of the international commodity restriction agreements, for rubber, tin, and 
sugar, which were erected in this period.37
The Malay States joined the rubber restriction scheme in the 1930s, and the 
Netherlands East Indies entered the Chadbourne International Sugar 
Agreement in 1931. Brown noted where two governments intervened in the 
import trade when cheap Japanese manufactured goods hit South-East Asia 
in the early 1930s. The Netherlands East Indies imposed quotas on a wide 
range of imports from mid-1933, and the Strait Settlements did so on the 
import of foreign cotton and rayon piece goods for local consumption in mid- 
1934.
36 Department of Overseas Trade, Economic Conditions in Siam at the dose of 1934, 
London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1935, p.2.
37 lan Brown, Economic Change in South-East Asia, c. 1830-1980, Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1997, pp.56-7.
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Brown sees the roots of economic intervention from a different angle.
But increased government intervention also had more deep-seated origins. It 
commonly reflected a largely new acceptance on the part of government that fundamental, 
long-term economic problems, now perhaps more clearly in focus, could be solved only by the 
state action. What those problems were perceived to be differed from country to country 38
For the Philippines, fear of losing privileged access to the huge American
market with full independence in 1946 prompted a large programme of
import-substitution. For the Netherlands East Indies,
the Dutch administration not only regulated imports to protect new domestic 
manufacturing but also took powers to regulate local industrial production, even to the point 
where government officials had discretion to control capacity and, in some cases, fix prices. 
The state was now a major player indeed.39
Country to country comparisons by Anne Booth also show that the
government intervened in the Netherlands Indies economy in the late
1920s.40 Her comparisons show only broad patterns and trends, because
of the incompatibility of government data and the primitive nature of national
income accounting techniques. However, table 1-2 shows various
categories of government expenditure as a percentage of GDP for Indonesia
and selected countries.41 The government in Indonesia spent a great deal
on ‘economic services’, including public works. This expenditure, in 1929,
was higher than that on defence and administration. Booth pointed out that:
'indeed, Indonesia was spending a larger percentage of national income on
economic services in 1929 than Japan a decade earlier, although the overall
percentage of government expenditure to national income was slightly
lower.’42
38 ibid., p.57.
39 Ibid., p.58.
40 Anne Booth, T h e  Evolution of Fiscal Policy and the Role of Government in the 
Colonial Economy', in Anne Booth, W.J. O ’Malley, Anna Weidemann, (ed), Indonesian 
Economic History in the Dutch Colonial Era , New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia 
Studies (Monograph Series 35/Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Center for 
International Area Studies), 1990, pp.210-243.
41 Ibid., p.235
42 ibid., p.233,
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A comparison is also made of the scale of government borrowing.
Table 1-3 shows public debt outstanding as a percentage of national income
and exports for Indonesia and selected countries. It shows that for Indonesia,
total foreign public debt outstanding doubled to 47 per cent of national
income between the early 1920s and the late 1930s. Of the other Asian
countries, Japan and Thailand, showed less than 7 per cent. This is an
important point: Indonesia borrowed heavily but Thailand avoided foreign
loans, in Siam, the government had kept balanced budgets, on the advice
of the Financial Adviser, from the last decade of the nineteenth century, and
proposals to raise foreign loans were always carefully examined.
Here the case of Thailand is particularly instructive. The maintenance of independence 
from imperialist domination was the over-riding preoccupation of the Thai monarchy and the 
indigenous elite. Therefore the Thai government borrowed very little abroad in the pre-1940 
era, and chose to concentrate scarce domestic investment resources on railways and defence 
infrastructure rather than on irrigation and agricultural research (Feeny 1982a). This retarded 
the growth of both agriculture and industry, leaving Thailand with a larger underdeveloped 
economy by the outbreak of the Second World War.43
Government intervention in the economy can also be seen in the
rubber industries of Indonesia and Malaya during the period 1900-40.44
Barlow and Drabble note:
The government in Malaya was far more interventionist. With greater financial 
resources than its Indonesian counterpart, it moved vigorously to support rubber estate 
development, establishing relevant infrastructures itself and conducting more research in its 
own institutions, it also acted much sooner to control output, in an approach supported by the 
private corporate developers.45
In spite of crucial differences with respect to investment in their
economic infrastructure between Siam, and Indonesia and Malaya, the
economic policies that emerged in Siam after 1932 involved various attempts
43 Ibid.,p.238.
44 Colin Barlow and John Drabble, 'Government and the Emerging Rubber Industries in 
Indonesia and Malaya, 1900-40', in Anne Booth, W. J. O ’Malley , Anna Weidemann, (ed), 
Indonesia Economic History in the Dutch Colonial Era, Monograph Series 35/Yale University 
Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Center for International Area Studies, New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1990.
45 ibid., p.207.
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to set up state enterprises on an experimental basis. The Siamese 
government paid careful attention to economic infrastructure investment, 
without relying on foreign loans.
This thesis consists of eight chapters. After this introduction, Chapter 2 
examines economic conditions in the 1920s and early 1930s. The effect of 
the world depression, and the major arguments over Siamese economic 
underdevelopment, by both Thai and Western scholars, will be discussed 
briefly.
Chapter 3 will consider three economic plans; those of Mangkorn 
Samsen, Pridi Phanomyong and Phra Sarasas. These were comprehensive 
economic plans, and provoked severe argument from the conservatives, 
foreign advisers and the press. In addition, the lives and education of the 
authors will be examined in an attempt to uncover their deeper ambitions in 
preparing these plans.
Chapter 4 will deal with the other plans submitted after 1932. They can 
be divided into two main groups; those prepared by the Siamese elite, and 
those written by Siamese commoners. In general, these plans were not 
comprehensive, but were project-oriented or sector-oriented plans. These 
plans can be further divided into several groups; the counter-plans to Pridi, 
which include the plans of Mano and Komarakun; specific plans prepared 
by the Siamese elite, such as those by Boriphanyutthakit and Wilat 
Osathanon; plans and ideas from the middle classes; and the economic 
ideas of foreigners. Here, particular attention will be paid to the role of the 
middle class, including its views on the economic crisis of the early 1930's, 
on economic nationalism, and on agricultural problems. There are two 
reasons to emphasize the role of the middle class, one is to show the 
different roles of the middle class before and after 1932, and the other is to
28
make clear how the middle class viewed the economic problems of the 
country.
Chapter 5 examines the development of economic nationalism in 
Siam. The year 1932 is an important focus. After 1932, various social 
groups participated in discussion of economic nationalism, and among 
them, the middle class and the small and medium merchants are particularly 
worthy of study. The establishment of the Siamese Chamber of Commerce in 
1933 will be examined, together with its founders, their lives, businesses and 
their relationship to the government. The role of the press is also important, 
because many press articles referred to economic nationalism. Several 
important newspapers will be examined, their ownership, circulation and 
their relationship to the government. Articles by notable authors such as 555 
(Phra Sarasas) and ‘Cultivator’ (Prince Sithiporn) will be noted briefly. One 
of the purposes of this chapter is to examine the nature of economic 
nationalism at that time. Was it anti-Chinese or anti-West? How did 
economic nationalism develop after 1932? How did the government react to 
the passion of economic nationalism? How did the government implement 
economic nationalism?
Chapter 6 will focus on the development of cooperatives. From 1917 to 
1939, the government supported cooperatives. The main questions are; why 
did the Siamese government establish cooperatives from 1917? What kinds 
of cooperative were important in the 1920s and 1930s? Was there any 
drastic policy change before or after 1932? Did the cooperative movement 
involve the farmers, or was it initiated from the top? Why were cooperatives 
poorly developed in the 1920s and 1930s?
The reason why the role of cooperatives is discussed is that 
agriculture was the backbone of the Siamese economy, and cooperatives 
were seen as important to promote agriculture. In addition, the world
29
depression affected the Siamese economy so greatly that the burden of the 
farmer’s debt became a major issue for the government. Cooperatives were 
expected to deal with rural problems.
Another point to be considered is the influence of Western
cooperative thought on the Siamese elite. Did they adopt or improve 
Western models for Siam? Did they just imitate or did they create a specific 
Siamese model? Most of the economic plans after 1932 saw cooperatives 
as vital for economic development.
Chapter 7 examines various plans for a central bank or national bank. 
The idea for the establishment of a central bank or a national bank can be 
traced back to the 1910s, but this chapter will focus on the proposals after 
1932. Why did these plans appear after 1932? Were they driven more by 
political reasons than by economic nationalism? Did Siam need to have a 
central bank at that time? What was the reaction of the Ministry of Finance? 
How did the financial advisers respond to these ideas? What was the 
connection of these plans with the establishment of the National Banking 
Bureau in 1939?
The establishment of a central bank can be seen to be vital for a 
country’s economic and financial policy. Therefore various economic plans 
after 1932 contained central bank or national bank projects. Why were these 
institutions seen as necessary for Siam - perhaps to deal with the effects of 
the world depression, or as a symbol of economic nationalism?
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Tabje 1-3. Public Foreign Debt Outstanding as a Percentage of National Income 
and Exports: Indonesia and Selected Comparisons
].............................; Debt Outstanding as a Percentage of:
; National Income I Exports
 ....... ; Early 1920s : Late 1930s [Early 1920s [Late 1930s
i Indonesia ....................... 23: 4 7 1 79 174I» .........
i Argentina n.a.I
! ; 
10:
t y
37
i
77
|Canada io ; 141 64 i 85
I Australia 54: 70 288; 397
S India 14: 211 128: 208
IJapan 9: 51 71: 46
[Egypt................ ;..... n.a.I 4 8 1 1591 263
I Thailand n.a.I 71 68^ 28
! (Source) Same as Table 1-2, p.237.
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2Economic conditions in Siam in the 1920's and 1930s
The aim of this chapter is to describe the main features of the Thai economy 
in the 1920’s and 1930's and to provide the context within which economic 
ideas were developed. Three main areas will be considered: the general 
condition of the Thai economy, including the trade structure and government 
revenue and expenditure, contemporary arguments regarding Siam’s 
economic backwardness and Chinese and foreign domination of commerce.
Siam was an agricultural country. During the 1920’s and 1930’s the 
economy was highly dependent on rice, teak, tin and rubber exports. Rice 
was the most important, accounting for about 70% of total export value in the
1920’s. Most of the population was engaged in agriculture.1 The Siamese
did not show much interest in commerce or industry, which were dominated
by Chinese and foreigners, especially Europeans. In tin and teak,
investment came from Europeans, mainly the British. As a result, the
enclave mining and forestry sectors did not impinge on the Siamese
economy in terms of bringing about fundamental structural change. As well
as Europeans, Chinese were involved in rice milling, as middlemen,
moneylenders and in commerce. The Siamese government had little
intention of fostering commerce or industry, and therefore economic
backwardness was entrenched. Even in agriculture, only a little capital was
invested in irrigation and agricultural research, rice expansion was brought
about by an increase in the amount of cultivated land. At that time Siam had
1 According to Statistical Yearbook 1929/30, agriculture, fishing and forestry employed 
6, 328, 211, 84%  of the total number of employed.
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an extensive land frontier, and the expansion of the land area under rice was 
mainly carried out in the central plain.
The trade balance was always in surplus in the 1920’s and 1930’s, 
except in 1920-21 because of a prohibition on the export of rice as a result of 
a failure of the crop. In the 1920’s exports and the trade surplus reached a 
peak in 1927-28. However, a trade slump developed in the late 1920’s (see 
Table 2-1). When the world depression hit Siam in 1930, export value fell 
rapidly, to 51% in 1931-32 of the peak of 1927-28. Rice export value in 
1931-32 was 39% of its peak in 1927-28. However, volume increased 
29.7% in 1931-32, which shows that Siamese farmers had been forced to 
export more rice because of the sharp fall in price.
Rice was the main export, far larger than the second, tin, in the 
1920’s. In imports, manufactured goods accounted for about 60% in the 
1920's, followed by such items as food and non-alcoholic beverages, and 
raw materials. Direct trade between Great Britain and Siam was small.2 
However, Siamese trade with the British ports of Hongkong and Singapore 
accounted for 60% of all Siam’s exports and 27% of her imports in 1928-29.
Before analysing the changing structure of revenue from the mid- 
1920’s, there must be a general description of the Siamese revenue. 
Government revenue consisted of three parts: direct revenue, taxation and 
others. According to the Statistical Yearbook 2473, direct revenue was 
defined as revenue from properties owned or worked by the state, or from 
the commercial activities of the state, or from the state’s coining or exchange 
operations. For example, forests, mines, the state railways, and telegraphs 
and telephones, were important sources of direct revenue. Revenue from 
taxation included all compulsory payments made under the taxing power of 
the state. Customs, land tax, capitation tax, opium and excise were
2 In 1928-29. Great Britain accounted for 17.61 % of Siamese imports, and 1.17% of her 
exports.
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important here, in the 1920’s, direct revenue had been more than 40% of 
total revenue, and taxation was a little larger than direct revenue. However 
in the 1930’s, taxation was more than 50%, and direct revenue was reduced 
to around 30% (see Table 2-3).
During the 1920’s the main sources of revenue changed (see Table 
2-4). Firstly, custom revenues increased rapidly: in 1920-21 this was only 
the fifth largest item, accounting for 7.7% of total revenue; but in 1929-30 it 
was the largest single item, accounting for 19.4%. During the 1930’s, 
custom revenue remained the largest, and increased rapidly (see Table 2-
4). Secondly, opium had been the major revenue during the 1920’s: 
however, its share declined gradually in the 1930’s.3 Thirdly, revenue from 
the state railways increased rapidly from the mid-1920’s.
Concerning government expenditure, the Ministry of Defence and 
Ministry of Interior had the major shares, accounting for more than 40% of 
the total in the 1920’s. In addition, royal expenditure was still high in the 
1920’s. Under Rama 7, cuts in defence and royal expenditures were carried 
out. For example, between 1920-21 and 1929-30, the share of the defence 
budget decreased from 26.8% to 19.8%, and the royal accounts decreased 
from 12.2% to 6.5% (see Table 2-5). On the other hand, expenditure for 
economic development was not given priority during the 1920’s.4 In fact, the 
Ministry of Land and Agriculture, the Ministry of Public Instruction, and the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, had relatively modest allocations (see Table 2-
5). In contrast, in the 1930's, the allocations of the Ministry of Public 
Instruction and the Ministry of Economic Affairs increased rapidly, although 
their share was still just over 10% each.
3 in 1926, the opium revenue accounted for 18% of total revenue,but this decreased 
to 8.8% in 1938. James C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, 1850-1970, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1971, p. 185, Table XV.
4 The only exception was the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1929-30, which accounted 
for 8.6% of total expenditure, in order for it to cope with the world depression.
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This chapter will focus on two particular problems. The first is the 
alleged extravagance of Rama 6 and the expenditure cuts under Rama 7. 
The first brought serious economic and financial problems to Siam. The 
second is the absence of effective government measures to cope with the 
economic difficulties. In order to deal with this argument, it would be useful 
to introduce several arguments promoted by Thai economic historians.
The first half of the 1920's saw serious political and economic 
problems. At that time political and economic reform was not a main issue - 
the king was preoccupied with such matters as the Wild Tiger Corps or the 
renovation of his various palaces-5 For example, the king spent huge sums 
on his coronation. The second coronation was an enormously expensive 
affair. The costs totalled almost two million dollars, or nearly 8 percent of the 
national budget for 1911. The amount spent was about ten times the amount 
initially allocated.’6 There was political conflict between the king and some 
princes regarding economic management. For example, Prince Chantaburi 
was so strongly opposed to the king’s personal expenditures that he was 
finally forced to resign as Minister of Finance. At that time, the king’s power 
was so great that direct argument with him did not bring about any substantial 
change. The British Minister noted that, The King’s hold over his immediate 
relations is extraordinary autocratic from a Western point of view, and I 
understand that no member of the Royal Family theoretically may leave the 
capital, even for a night, without permission.’7
Financial problems were becoming serious during the first half of the 
1920’s. The accumulated budget deficit amounted to over 11 million baht 
from 1922/23 to 1925/26 (see table 2-2). Most of this huge deficit was 
caused by the king’s special personal expenses: a British diplomat put it as
5 See chapter 3, The Wild Tigers’, in Water F. Vella, Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the 
Development of Thai Nationalism, Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1978 pp 27-52
6 Ibid., p.25.
7 Greg to FO No.215, 31 December 1923, F366/220/40, FO371/10348 PRO
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follows:
I fear that as long as the present reign lasts it is unlikely that there will be any change 
for the better, unless the financial situation, none too bright as it is, were to become so grave 
as to compel His Majesty to reform the present faulty system under which a distortion of the 
amount of the public revenue is expended on luxuries like the Court, the Royal palaces and 
the armed forces of the country, instead of useful and productive objects like roads, forestry, 
irrigation and co-operative societies, to say nothing of education, which, though heralded with 
great flourish of trumpets, is being literally starved at its birth, teachers in country districts not 
receiving more than 15 ticals a month salary.8
Such a situation caused doubts about Siam's financial policy and about the
floating of external loans, on the part of Siam's foreign advisers,9
In a cabinet meeting in May 1925, the Prince of Nagor Svarga
expressed his support for cutting military expenditure in order to cope with
these financial problems. He also criticised the king’s extravagance, saying
that, 'the sums expended on the King's comfort and on the maintenance of
the Royal dignity were out of all proportion to the revenue of the country.’10
The measures necessary to cope with these financial problems were carried
out after the death of Rama 6. They included a reduction in the number of
officials, and also reduction of expenditure for the military and the Royal
Household. Although the actual figure for the cut in officials was not
announced officially, the British Foreign Office commented:
How many Siamese have been dismissed it is impossible to say as the most important 
Ministers have published no figures. Some put the total for Bangkok alone at 9,000, others at 
4,000. If one includes in the term "official” messengers and all others, however menial their 
position, who are paid by Government the estimate of four thousand for Bangkok is perhaps 
not far wrong. To this figure must be added the provincial officials who have also been 
retrenched.11
In addition, in early April 1925, twenty six European officials were 
dismissed.12 The amalgamation of the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry
8 Greg to FO No.63, 9 April 1925, F1687/183/40, FO371/10973, PRO.
9 See Greg to FO No. 103, 11 June 1925, F3129/72/40, FO371/10972, PRO.
10 Greg to FO No.86, 21 May 1925, F2461/72/40, FO371/10972, PRO. The date of the 
Cabinet meeting was not given.
11 Johns to FO No.71, 12 April 1926, F2053/78/40, F0371/11717, PRO.
12 Ibid. They were 9 British, 8 Italians, 7 Danes and 2 Americans.
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of Communications, and the abolition of the posts of Viceroy and of Deputy 
Lord Lieutenant were carried out. The number of provinces (monthon) was 
reduced from seventeen to thirteen.
Government revenue and expenditure in the 1920’s produced a large 
deficit during Rama 6’s reign, especially from 1922-23 to 1925-26, and again 
in 1931-32 (see Table 2-2). The former was mainly caused by Rama 6’s 
extravagance, the latter was mainly due to the effects of the world 
depression, especially the drastic fall in export value. In order to deal with 
the financial problems caused by Rama 6, Rama 7 tried to reduce 
expenditure as much as possible.
When King Rama VII came to the throne in 1925, he launched an economy drive 
designed to reduce expenditures and to put the government’s finances on a sound basis. His 
Majesty's civil list was cut from 9 million baht to 6 million baht as a first step, salaries were cut, 
and various other economy measures were adopted. The successful revision of foreign 
treaties helped by providing sources of increased revenues. As a result of these measures, 
the budget was balanced, capital expenditures were financed from revenue, and a reserve for 
debt redemption was accumulated.13
Cuts in the budget of the Royal Household, the Ministry of Defence, and the 
Ministry of the Interior took effect immediately in the second year of Rama 7’s 
reign. They fell 32%, 8.2%, and 8.5% respectively, compared with their 
1925-26 levels (see Table 2-5).
Another important development during the 1920’s was the revision of 
the treaties between the Great Powers and Siam which had denied fiscal 
autonomy. This had meant that Siam’s custom revenues had been very low 
for a long time. Ingram explains why Siam was anxious to secure revision 
of the foreign treaties:
Thailand's efforts to reform her fiscal system centred around the campaign to revise 
the import duties. The government was convinced by foreign advisers and critics that a modem 
state should not receive 30 to 40 percent of its revenue from gambling and opium, and it was 
aware that the many export and inland-transit duties were harmful as well as inefficient.14
13 James C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, 1850-1970, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1971, p. 190.
14 lbid.,p.179.
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The breakthrough was brought about by the American treaty in 1921, which 
both gave fiscal autonomy and removed American exterritorial rights in 
Siam.15 In this negotiation, the American Foreign Adviser played an 
important role in securing favourable conditions for Siam. The Great Powers 
then signed similar treaties with Siam.16 When the Anglo-Siamese Treaties 
were signed on 14 July 1925, Siam fully regained fiscal autonomy, because 
Great Britain (including her colonies, Hongkong and Singapore) was Siam’s 
most important trade partner.17 The new import tariff was a general 5% ad 
valorem, instead of the old 3% ad valorem. Beer and wine were levied at 
12% ad valorem.18 The important point was that under this agreement, the 
chief British imports - cotton goods, iron and steel manufactures and 
machinery - were protected against duties higher than 5% until 1937. 
Import revenues in 1927-28 increased by 123.8% to 16 million baht.
Siam’s economic backwardness has been explained by scholars in 
many ways.19 These scholars vary from Marxists, the political economy 
group, to the neoclassical group. There are two main approaches to explain 
economic backwardness in Siam, by internal factors and external factors. 
Those who stress internal factors include the Marxist group (Jit Poumisak, 
Peter F. Bell, David Elliott), the political economy group (Chatthip Nartsupha, 
Suthy Prasartset, Hong Lysa), and the neoclassical group (David Feeny). 
Those who emphasise external factors include Ian Brown and some
15 The American Treaty was signed on 16 December 1920, and ratified on 1 September 
1921.
16 In 1925, seven countries, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain and Sweden revised their treaties with Siam. In 1926, three countries, Belgium, Italy 
and Norway followed.
17 Treaties were a ‘General Treaty of Friendship' and a  T reaty  of Commerce and 
Navigation’. They were ratified on 30 March 1926.
18 The Siamese Government enforced the new customs duties from March 1927. The 
other items which attracted special ad valorem rates were manufactured tobacco (25%), and 
motor cars and equipment (10%). Kerosene, benzine, matches, and sugar also faced higher 
rates.
19 See the introduction and summary in Sompop Manarungsan, Economic Development 
of Thailand, 1850-1950: Response to the Challenge of the World Economy; Bangkok: 
Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1989, pp. 1-30.
40
elements of the political economy group. Although political economy is 
within the Marxist school in a broad sense, there are several differences in 
their approach to explaining economic backwardness. Among Marxists and 
the political economy group, the influence of the Sakdina system and the 
Asiatic mode of production has frequently been argued. In Thailand, the 
political economy group has been led by Chatthip Nartsupha and Suthy 
Prasartset. Chatthip’s main argument is that internal factors, the Sakdina 
system, and external factors, the imperialist powers, exploited farmers and 
commanded resources.20 He emphasizes the importance of the internal 
factors, the existence of the Sakdina system, rather than the external factors, 
the imperial powers. He viewed Siam’s economic condition before the 
Bowring Treaty in 1855 as being stagnant and self-sufficient. 'Up to the 
middle of the nineteenth century the economy of Siam had been mainly self- 
sufficient. Thus, the process of division of labour and specialisation could not 
develop.’21 This view is shared by J. Homan van der Heide. Chatthip 
maintained that despite a dramatic expansion in trade after the Bowring 
Treaty, exploitation of the economic surplus by the Sakdina class continued 
without any change in the mode of production.
The Sakdina system was explained by Udom Sisuwan as follows:
The ruling class of saktina society consisted of the monarch, royalty, and nobility, and 
all tand was owned by the monarch or ksatriya. The ruled class consisted of phrai (agricultural 
slaves/serfs), who were bound individually to the members of the ruling class, who were 
bought and sold at whim, and who were forced to labour three to six months of the year for 
their masters in cultivating the fields. The Phrai could not move away from their landholdings; 
they possessed no political, economic, cultural, or nationality rights; and their conflict with the 
saktina class led to struggles that always ended in brutal suppression because the Phrai 
lacked correct and forceful leadership. In the nineteenth century, when European imperialists 
asserted their interests in Asia, the saktina class was unable to withstand the pressure and was
20 See Chatthip Nartsupha and Suthy Prasartset, The Political Economy of Siam 1851- 
1910, Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1981, and Chatthip Nartsupha, Suthy 
Prasartset, and Montri Chenvidyakarn (ed), The Political Economy of Siam 1910-1932, 
Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1981.
21 Chatthip Nartsupha and Suthy Prasartset, The Political Economy of Siam 1851-1910, 
Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1981, p.1.
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forced to concede to demands, especially from the British, for trading and extraterritorial 
rights22
in other words, the king commanded the three important factors of
production: land, labour and capital. In fact all land in Siam theoretically
belonged to the king until the reign of Rama IV (1851-1868). It was not until
1861 that private land ownership was permitted.23 Chatthip explained that:
the peasants were exploited through a) corvee labour or capitation tax, b) paddy land 
tax, c) taxes on certain products, d) interest, and e) rent. It was estimated that at least 3/5 of the 
total product of each peasant family was taken by the Sakdina and bourgeois classes.24 
Therefore little capital accumulation was possible in the rural areas.
In conclusion the king controlled the largest portion of land, labour, and capital funds 
in nineteenth century Siam. Consequently he absorbed a disproportionately large share of the 
surplus product. This seizure of the essential product of the peasant, the very source of the 
peasant’s livelihood, restricted the development of the productive forces of the economy. It 
also inhibited the process of class or estate differentiation. Centralised Sakdina control was an 
obstacle to the development of a capitalist mode of production. What emerged was merchant 
capital subservient to saktina lords and the royalty.25
In general, the economic surplus commanded by the sakdina class was 
spent not on productive investment like irrigation, economic development, 
or education, but on luxury goods, or the king’s personal expenses, as 
already noted with Rama Vi's extravagance.
The second argument focuses on the emergence of a bourgeoisie 
class in Siam. Did Siam have an indigenous bourgeoisie class that could 
promote economic development? In Siam there was no possibility for the 
Siamese themselves to create an indigenous bourgeoisie because of the 
severe exploitation of the economic surplus by the sakdina class. The only 
opportunity given was to the Chinese. However there were a number of
22 Craig J. Reynolds and Hong Lysa, ‘Marxism in Thai Historical Studies’, Journal of 
Asian Studies, voi.43, no.1, November 1983, p.81. Udom published Thailand, a Semicolony 
in 1950 under the pen name Aran Phrommachomphu. He worked as a journalist and literary 
critic during the 1940’s and 1950’s.
23 if the king wished to use land in private use, he could claim it by paying compensation 
to the holder.
24 Chatthip Nartsupha and Suthy Prasartset, The Political Economy of Siam 1851-1910, 
Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1981, p.35.
25 ibid., p.31
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obstacles to curb the development of the Chinese as a bourgeoisie. The 
development of a bourgeoisie class was quite different in Siam from that in 
Western countries. Chatthip pointed out that the sakdina system absorbed 
the Chinese as tax farmers or local governors. Chinese tax farmers were 
appointed as officials with a Sakdina rank, and were expected to play an 
important role in bringing the economic surplus, through taxation, to the 
monarchy. Some Chinese tax farmers and local governors in southern Siam 
had administrative and judicial powers as well as fiscal authority. Chatthip 
maintained that: ‘In Siam the bourgeois class consisted of two groups, the 
bureaucratic capitalists and the compradore capitalists. They were both 
dependent bourgeois, the former on the Sakdina lords and the latter on 
foreign capitalists. They were not in a position to industrialise Siam.126 Under 
the Sakdina system, Chinese merchants had little opportunity to invest in 
manufacturing industry, because the government did not support them. The 
economic power of the Chinese merchants rested on their alliance with the 
Sakdina class.
Chatthip and Suthy’s arguments have been challenged on various
counts. First, economic conditions in pre-Bowring Treaty Siam were
examined by Hong Lysa.27 She provided clear evidence that the pre-1855
Siamese economy was not static but dynamic and flexible.
The pre-Bowring Treaty economy did contain and encourage economic exchange, 
surplus production and internal trade, not to the extent that one could talk of class formations 
and the accumulation of capital, but still of sufficient sophistication to handle the new capitalists 
forces of the post-1855 period.28
Chatthip did not use Marx’s concept of the Asiatic Mode of Production
(AMP). AMP is defined as follows: 1) the absence of private ownership of
land; 2) the village community as the essential cohesive force; 3) the village
26 Chatthip Nartsupha, Suthy Prasartset, and Montri Chenvidyakarn (ed), The Political 
Economy of Siam 1910-1932, Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1981, p.21.
27 Hong Lysa, Thailand in the Nineteenth Century: Evolution of the Economy and 
Society, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984.
28 Ibid., p.149.
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community with agricultural and craft industry; 4) the existence of hydraulic 
works, that is, irrigation; 5) an ‘Oriental Despotic’ state. Since Jit Poumisak 
termed Thai society from the Sukotai period as Thai feudalism', similar to 
European feudalism, based on the Marxist concept, AMP has dominated the 
argument. Jit’s view has been challenged by many scholars, not only the 
political economists, who have argued that the AMP was not a useful concept 
for understanding the Thai situation - Thai noblemen did not possess 
autonomous political and economic power, like European nobles, they were 
mere officials who belonged to the Sakdina class, control of labour was 
more important than control of land in Siam, huge irrigation works had 
never been carried out by the state in Siam.
Chai-anan challenged Jit by using Karl Wittfogel’s writings, 
maintaining that precapitalist Thai society was an AMP, not feudal. He 
characterises central Thailand in the Sukotai and Ayutthaya periods as a 
'simple hydraulic society’. Critics of this view were Chatthip and Tanabe, 
who argued that precapitalist state irrigation construction was not for 
agriculture.
Thirdly, critics of Chatthip point to external factors rather than internal 
factors. Brown noted that the Siamese government discussed irrigation 
works and the introduction of high-yielding rice seeds, advanced agricultural 
equipment, use of fertiliser and crop diversification but could not invest 
because of external factors.
The principal reason for the Siamese administration’s failure to commit itself to the 
construction of major irrigation works in Central Siam in the early twentieth century was the high 
cost of that project in relation both to the volume of resources at the government’s command 
and to the demands of the other major expenditure programmes before it. It is important to 
emphasise that these latter considerations -the volume of resources available to government 
and their allocation between competing expenditure demands - constituted constraints that 
were essentially externally imposed.29
29 Ian Brown, The Elite and the Economy in Siam c. 1890-1920, Singapore- Oxford 
University Press, 1988, pp. 174-5.
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The Siamese government found it difficult to raise revenue from foreign trade 
and from the land because of the treaties with the West in the mid-nineteenth 
century. An alternative was to raise capital in Europe. But Brown pointed out 
that:
borrowing from the imperial powers could well bring with it a dangerous degree of 
foreign intrusion. And the allocation of those resources - towards the construction of railways, 
the strengthening of military forces, and the creation of substantial exchange reserves, but not 
towards irrigation - was determined by the overriding need to defend the political sovereignty 
of Siam, threatened by European territorial expansion and commercial aggression in mainland 
South-East Asia from the middle of the nineteenth century.30
Chatthip also noted how the openness of Siam’s economy destroyed the 
local textile industry after the Bowring Treaty.31 J. Homan van der Heide also 
noted the decline of various local industries, such as cotton and silk textiles, 
metalware, paper, earthenware, as a result of cheap imports.32
The gradually increasing influence of foreign trade, it must be observed here, in the 
main is not due to the country being opened up, as it generally is called, by improvement of the 
inland means of transport, but simply to the fact that the progress of modern engineering had 
opened up the sea as a cheap way for distant transportation.33
Chatthip’s explanation mentioned only imperialism: he did not expand his 
argument to show how imperialism had prevented economic development 
in Siam.
Lastly, Chatthip did not fully explain the political and economic 
changes after the 1932 revolution. Did the Sakdina system continue after 
1932? Did a change in the mode of production or new class formation take 
place? Chatthip concluded that 1932 did not change the Thai economy. Is it 
possible to explain the People’s Party policy of state capitalism during the 
1930 s in terms of Chatthip's theory? There are different Marxist approaches 
to understanding the mode of production after 1932. The first is that the
33 ibid., p. 175
31 Chatthip Nartsupha and Suthy Prasartset, The Political Economy of Siam 1851-1910, 
Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1981, pp.3-6.
32 J. Homan van der Heide, The Economical Development of Siam during the Last Half
Century’, Journal of the Siam Society, vol.3, pt.2 (1907), pp.86-7.
33 Ibid., p.88.
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mode of production after 1932 was capitalistic; the other is that no 
fundamental change took place after 1932. Songchai considers 1932 as a 
watershed in Siam’s social formation since 1855:
because it overthrew the saktina state and opened the way for the establishment of a 
capitalist mode of production - dependent and underdeveloped in Thailand - which became 
the fundamental mode of production thereafter. It was not only saktina state power that was 
overthrown but the relations of production as well. I am referring, for example, to the 
proclamation in 1932 of the royal decree prohibiting the confiscation of agricultural assets and 
in 1938 of the royal decree on revenue collection which abolished the capitation and field 
taxes.34
In contrast, David Elliot argues that:
Most important of these changes was the coup d ’etat of 1932 which hoisted the 
military to power. However, it was not until after the Second World War that the military was able 
more or less effectively to represent the interests of the ruling class and it was accomplished by 
incorporating the bourgeois elements of Thai society into the ruling class. This was to mark the 
change from the old, Asiatic, mode of production to the underdeveloped form of capitalism.35
Ingram viewed economic change since 1855 as follows:
we have seen many changes in the economy of Thailand in the last hundred years, but 
not much "progress" in the sense of an increase in the per capita income, and not much 
“development" in the sense of the utilisation of more capital, relative to labour, and of new 
techniques. The principal changes have been the spread of the use of money, increased 
specialisation and exchange based chiefly on world markets, and the growth of a racial division 
of labour. The rapidly growing population has been chiefly absorbed in the cultivation of more
land in rice For the most part economic changes have occurred in response to external
stimuli.36
Even so, Ingram did not explain why Siam had remained caught in 
economic backwardness. David Feeny used the 'induced innovation’ 
hypothesis, that trends in relative factor returns were the main force in 
determining demand for innovation. Feeny concluded that important 
productivity-increasing changes had not been undertaken in Thailand in this
34 Craig J. Reynolds and Hong Lysa, ‘Marxism in Thai Historical Studies’, Journal of Asian 
Studies, vol.43, no.1, November 1983, p.94.
35 David Elliott, T he  Socio-Economic Formation of Modern Thailand’, in Andrew Turton, 
Jonathan Fast, and Malcolm Caldwell, (eds.), Thailand: Roots of Conflict, Nottingham’: 
Spokesman, 1978, p.34.
36 James C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, 1850-1970, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1971, pp.216-7.
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period because the potential suppliers of such changes (the Thai elite) 
would not have gained enough to make the effort worthwhile.37
Feeny used a supply and demand model of technical and institutional 
change in order to explain economic backwardness. His approach was 
based on an analysis of changes in relative factor prices and changes in 
technology.38 He pointed to a dramatic decline in paddy yields in the Central 
Plain from the 1920s to World War II. From 1920/21 to 1941, the paddy area 
in the Central Plain grew by 1.98% per year, population by 2.3% and paddy 
output by 1.03%. Paddy yield per hectare therefore declined by 0.93% per 
year, a serious and significant fall.39 This decline is explained by several 
factors: deterioration in land quality, increases in the percentage of the 
damaged crop area and in the man-land ratio, declines in seed quality, poor 
drainage and poor water supply. 'Over the period 1880-1940 there seems to 
have been no significant technical progress in rice production in Thailand. In 
fact, it appears that total factor productivity declined significantly.’40 In order to 
combat the decline in productivity, irrigation, selection of high quality seeds 
and water control were required. However irrigation works were carried out 
only in certain areas.
Feeny gave the example of irrigation development in Rangsit, where 
most of the landowners were absentee, that is the royal family, influential 
government officers, and rich Chinese merchants. He concluded that the 
government was willing to invest in irrigation only where the §lite would gain. 
This was the main reason why Van der Heide’s irrigation proposal for the 
Central Plain was not pursued. Feeny explains that investment in railways
37 David Feeny, ‘Competing Hypotheses of Underdevelopment: A Thai Case Study’, 
Journal of Economic History, vol.39, no.1 (March 1979), pp. 126-7.
38 Ibid., pp.113-27.
39 David Feeny, ‘Paddy, Princes, and Productivity: Irrigation and Thai Agricultural
Development, 1900-1940’, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 16, no.2 (April 1979) 
pp.135-136.
40 David Feeny, 'Competing Hypotheses of Underdevelopment: A Thai Case Study’,
Journal of Economic History, Vol.39, No.1 (March 1979), p. 126.
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was given priority.
The basic motivation in investing in railways was strategic. Railroads helped the 
government in its effort to administer the country more closely and make more effective use of 
its limited military power, and they were another tool used to exert Bangkok's control over 
provincial and local governments .... The railway provided security and public administration 
benefits to the elite and nation.41
He also explained why the government decided against irrigation:
There were a number of factors which may have been important in the formation of the 
government’s decision not to invest in irrigation. First, irrigation would provide primary 
economic benefits, whereas the railroad served national security goals. Second, there were 
critics of the cost and potential benefits of investments in irrigation. Third, the government 
faced significant limitations in the amount of capital it could raise and invest. Fourth, there was 
opposition from landowners at Rangsit who would probably have lost their tenants if new 
irrigation projects had been built. Finally, the government and its officials had only limited 
means by which they could appropriate some of the gains from investments in irrigation, unlike 
the railway case.42
Another approach derives from the W.A. Lewis/Adam Smith ‘Vent for
Surplus’ model. Sompop explains as follows:
some factors of production, i.e., land and labour are not used or only partially used. 
The major reason for such resources being left idle is a lack of effective demand and lack of 
transportation; therefore resources or products will be rather immobile. Effective demand, 
stimulated by improvements in transport and communication, gave farmers new incentives to 
increase market production by employing the under-utilised resources. How far the surplus 
productive capacity will be reduced depends on the strength of market forces or demand. It 
should be noted that when the local labour supply was exhausted, the reaction of less 
developed countries was not resource reallocation or improvement of techniques of 
production, but rather seeking additional supplies of cheap labour. This is why there was, in 
the iate nineteenth century, substantial movement of cheap labour from China and India.43
Eliezer Ayal used a combination of the staples and vent-for-surplus
approaches to economic backwardness, examining the nature of the
staple’s production function and its technological spread and linkage effects.
The conclusion was that rice exports did contribute to the development of a
41 David Feeny, ‘Paddy, Princes, and Productivity: Irrigation and Thai Agricultural
Development, 1900-1940’, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 16, no.2 (April 1979), 
p.142.
42 ibid., pp. 142-3.
43 Sompop Manarungsan, Economic Development of Thailand, 1850-1950: Response 
to the Challenge of the World Economy, Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn 
University, 1989, p.9.
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market economy and some infrastructural investment, but did not lay the base 
for development by increasing productivity.44 This view can be criticised 
because the infrastructure linkage analysis does not explain why limited 
irrigation works, railway construction, and rice milling investment did not 
bring about economic development.
Attention will now be directed towards Chinese and foreign 
domination of commerce and industry. Most commerce and industry fell into 
the hands of Chinese and foreigners, and few Siamese engaged in 
business. There are several estimates of the number of Chinese in Siam, 
although Chinese assimilation into the Thai society makes all figures 
unreliable. William Skinner suggested that the inflow of Chinese during the 
1920’s was around 407 thousand people, averaging roughly 40 thousand 
each year.45 Skinner notes:
This mass influx of Chinese resulted, quite simply, from favourable conditions in Siam 
and unfavourable conditions in south China. The 1920’s saw a boom in rubber and tin 
production in South Siam, further trade, and a resumption of railroad construction - all of which 
contributed to a heightened demand for labour and entrepreneurial skill. As in the prewar 
years, Siam could boast the highest wage level in the East.46
The Chinese population of Siam in 1927 was estimated by Skinner at 1.3
million, 11.7% of the total population.47 The Chinese community in Siam
consisted of five different groups: Cantonese, Hakka, Hainanese, Teochiu
and Hokkien. A Foreign Office document argued that:
the bulk of the Chinese in Siam come from South China. About 65 per cent, come 
from Swatow and Amoy (Tieuchows, Hokiens, Keho, etc); from this class come the rice-millers, 
traders and coolies, including the mines in the peninsula. About 15 per cent, are Cantonese, 
mostly mechanics and fitters. About 15 per cent, or less are Haiams; these represent the 
house-servant class. The remaining 5 per cent, are nondescripts.48
44 David Feeny, 'Competing Hypotheses of Underdevelopment: A Thai Case Study’
Journal of Economic History, Vol.39, No. 1 (March 1979), p. 119.
4 5 . G. William Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History, Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1957, p. 173. These figures are calculated from Table 6.
48 Ibid., p. 174.
47 Ibid., p. 183.
48 Waterlow to FO No. 131, 21 July 1926, F3499/3499/40 F0371/11719 PRO
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Remittances to China by Chinese immigrants should also be 
considered. The trade balance in the 1920's had shown a surplus. However 
remittances to China by local Chinese was a big issue for the Siamese 
government. An accurate estimate of their scale is difficult, because of a lack 
of statistics. However there were several estimates. The important point is 
that Chinese remittances were large, regardless of the precise figure. For 
example, Ingram estimates that:
One form of remittances has received much publicity in Thailand: namely, those sent 
by Chinese immigrants to their families in China. Various estimates - largely guesses - have 
been made of the magnitude of this item. If these estimates are approximately correct, 
remittances have comprised a significant drain on the Thai economy, For example, if 
remittances averaged 25 million baht from 1890 to 1941, the total would have been about 
1,250 million baht, compared to an aggregate investment in railways and irrigation through 
1941 of about 250 million baht. The total amount of government capital expenditure from 1892 
to 1941, including those financed from foreign loans, was only about 380 million baht. Had the 
remittances been invested in Thailand the addition to the national capital would obviously have 
been of considerable importance.49
Foreign domination in business can be seen in timber, tin mining, 
banking and trade. Among Europeans, the British were dominant in these 
sectors. It is important to note that British investment in Siam was not as 
diversified as it was in other Asian countries, such as India, Burma and 
Malaya.50 However, for Siam, Britain was the largest investor during the 
1920 s and 1930’s.51 British investment was not diversified into railway 
construction, plantations or infrastructure. This was largely because the 
Siamese government was afraid to allow any one country to make a large- 
scale capital investment and gain a strong economic position. British
49 James C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, 1850-1970, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1971, p.204, The argument on Chinese remittances is on pp.204-5.
50 Malcolm Falkus, ‘Early British Business in Thailand’, in R.P.T. Davenport-Hines and 
Geoffrey Jones (eds.), British Business in Asia since 1860, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989, p. 117. 'British long-term investment in Siam in 1914 probably totalled less than 
£2 million, compared with investments of around £16 million in Burma and £ 25 million in Malaya 
at the same time.’
51 Malcolm Falkus, op.cit., pp. 122-4.
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investment was concentrated in the teak and tin industries. In the teak 
industry, the. British dominated from the late nineteenth century. On the other 
hand, in tin mining, the British entered, between 1918 and 1940, in 
competition with Chinese and Australian firms. Large investment in the teak 
industry was carried out by big British trading houses, the Borneo 
Company, Bombay-Burmah Trading Company and Siam Forest Company. In 
other words, the investment in teak required was so huge that British 
trading houses dominated. In addition to this, there was a lack of competition 
from Chinese businessmen. British investment in mining involved capital- 
intensive machinery, notably bucket dredging.
British dominance in the teak industry appeared after the Treaty of 
Chiang Mai in 1883. Before this treaty, chiefs (chaos) in the northern 
provinces were autonomous, and gave forest concessions mainly to small- 
scale Burmese contractors. Malcolm Falkus noted three points in this treaty:
first, it extended {and modified at the same time) the extraterritorial privileges of the 
Bowring Treaty to the north, providing a resident British Vice-Consul in Chieng Mai; second, it 
established the right of the Bangkok government to a measure of control over the terms of 
forest leases and to a share of the revenue produced; and third, the treaty opened the way for 
Western firms to cut logs themselves, instead of buying them from native foresters.52 
The three biggest British firms were the Borneo Company, the Bombay-
Burmah Trading Company and the Siam Forest Company. The Borneo 
Company used a personal connection with the Royal Family to expand its 
business, when it moved from Burma to Siam because of the near­
exhaustion of teak in Burma.53 During the 1920’s most of the forest 
business was carried out by European companies. The British had invested
52 Ibid., p.137.
53 For example, Anna Leonowens, home tutor to the children of King Mongkut between 
1862 and 1867, was recommended by the Borneo Company. Her son, Louis, had worked for 
the Borneo Company as the agent in Raheng (Tak), and later established his own firm, Loius T  
Leonowens to engage in the teak business.
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a huge amount in the teak industry.54 Even though teak exports fell from 10% 
in the 1910’s to 3 or 4 % of total export value in the 1920’s, the British still 
dominated the industry. Among the big five foreign companies, four were 
British.55 According to the Foreign Office Annual Report of 1926, there were 
twenty-eight teak leases in force.56 The report estimated that about 85% of 
the teak forests were worked by European firms, 14% by local leasers, and 
1% by the Forest Department. The report noted that some 5 million pounds 
was invested in the industry. Europeans dominated not only teak 
concessions but also the large saw-mills in Bangkok and exports.
Chinese participation in this sector was very limited. Even though 
some big Chinese companies, like Wing Seng Long or Lamsam, were 
present, their investments were much smaller than that of the European 
companies. In addition, Chinese operated small and medium-sized saw mills 
in Bangkok.
The development of tin mining was quite different from that of the teak 
industry. In the early stages, Chinese dominated because of their labour- 
intensive technology and the supply of cheap labour from south China 
through the Straits Settlements. The opportunity for Western firms to advance 
came around 1905, when new capital-intensive technology was needed. At 
the same time, the cost of production in Malayan mines began to rise 
because of the need for more capital-intensive technology to work the 
poorer deposits. Siam emerged as a new source of supply. Malcolm Falkus
54 According to the Foreign Office Annual Report in 1922, between 500 and 1,000 
elephants, each one worth from £400 to £700, were needed to girdle or fell timber.The value 
of the logs in the rivers alone, which take approximately from four to eight years to reach the 
capital from the time of felling, is something like £2,500,000. Many of the firms’ agents are 
public school and university men, and their standard of education, living and general conduct 
is unusually high.’ in Greg to FO No. 13, enclosing Annua! Report for 1922, 17 January 1923 
F656/656/40, F0371/9251, PRO.
55 see details on these companies in Akira Suehiro, Capital Accumulation in Thailand 
1855-1985, Tokyo: Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1989, p.57-63.
56 Waterlow to FO No.39, enclosing Annual Report for 1926, 22 February 1927  
F2874/2874/40, FO 371/12535, PRO.
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made several important points about the tin industry.57 British investment in 
tin came many decades after Siam’s tin was first exported on a significant 
scale. Even in 1914, London-registered companies had made only a modest 
start, Australian-registered companies were much more significant. Second, 
teak investment was undertaken mainly by major trading companies, tin 
investment normally by specialised tin dredging companies. Third, Western 
enterprise in tin used capital-intensive technology, especially dredging. 
Fourth, British tin enterprise had to face considerable opposition from both 
Chinese competitors and local provincial governors, themselves often 
Chinese. Lastly, Western control was furthered by the Great Depression of 
the 1930s and the commitment of Siam to the international tin restriction 
schemes after 1931, for these saw the collapse of many of the independent 
firms, leaving the major London-based holding companies dominant.
57 Malcolm Falkus, 'Early British Business in Thailand’, in R.P.T. Davenport-Hines and 
Geoffrey Jones (eds.), British Business in Asia since 1860, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press,1989, p,146.
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Table 2-1 Exports and Imports 1920-21 to 1938-39
Year i Exports ; Imports ! Balance
; Baht ; Baht Baht
1920-21 *9 0 , 4 9 2 , 501 1 1 59, 676 275 ; * * -6 9 ,1  8 3 ,7 7 4
1921-22 ......  183, .620 , 381 ; 144, 542 065 ! 39, 078 316
1922-23 ; 170, 459, 164  ^ 144 250
1923-24 ! 201, 552, 242 H 4 9 860 522
1924-25 203, 079, 862 ; 169 369
1925-26 i 244, 731, 247 ■181 377 408
i 1926-27 i 239, 265, 988 i 196 520
11927-28
i ■ ■ -  • .... [276, 269, 363 .201, 080, 535 7 5 , 188, 828
1928-29 252, 474, 784 189, 790 506 1 62,
1929-30 1219, 772, 893 206 713 078
1930-31 : 161, 518, 891 155, 008, 887 ! 6, 510, 004
1931-32 : 134, .206, 840 09, 908, 837 ! 34, 298, 003
1932-33 M 52, 522, 494 88 497 423
1933-34 i 144, 079, 014 92, 963, 381 51, 115, 633
1934-35 17 2, 594, 870 101 726
1935-36 : 158, 218, 323 108 754
1936-37 184, 361 153 n o
1937-38 169, 492, 804 m 824
1938-39 : 204, 422, 088 129, 630, 731 7 4 , 791, 357
* Prohibition of Exports of Rice.
**  Adverse Balance due to the Prohibition of Exports of rice
(Source) : Central Service of Statistics, Statistical Year
f Book Thailand 2480-2481  (1938  39), I Bangkok, p74. |
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Table 2-2 Government Revenue and Expenditure 1920-21 to 1938-39
Year I Revenue (Net) 
J  Actual
| Expenditure (a) 
■ Actual
;Surplus(+) or Deficit(-) 
i Actual
Baht
1920-21 ; 8 0 ,3 4 0 ,1 7 7 i 80, 363, 501
1921-22 : 79, 624, 942 ! 79, 389, 644
1922-23 78, 076, 581
1923-24 : 8 1 ,5 9 8 ,5 8 8 1 84, 233, 989
1924-25 i 85, 182, 219 1 89, 674, 480
1925-26
1926-27 (b)
; .92 , 712, 662 
100, 590, 765
i ..94, 651, 651 ...  -1, 938 ,989
1927-28 117, 442, 511 : 117, 390, 930
1 928 -29 ; 106, 963, 080 ; 106, 921, 012 +42, 068
1929-30 ! 107, 117, 934 I 107, 102, 488 +15, 466
1930-31 9 6 ,3 2 2 ,2 1 9 9 6 ,3 0 4 ,9 1 5
1931-32 : 78, 943, 233 87, 482, 123 -8, 533, 890
1932-33 ; 7 9 ,6 5 1 ,3 6 9 70, 232, 968
1933-34 : 83, 734, 821
1934-35 94, 004, 764 75, 8 2 1 ,7 8 8
1935-36 i 94, 663, 495 85, 075, 840 :; ...............................     .i.......w y f . y . . .  ° . 3 . y ......J.............. ( > .  D O O
: 1936‘ 37  i 120, 318, 856 j  98, 141, 153 i 22, 177, 703
I 1937"38 ......  :1Q9, 412, 311...  101, 658, 534 I 7, 753, 777
| 1 938“39........... J J A  233, 206... : 110, 7 .13 ,159  ! 7, 520, 047
l : ij - ..................................:............... :
i .(3.) Expe nditure debitable ..to Re venue
j.{b)Jhe expenditure ...figuresfrom B,E. M 6 9 .( .1 .9 2 6 -^
i appropriations for the ..financing of capital expenditure.
(Source) j Same as Table 2-1, pp.272-3.
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(Source) 
, Same 
as 
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2-1, pp.274-5.
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j Same 
as 
Table 
2-1, 
pp.276-9.
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3Economic Plans: 1
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter, three economic plans will be examined. They are Mangkorn 
Samsen's plan in 1932, Pridi Phanomyong's plan in 1933 and Phra Sarasas' 
plan in 1934. These are among the most important economic plans 
submitted after the constitutional revolution on 24 June 1932.
Before examining these plans, there is a fundamental question to be 
put - why were more than a dozen economic plans submitted after the 
revolution? The world economic depression had affected the Thai economy 
from 1929 and the slump of rice exports and economic deterioration in the 
early 1930's had caused severe discontent among farmers and civil servants. 
This became a hot issue in the media, and many articles about the economic 
recession appeared before the revolution in 1932. This meant that the 
political and economic background was already ripe for change before 
1932. It seems natural that pians were submitted to deal with the economic 
crisis. Second, the People's Party had to deal with the economic crisis to 
improve the well-being of the people. But the People's Party had no 
economic base at that time and therefore it was an urgent task to establish 
one. The prominent economic principle of the Party, government intervention 
in the economy, can be linked to this. Thirdly the constitutional revolution on 
24 June 1932 brought about a new age. Even though the new ruling class 
consisted mostly of the ancien regime - civilian and army promoters, M.Ps., 
lawyers, and merchants, participated in the discussion of political and
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economic matters in Parliament.
The three authors of the plans played an important role by expressing 
their ideas to create a new state. The important point here is that their plans 
were quite different from the other plans or economic policies because 
these three were comprehensive economic plans. In other words, they 
included not only an ideology and vision for the new state but various 
practical economic measures to deal with the economic crisis.
Although the three authors of these plans had a substantial 
influence on Thai society, only Pridi has been fully studied. Mangkorn 
Samsen and Phra Sarasas have been neglected in Thai history, even 
though there are many documents in the National Archives about them, and 
they expressed their political and economic ideas to the government many 
times.
These three plans had a strong impact on Thai society, so that 
serious arguments were voiced and various counter-plans, like those of 
Mano and Komarakun, emerged. In addition there was confrontation 
between these three authors and the foreign advisers.
There are two main themes to be discussed here. First, why did 
these three men submit economic plans? This question is examined in terms 
of the authors' educational backgrounds and careers. Each plan had a 
different background. For example, Mangkorn Samsen submitted his plan 
when he was appointed an M.P. In the case of Pridi, the situation was quite 
different because he was responsible, through the People's Party, for 
drawing up an economic plan to promote the economic well-being of the 
people. Phra Sarasas presented his plan when he was the Minister of 
Economic Affairs in 1934. in this context, it is necessary to consider the 
authors' educational background. Mangkorn had never studied abroad, but 
the others, Pridi and Phra Sarasas, had studied in France. This difference is
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crucial in understanding the background of the plans. For example, 
Mangkorn expressed anti-foreign ideas but Phra Sarasas accepted foreign 
participation in government projects. Their careers were also different. For 
example, Mangkorn had many occupations, as a lawyer, rice milter and 
merchant, manufacturer of coconut oil and sugar and M.P. Pridi was a 
statesman, lawyer, educator and scholar. Phra Sarasas was a diplomat, 
journalist and the Minister of Economic Affairs. He also played an important 
role as a journalist, under the pen-name ‘555’ in various Thai papers during 
the 1930's.
The second main issue concerns the economic ideas behind the 
plans. It is difficult to categorise the plans into socialist and nationalist. It can 
be said that Pridi's and Phra Sarasas' plans are socialist, but there are clear 
differences between them. Pridi supports state intervention in land, capital 
and labour. Phra Sarasas stressed government intervention in the economy, 
but opposed the concentration of land, capital and labour in government 
hands. Both thought that co-operatives were vital, but Phra Sarasas 
suggested the establishment of co-operatives which had the functions of 
selling, buying and banking, in contrast to Pridi's state co-operatives.
Mangkorn Samsen expressed strong anti-foreign ideas in his plan. 
Nationalism has two meanings here - anti-foreigner and anti-Chinese. In 
spite of his Chinese origins Mangkorn attacked not only foreign merchants 
but also Chinese. His proposal to encourage Thai merchants is important, 
because he clearly opposed the role of foreign and Chinese merchants. 
Phra Sarasas also emphasized nationalism, although his nationalism is 
different from that of Mangkorn. Although Phra Sarasas supported 
government intervention in the economy, he did not reject foreign capital 
participation. In other words, Phra Sarasas thought that foreign capital and 
technology were vital for Siamese economic development. Mangkorn also
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promoted import substitution, with which other Asian nations, like China and 
India, had had success.
Apart from their economic ideas, the ideology of each author will be 
examined, in connection with their educational backgrounds. Pridi was 
obviously influenced by French socialism during his stay in France from 
1920 to 1927. Pridi maintained that his plan consisted of capitalism, 
socialism, solidarism and liberalism. And according to Thipphawan, Pridi's 
economic plan was guided by four principles: socialism, solidarism, 
humanitarianism and nationalism. An examination of each principle is 
essential to reveal Pridi's ideology. With reference to Phra Sarasas, his 
letters written in Paris in 1930 which sought to bring about a revolution in 
Siam, give important clues to his political ideas.
3.2. Mangkorn Samsen's Economic Plan of 1932
Mangkorn Samsen submitted his economic plan to the Assembly on 4 July
1932.1 His plan was probably the first economic plan after the constitutional
revolution on 24 June 1932. In this section, there are two main points to be
discussed. Firstly, why did he prepare an economic plan? Secondly, what is
his economic plan? More attention should be given to Mangkorn Samsen
because he has been neglected in the study of Siamese economic history.
His education and background as a merchant will be considered in relation
to his economic plan. He will be reassessed in terms of his business life as
well as his economic thought. He was one of the few politicians who had real
business experience. His businesses included a rice mill, a coconut oil
plant, mining, a rubber plantation, a sugarcane plantation, sugar refining and
a tanning factory. Moreover he was the first person to draft a national
economic plan and he made many interesting statements on economic
1 Lak Muang, 21 July 1932.
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matters in the Assembly.
Information on Mangkorn Samsen is available from various sources. 
His cremation book is useful for details of his life, family and business 
activities.2 His economic plan and political activities can be traced in the 
Thai National Archives, the record of the proceedings of the Assembly, and in 
local newspapers.3
Mangkorn Samsen was the eldest son of Keengsan Samsen and Poo 
Samsen, and he was born on 3 July 1888. It is difficult to describe in detail 
his early life because of limited information, but it is clear that he studied Thai 
and English at a local temple and studied Chinese through a private tutor at 
home. He specialized in law, and after graduation he worked as a public 
prosecutor in Nakonpatom Province.4 He showed an interest in business 
and manufacturing when he was a public prosecutor. Sa-ngiam 
Phisansalakaset suggests that Mangkorn resigned from this job because of 
the low salary.5 After his resignation he became a lawyer in Bangkok and 
worked with a foreign lawyer, Mr. Pruk, before he went independent. In 1943, 
he abandoned the profession.
Mangkorn Samsen's economic plan can be found in the Thai 
newspaper, Lak Muang from 21 July to 31 July 1932.6 This newspaper 
printed the full text of his economic plan. In addition, Bangkok Times Weekly
^ T am n d n p h u tth aced i S o m d ephracao  b o ro m m aw o n g ih o er K rom phraya
Damrongrachanuphap phimnai ngan chapanakitsop Nai Mangkorn Samsen {Cremation 
Volume of Mangkorn Samsen), Wat Mongkutkasattriyaram, 21 December 1947.
3 Raigankanprachum Saphphuthenrasadon (Minutes of the National Assembly) 
20/2475, 55/2475, 4/2476, 14/2476, 21/2476, 24/2476, 21/2477. See Mangkorn's file in 
the National Archives, S.R.0201.8/18.
4 There was no Mangkorn in the graduate list of the Law School. However in an 
interview with Sakrai Samsen, son of Mangkorn in August 1995, I was told that Mangkorn 
studied law at the Law School without obtaining a degree. His family root is Hainan.
3 T am n a n p h u tth a ce d i S o m d ep hracao  b o ro m m aw o n g ih o er K rom phraya  
Damrongrachanuphap phimnai ngan chapanakitsop Nai Mangkorn Samsen (Cremation 
Volume of Mangkorn Samsen), Wat Mongkutkasattriyaram, 21 December 1947. According to 
Sa-ngiam Phisansalakaset, he met Mangkorn in Phetchaburi Province when he was a vice- 
governor. At that time, a civil servants salary was between 100 and 200 baht a month.
3 Lak M uang , from 21 July to 31 July, except 25 July, 1932. The title is 'Khrongkan 
setthakit phanitchakan Kasikam lae Utsahakam khong Mangkorn Samsen'
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Mail of 20 and 21 July 1932 summarised Mangkorn's plan.
His economic plan consists of an introduction and nineteen parts. In 
the introduction Mangkorn Samsen focused on the poverty of the previous 
ten years, describing the rapid economic change of the past as follows:
A quarter of a century ago there were well to do The people generally had money to
spare to help their poorer relatives and friends. They had land and homes of their own; they 
were happy and prosperous, and sold much rice, both by land and water. In the last ten years 
poverty has gradually become general. The trade formerly in the hands of our people is ended, 
being seized by foreign merchants with their tricks. There are no more Siamese merchants; 
and the land and homes of the cultivators have nearly all been sold or mortgaged, having 
passed into the possession of wealthy people and foreigners.7
There may have been at least two reasons for him to write this plan. 
The first, as noted in the Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, was his position as a 
Senator. 'I am myself a citizen of Siam and have the honour to be a member 
of the Senate. It is my duty therefore to help the People's Party to the best of 
my ability.8 Second, he was one of the few Siamese politicians who had 
real business experience. This experience led him to present an economic 
plan because of the poor economic situation. The argument here involves 
his relations with the People's Party. At that time he was sympathetic 
towards the People's Party, but in 1933 he criticized the Party's third 
manifesto. Why did he change his attitude?
Mangkorn Samsen described the economic problems facing Siam.
Apart from the world economic depression there are six reasons for the depression in 
Siam:(1) the people's means of earning a livelihood has been strangled; (2) Siam lacks 
Siamese merchants; (3) Siam lacks industries; (4) Siam has no national bank; (5) the Siamese 
do not help one another enough; (6) the high value of the currency reduces the price of all 
produce.9
Mangkorn explored each reason with many examples. For the first he
7 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 20 July 1932.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
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noted that Siam's farmers lacked modern agricultural tools, scientific 
methods, co-operative credit and agricultural banks. High rates of interest 
and rent took from 35 to 40 per cent of the value of the farmer's output, 
leaving him in a poor condition. The second factor was also supported with 
several examples. First, he noted, ‘there are not a hundred Siamese 
merchants in the whole country buying and selling to the cultivator. The tricky 
foreign merchants buy cheap and sell dear.'10 For the third reason he 
suggested that without industries such as sugar factories, cotton weaving, 
and gunny bag manufacture, Thais had to spend a lot of money on expensive 
imports. Therefore these factories should be established in spite of the low 
profitability of large scale industries in the kingdom. The fourth point 
concerned the European banks and Chinese exchange houses which made 
huge profits through financing Siam's exports.11 The fifth factor was about 
the character of the Siamese: The Siamese are too hostile to one another. If 
they were as mutually helpful as the Chinese and Indians, they would be 
more prosperous.'12 The last point focused on rice exports to Hongkong.and 
Singapore. The high value of the baht brought Siam less income for her 
exports. He suggested devaluation to the earlier rate.
His arguments can be summarised in two main points. First, he 
pointed to the lack of government support. There was no co-operative credit 
or agricultural bank; no national bank to support commerce, agriculture or 
trade; the exchange rate was too high. Second, he noted the exploitation by 
foreign merchants, the European banks and Chinese exchange houses. 
Mangkorn tried to analyse Siam's economic problems in terms of internal 
and external factors, with the emphasis on external factors.
The second part of his plan was published in Lak Muang from 24 to
10 ibid
11 Ibid. Mangkorn noted that the cost of import financing was one percent per month, 
but five percent for financing exports.
12 ibid.
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31 July 1932. Here several concrete measures for prosperity were proposed. 
First was the establishment of a National Bank, with the aim of initiating co­
operative credit movements for cultivators. The purpose of the bank was 
to assist farmers, co-operatives, commerce and industry. An able Siamese 
manager and an expert American adviser would be required for the bank. 
The total capital required was three million baht.
Second, Mangkorn suggested establishing a company to buy raw 
materials. It would find markets for Siamese products at home or abroad 
in order that the kingdom would not have to rely on imports for products 
which Siam could in fact produce itself. In other words, the proposed 
company would compete against foreign and Chinese import merchants. 
Siamese products such as cotton, hemp, corn, lacquer, pepper, caster seeds, 
silk, soybean and bean sprouts faced strong foreign demand. Mangkorn 
pointed out that Manchuria exported these products far more than Siam. He 
stressed that guaranteeing purchase of these products from Siam's 
farmers was vital, because in the past Siamese civil servants had 
introduced new crops but then nobody had bought them. He also argued 
that the company would offer students an opportunity to study and practice 
commerce, in order to encourage a class of Thai merchants. In other words 
he thought highly of real practice in commerce, in much the same way as 
Chinese gained skills and knowledge in shops rather than by studying at 
school. The total amount of capital for the company would be two hundred 
thousand baht.
Third, a new agricultural company would engage in large scale 
cultivation. This might suggest a socialist collective farm. But his model 
farm was quite different in terms of capital, land ownership and 
participation.
We have a vast amount of iand uncultivated, so there should be no difficulty 
about getting the necessary land. In this way our labourers will be provided with jobs, and
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students of agriculture will find a ready school in the practice of the cultivation of the land. The 
company would be backed by the government in the matter of capital, the application of 
scientific methods and other facilities. Cultivators could get land on the model farm which they 
could cultivate under supervision, and in ten years these model farms could be sold out to 
trained men or families.’13
Regarding capital, the government and the people would each be required 
to invest fifty percent. The company would aim to reduce expenditure in 
order to make a profit. Profits would be divided - for the company one-third 
and for farmers, two-thirds.
Fourth, the company would be responsible for providing farmers with 
modern scientific methods, including the lease of tractors and pumps. 
Most farmers tilled land with a hoe, so that the company would bring 
about an increase in the productivity of the land by working with 
machinery. A cattle-breeding company would be established to supply 
livestock, and fresh milk and butter.
Fifth, Mangkorn proposed the establishment of a rice-miil by 
Siamese. He hoped that Siamese rice-millers would end the exploitation 
by foreign middlemen and restore the good reputation of Siam's rice. In 
addition he argued that a Siamese shipping line was essential in exporting 
rice to foreign markets, in order to challenge the high rates charged by 
foreign shipping companies. The cost of the rice mill would be about twenty 
thousand baht and the site of its construction would be Bangkok.14 The 
company would export directly to Hong Kong, Singapore and Europe. 
Branches in Hong Kong, Singapore and Java would be proposed. 
Mangkorn's proposal is worth considering in the context of the 
establishment of the Thai Rice Company in 1938, although there is no 
evidence that Mangkorn's proposal led directly to its establishment. 
Mangkorn was one of the first merchants to promote business and 
investment by the Thai people, in spite of his Chinese origins. Phraya
13 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 21 July 1932.
14 Near the central power station in Samsen.
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Phiromphakdi and Phraya Phakdinorasaet (Lert Saetthabut) also belonged 
to this group. These capitalists had a strong desire to promote manufacturing 
industry, despite insufficient capital and backward technology. The initial 
purpose of the Thai Rice Company was to eliminate control of the rice trade 
by foreign merchants, and later to expand operations into milling and the 
domestic distribution of rice. Second, Mangkorn thought highly of the 
business ability of Ma Lap Khun, a large rice miller. Mangkorn recommended 
Ma Lap Khun as a member of the Setthakithaengchat in 1933. This will be 
discussed later. Ma Lap Khun was appointed managing director of the Thai 
Rice Company in 1939. Third, Mangkorn argued that a Siamese shipping 
line was vital to the export of rice, eliminating the foreign shipping 
companies. This should be considered in the context of the establishment of 
the Siamese Steamship Company in 1918, and its collapse in 1926. This 
company was financed by the Thai Navy and the Privy Purse Bureau in order 
to develop Siamese trade. Brown explained its collapse as follows:
the Siamese Steamship Company possessed no form of protection against 
foreign competition, and therefore it failed in the face of the highly-integrated shipping 
networks created by the major Western lines operating in Eastern seas.15
Mangkorn's proposal for a shipping line may have learnt from this failure.
Mangkorn also suggested the establishment of a new rice mill, to mill 
200 coyan per day. The functions of the rice milling company were as 
follows: (1) Siamese merchants would buy and sell rice; (2) to train book­
keeping, commercial, and engineering students; (3) to have agents in the 
leading markets for Siam's rice, such as Hongkong, Singapore and Java; (4) 
to provide a shipping service and (5) to establish a system of buying paddy 
directly from the cultivator. He showed his confidence in this proposal by 
saying that: ‘If the People's Committee agree with this and wish to open such 
a company I hereby offer my services to open this milling company in six
15 lan Brown, The Elite and the Economy in Siam c. 1890-1920 , Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1988, p. 178.
68
months time - in time for the coming rice selling season.’16
The.last part of the article concerned other possible industries, 
including the timber trade, manufacturing gunny-bags, weaving cotton, 
manufacturing glass and porcelain, and tobacco products.17 Regarding the 
timber trade, Mangkorn suggested that the business should be open to 
Siamese in spite of their indifference and lack of skill. He maintained that 
the government would allow foreign companies to continue in the business, 
but with the renewal or approval of new concessions to foreign companies 
being examined carefully. If possible, the timber trade should be a protective 
industry for the Thai so that Thai traders would have an opportunity to 
increase their competitiveness. Other industries which Mangkorn 
recommended were to engage in import substitution, for example, food 
stuffs (canned milk, sugar & molasses, flour), raw materials(kerosene and 
benzine), light industry products (rubber products, electrical appliances & 
matches, gunny bags, machinery, metals, paper, cotton products and 
tobacco). It is important to note that he mentioned only the industries with 
high import substitution potential. Machinery or chemical industries were not 
recommended. The possible import substitutions could be produced in 
Siam with little capital. For example, with the gunny bags project, hemp 
could be produced easily in Siam because of its climate and labour 
conditions. Farmers were idle for four or five months after harvesting rice. 
Gunny bags were used in rice export, and thus there was a strong demand in 
Siam. Exporters could claim import tax rebates when they exported rice with 
imported gunny bags. Therefore, the import duty rebate did not benefit the 
government in terms of revenue, or the people in terms of employment.
16 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, , 21 July 1932. Mangkorn was engaged in rice milling in 
Bangkok.
17 Mangkorn also suggested the following: sugar factories, flourmills, coconut oil and 
castor oil factories, paper factories and a company to promote arts and science. See details in 
the Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 22 July 1932.
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Mangkorn pointed to the success of producing gunny bags in Calcutta. 
His point was to recommend the hiring not of expensive foreign experts 
but cheap Indian experts. He thought that Indian experts and engineers 
would contribute to the improvement of hemp planting and the quality of 
the bags. He thought that no Siamese merchant would invest in such an 
experimental venture and that therefore the government should provide the 
capital.
His economic plan can be summarized in several points. First, 
nationalism, especially anti-foreign feelings, were emphasized. His 
target was not only the European merchant but also the Chinese middleman 
and moneylender. He used two expressions in Thai to attack: ‘Khon tang 
chat, for European merchants; ‘Chin’ or ‘Ceg’, for Chinese merchants. In 
spite of his Chinese origins, Mangkorn sought to encourage Siamese 
merchants, including Chinese with real Thai hearts and respect for the 
nation.18
Second, his plan was project oriented. It was quite different from those 
of Pridi and Phra Sarasas. His ideology was mainly expressed in the 
introduction, the other parts described various projects. There are three 
points to be emphasized. First, his engagement in business was important. 
His business experience included timber trading, a coconut oil plant, rice
milling, mining, a rubber plant, sugarcane and sugar refining.19 Through
18 According to Mangkorn's daughter, Bunkua, Mangkorn thought of himself as Thai 
(even though he was of Chinese origin), and he was loyai to the Nation and King. Her father's 
aim was to strengthen the country's economic base. Therefore his economic plan was 
based on the idea, Thai tham, Thai chai’. See his cremation book.
19 His business started with timber trading in Phichit Province. His business in 
Bangkok included a coconut plant and a small rice mill at Samsen. It is interesting to note that 
he was keen on the latest machinery and technology. In fact, he imported a compressor 
from Germany in 1926, and established the largest coconut oil plant in Siam at Samsen at that 
time. His business interests led him to purchase about 8,000 rai (1,280 ha) of land in 
Samutrakarn. He converted this land into a rice plantation, with machinery and 300 wage 
workers, including three Americans. His businesses in the 1930's included mining on Samui 
island in 1933, a rubber plantation in Yala Province in 1935, a sugarcane plantation and sugar 
refining plant at Ubonrachathani in 1937. Later this sugar refinery was moved to Chonburi 
Province. He established Thai Kasikon Utsahakam (Thai Agricultural Industry Company) to 
take care of this business.
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these various business experiences, Mangkorn could suggest several 
projects, pointing out the problems and advantages. Second, Mangkorn 
made a suggestion about the rice trade between European and Chinese 
merchants in 1929, before the constitutional revolution.20 At that time, as a 
rice merchant, Mangkorn asked the government to pay attention to the 
deterioration in the position of the farmers caused by conflict between 
European and Chinese merchants. The important point here is that 
Mangkorn was contacting the government well before 1932. Besides his 
plan, Mangkorn submitted his own proposal to establish a sugar refining 
plant in Chonburi in November 1932, asking support from the
government.21
Thirdly, his plan emphasized import substitution. He stressed gradual 
import substitution, from raw materials to light industrial products, 
which it might be possible for Siam to produce. It is interesting to note that he 
mentioned China and India as models of import substitution for Siam.
Fourth, he recommended government involvement only in those 
projects too difficult for the private sector. In other words, government 
participation was recommended only for the first stages, later, given 
success, the people would be encouraged to invest in these projects. On 
this pointnt Mangkorn is quite different from Pridi and Phra Sarasas.
R.7 .Ph.8/4. N.A. See his letter to Prince Purachatra, the Minister of Commerce and 
Communications, on 24 December 1929. In this letter, Mangkorn reported that European 
merchants in Bangkok had asked the Chinese rice millers to change their contract to allow 
for the delivery of rice to the warehouses of the buyers (Europeans) in order for them to check 
weight and quality. The reason was that at that time, rice exports to Europe and Cuba were of 
poor quality and incorrect measure, which caused huge losses to the European buyers.
21 S.R.0201.8/18. N.A. An official letter from the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce 
to the President of the Assembly, dated 18 November 1932, discussed Mangkorn's 
request to establish a sugar plant in Chonburi. Mangkorn asked the government for tax 
concessions, an import duty increase, a ban on the establishment of other plants, and 
permission to use a huge plot of land, of 1,200 rai, for a sugarcane plantation. A letter from the 
Prime Minister to Mangkorn Samsen, 4 January 1933, indicates that the government would
support his plan, on condition that Thai investment and employment was more than 50 
percent.
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Fifth, co-operatives were not important in his plan. In the other 
economic plans, co-operatives were considered among the most important 
policies, but Mangkorn did not stress co-operatives. It seems that his 
background as a merchant made him see the role of companies as more 
important than co-operatives.
Sixth was the important role of a national bank. He regarded the 
national bank as the financial core to provide loans to the various projects. 
To put it another way, the national bank would link agriculture, industry 
and commerce. He did not fully explain the details of the national bank.
Seventh, Mangkorn emphasized small capital investment. It is 
important to note that there were few big projects like the national bank or 
the raw material purchasing company. It seems he thought that a small 
investment would test viability of each project. In addition, hiring Asian 
experts and engineers, such as Indians and Chinese would save 
expenditure.
Last, he proposed education in commerce at these companies. Job 
experience was more important than studying at school. His ideas remind us 
of the methods of Chinese merchants, who teach and practice commerce 
to employees at their shops every day.
Several comments on Mangkorn's economic plan appeared in the
Bangkok Timos Woekly Mail. There were three critics and two sympathetic
writers. The former appeared in the issues for 21, 22, and 23 July, the latter
on 26 July and 2 August 1932. It is difficult to identify the writers, because
they used pseudonyms. The critics may have been foreign merchants,
because they supported foreign merchants. ‘Great Thinker’ started by 
saying:
Nai Mangkorn makes but a passing reference to what every thinking Siamese knows to 
be the root cause of Siam's financial difficulties - “apart from the world economic depression, 
there are six reasons for the depression in Siam." It is worthy of note that he does not say: “In
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addition to the world economic depression there are six reasons." So the world economic 
depression is, in Nai Mangkorn's view, a subsidiary and not a primary reason. If he makes an 
effort to make his countrymen apply that line of thought to the settlement of their problems, 
the result may be disaster.22
Critical comments concentrated on Mangkorn's first, second, fourth and sixth
points. On the first and second, A.B. said:
My own commercial experience in Siam carries me back 45 years to 1888, and the 
foremost Siamese merchant then was Nai Sin (Phya Samud) here in Petrieu, but there were 
very few others. Even at that time the major portion of the trade was in Chinese hands, as it is 
today, with a small proportion in European hands.23 
A.B. also said:
Since trade was never in the hands of the Siamese, it is improper to state that it was 
seized by the foreigners by tricks. Were trading as easy as the Senator imagines, there would 
be plenty of Siamese trading. The field has always been open to all and everyone, without 
restriction.24
Another comment concerned the positive role of foreign merchants. 'Great 
Thinker’ asked:
Does Nai Mangkorn realize that the export of Siamese Rice and Siamese Teak and 
other products is due entirely to the fact that the foreign merchant has created a demand for 
them, which the Siamese, not up to the present having been a trading people, could not have 
created themselves? So of what value would the million superfluous coyans per annum of 
Rice be to them, if the foreign merchant had not created a market for it; and not only created a 
market but provided the means of financing the business and of carrying the cargo overseas? 
Does Nai Mangkorn realize that the entire commerce of Siam has been organized by the 
foreign merchants?25
Another writer, PRO PATRIA, pointed out that Mangkorn was himself a ‘luk- 
chin’, and that his businesses had close relations with Chinese rice mills.26
Mangkorn's fourth point was severely criticized. The interest rate 
figure he quoted, 60 per cent per annum, was disputed. A.B. pointed out: 
_______ Following the ill-conceived linking of the tical to the dollar at too high a rate, the Banks
22 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 22 July 1 9 3 2 ,‘Some Comments, Criticism of the
Proposals’.
23 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 21 July 1932, ‘Trade in Siam, A Business Man's 
Opinion’.
■ 24 ibid.
25 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 22 July 193 2 ,'Some Comments’.
26 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 23 July 1932 ,‘Siam's Problems'.
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made more money for a time. But Bills are now sold with one or two points margin, and there is 
keen competition. The statements made are singularly contrary to the real facts. The Treasury 
wants a profit of 4 per cent., and has it in its hands to control the banker's rates when they have 
to come to it for funds27
A.B. argued that the exchange rate had been maintained at a reasonable 
level, and he was supported in this by PRO PATRIA. 'Great Thinker' noted 
that:
exchange only affects the balance between the Imports and Exports, provided, of 
course, that exchange is at a level at which all the country's surplus production can be 
exported and so does not accumulate. In this connection, Mr.Editor, your favourite remark that 
after all it is exports that pay for imports' is not perhaps so much of an axiom as it seems. If it 
were, how do you account for the fact that some of the debtor countries are amongst the most 
prosperous? Has not England been a debtor country for many years?28
Sympathetic comments were few indeed and Mangkorn's plan was
not well supported. However one commentator in the Bangkok Times Weekly
Mail showed some understanding of his intentions.
He deeper states that when he wrote 'foreign merchant', what he had in mind was the 
Chinese merchant chiefly; and further the word which this paper translated as 'tricky' only 
conveys in Siamese 'clever' or 'able in the matter of commercial dealing.' It seems extraordinary 
that when meaning Chinese as opposed to farang, Nai Mangkorn did not say so merely by 
using the word 'Chiin' instead of 'Chaaw Taangpratheed'; and as regards the other points, the 
Commentator is not in a position to judge.29
The second part of this section concerns Mangkorn's economic 
ideas, as explained in a letter to the Prime Minister, Phahon 
Phonpayuphasena, on 29 June 1933. This letter can be seen in the Thai 
National Archives.30
This letter expresses doubts about the People's Party manifesto, 
especially its third principle which stated that a national economic plan must 
be drawn up to ensure the economic well-being of the people, and that the 
new government must provide work for every citizen and not allow people to
starve. It is clear that Mangkorn's attitude towards the People's Party
27 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 21 July 1932, Trade in Siam’.
28 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 22 July 1932, 'Some Comments’.
29 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 26 July 1932, 'Give me leave’.
30 S.R. 0201.8/18. N.A.
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changed after he submitted his economic plan in 1932. The reasons for his 
doubts were- that bureaucrats had no familiarity with, or expertise in, 
agriculture, industry, or commerce. Even though they possess some 
knowledge, it was based on foreign textbooks. Mangkorn stated that the 
geographical features of Thailand made it suitable for every kind of 
agriculture. There was a lack of bureaucrats willing to promote industry.
The Economic Council (Sapha Setthakit) was established by the 
Mano Government on 8 April 1933. The Council was composed of members, 
experts and advisers.31 According to a speech by the President of the 
Council, Phraya Komarakun Montri, on 16 August 1933, it would deal with 
all economic problems. The Council had a number of ex officio members, 
government executives who carried out their duties in accordance with the 
economic policy laid down by the Government, expert members to provide 
an opportunity for people outside the government service who possessed 
knowledge and experience and who took a keen interest in the development 
of the country, advisers and learned foreign officials to give the benefit of 
their advice to the Council.32 This Economic Council was a substitute for the 
Board of Commercial Development of the absolute regime. Mr. Bailey 
observed that:
the appointment of Advisers to the Council is no innovation. A precedent is to be 
found in the Board of Commercial Development of the Absolute Monarchy Regime, which 
seemed to have been functioning smoothly with good results throughout. As a matter of fact 
the Economic Council as newly re-organized is but a substitute for the Board of Commercial 
Development, which has now ceased to function by virtue of the Law on the Constitution of 
the Civil Service, though it has a wider scope of activities than the latter33
31 Bailey to FO No. 132, 11 August 1933, F6207/42/40, F0371/17175, PRO, gives 
details on the experts and advisers; Chao Phraya Yomaraj, Chao Phraya Bijayanati, Phraya 
Suriya Navatr, Mom Chao Sakol, Phraya Bhakdi Norasresth, Phraya Prida Narubesra, Dr.Joti 
Gumbandh, Mr. Raymond B. Stevens, (Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs), Mr James 
Baxter (Financial Adviser), Mr. Charles L'Eversque (member of the Committee of Legislative 
Redaction) and Dr. Hugh McCormick Smith (a fishery expert). S .R .0 2 0 1 .8 /1 8 .N. A. This  
document includes the full list of 25 members recommended by Mangkorn.
32 ibid.
33 Bailey to FO No. 136, 18 August 1933, F6243/42/40, F0371/17175, PRO.
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But Mangkorn criticized the Economic Council for being a political 
body rather than an economic one - it was dominated not by economic 
experts but by legal experts and bureaucrats. He insisted on the 
establishment of a Saphacatkan Setthakithaengchat (National Economic 
Council), which would include the Department of Commerce and Department 
of Agriculture. The National Economic Council would be in a position to 
deal with the cabinet, and would have a duty to present a national economic 
plan. It would be independent of the government. The most important and 
interesting of Mangkorn's ideas was that the council's members would 
consist of two groups, non-bureaucrats, including merchants, experts in 
agriculture, industry and finance, and bureaucrats.
Mangkorn recommended 25 people for the Saphacatkan 
Setthakithaengchat, 15 non-bureaucrats and 10 bureaucrats. Some 
members of the existing Economic Council were selected by Mangkorn for 
his proposed National Economic Council, for example, Chao Phraya 
Yommarat, once Minister of the Interior, Phraya Phakdi Norasaet (Nai Lert), of 
the bus company, and Dr. Chote Khumphan, an expert on economics and 
finance. Advisers, especially foreign advisers, were excluded. Many 
businessmen and experts were listed by Mangkorn, including Ma Lap Khun, 
who owned a rice mill and a bank, Nai Tii Khosiriwong, an expert in 
commerce and finance, and Lo Tek Chuan, a rice miller.34
3.3. Pridi Phanomyong's Economic Plan
Pridi submitted a National Economic Plan to the government in March 1933.
34 Ibid. There are major differences between the members of the Economic Council 
and Mangkorn's recommendations. For the Chinese merchants, see Akira Suehiro, Capital 
Accumulation in Thailand 1855-1985, Tokyo: Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies 1989 
pp.85, 110, 115-116, 120-122, 133-134, 156-157.
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Pridi Phanomyong was one of the most influential Thais in the twentieth 
century. He played a major role in Thai politics as statesman, lawyer, 
educator and scholar. His political leadership in the constitutional 
revolution is particularly important. He was one of the promoters who 
gathered in Paris in 1927, aiming to end the absolute monarchy in Siam.35
Pridi's economic plan has been considered by many scholars, and 
many books about him and his plan have been published.36 It is important to 
note that the establishment of the People's Party in 1927 took place during 
Pridi's study in France, from 1920 to 1927. Wyatt describes overseas 
Siamese students as follows:
It was Siamese students abroad, however, who were most intensely involved in 
political discussions and dreams during the 1920s....The small numbers schooled in France, 
however, were much more ideological and radical. These included both law students and 
young military officers, who at meetings in Paris in the mid-1920s talked of socialism and 
popular democracy.37
A student meeting held in Paris during 5-7 February 1927 elected Pridi as its
Judith A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand: A Story of Intrigue, Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1991, p.12. Seven people were present: Pridi, Pibul, Prayoon, Tasnai 
Niyomsuk, Naeb Phahoiyothin, a student from Britain, Tua Lapanukrom, studying science in 
Switzerland and Luang Siri Rajmaitri, a diplomat based in Paris.
36 See, for example, Thammasat University, Pridi Phanomyong kap Sangkhom Thai (Pridi 
Phanomyong and Thai Society), Bangkok; Thammasat University Press, 1983; Chatthip 
Nartsupha, Prasopkan lae khwamhen bang prakan khong ratthaburutawuso Pridi 
Phanomyong, Bangkok: Khrongkan "Pridi Phanomyong kap Sangkhom Thai", 1983-Saneh 
Chammarik (et si),Pridi parithat: Pathakathachud Pridi Phanomyong anusorn, Bangkok: 
Samnakphim Thianwan, 1983; Chalermkiat Phiunaun, Botkhwam prakopkan sammana kung 
satawat Thammasat: 2477-2527 ruang khwamkhit thang kanmuang khong Pridi Phanomyong, 
Bangkok: Thammasat University, 1984; Chanwit Kasetsiri and Phoemphol Phophoemhem 
(eds), Pridi Phanomyong: Chiwitngan lae Thammasat, Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, 
1986; Chatthip Nartsupha, Khwamkit sahakon khong Pridi, Bangkok: Samnakphim 
Aksonsarn, 1987; Thipphawan Chiamthirasakun, Pathommathat thang kanmuang khong Pridi 
Phanomyong, Bangkok: Aksornsan, 1988.
Pridi's life and work are the subject of several books: Vichitvong Na Pombhejara, Pridi 
Banomyong and the making of Thailand's modern history, Bangkok: Siriyod Printing, 1979; 
Suphot Dantrakun, Chiwit lae ngan khong Dr. Pridi Phanomyong Bangkok: Pracakkanphim, 
1971; Duan Bunnag, Than Pridi ratburut awuso: Phuwangphaen setthakit Thai khon raek 
Bangkok: Samakkhitham, 1974;Saranya Bamrungphong, Prawat thang kanmuang khong Dr. 
Pridi Phanomyong (Translation from David Morell and Richard Donor, 'Pridi Banomyong: A 
Political Biography’, 1983), Khana Kammakam Catngan Ramluk Pridi Phanomyong.
37 David Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History, London: Yale University Press 1984 p 238
77
provisional chairman and leader of the People's Party.38 The aims of the 
party were known as the "Six Principles". They were to change Thailand from 
an absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy, with a view to 
acquiring absolute national independence, maintaining law and order, 
promoting economic well-being, guaranteeing equality for all, granting 
complete liberty and freedom and providing the people with education.39 At 
the meeting Pridi was assigned the task of drafting policies and programmes, 
including the national economic development plan.
The main reason why Pridi submitted his economic plan can be seen 
in the third principle: ‘A national economic plan must be drawn up to ensure 
the economic well-being of the people. The new government must provide 
work for every citizen, and will not allow people to starve.'40 In this section,
the contents of his economic plan and Pridi's economic ideas will be 
examined.
The educational background of Pridi, especially his studies in France, 
give a clue towards understanding his economic thought. In the interview of 
Pridi by Chatthip on 10 April 1982 in Paris, Pridi talked about his interest in 
economics.41
He obtained his first degree in law from Caen University in 1923. 
During his study at Caen, he took economics 1 for the first year, economics II 
for the second year, and public finance and labour law for the last year.42 The 
important thing is that the French education system changed after the Third 
Republic in 1870. Before 1870 private law and constitution were taught by
38 See the detailed description of the founding of the People's Party in Vichitvong Na 
Pombhejara, Pridi Banomyong and the making of Thailand’s modern history, Banqkok' Sirivod 
Printing, 1979, pp.46-60.
39 Ibid., p.54.
40 Judith A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand: A Story of Intrigue, Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1991, p. 25 y
41 Chatthip Nartsupha, Prasopkarn lae khwamhen bang prakarn khong awso Pridi
Phanomyong, Bangkok: Khrongkarn "Pridi Phanomyong kap Sangkhom Thai" 1983 
pp.51-2. ’
42 Ibid., p.52.
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the law department, as in the Anglo-Saxon countries. However, after 1870, 
economics was taught as the way to understand the basis of society. It is 
also important to note that when he passed the examination for PhD in law, 
he also passed the Diplome d' Etudes Superieures d' Economie Politique. 
This means that he studied economics, economic history, public finance and 
labour science.
Two economic textbooks which Pridi used at that time greatly 
influenced him. One was Cours d’ Economie (Gide's Political Economy, the 
English version) by Professor Charles Gide; and the other was Histoire des 
Doctrines Economiques (A History of Economic Doctrines: From the Time of 
the Physiocrats to the Present Day) by Charles Gide and Charles Rist.43 It is 
not clear whether Gide was Pridi's teacher or not, but Pridi was nonetheless 
strongly influenced by Charles Gide. This is shown as Pridi often used 
quotations from Gide in his books, and he made Dr. Serm translate half of 
Gide's book to distribute to the promoters.44 Gide was considered as famous 
an economist as Saint-Simon, Fourier, Pecqueur, Proudhon and Louis 
Blanc in the field of French socialism. Pridi at first confessed that Siam should 
have a planned economy based on socialist theory, but he changed his 
opinion later.45
As Pridi talked particularly about his views on Thai history and on Thai 
farmers in his interview with Chatthip, it seems worth examining that interview 
to understand the aims of his economic plan.46 First of all, he compared the 
place of farmers in the social structure of European and Thai society. Even 
though he admitted that European society had become more advanced, he 
said that there was almost no difference in terms of class formation between
43 Thipphawan Chiemthirasagun, Phatommathat thang Karnmuang khong Pridi
Phanomyong, Bangkok: Aksornsan, 1988, pp.279-280.
44 Ibid., p.283.
45 Chatthip Nartsupha, Prasopkarn iae khwamhen bang prakarn khong awso Pridi
Phanomyong, Bangkok: Khrongkarn "Pridi Phanomyong kap Sangkhom Thai", 1983, p.52.
46 Ibid., pp.25-33.
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European villages before the industrial revolution and Thai villages when 
Pridi was a child. According to his view, Europe and Siam had had the same 
historical development, that is, from primitive society (community), through 
slavery, and the Sakdina system (Feudalism) to capitalism. However, he 
pointed out that the transformation from slavery to the Sakdina system had 
occurred earlier in Europe, and that slavery and the Sakdina system had 
coexisted until 1906 in Siam.47
His views on the exploitation of Thai farmers reveals his deep 
understanding of their hardship. From an historical point of view, Siam had 
much uncultivated land, and it was easy for any farmer who wanted to 
cultivate land to apply for the authority to do so.48 This means that the 
likelihood of a tenant was not great at that time. The more important point 
was that the people (Phrai) were forced to pay Suai (tax) and land tax to the 
king, the owner of the land.49 Thai farmers were exploited not only by 
landlords but also by rice mill capitalists (including rice traders). Pridi 
classified Thai into six groups: the working classes, farmers, small 
capitalists, medium capitalists, the bourgeois (modern capitalist class) and 
the Sakdina class.50 In Siam, he maintains that the working classes and the 
farmers were exploited by small capitalists.
Pridi makes four points about the exploitation of the farmers.51 First, it 
should be borne in mind that in Siam the number of owner farmers was 
bigger than that of tenant farmers. Exploitation of the farmers was by the rice 
trader and rice-mill owner rather than by the landlord. Second, rent should
reflect land fertility and no other consideration. This would mean that a higher
rent was paid for more fertile land. Third, the landlords confiscated the
4? Ibid., p.27.
48 Ibid., p.28.
49 Ibid., p.30.
50 Ibid., p.30.
51 Ibid., pp.32-3.
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farmers' properties when farmers suffered natural disasters such as drought, 
flood and crop disease. Lastly, the landowner should be considered a 
capitalist in his economic behaviour.
(1) The National Economic Plan
In this section, Pridi's economic plan will be examined in detail. When he 
presented his economic plan, a socialist call for the partial nationalization of 
land and labour with utopian elements, to a cabinet meeting on 28 March 
1933, it was rejected as communist. The aim and content of his plan will be 
considered not only from the point of view of his economic ideas but also as 
part of his political thought.
His economic plan was inspired by one point in the six-point platform 
of the People's Party: the statement that ‘a national economic policy must be 
drawn up to guarantee remunerative work to everyone.’ The draft of this 
economic plan was originally prepared by Mangkorn Samsen, a local-born 
Chinese ‘industrialist’, and was upgraded to an economic programme by 
Pridi.52 When Pridi presented the king with a copy of his draft economic plan 
at the end of February 1933, he explained that its aim was not only to 
improve agricultural production and the living standards of farmers but also to 
increase Siamese control over the economy, by eliminating the role of the 
foreign entrepreneur.
 His economic plan consisted of twelve sections, as follows.53
52 Duan Bunnag, Than Pridi ratburut awuso: phuwangphen setthakit Thai khon raek , 
Bangkok: Samakkhitham, 1974, p.48. See the description of Mangkorn Samsen in Akira 
Suehiro, Capital Accumulation in Thailand 1855-1985, Tokyo: Centre for East Asian Cultural 
Studies, 1989, p.360.
53 See the full translation of Pridi's economic plan in Kenneth P. Landon, Siam in 
Transition. A Brief Survey of Cultural Trends in the Five Years since the Revolution of 1932 , 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1968, pp.260-293 (Appendix III); Pierre Fistid, Sous- 
ddvelopment et utopie au Siam: le programme des reformes presente en 1933 par Pridi 
Phanomyong, Paris: Mouton & Co, 1969; or Suphot Dantrakun, Khaokrong kansetthakit 
khong Luang Pradit Manutharm  (Economic Plan of Luang Pradit Manutham), Bangkok: 
Pracakkanphim.1974.
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National Economic Policy of Luang Pradist Manudharm 
Preamble points to be kept in mind during the reading of this policy.
Part I The original proclamation of the People's Party
Part II Instability of the present economic system
Part III Social insurance
Part IV Labour waste and social parasites
Part V Method by which the government secures land, labour and 
capital
Part VI Balancing the government's budget
Part VII The establishment of co-operative societies
Part VIII What lines of economic endeavour shall the government
undertake?
Part IX The solution of the capital and labour question
Part X National economic plan
Part XI Successful realization of the six-point platform
The main points in these twelve sections will be summarized here. In 
the preamble, it was stressed that a division of the economic system into co­
operative associations under the government's national economic policy was 
the only way to achieve the advancement of the people. In Part I the new 
government promised to promote the economic welfare of its citizens by 
providing remunerative employment for everyone, and by promulgating a 
national economic policy designed to end poverty. Pridi's main purpose was 
to promote the welfare of the Siamese people. In Part II the poverty of the 
people was explained as a lack of necessities, such as food, clothing and 
shelter. He emphasized that the rich, middle class and poor may face the 
same uncertainties in the future - that is, old age, disease and the misfortune 
of losing their wealth.
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The reason why social insurance was necessary was explained in 
Part III. First of all, private companies cannot undertake this function, 
therefore the government must guarantee the security of every citizen. The 
Social Security Act would have the government distribute money to all the 
people, so that they might exchange it for necessities such as food, clothing 
and shelter. The plan to issue monthly wages to all of the people was based 
on the Siamese characteristic that they liked to be government employees. It 
is an important point that Pridi maintained that the government should not 
expropriate property from the wealthy in order to finance this. To establish 
social security by paying salaries to all citizens, Pridi suggests establishing 
co-operative societies which would have the functions of producing and 
distributing the necessities of life. The reason behind this idea was that the 
people lack land and capital, and could provide only labour.
Part IV, labour waste and parasites, was illustrated by a number of 
examples. First, farmers, on average, worked for not more than six months 
out of the year, (ploughing, sowing, harvesting). That is the main reason why 
the government should draw up a national economic plan, to make use of the 
six months left free and unproductive. The merit of a co-operative to farmers 
was illustrated by the case of raising a cow - the co-operative method of 
taking care of a cow saves labour. With respect to the use of machinery, Pridi 
admits a fundamental economic principle, that is, machinery multiplies the 
efficiency of labour. According to his description: ‘Siamese are slight in body, 
not as strong as Chinese and foreigners. If we depend upon manpower in 
our various enterprises we can never compete with Chinese and foreigners.
If we use machinery we can compete successfully.'54 Even though machinery 
has the disadvantage of displacing labour, the use of machinery was 
recommended, under the control of the government. This means that the
54 Kenneth P. Landon, Siam in Transition: A Brief Survey of Cultural Trends in the Five 
Years since the Revolution, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1968, p 268
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government would create more job opportunities for people displaced by the 
use of machinery. In addition, working time could be reduced gradually, 
without reducing salaries. The capital to purchase machinery would be 
amassed by the government through the collection of indirect taxes.
In Part V methods by which the government secures land, labour and 
capital were analysed. Under the current system, cultivation was controlled 
by individuals and cultivated land had high running expenses, taxes and 
interest, so that landowners received inadequate returns. On the other hand, 
99 percent of farmers were in debt, and were unable to pay full rents. This 
vicious circle would be solved by the government purchasing land. Where 
would the government get the money to buy the land? According to Pridi:
At present the government does not have in its possession sufficient reserve funds to 
purchase the land, but the government could issue bonds to the landowners to the amount of 
the value of their land. The interest on the bonds would be determined by the government, in 
accordance with the rates of interest prevailing on the day of purchase, not to exceed the 
maximum legal rate of fifteen percent.55
The type of land which the government would purchase was productive fields 
and gardens, not residential areas. The advantage to the government of 
purchasing land would be to encourage a better co-ordinated, cheaper 
system, for ploughing, cultivating and irrigation.
There was also the argument that the transfer of ownership from 
individuals to the government would extinguish the farmers' feel for the land. 
Pridi suggested that it was widely thought that a close relationship existed 
between ownership of land and nationalism, but he maintained that the 
ownership of land was not affected by nationalism or love of race.
With respect to employment, ail persons between the ages of eighteen 
and fifty-five were to be employed by the government, according to their 
education, strength and abilities. People under eighteen would be expected 
to attend school or engage in light work. Persons aged over fifty-five would
55 Ibid., p.271.
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be eligible for pensions for the rest of their lives. The important point here 
was that exceptional citizens, who could support themselves, did not need to 
enter government employment. For example, independent professions, such 
as authors, doctors, lawyers and special teachers, would be allowed to 
practice their professions, in addition, private ownership of existing factories 
would be allowed to continue if the owners did not want to enter government 
service. Thus the freedom of choosing one's occupation and private 
ownership of property were guaranteed under the economic plan.
According to the plan, the government would need two kinds of capital 
to administer the economic system:
1. capital to be invested in machinery and manufactured products, which the 
government cannot as yet produce;
2. capital for the payment of wages.56
How does the government secure these two forms of capital? There 
are four main ways. First, by the collection of taxes, such as inheritance tax, 
income tax and indirect taxes. Among these, indirect taxes play an important 
role, because the small sums paid by each citizen amount in total to a great 
deal. Second, the establishment of lotteries is planned. Third, internal loans 
would be secured by co-operating with the wealthy classes. An alternative 
was to rely on foreign loans, but these should be used only for the purchase 
of machinery and other manufactured products which could not be produced 
in Siam. Lastly, the purchase of foreign machinery on an instalment basis 
might be used if the government could not find or afford foreign loans.
In Part VI, balancing the government's budget was explained. Pridi 
explained that:
the government will have to provide these necessities in abundance, in order that the 
people in turn may purchase them. If month by month and year by year the people save their 
money, they save it in order to spend it in the future on things which they still must buy from
56 Ibid., p.277.
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the government. So the balance of the financial system of the country is assured.57 
Pridi agreed with Professor Charles Gide, that is to say that a people have
advanced is merely to say that their wants have multiplied.58
In order to purchase machinery and other manufactured products
which Siam cannot produce, the government should make an effort to
increase surplus production of rice and teak for export, to earn foreign
exchange. Therefore unnecessary imports should fall to a minimum: only
necessities, such as machinery, that cannot be produced in Siam, should be
imported.
There was also the criticism that the people would be reduced to the 
level of animals - women would become common property, family life would 
be destroyed and interest in progress would cease when the government 
controls the whole economic system.59 However, Pridi maintained that the 
advantage of becoming government employees would be that all would 
obtain the same privileges and prerequisites which government officials now 
enjoyed - salaries in exchange for their labour, and pensions for their old 
age.
In Part VII the reason for the establishment of co-operative societies 
was explained. As the central government cannot oversee every project in 
detail, it was necessary to divide the administration of the economic system 
into co-operative societies. Each co-operative society would consist of 
members who would receive a monthly wage in return for their labour. If an 
individual was in a difficult situation, such as being old, ill, or physically 
disabled, they would be entitled to a pension. Co-operative societies, such as 
agricultural societies or industrial associations, would be allowed to make
profits, and these profits would be distributed to members as bonuses. The
57 Ibid., p.279.
58 Thipphawan Chiemthirasagun, Phatommathat thang karnmuang khong Pridi 
Phanomyong, Bangkok: Aksornsan, 1988, p.280.
59 Kenneth P. Landon, Siam in Transition: A Brief Survey of Cultural Trends in the Five 
Years since the Revolution, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1968, p.280.
86
members of the co-operative would have the following obligations and the 
government the following duties:60
1. the government will supply land and capital. The members of the society will supply the 
labour and assume responsibility for production;
2. the members of the societies are to assume responsibility for the sale and distribution of 
the products which they produce, under the guidance and direction of the central 
government;
3. the societies are to assume responsibility'for producing food and drink for their members. 
That is, the society will undertake to sell food, drink, wearing apparel, and other necessities to 
its members, but will not be responsible for preparing such food as is sold. Its responsibility will 
cease with the distribution of uncooked food to its members, such as rice, raw meat, which the 
members will be expected to prepare for themselves, according to their own taste. But if the 
members so desire, a society may arrange to prepare all food which is to be sold to its 
members;
4. the societies will be responsible for the erection of homes for their members, under the 
supervision of the government. Each member-family will have its own home, built according to 
the society's plans, and designed to safeguard health, to provide adequate protection from 
danger, and to make for ease in administration.
In Part VIII, the government’s economic endeavours were noted. In
order to achieve economic independence, the government should protect the 
country against trade restrictions. Even though Adam Smith's theory of the 
international division of labour is valuable, in practice it is doubtful whether it 
should be adopted by Siam. This was because of Siam's economic 
backwardness. As Siam was not a developed country, Pridi supported the 
views of the nineteenth century German economist, Friedrich List, who taught 
that Germany must make itself self-sufficient. Pridi believed that control of the 
economic system by the government would bring about economic 
development.
In Part IX, the solution to the capital and labour question was 
examined. The important point here was that private ownership created 
discord, such as lockouts, strikes and arguments between employer and 
employees. These conflicts would be settled not by private companies but by 
the government's control of the entire economic system. There was also a
60 Ibid., p.282.
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difference in the treatment of profits. When the government controlled the 
economic system, profits would be shared equally between labour and other 
government employees. In contrast, under the private sector, capitalists were 
inclined to keep the profits. Pridi states:
A further point in favour of government administration of the entire economic system is 
that the government is assured of profits by the fact that it can utilize what are now only latent 
abilities for work; can conserve the expenditure of labour; and can multiply its efficiency by 
employing proper machinery.61
In Part X, the national economic plan was presented. According to the 
plan, there were three stages in the preparation of careful estimates:
1. it will be necessary to investigate carefully and prepare estimates of the necessities of life 
required by the average citizen of a civilized nation in order to assure him a happy and 
prosperous existence;
2. when these various estimates and investigations have been completed, further estimates
will be necessary to determine how much land, labour and capital will be necessary to produce 
them;
3. when all these estimates have been prepared, it will be necessary to make further 
calculations of the land, labour and capital available to the government, either potentially or 
actually, as a basis for the proposed economic system.62
In Part XI, th© succ©ssful r©alization of th© six-point platform was 
explained. First of all, independence in the courts, independence in the field 
of economics, and independence in politics, was emphasized. The 
inauguration of the national economic plan was expected to bring about a 
stable internal order, economic welfare, equality for all the people, personal 
liberty, and good opportunities for education. Pridi concluded modestly that 
his plan would lead the Siamese into a golden age.
(2) Economic Thought of Pridi
In this section, two main points will be examined. Pridi's economic thought - 
even though the development of Pridi's economic thought during his period
61 Ibid., p.285.
62 Ibid., pp.285-7.
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of study in France was discussed earlier, detailed analysis is necessary to
understand his economic plan. Second, the plan itself will be assessed.
His plan was based on various economic systems. Pridi said that he
would like to adopt economic principles which suited Siamese conditions,
and that he might not stick to one specific principle.63 At a meeting on the
national economic plan on 12 March 1933, Pridi maintained that his
economic plan was not based on communist principles, and that it had
elements of both capitalism and socialism.64 Furthermore, he said that his
economic plan consisted of capitalism, socialism, solidarism, and
liberalism.65 As the development of his economic thought was examined
earlier, it remains to consider the political and economic thought current in
France when he studied there from 1920 to 1927.
It was noted that Pridi was influenced by two French economists,
Charles Gide and Charles Rist. Dr. Serm Winichaiyagun suggests that
Pridi's economic plan was influenced by his study of these scholars during
his years in Paris.66 As Thipphawan has produced an incisive study of Pridi's
economic thought in his national plan, it would be useful to introduce his
main points. According to Thipphawan, Pridi's economic plan was guided by
four principles: socialism, solidarism, humanitarianism and nationalism.67
According to Gide, there are three types of socialism; associationism,
collectivism and co-operatism.68 Gide describes socialism thus:
all the Socialist schools see the essential cause of social disorder in the concentration 
of wealth in the hands of a small number of parasites, who thus have the power to exploit the 
masses and to make the many work for the profit of the few: paucis humanum genus vivit.. 
They therefore look for a new order of things, in which the private ownership of capital and its 
obverse side, the wage system, will be, if not altogether abolished, at least more and more
63 Thipphawan Chiamthirasakun, Phatom m athat thang karnmuang khong Pridi 
Phanomyong, Bangkok: Aksornsan, 1988, p.271.
64 ibid., p.289.
65 ibid., p.289.
66 ibid., pp.282-3.
67 ibid., p.290.
68 ibid., p.291.
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limited.69
In the first half of the nineteenth century, socialism was popular in France,
with prominent thinkers such as Saint-Simon (1760-1825), Fourier (1772-
1837), Proudhon (1809-1865) and Louis Blanc (1811-1882).
What is associationism? Gide defines it as the various forms of free
association that will produce an adequate solution to social questions,
without need to resort to revolution, or to the abolition of property, interest, or
the inequality of wealth.70 While it might be said that associationism was an
abandoned model, elements of it emerged in 'co-operative socialist' and
'concern for solidarity'. Robert Owen, Charles Fourier and Louis Blanc were
associate socialists.71 The important point here is that the associate socialists
differ from the Saint-Simonians, who sought solutions in socialisation rather
than in association. Let us examine the influence of these associate socialists 
on Pridi.
Pridi was influenced by Charles Fourier in the establishment of the 
commune. The commune was called 'Phalanstere' in French, and its size 
was about fifteen hundred people. The important point here is that the 
commune was to be self-sufficient, by establishing co-operatives for 
production and consumption. Charles Fourier pointed out that a co-operative 
should be established by members and their capital at their own will. 
However, Pridi stressed the need for government initiative and finance in 
establishing co-operatives. Another difference between them is that Fourier 
did not support the ideas of mass production and centralization.
Robert Owen's influence on Pridi was in the use of labour notes
69 Charles Gide, Political Economy, ( authorized translation from the 3d ed (1913) of the
Cours d' economie politique under direction of William Sharp by Constance A.M. Archibald) 
London: George G. Harrap & Company, 1924, p.23.
70 Ibid., p.480.
71 Charles Gide and Charles Rist, A History of Economic Doctrines: From the Time of the 
Physiocrats to the Present Day, (authorized translation from the second revised and 
augmented Ftench edition of 1913 by R. Richards), London: George G. Harrap & Company 
1948. See the detailed description of three associate scholars, Owen, Fourier and Blanc’ 
pp.246-265.
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instead of money. According to Owen, money is evil, and labour notes based 
on the amount of labour hours required in production would be issued, to be 
exchanged for necessities. This system was called ‘the National Equitable 
Labour Exchange’.72 The only substantial difference between Pridi and 
Owen with respect to labour notes was that Pridi supported government 
initiative, while Owen was against government intervention.
Louis Blanc thought that poverty was caused by competition. His point 
was that a new society should be created by association. For example, he 
suggested establishing a social workshop or national workshop, which 
simply means a co-operative producer society. The important point here is 
that Blanc noted that it was necessary for workshops to borrow capital from 
the government or for the government to undertake the initial organization. In 
addition, interest would be paid on the capital accumulated in establishing 
the industry. These ideas were fully illustrated in Pridi's economic plan. 
Furthermore, the net income of the social workshop would be divided into 
three, as follows. First, to members of the association who were engaged in 
production. Second, to the old, the disabled and the sick and third to those 
supplying machinery for production. Pridi's economic plan was quite similar 
in that aspect. Pridi admitted that workers or officers could receive a reward in 
addition to their basic income. He calls this reward 'sharing', or giving a part 
of the profit to the workers.73
The second form of socialism is collectivism. It is said that collectivism 
developed from associationism. According to Gide,
Collectivism is a milder form of Communism. It proposed to hold in common the 
instruments of production only - land, mines, factories, banks, railways, raw material - and to 
leave consumption goods under the regime of private property, save that they are to be better
72 Ibid., p.251. A experiment in the elimination of money was attempted in London with 
the establishment of the National Equitable Labour Exchange.
73 Thipphawan Chiemthirasagun, Phatommathat thang karnmuang khong Pridi 
Phanomyong, Bangkok: Aksornsan, 1988, p.302.
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distributed.74
Collectivism can be said to be a mixture of associationism and communism. It 
is important to note that the Saint-Simonians developed the theory of 
collectivism. Gide states that: 'We must, in fact, distinguish between two 
currents in Saint-Simonism. The one represents the doctrine preached by 
Saint-Simon himself, the other is that of his disciples, the Saint-Simonians.’75 
Saint Simon's doctrine is called ’industrialism’. The disciples' doctrine, on the 
other hand, is described as 'collectivism'. As Pridi was very much influenced 
by the idea of collectivism, he supported the transfer of the instruments of 
production from the private sector to the government. For example, he 
maintained that the government should buy land.76 However, it is important 
to note that Pridi accepted the existence of the liberal professions, such as 
writer, doctor, lawyer and teacher. To put it another way, it was not necessary 
for these to be civil servants. In addition, some private commercial business 
and agriculture would be allowed, on condition that they could support 
themselves. In this sense, Pridi shows a flexible attitude towards the private 
sector. When he was interviewed later, he said that his idea was not 
utopian, communist, but scientific socialist.77
The last form of socialism is co-operatism. Charles Gide defines co- 
operatism as follows.78
(1) all co-operative associations aim at the economic emancipation of certain classes of
74 Charles Gide, Political Economy, { authorized translation from the 3d ed. (1913) of the
Cours d' economie politique under direction of William Sharp by Constance A.M. Archibald), 
London: George G. Harrap & Company, 1924, pp.483-4.
75 Charles Gide and Charles Rist, A History of Economic Doctrines: From the Time of the 
Physiocrats to the Present Day, (authorized translation from the second revised and 
augmented French edition of 1913 by R. Richards), London: George G. Harrap & Company, 
1948, p.214.
76 Thipphawan Chiamthirasakun, Phatommathat thang karnmuang khong Pridi
Phanomyong, Bangkok: Aksornsan, 1988, p.307. Pridi advocated that the government 
should buy only farming land, not residential.
77 ibid., p.310.
78 Charles Gide, Political Economy, ( authorized translation from the 3d ed. (1913) of the
Cours d' dconomie politique under direction of William Sharp by Constance A.M. Archibald),
London: George G. Harrap & Company, 1924, pp.493-5.
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persons, so that they may dispense with intermediaries and be self-sufficient. Producers' 
societies allow the worker to do without the employer by producing themselves on their own 
account, selling directly to the public, and keeping the whole product of their labour for 
themselves;
(2) all aim at substituting solidarity for competition, and the co-operative motto, ‘Each for all’, 
replaces the individualist motto, 'Each for himself’. Individuals no longer compete, in principle 
at least, but associate together to provide for their wants; and these associations in turn make it 
a rule to combine in order to form larger organizations;
(3) all aim, not at abolishing private property, but spreading it by making it accessible to 
everyone in the form of small shares; while, at the same time, they aim at creating alongside, 
and above, a collective property in the form of impersonal funds, to be used for the 
development of society and for work of social utility;
(4) all aim, not at doing away with capital, but at depriving it of its preponderant role in the 
management of production, as also of the tribute which it levies for this in the form of profit;
(5) all co-operative associations, then, possess a considerable educational value.
Charles Gide explained that co-operativism had developed from 
associationist socialism.79 The aim of a co-operative is for its members to 
help each other instead of competing against each other. It is important to 
note that many societies consider the making of profit as evil. Therefore, 
societies which are allowed to make profits should divide these profits among 
their members in proportion to their labour when they are employees, but 
never in proportion to the capital which they contributed.
How did Pridi develop the idea of the co-operative? He answered this 
question in his interview with Chatthip. Pridi pointed out that he came across 
two types of co-operative, the capitalist and the socialist, during his years of 
study in France.80 He also noted the difference between the role of the co­
operative in the period of the absolute monarchy and in the period of the 
constitutional monarchy. He said that the role of the co-operative before 1932 
was limited to the provision of credit, but now this role would cover every 
aspect of the economy, including production.81 He explained the relationship
79 Ibid., p.492.
80 Chatthip Nartsupha, Prasopkan lae khwamhen bang prakan khong ratthaburut awso 
Pridi Phanomyong, Bangkok: Khrongkan "Pridi Phanomyong kap Sangkhom Thai" 1983 
p.69.
81 Ibid., p.66.
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between the co-operative and government in the economic plan in terms of 
the upper part and the lower part of the plan.82 If the upper part is conducted 
by theory alone, it might remain in the realm of theory. Therefore, the upper 
part should connect with the lower part (the practice). In his economic plan, 
the co-operative had four functions - production, circulation, consumption and 
construction.
Before moving to solidarism, two more points are important; the role of 
the private sector and Saint - Simon's influence on Pridi. Pridi did not 
support laissez-faire. Pridi gave an example of the problems inherent to land 
and labour in agriculture under private sector control. Under these 
conditions, land and labour would not be used productively because the 
private sector cannot control the whole economic system. That is the reason 
why Pridi advocated that the government take the initiative and control the 
economic system, rather than leave it to the private sector. It would do so by 
controlling land, labour and capital.
Pridi was influenced by Saint - Simon on industrialism. Saint - Simon 
argued that an industrial - based economy would bring about economic 
development. In the national economic plan, the promotion of manufacturing 
industry was stressed for national economic development.
Solidarism is one of the most important principles in Pridi's economic 
plan. The principle of solidarism is simply that, as human beings depend on 
each other, everybody should help each other. How can the government help 
people? Pridi answers that the government can produce social insurance to 
protect the people. For example, the people are expected to receive food, 
clothing and a place to live from their birth to death, including children, the 
sick, the disabled and the old.83 According to his economic plan, these 
people are in a position to receive a monthly salary from the government. In
22 ibid., p.67.
23 Thipphawan Chiamthirasakun, Phatommathat thang karnmuang khong Pridi 
Phanomyong, Bangkok; Aksornsan, 1988, pp.321-2.
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addition, people such as pregnant women, the sick, the disabled, students 
and retired officers on a pension are not obliged to work. How could the 
government obtain the financial resources to introduce social insurance? 
Under the principle of solidarity, the government was expected to act as an 
agent of social equality, by promulgating laws and levying taxes, especially 
progressive taxes.84 Another important aspect of solidarity is respect for 
private ownership and individual freedom. This means that solidarism does 
not support the confiscation of private property. According to Gide, solidarism 
had developed from association socialism, and it does not accept 
collectivism or state socialism, because of their different views on the role of 
private ownership.85 It can be said that Pridi aimed not for radical but for 
moderate reform. In fact, Pridi asks the rich for cooperation in finance. He 
emphasized that he did not agree with the confiscation of private property, 
because the government should look for revenue through the collection of 
taxes, such as an inheritance tax, income tax, or indirect taxes.86
Humanitarianism is also an important principle in Pridi's economic 
plan. The description of uncertainty in his economic plan indicates that he 
was influenced by Buddhism, where helping each other is considered 
good.87 Pridi said that his own parents had been faithful Buddhists.88 It might 
be said that the idea of ‘helping each other’ originates from Buddhism rather 
than solidarism. In the conclusion to his economic plan, he stated that if it was 
adopted, it would be the dawn of the age of Sri Ariya Mettraya, the next, ideal, 
and final world age as conceived by Theravada Buddhists in South East
84 Ibid., p.324.
88 Charles Gide and Charles Rist, A History of Economic Doctrines: From the Time of the 
Physiocrats to the Present Day, authorized translation from the second revised and 
augmented French edition of 1913 by R. Richards, London; George G. Harrap & Company,
l y ^ r O ,  p . O b 9 ,
88 Thipphawan Chiamthirasakun, Phatommathat thang kanmuang khong Pridi
Phanomyong, Bangkok; Aksornsan, 1988, p.327.
87 Ibid., p.331.
88 Ibid., p.331.
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Asia.89 The Manifesto of the Kana Ratsadorn ended by stating: ‘What
everyone most desires, the greatest prosperity and happiness calted Sri
Ariya, will be realised by all the people.’90 Buddhist terms were thus used in 
his plan.
The last important principle in the economic plan was nationalism. 
Pridi emphasized that Siam should develop to the level of a ‘civilized’ 
country. It was noted above that Pridi was influenced by Friedrich List on 
nationalism. List's main point was to encourage agriculture, handicrafts, 
industry and commerce to be self-sufficient. In order to do this, List 
suggested levying a high import tax to protect domestic industry, it is clear 
that List denied the theory of the international division of labour. Pridi 
argued that the development of both agriculture and manufacturing industry 
was essential for Siamese economic development. It is important to note that 
Pridi and the Peoples Party were afraid of an economic invasion from foreign 
countries.91 Pridi was also impressed by the French indirect taxation system. 
On agricultural policy, Pridi was much influenced by Gide, who maintained 
that intensive cultivation and the use of machinery were essential for 
agricultural development.92
It is useful to examine the arguments against Pridi's economic plan 
from the conservatives. They had two main objections to his plan.93 First, that 
it represented a form of Bolshevism, and that there was a danger of Siam 
becoming contaminated in this way. Second, his economic plan would
Kenneth P. Landon, Siam in Transition: A Brief Survey of Cultural Trends in the Five 
Years since the Revolution, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1968, pp.292-3 .
90 Judith A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand: A Story of Intrigue, Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1991, p.37.
91 Thipphawan Chiamthirasagun, Phatommathat thang karnmuang khong Pridi 
Phanomyong, Bangkok: Aksornsan, 1988, p.338.
92 Ibid., pp.343-4.
90 Chalermkiat Phiunaun, Botkwam prakopkan sammana kung satawat Thammasat:
2477-2527  ruang khwamkhit thang kanmuang khong Pridi Phanomyong Bangkok- 
Thammasat University, 1984, p.231.
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destroy the freedom of the people. The counter-arguments are as follows.94 
First, the constitutional revolution in 1932 was quite different from the Russian 
revolution, which had put an end to the Tsars. The political system in Siam 
changed from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. Second, 
his economic plan did not support confiscation of the property of the rich, and 
it permitted the operation of private business. Lastly, his plan was based on 
the idea of solidarism, meaning that the government should take on the role 
of providing social security from poverty or economic recession.
There were other criticisms of his economic plan.95 The first was that 
there was insufficient data for its implementation. The second was that it 
demanded the services of many experts, while there was a serious shortage 
of experts. The last was that his economic plan aimed to mobilize and involve 
all the people, but in fact not ail the people participated in the 1932 
constitutional revolution. The counter-argument to the first point is that his 
economic plan was not a real plan, because it was based solely on ideas. 
Second, Pridi acknowledged the shortage of experts and recommended 
hiring foreign experts for the first stage.96 Pridi was also aware of the third 
criticism, and he therefore intended to set his economic plan before all the 
people.97
Pricha made three principal comments on Pridi's economic plan. First, 
Pridi sees Siamese society as being in historical decline. He considered the 
year 1932 as the worst year economically, and he therefore proposed the 
establishment of a new. economic system.98 Second, his economic plan can 
be considered an important event in the development of Thai political
94 ibid., pp.231-3.
95 Ibid., pp.233-4.
96 Ibid., p.234.
97 Ibid., p.234.
98 Pricha Piamphongsan, ‘Pridi Phanomyong kap naeoukhwamkhit thang setthakit’, 
Saneh Chammarik (et al), Pridi parithat: Palhakathachud Pridi Phanomyong anuson 
Bangkok: Samnakphim Thianwan, 1983, p.175.
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economy." Lastly, his idea of a national economic plan has contemporary 
significance because of the lack of a social ideal today.100 The ideas in his 
economic plan were partially realized in the government policies that 
attempted to overcome poverty in the rural areas.101
3.4. Phra Sarasas' Economic Plan
The economic plan of Phra Sarasas can be found in the Thai National 
Archives.102 It is a single document of 12 pages, with a diagram. Phra 
Sarasas completed his economic plan on 14 July 1934, and submitted it to 
the government in October.103 There are two documents concerning his plan 
in the Public Record Office. The first is 'Economic policy of Siamese 
Government', which includes an inaccurate translation of the plan: but it also 
provides useful information on the response of the British Foreign Office to
the plan.104 The second is a draft scheme by Phra Sarasas for the
exploitation of the mineral wealth of Siam.105 This scheme was not part of 
the original economic plan held in the National Archives. This document is 
important for showing Phra Sarasas1 views on foreign capital participation. 
There are also several articles about his economic plan in the Bangkok 
Times Weekly Mail. 106 Among them, an article dated 10 July 1934, The 
State Councillor Talks on his subject’, includes an accurate English
99 ibid., p .178.
100 Ibid., p.179.
101 Ibid., p.107.
102 S.R.0201.22/9. N.A.
1°3 Be^jamin A- Batson, 'Phra Sarasas: Rebel with Many Causes’, Journal of Southeast 
sian Studies 27, 1 (March 1996) gave the month his proposal was submitted to the 
government in footnote 24 on p. 155.
104 Coultasto FO No. 120, 25 May 1934, F4099/123/40, FO371/18208, PRO.
105 Coultas to FO No. 164, 31 July 1934, F5433/123/40, FO 371/18208,’ PRO.
106 Bangkok Times WeeklyMail, 21 June, 4  July, 10 July, 12 July, 20 September 1934.
The article of 20 September dealt with Phra Sarasas's resignation
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translation of his economic plan.
This section consists of three parts: Phra Sarasas' economic plan, 
his life and economic views and thirdly his political and historical ideas.
There are several reasons why Phra Sarasas wrote his plan. First, his 
position as Minister of Economic Affairs in 1934 forced him to present an 
economic plan. The plan represents the economic ideas of the political group 
considered to have had close links to Pridi. He clearly felt an urgent need to 
improve the Siamese economy. According to the Foreign Office document, 
he wrote:
It is necessary, if the work of every Ministry is to run smoothly and without hitch, that 
State Councillors hold responsibilities severally and jointly. The present economic condition of 
Siam is one which inspires terror. Should the position not improve during this year, it is to be 
feared that this Government will not last. Government, then, has only one year in which to 
prove its worth, and the proof lies in economic recovery.107
Phra Sarasas surveyed economic conditions in the south of the kingdom 
before drawing up his economic plan. The Bangkok Times Weekly Mail 
reported that:
There are two parties at work on the economic survey. One party is led by Mr. James M. 
Andrews, carrying on the work formerly undertaken by Professor Zimmerman, and surveying 
the north, while the State Councillor for Economics himself, accompanied by some experts, 
has been surveying the south.108
Second, economic issues were Phra Sarasas' life-long theme. His 
journalistic activity in advocating economic nationalism, under the pen-name 
‘555’, was well known, and in addition he had expressed his economic ideas 
in several books.109
His economic plan expressed not only practical economic policies but 
also his ideas and dreams. His plan stressed the importance of rural
107 Coultas to FO No. 120, 25 May 1934, F4099/123/40, F0371 /18208, PRO.
108 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 'Economic Development. A Demonstration Needed’, 21
June 1934, p.11. Andrew's survey was published as James M. Andrews, Siam: 2nd Rural
Economic Survey 1934-1935, Bangkok: Bangkok Times Press, 1935.
109 Phra Sarasas,Setthsat waduai setthakitkankha, Sophonphiphatthanakon,1937, and 
Phra Sarasas, Setthasat waduai setthakitkanngoen, 1938.
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development. He noted:
From the diagram it is easy to see that i start with the provinces and take rural 
economics as the heart of the scheme rather than capital. The greater portion of the population 
lives in the provinces, and they are the people in great difficulties, to whom aid should first be 
given. For that reason the writer has made them the centre of the scheme, and when their 
position has improved there is no question but that the capital will quickly follow.110
He proposed to start by setting up a network of co-operatives in the 
countryside. Cooperation with local government was expected to play an 
important role in expanding the networks of district co-operatives. In his plan, 
'O’ represented the Changwat co-operative societies, which had a store, a 
warehouse and a branch bank, both general and savings (see Chart 3-1). 
They would also provide education, instruction in the use of tools and the 
necessities of life, and information on experimental and model farms.
Before explaining the functions of the co-operatives, it is necessary to 
discuss their capital resources and the way in which they would compete with 
Chinese shops. In order to set up Changwat co-operatives, three sources of 
capital would be utilised; local government would provide 50%, and Siamese 
and foreign nationals, 25 % each. If local government was short of money, 
loans would be available from banks or from savings banks, under the 
guarantee of the central government. The existence of Chinese shops in the 
countryside was considered an obstacle to the expansion of the co­
operatives. Phra Sarasas argued that the help of the government was vital if 
the co-operatives were to deal with the Chinese shops, although it was not 
intended to eliminate them. Cooperation was possible - Chinese shops 
would buy products cheaply from the co-operatives, while Changwat co­
operatives would buy from the Chinese shops. The advantage of the 
Chinese shops, that they could sell on credit, would be matched by the 
capital resources of the Changwat co-operatives. Buying easily and selling
110 Coultas to FO No. 120, 25 May 1934, F4099/123/40, F0371 /18208 PRO
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smoothly would reduce credit sales.
The three functions of the co-operative were buyer, seller and banker. 
As buyers, they purchased agricultural products from the people, and stored 
them for re-sale to other Changwat co-operatives or to the commercial 
exchange. The commercial exchange will be explained later. As sellers, they 
provided the people with the necessities of life, tools, clothes and food, at 
reasonable prices. They would buy products from the wholesale society, 
which would supply products from both domestic and foreign sources. The 
wholesale society could buy products cheaply and in large quantities 
because there was no middleman. In addition, the wholesale society 
distributed products to the Changwat co-operatives on credit or for cash. This 
made it possible for the Changwat co-operatives to invest little and to sell 
their products cheaply.
As bankers, they would accept deposits and transfer money. Their 
banking function was based on the ideas of Schulze and Raiffeisen. Phra 
Sarasas did not explain further; but Schulze aimed to support urban 
workers, Raiffeisen, rural farmers. Both aimed to eliminate money lenders. 
The Raiffeisen form had been chosen as the model for the co-operatives 
promoted by the Ministry of Finance in 1915.111 This provided loans based 
on personal credit, which consisted of the deposits of members. In other 
words, Raiffeisen advocated the establishment of rural credit associations. 
The development of the co-operative movement and the development of co­
operative thought will be discussed separately. The former had little success, 
but the latter became significant not only in the 1930's but also after October 
1973.
‘CO’ represented the Co-operative Society, which would take care of
provincial co-operatives all over the country, and advise on technology and
111 'Prawatikan sahakon nai prathed Thai' (The Development of Co-operative in Thailand), 
in Khroprong 60  pi khong ngansahakon (Memorial of 60 years of Cooperatives) Bangkok' 
1977, p. 12.
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capital, in order that smallholdings would combine into larger-scale 
organizations. It would undertake the co-operative buying of modern tools, 
fertiliser and seed. lC0‘ was an umbrella organization for the co-operatives 
(see Chart 3-1).
‘EX’ stood for the Commercial Exchange, similar to the corn 
exchange in England and the bourse de commerce in France. Its main 
function was to exchange goods both internally and externally; it was where 
buyers and sellers got in touch with each another. This was not a private but 
a governmental organization, and the members of the exchange were to be 
selected by the government. Its aim was to improve grading and prevent the 
deterioration in quality of products. Phra Sarasas did not explain why and 
where he got the idea of the Commercial Exchange.
There were several types of financial resource in the plan: savings 
bank, credit foncier, insurance and national bank. There were two main 
objectives of the national bank - to make distribution and exchange work 
smoothly and to secure for the would-be producers the fruit of their work in 
order to promote production. The main functions of the national bank were to 
control the national debt, control the gold reserve, to be the principal bank 
of issue, to be the printing office for the currency, to be a clearing house for 
private banks and to be the central bank. Siam did not have a central bank at 
that time and Phra Sarasas saw it as essential for economic development. In 
his economic plan, he did not promote a particular model of a central bank, 
based on those in England, France, Germany, the United States, or Japan. 
But it was clear that he aimed to establish a strong central bank in order that 
Siam would not rely for loans on foreign countries.
‘OF’ stands for Credit Foncier, which would accept property as 
mortgage in order to assist the Cooperative Department. Where would the 
co-operative societies obtain funds? Phra Sarasas said that funds wouid be
102
obtained from the Cooperative Department - if there was not enough, more 
would be obtained from the Savings Bank. If that was still insufficient, ioans 
would be made from the National Bank.
‘A’, ‘F’ and TS’ represented agricultural industry, extractive industry, 
and transport and shipping.
This plan wouid be carried out by a limited company. Government 
participation wouid be 50%, the balance being divided between Siamese 
and foreign nationals. The ratios of capital participation given in the Foreign 
Office document was: government 51%, Siamese 25%, foreign nationals 
24%.112 The central or local government would sell its 50% to the people in 
the event of success.
The total amount of money needed for this plan was 25 million baht; 
15 million in reserves, 6 million in the savings bank, 4 million in government 
bonds. The government would not rely on loans from foreign countries. 25 
million baht would bring about an economic expansion of 75 million baht. 
Phra Sarasas showed great confidence in his plan:
The General Scheme as submitted will, if carried out, result in economic recovery in 
Siam within the space of one year. The writer has spent a long time in preparing this scheme; it 
is one that is suitable for our present conditions and in tune with the present Government: it is 
simple too, and not complicated: it should be a good scheme.113
As he did not explain his calculations, it seems useful to compare his figures
with government total expenditure in 1933 and 1934. Total expenditure in 
1933 and 1934 was 73,639,315 baht and 75,821,788 baht respectively; 25 
million baht would be about 30% of total government expenditure in 1934.
There are four observations to be made about the plan. First, in what 
ways did Western economic thought influence Phra Sarasas? It has already
112 Coultas to FO No. 120, 25 May 1934, F4099/123/40, F0371 /1 8208, PRO.
113 jbid.
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been noted that he was influenced by Ricardo,114 although he simply 
mentioned the names of Ricardo and Jevons without detailed explanation. 
Were his economic ideas socialist? His economic plan had socialist aspects 
because of his strong support for government intervention in the economy, 
but he was against government control of land, labour and capital. In other 
words, he supported the right to individual property. It also can be said that 
some aspects of liberalism, advocated by Adam Smith, Ricardo and John 
Stuart Mill, had an influence on Phra Sarasas. For example, he paid 
considerable attention to Ricardo, concentrating on the law of diminishing 
returns from land, and he suggested several ways to combat it, supplying 
capital, crop variety and machinery. To put it another way, to provide both 
fixed capital (for example rice mills) and working capital (improved rice 
varieties) were necessary to maintain returns from the land. The fertile central 
area of Siam was now almost fully under rice cultivation, further expansion 
would involve cultivation of land with less fertility.
Phra Sarasas did not examine the role of rent in Ricardo's theory, or 
the distribution between wage, profit and rent. Phra Sarasas did not see 
landlords as an obstacle to economic development in Siam. It is interesting to 
note that he made no mention of class struggle, his plan did not aim to 
liberate employee from employer exploitation. He wrote that the plan would 
make employers and employees work in harmony.
With respect to his Triangular Scheme’, consisting of cooperation 
between the government, Siamese capital and foreign capital, the important 
point is that Phra Sarasas did not deny the role of foreign capital. He
114 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 4 July 1934. It was written there that David Ricardo's 
principal work, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, published in 1817, 
discussed value, wages and rent. ‘His method in political economy is almost universally 
abandoned. Even the strongesi supporters of the traditional doctrines acknowledge that the 
value of his formulas have been greatly overrated, and must undergo continual limitation, 
modification and correction in the light of experience and of historic conditions. Yet his 
theories are eminently worthy of study, both as a phase in the development of economic 
science, and as illustrating a stage in the development of economic facts.’
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understood that economic development in Siam would be impossible without 
foreign capital. He pointed out that foreigners were useful to the Siamese in 
several ways.115
1. they provide knowledge;
2. they release buried treasure, so that it becomes silver and gold;
3. they provide revenue for the government through taxation.
In his economic plan it was clear that he supported government 
intervention. According to his book, Setthasat waduai setthakitkankha in 
1937, he argued the case for state intervention in Thailand.116 He 
maintained that state intervention was appropriate for Thailand because of its 
economic backwardness. State intervention meant creating a self-sufficient 
economy, in order not to rely on foreign countries. Phra Sarasas argued that 
the Thai government should have an economic plan different from European 
and American plans.
Third, what was the source for his co-operative ideas. Co-operatives 
were expected to play a major role in his plan, but he did not explore the 
ideas behind the co-operatives. He simply mentioned German co-operativists 
such as Schulze and Raiffeisen. It is difficult to see precisely where Phra 
Sarasas obtained his ideas on co-operatives. My assumption is that the 
French economist, Charles Gide, may have influenced him. Charles Gide 
wrote two books about co-operatives, Consumer's Co-operative Societies, in 
1921, and Communist And Co-operative Colonies, in 1930. Phra Sarasas 
may have read these books during his stay in France. Another clue is that 
Phra Sarasas wrote that his teacher was Camille Perreau.117
The last issue is finance. Even though he explained the financial 
sources in his plan his explanation was insufficient and it is difficult to
115 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 10 July 1934.
116 Phra Sarasas, Setthasat wa duai setthakit kankha (Economics of Commerce), 
Sophonphiphatthanakon, 1937, pp.320-23.
117 ibid., p.206.
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explain his figures. The British Foreign Office considered the financing of the
plan a real problem. Coultas reported that, 'Whatever may be the merits of a
scheme, in regard to which I am incompetent to form an opinion, it seems
fairly evident that the chief stumbling-block will be that of finance.1118 Did
Phra Sarasas support balanced finances or not? As revenue was limited,
fiscal policy would play an important role. However, he did not mention fiscal
policy, and it is not clear whether financing depended on domestic loans or 
foreign loans.
The second part of this section looks at his life and the economic views
promoted in his books. The purpose here is to give some clue to
understanding his political and economic thought. The primary sources are
mainly his books and his articles in newspapers, and records from the Thai
National Archives and the Public Record Office. As his cremation book was
never published, it is difficult to describe his life in detail. However, an outline 
is possible.
Phra Sarasas was born in Bangkok on 14 July 1889.119 After 
graduation from Swankraap College, he became a teacher of mathematics 
and physics at Naairooi School (Royal Military Academy). He was eventually 
promoted to principal of this school - Phibun Songkram was one of his 
students. In 1915 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel, and given the title 
and name, Phra Sarasas. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1920. 
He was first Third Secretary in the Legation in the Hague, but in 1921 he
118 Coultas to FO No. 120, 25 May 1934, F4099/123/40, FO371/18208, PRO.
1 19 ■ D The *° ,lowing jnformation is cited from a brief outline of Phra Sarasas filed in the Mitsui 
Thai-Room. However some dates, for example of his appointment as Minister of Economic 
Affairs is given as 1933, but this is incorrect because he was appointed in March 1934 
According to Benjamin A. Batson, ‘Phra Sarasas: Rebel with Many Causes’, Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies 27, 1 (March 1996): pp. 150-165, many dates are different: Phra
WaS promoted Mai°r in 1913 and then Lieutenant-Colonel in 1916. He left the army in 
1920 and went to work at the Samsen electric plant in Bangkok, under the Ministry of the 
Capital. The date for winning the Calcutta sweepstake is 1927, and resignation from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is mid-1928.
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was transferred to London. During this period he studied political economy at 
the University of London. In 1922 he was appointed Consul General in 
Calcutta, and in 1923, First Secretary at the Legation in Paris. But he did not 
agree with the policy of the government, and he therefore resigned. From 
1925 to 1932 he lived in exile in Paris. It seems that this period was an 
important turning point in his life.
During his exile in France, he studied economics and other social 
sciences at the Sorbonne. It was at this time that he knew Pridi and Phibun. 
In 1930 he married Claude, the daughter of the French prime minister, 
Camille Chautemps.120 The constitutional revolution in 1932 brought him 
back to Thailand, and he was made Minister of Economic Affairs in the first 
Phahon government. He made an effort to develop economic policy, 
especially the cooperative movement. He resigned as Minister in September 
1934. His passion for research into economic issues encouraged him to go 
to Japan with his family, from 1936 to 1941, and again from 1942 to 1945.121 
In this period he concentrated his studies on Japanese finance and 
economy, he published Money and Banking in Japan in 1940.122
120 The cremation book of Phra Sarasas was not published. A simple personal file (in 
Japanese) was obtained from Zaidan hojin Thai shitsu (Thai Room) of Mitsuibusan The 
names of his ex-wife and of her children were not available. However, he had two 
daughters, Reva and Didi, by his second, French wife, Claude. According to Benjamin A. 
Batson, 'Phra Sarasas: Rebel with Many Causes’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 27 1 
(March 1996), Phra Sarasas had five children with a Thai Bangkok wife. His eldest son’is 
Captain Somwang and the eldest daughter is Ngarmchit, who married a high ranking prince of 
the Chakri, H.H. Prince Prem Purachatra.
121 Mistui Thai-Room. However, according to Benjamin A. Batson, 'Phra Sarasas: Rebel 
with Many Causes’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 27,1 (March 1996), Phra Sarasas left 
Thailand in August 1935 and his first stay in Japan lasted about two years.His second stay was 
from the end of 1939 to early 1945: p. 154 and p. 156.
122 Phra Sarasas, Money and Banking in Japan, London: Heath Cranton, 1940. This book 
consists of three parts. Administration, Money, Banking. In the preface, he wrote: 'It became 
evident to the author that a book which will throw light on the difficult position of Japan 
(which claims a place in the sun), her problems, her hardships, may contribute to a right 
understanding and a fair sympathy which will pave the way to international accord and amity. 
For this aim and purpose the book needs not only relevant facts but also a clear and candid 
presentation of the true aim and intention of this nation together with the principles 
underlying these facts in order that it may make at once a constructive as well as an objective 
study.' An article of dialogue on the economy between Phra Sarasas and Tesuji Kada 
appeared in Kokusai bunka, March 1941, pp. 18-24.
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He went back to Thailand in 1945, and later took up minor official 
and semi-official positions. The little information on Phra Sarasas’s postwar 
activities makes it difficult to describe his life after 1945. However Batson 
suggests:
At some point in this period, Phra Sarasas returned to Europe, and then to North 
Africa, where he had friends with political influence. He went into tea planting, only to be 
caught up in yet another political upheaval in which his patrons lost their positions and he “lost 
everything”. After this setback he retreated again to France, where he died in obscurity in 
1966. A memorial service in Paris was attended by two people, his son and a Thai diplomat.123 
Among his economics books, Setthasat waduai setthakitkankha
(1937), and Setthasat waduai setthakitkangoen (1938), are particularly
important in terms of their influence on Thai society.124 The former was
written in Tokyo in 1937, and extracts were published in a local
newspaper, Thai Ma/.125 Phra Sarasas stressed the importance of studying
economics for the Thai people. He argued that the government did not
understand the importance of having an economic policy and an economic
plan. To put it another way, the government did not realise the value of
economics, which could bring about development.
In the preface to this book he considered the reasons why
Thailand was becoming poorer and poorer.126 This was not the fault of the
people, but a result of the ignorance of economics on the part of the people
and the government. He gave as an example the breakdown of a car which
could be repaired only by an expert. He said that the mechanisms of
economics were greatly more complicated than those of a car. Second, he
argued that the economics texts used in foreign countries were obscure and
123 Benjamin A. Batson, Phra Sarasas: Rebel with Many Causes’, Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies 27, 1 (March 1996), p. 162.
124 Setthasat waduai setthakitkangoen (1938) was not available In the libraries of 
Chulalongkorn, Thammasat and the National Library during my research trip.
125 Sunthari Asawai, ‘PhraSarasasnaPhonkhankap tarnrasetthasat waduai setthakit 
kankha’ (Phra Sarasas and the 'Economics of Commerce’ text), Chulasan Thai Khadi syksa 
[Thai Khadi Research Institute Bulletin], August 1991.
126 Phra S arasasnaphonkhan, Setthasat waduai setthakitkankha, 
Sophonphiphatthanakon, 1937, Preface.
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complicated. Therefore readers were bored with them and did not 
understand the intentions or thoughts of the authors. In Thailand, the people 
who understood economics were lawyers. In fact, economics was taught at 
Law School.127 It was common for lawyers to write economics texts. The 
problem was that most lawyers preferred to use sophisticated vocabulary 
and an eloquent style, consequently readers had difficulty in 
understanding.128 Therefore the people who read these texts came to realise 
that studying economics needed a teacher, or a higher education. He also 
suggested that studying economics was difficult in the beginning but easy in 
the end.
According to Phra Sarasas, his book in 1937 had three purposes. 
The first was that readers could understand economics without having a 
teacher or entering university. The second was to share his experiences and 
his lessons from life with the people. The third was that economics was 
necessary for everyone in Thailand. In other words, an individual's 
development would bring about the development of the household and of 
the people. A person's life, whether a coolie or a minister, depended on 
economics. He thought much of the role of economics in the future. The 
division of labour’ wouid expand the range of occupations, especially in 
commerce and government. In addition, the expansion of occupations 
depended on economics, because development required knowledge of 
economics. In spite of his emphasis on the role of economics, he did not ask 
the people to be economists. What he intended was that everyone should 
know elementary economics in order to understand the political, economic 
and social problems which they encountered each day.
In Thailand, the teaching of economics began with the establishment of 
Thammasat University in 1934. In the Law School, economics was taught as a minor 
subject. Pridi and Duan Bunnang taught economics at the School.
128 Phra Sarasasnaphonkhan explained that Duan Bunnag was an exception
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His book was banned by the government in 1938.129 Phra 
Sarasas gave his reaction to this decision in letters to the prime minister and 
to Luang Adundetcarat, minister and director-general of the Police 
Department.130 In his letter to the prime minister on 8 December 1938, he 
pointed to the government’s ignorance of the People's Party sixth principle - 
that the people must be given the best education possible. Public opinion 
thought that the government action had been too severe. The book was 
published by Prachachat and widely advertised.131 He also maintained that 
the book was not about politics but economics. It was a history of finance. A 
paragraph, ‘whereas power had once resided in those with weapons [i.e., the 
military] it now lay with those who had money’, became controversial. Batson 
argues:
Phra Sarasas argued that he was simply stating historical fact, that he himself had a 
military background and he had intended no reflection on the Thai military, that suppression of 
knowledge and honest opinions would contradict the ‘6 Principles' professed by the People’s 
Party, that the text had previously appeared serially in the newspaper Prachachat without 
drawing official reaction, and that he was willing to make modifications to satisfy the 
authorities.132
Public opinion, he suggested, thought that the government intended to 
discourage the authors of text books. He argued that Thailand needed these 
texts.
An article, ‘Tamra Setthasat khong 555’, on 9 December 1938, 
was sympathetic to Phra Sarasas. The writer was shocked that the book had 
been confiscated by the police, and he expressed his thanks to the editor 
who had published Phra Sarasas in Phrachachat in serial form. He criticized 
the government indirectly: ‘An economics text has nothing to do with
129 s . R .  0201.8/85. N.A. The book was Tamra setthasat lem 2  (Economics Text, Vol 2).
130 Ibid.
131 It is not clear whether parts of Phra Sarasas’ book were published in 
Phrachachat. However, an article in Phrachachat on 9 December 1938 noted publication in 
the newspaper.
132 Benjamin A. Batson, ‘Phra Sarasas: Rebel with Many Causes’, Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies 27,1  (March 1996), p. 155.
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nationality, party, or group. It is something like a shelter under a big tree, 
where people all over the world take a rest for a while.’133
The last part of this section is concerned with the political and
historical ideas of Phra Sarasas. As politician, economist and journalist he
had many, but it seems that only one aspect of his life has been emphasized
in earlier studies. His political role during his stay in France in the early
1930's deserves more attention. A Foreign Office document describes him:
’Whilst in France he is alleged to have been an agent of the Third
International and to have tried to form a communistic association among
Siamese students in Europe, more particularly in France.'134 Vella notes:
At least one older Thai, Phra Sarasat, who was an outspoken critic of the Thai 
government and was in France as a political refugee, played a part in shaping the views of the 
Thai students abroad. The Thai government forbade other Thai to see him, but Sarasat 
propagandized the students against the government by pamphlet and letter.135
These letters, written in English, can be found in Thailand.136 Phra 
Sarasas describes them in these terms:
These letters were written in 1930, that is to say, two years before the Revolution of 
June 24, 1932; and the contents were freely distributed to the Siamese patriots then studying 
in England and France. They were the 'notorious pamphlets' which the Despotic regime so 
much dreaded that the government of France was asked to use its good offices to expel the 
author. Happily that democratic country neither suppressed the pamphlets nor expelled the 
author.137
These letters have several important meanings. First, it is clear that Phra 
Sarasas wrote them In order to incite Siamese students. It is worth noting
that Phra Sarasas wrote 29 letters from 14 July 1930 to 11 August 1930,
133 Phrachachat, 9 December 1938, Tam ra Setthasat khong555\
134 j .  Crosby to FO No. 3, 3 January 1935, F1261/1261/40, FO 371/19379, PRO.
135 Walter F. Vella, The Impact of the West on Government in Thailand, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1955, p.364. Vella does not mention where these pamphlets 
and letters can be found.
136 Nakharin Mektrairat, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat 
University found these letters in Phra Sarasas' home in Thailand in 1992. They have not yet 
been published in Thailand.
137 ibid. The title of these letters by Phra Sarasas was T o  the Siamese Revolutionary 
Party of 24th June 1934.’ These phrases were written in Tokyo, 1 October 1937
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totalling 151 pages.138 Second, these letters were not merely political
pamphlets, but a kind of political and economic text, which preach the
necessity of revolution in Siam.139 Third, Phra Sarasas' attitude towards the
Siamese absolute monarchy was critical. His descriptions here seem more
radical than those in his book, My Country Thailand, which was published in 
1940.140
Part of these letters are concerned with the various forms of 
government, despotism, aristocracy and democracy, with many quotations 
from the great figures, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hobbes and Locke. Phra 
Sarasas examines these various forms in world history with many examples 
from Europe-Greece, Rome, England, France and Germany. For example, 
he borrowed a definition of 'despotism' from Bossuet, tutor of the Dauphin, 
son of Louis XIV. ‘Despotism’ is defined in the following terms:
1. royal authority is absolute. The Monarchs are gods and are invested with divine 
immunity. The words of a king are omnipotent and no voice may ask him, ‘Why do you do 
such?’; 2. a judgement pronounced by a monarch is immutable: no other judgement may be 
superimposed, for the royal authority is absolute; there can be none other. Woe betide he who 
disobeys; 3. there is no coactive force against a monarch, therefore it is to be deduced that his 
authority recognizes neither limitation nor resistance; 4. the people should fear their king, for 
the people have an inclination toward servility and vice. Endowed with a king, they will dwell 
forever in peace under his sceptre.141
Phra Sarasas explained how and why benevolent despotism occurred and 
was diffused in Europe, and also notes its decline because of two 
fundamental causes: 'one pre-eminently material, which affected the world
Phra Sarasas' French wife, Claude, wrote a Supplement in Paris, 1 September 1930.
139 phra Sarasas, T o  the Siamese Revolutionary Party of 24th June 1934.’ Phra 
Sarasas wrote in the preface: This little volume is neither political theory nor political 
philosophy as I only try to depict the vital episodes of the life of Siam and to draw my 
countrymen s attention to the danger which lay at her door.’ However this statement does 
not apply to his letters, which explained various forms of government despotism 
aristocracy and democracy.
140 Phra Sarasas, My Country Thailand, 6th ed., Bangkok: Golden Service Co 1960
This book is about the history, geography and civilisation of Thailand. Phra Sarasas covers
the Ayudhya and post-Ayudaya periods by the rule of each King.
141 Phra Sarasas, T o  the Siamese Revolutionary Party of 24th June 1934 ' Letter No 3
‘Despotism’, 16 July 1930.
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on its physical plane, such as the discovery of America, and one
predominantly subjective which transformed the intellectual attitude, namely
the Renaissance with the Reformation.1142 Phra Sarasas tries to make clear
the difference between the benevolent despotisms of Europe and those of 
Asia.
It should be abundantly clear now that Despotism, even Benevolent Despotism 
represented by enlightened monarchs, has demonstrated its uselessness, its perfect futility, 
in the modern universe. Therefore, in the name of justice and in the name of happiness for the 
human race, it should be shamed out of existence. But how is it that it still rules on the throne 
of a wonderful country in Asia? The answer lies in the ignorance of the masses, in religion, and 
in the tradition which gives it shelter and in the opulent property of the soil which, according to 
Rousseau, opens the door for, then feeds the despots.143
He also compared Europe and Asia in terms of law: ‘In Europe, the Roman 
emperors were among the first to promulgate 'Constitutions’ - general rules 
or laws, to be applied universally, but in Asia such laws were incorporated in 
religion.’144 The difference between the ancient despot and the modern one 
was that the former was absolute over all his subjects, but the latter is 
absolute over all his subjects and the law. In conclusion: ‘Our continent.has 
been and still remains the home of despots, and the most horrible oppression 
was practised and is still being practised in Asia.’145 He quoted Montesquieu 
and Rousseau in order to show how despotism causes pain to the people. 
Despotism caused such great pain to human nature that another pain 
minimizing the great suffering may be considered a blessing 
(Montesquieu).’146 Rousseau said in his Contract Social that in a despotic 
country, he sees only one master, while the remainder are slaves; he never 
sees the people and their chief. ‘If the Master perishes, his Kingdom or 
Empire, whatever it may be, perishes after him, because it will fall in disorder,
142 Ibid., Letter No.6, ‘Benevolent Despotism’, 19 July 1930.
143 Ibid., Letter No.8, 'Benevolent Despotism’, 21 July 1930.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid., Letter No.9, ‘Benevolent Despotism’, 22 July 1930
143 ibid.
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as the oak falls in ashes after the flame has devoured it.’147
A further part of these letters was concerned with the Government of 
Siam. In this part, Phra Sarasas talked about the despotic Siamese 
government, Siamese political history, present conditions, the reformers, 
education, and customs and traditions.148 His attack on the Siamese 
absolute monarchy is comprehensive, with the main aim to persuade his 
readers of the necessity for revolution in Siam. He says: 'Remember 
always that our country is the only country in the civilized world, which is still 
governed by Despotism - the only shameful living relic of the past.’149 He 
described the difficulty of getting accurate historical information:
Concerning the epochs before this, in so far as they touch our politics, it is very difficult 
to obtain any accurate and precise information, because our History has been, and is still 
being, written on behalf of the despotic Kings, in their interest, and for their glorification. When 
we get the first glimpse of our political life, this stage is already set for Monarchy [i.e., it is a 
stage occupied only by the monarchy].150
His criticism of the Siamese kings continues: 'We can say that every King of 
the House of CHAKRi showed genuine enthusiasm for the improvement of 
his dominion - but not of the people, because the people never exist.’151 It is 
important to note that in spite of his strong criticism of the Kings, Phra 
Sarasas did not mention the possibility of abolition of the monarchy. In other 
words, he concentrated on the role of the people based on the exercise of 
democracy. He says: ‘Our misfortune lies in the fact that the masses are 
degraded and miserable and have lost all hope and aspiration. How to alter 
th is?  We must begin to build our nation on the foundations of a healthy
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid. The second set starts from Letter No. 19, 1 August 1930, to Letter No. 29, 11 
August 1930. Letter No. 19 includes ‘Our Political History’; No.20 is ‘Why have we to 
change? , No.21 i s ‘Conservatism’; No.22 is T h e  Program of Despotism’; No.23 is ‘Our 
Present Conditions’ and T h e  Reformers’; No.26 is T he  fear of Democracy’; No 27 is 
‘Education’; No,28 is 'Customs and Traditions’; and No.29 is 'Historical fitness'.
149 Ibid., Letter No. 19, T he  Government of Siam’, 1 August 1930.
150 Ibid.
151 ibid.
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democracy.'152
Concerning economic aspects, Phra Sarasas noted two points. 
First, he admits that Siam is rich in natural resources. There is plenty of 
wealth in this country, but it remains unexpioited, natural resource with no 
exchange value; the Government instead of wrestling with its development in 
earnest, has adopted the doctrine of 'watch and wait’.’153 He pointed out that 
the problem was not the natural resources but the men who use them. Phra 
Sarasas quoted Talcott Williams:
A nation is made great not by its fruitful acres but by the men who cultivate them; not 
by its great forests but by the men who use them; not by its mines but by the men who work in
them America was a great land before Columbus discovered it - the Americans have made it
a great nation.154
Regarding the capability of men, Phra Sarasas argues that the Siamese 
have great possibilities:
In spite of ail drawbacks, the Siamese still hold their own against foreigners of all 
nations in respect of intelligence, because we are one of the most gifted creations - our nation 
is endowed with intellectual capacity and adaptability, but misuse of these two great qualities 
bring poverty, misery and degradation. Why? Is it not due to the policy of our despotic 
government?155
In order to achieve democracy, Phra Sarasas focused on the role of local 
government. He thought that establishing local government with full 
autonomy would decentralise government. That is to say, central 
government would become a federation of local governments, with 
Switzerland as the model.
The legislative and judiciary powers should be vested in the provincial council of 
representatives elected by the local governments. This council would do very well for 
temporary purposes until a regular and permanent House of Representatives could be 
established three years later. The power of the Crown shall be confined only to executive
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid., Letter No.24, T h e  Government of Siam’, 6 August 1930.
154 ibid.
155 Ibid.
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function.156
Phra Sarasas finished the last letter by saying:
Siam is anxious to see a new awakening, the pulsation of a new life in the whole nation. 
We must abolish all manner of artificial inequalities. A radical change is imperative. So long as 
the entire nation refuses to go mad for Liberty and Equality, so long will our salvation remain a 
chimera Let our face be turned towards Liberty and Equality.157
His book, My Country Thailand, also contains some interesting 
points. First, he argued that sending princes, nobles and commoners abroad 
to absorb Western knowledge was not very useful. Sending them away at an 
early age made it difficult for them to form their Siamese identity, and they 
realized the gap between Western society and Thai society when they 
returned.
It never occurred to the King to send men of ripe experience to the West as Emperor 
Meiji did, so Thailand lost much priceless time waiting for these young men to come back with
Western knowledge Naturally these men had little ability to do the work for which they had
studied and even less opportunity of doing it. Lack of knowledge of their own country and 
ignorance of its conditions, marred their achievements. Having been sent abroad at a very 
young age they came back quite out of touch with their native life and strived with fervid 
ambition to accomplish a great deal according to the recognised formula of the West.158
Second, Phra Sarasas discussed his press pen-name, 555.159
During his reign there was a newspaper publishing house in Bangkok owned by an 
American, issuing two dailies, one in Siamese and one in English. Special articles appeared 
from time to time in both papers written by a freelance who used the pseudonym of 555, who 
was a militant revolutionary. At first the writer attacked neither the King nor his government, but 
simply brought into contrast what were being done in Siam and in the democratic countries, 
which gave the readers plenty of food for thought. Later when he became known he began
156 ibid., Letter No.25, T h e  Government of Siam’, 7 August 1930
157 ibid., Letter No.29, T h e  Government of Siam’, 11 August 1930
156 Phra Sarasas, My Country Thailand, 6th ed., Bangkok: Golden Service Co.,1960,
p .131
159 The origin of his press pen-name, 555 is explained in Prince Chula’s book as follows:
'Phra Sarasas later became a successful journalist and wrote under the pseudonym “555,” and 
when I asked him why he chose that number, he explained that the "5" referred to the Fifth 
King of the Chakri Dynasty - Chulalongkorn - whom he worshipped, and it was repeated three 
times in reference to the Triple Gem of Buddhism.’ Chula Chakrabongse Prince H.R.H., The 
Twain Have Met: An Eastern Prince Came West, London: G.T. Foulis & Co. Ltd, 1957, p.93.
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to drop dark hints of the drawbacks and the dangers which Siam had been and would be 
courting unless his advocacies were adopted. His articles raised acute controversies and 
gradually moved from the stage of novelty to general adoption. They were accepted without 
cavil by the young Thai who went into rapture over them.160
Phra Sarasas said that the Siamese government was searching for 555 and 
found him in France.
It was this man who had drawn the Thai government's attention to himself by being the 
government's target, so that others who were revolutionaries like himself would have a free 
field for their zeal. It was known at that time that the seeds of sedition which 555 had sown, had 
sprouted and many intellectual Thai were working under cover towards a revolution.161
Benjamin A. Batson’s article on Phra Sarasas shows some part of his 
life, particularly his relations with Japan.162 Batson assessed Phra Sarasas’s 
views on politics, economic influence, and the writing of Thai history.
Firstly, Phra Sarasas played an important part in shaping the political developments of 
his time (even if he himself was at times prone to exaggerating his role). From 1910 to 1932 he 
was a major intellectual force in a movement for a change that, at least in its most immediate 
aims, was successful. From 1935 to 1945 he was a leading figure in a case that ultimately failed, 
but one that nevertheless is a significant and in many ways unique chapter in modern Thai 
history.163
This chapters study of his letters written in exile in France provides 
evidence that Phra Sarasas played an influential role in promoting the 
constitutional revolution. It is easy to conclude that some Siamese students 
overseas in Europe might have been influenced by his letters.
With respect to economics, Batson notes:
Secondly, it may be suggested that Phra Sarasas’ economic influence (which often 
seems to have been his prime concern) was greater than might first appear. Certainly his brief 
tenure as Minister of Economics Affairs was not notably successful, nor did his various 
proposals, plans, and schemes find much favour with those in power, or with a wider public. 
16?Cn £ hra Sarasas’ My  Country Thailand, 6th ed., Bangkok: Golden Service Co., 1960, 
known English newsPaPer maY have been the Bangkok Daily Mail, but the Thai is not
161 Ibid., p.152.
Benjamin A. Batson, Phra Sarsas: Rebel with Many Causes’, Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies 27, 1 (March 1996): pp. 150-165.
163 Ibid., p,162.
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Nevertheless, the mixture of economic nationalism and a degree of socialist centralised 
planning which he advocated - as did a number of other leaders, Thai and foreign, of his day - 
was by the end of the 1930s in large measure adopted in Thailand as government economic 
policy. Under such labels as ‘bureaucratic capitalism’ these doctrines would remain central to 
the Thai economy at least until the coming of Sarit and World Bank advisers in the late 
1950s.164
Although Batson says little about Phra Sarasas' Economic Plan in 1934 and 
his other books on economics, it is clear that Phra Sarasas had a socialist 
vision of the Siamese economy. The important point is that, as an economist, 
he did not emphasize theory but had flexible economic policies to deal with 
actual economic problems.
Concerning the last part, Batson states: 'Finally, Phra Sarasas has had 
a lasting, if controversial influence on the writing of Thai history.'165 Batson 
used several quotations from My Country Thailand: The work as a whole
is discursive, subjective, and unbalanced, but it offers some highly original 
interpretations, and in particular a view of monarchy virtually unprecedented 
in Thai historiography. Monarchy, for Phra Sarasas, is an almost unmitigated 
evil.’166 Although My Country Thailand was his major work, he wrote many 
articles on Siamese politics, economy and society under the pen-name 
‘555’, and his contribution to the mass media of the 1920s and 1930s 
should be carefully examined.
Although Batson throws light on parts of Phra Sarasas' complicated 
life, crucial periods, such as his exile in France in the late 1920s and his 
early life, are still missing. Batson emphasizes the many paradoxes of Phra 
Sarasas:
All in all, Phra Sarasas remains in many ways a paradoxical figure - a key actor in Thai 
politics of the first half of the twentieth century who at one time or another was at odds with 
almost every party or faction in the Thai ideological spectrum, a proclaimed socialist who found 
refuge in Japan at the height of the militarist period, and a long-time critic of monarchy who
164 ibid., p. 163.
165 ibid., p.163.
166 ibid., p.163.
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admired the Japanese imperial system.167
In conclusion, these three plans are important because they showed a 
comprehensive vision for Siamese economic development. Although, in 
general, they lacked practical measures they established crucial ideological 
principles. The confrontation between laissez faire, by Mangkom Samsen, 
and socialism and the state intervention in the economy advocated by Pridi 
and Phra Sarasas caused the government to take ideological positions and 
brought about wider discussion within the government. The government’s 
response to Pridi’s plan, in Chapters 1 and 8, show its serious concern.
In addition to that internal controversy, the foreign community, 
Crosby, the British Minister to Siam, and the foreign advisers, particularly the 
financial adviser, exhibited great concern over the plans of Pridi and Phra 
Sarasas. The foreign advisers’ severe attack on Phra Sarasas will be shown 
in Chapters 4 and 8, and Crosby’s comment on Pridi in Chapter 8.
One common theme in the plans of Pridi and Phra Sarasas was the 
co-operatives oriented strategy, the government response will be examined 
in Chapter 6. Another common theme was for a central or national bank, this 
will be explored in Chapter 7.
Ibid., pp. 164-5.
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4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, ten economic plans or economic ideas are to be examined. 
They can be summarised in six parts. First, Mano's and Komarakun's 
plans are presented. These plans of the two authors, who hated socialism 
and communism, were directly opposed to Pridi’s plan. Second, a request 
for a special budget by the Minister of Economic Affairs in 1934 is 
considered, as part of a political and economic conflict between Phra 
Sarasas and James Baxter, the Financial Adviser. Third, Boriphanyutthakit's 
plan in 1938, which was closely related to the establishment of the Thai Rice 
Co. in 1938 is examined. Fourth, there were many minor economic plans or 
ideas which were presented by the middle class. Among them, 
Wuthithonnetirak's plan for the establishment of the Samakhom Bamrung 
Setthakit on 25 July 1932 is discussed. Fifth, there is a case study of the 
establishment of two governmental institutions to promote trade in 1920 and 
1931, to show how economic policy before 1932 worked. Last, there were 
two plans by foreigners.
There are several points to be discussed here. It is important to realise 
that many individuals, not only the Siamese elite but the middle class, 
prepared plans or ideas for the government after the constitutional revolution 
in 1932. Their social and educational backgrounds were varied and a wide 
range of individuals participated in the argument as to how to deal with the 
Siamese economy. For example, their occupations included bureaucrat,
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politician, promoter, lawyer and merchant. According to the National 
Archives, in the two years 1932 and 1933, 130 issues concerning the 
Siamese economy were submitted as petitions or proposals, or opinions to 
the government.1 Details will be given in the section on the middle class in a 
later chapter. Another interesting point is that foreigners also played a role in 
the discussions. The foreigners were officials, including the foreign advisers 
and the Principal Trade Commissioner, and merchants.
Second, some authors had real business experience. Mangkorn 
Samsen's plan was examined in the previous chapter, but in addition one 
Thai and two foreign merchants put down their ideas, among them a British 
rice trade merchant, J.E. England, and a Danish merchant, H. Christiansen, 
the Principal Trade Commissioner.
Third, nationalism was in evidence in most of the economic plans. 
Nationalism means anti-Chinese and anti-foreigner, and to encourage the 
Thai to engage in business and buy Thai products. Chinese middlemen and 
Chinese rice millers were considered an obstacle to Siam's economic 
development, and several measures were discussed to deal with this. 
Foreign merchants were also attacked. It is interesting to note that even J.E. 
England strongly advocated economic nationalism.
Some measures and ideas were not new - they had been discussed 
by the old regime before 1932. For example, Mano's and Komarakun's plans 
included co-operatives, silos and experimental farms, which were under 
consideration by the absolute monarchy. On the other hand there were also 
new ideas. Wuthithonnetirak suggested the establishment of the Samakhom 
Bamrung Setthakit, and England proposed the creation of a company which 
would deal with every aspect of the rice business, from cultivation, milling, 
transportation, selling, and buying, to export.
Fourth, the role of government in the economy provoked divisions
i  S. R.0201.25. N.A.
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between those who sought positive government support and those who 
wanted less government involvement. Mano and Komarakun stressed 
government support, Wuthithamnethikorn and England supported the idea of 
self-reliance, which would require farmers and the people to participate fully 
in projects.
Lastly, similar ideas were often repeated in different plans. For 
example, Boriphanyutthakit's plan in 1938 can be traced back to England's 
proposal in 1932, or to Chote Khumphan's economic ideas in 1932. Even 
though England stressed self-reliance, without government intervention, he 
indicated the possibility of Thais competing with Chinese and Europeans in 
the rice business. In contrast, Chote supported government intervention in 
the rice business. It can be said that Boriphanyutthakit's ideas were similar to 
those of England and Chote. Boriphanyutthakit supported Chote’s ideas. He 
was also recommended as a member in Chote's plan.
4.2. Mano’s Economic Plan In 1933
Phraya Manopakorn's economic plan can be seen in the National Archives.2 
In 1933 at least three economic plans were submitted, those of Pridi, Phraya 
Manopakorn and Phraya Komarakun. When Pridi's plan was rejected by the 
cabinet on 28 March 1934, two conservative economic plans appeared, in 
March and September. These two economic plans have various similarities, 
and a strong tendency to oppose Pridi's plan.
Mano's plan, consisting of four parts, was presented at a meeting of
the Economic Council on 13 April 1933. In the introduction, the
reasons for the economic plan were explained. First of all, the Siamese
2 (2)S.R.0201.22/3. N. A. A full translation of Phraya Manopakorn's economic plan is
included in an article,'Siam’s Economic Policy’, Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 17 April 1933,
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people have been engaged only in agriculture, especially in rice farming, so 
that other crops have not expanded. Concerning trade, it has always been in 
the hands of foreigners, and the present trade depression has caused 
serious problems for the Siamese economy. In order to help Siam, Mano 
pointed out that there was a need to acquire experience and ability. He 
suggested the value in studying the experience of other countries in order 
to adapt them to Siamese needs. There were four basic constraints on his 
economic plan. First, the right of private property and freedom of occupation, 
as stated in the constitution, should be respected. Second, relations and 
treaties with foreign countries should be respected. Small countries such as 
Siam should maintain good relations with foreign countries. Third, public 
projects would be carried out in accordance with the real needs of the 
country and public opinion. Lastly, every new project should have an 
experimental phase to test its viability.
Mano's plan consisted of four parts; part 1, Survey and Experiment; 
part II, Planning; part III, Execution; and part IV, Improvement of the Condition 
of Agriculturalists and Labourers. Part I, Survey and Experiment, is as 
follows:
(1) a general survey of the whole country - its resources - to be made by an expert 
with a view to finding out the suitability of the soil for various kinds of cultivation;
(2) increase the agricultural and animal experimental stations;
(3) survey the vacant lands which are still without owners and modify the rule regarding chab 
chong (to lay claim to a piece of unpossessed land) to suit the cultivation of the land by the 
people;
(4) draw up an irrigation system and proceed by stages to improve the means of 
communication of the country with a view to encouraging agriculture and trade.3
Part II, Planning, is divided into three sections:
(1) set up a National Economic Council whose duty is to draw up in detail an economic 
programme, and to collect statistics with a view to checking and modifying the programme to 
procure the result intended;
(2) encourage the clearance of goods from the planters and producers so that they may reach 
the consumers by finding markets for these goods both within and without the country;
3 Bangkok Times Weekly M ail, 17 April 1933.
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(3) try to encourage and instruct the people so that they may have better knowledge and 
experience in trade and industry/
Part III, Execution:
(1) as regards undertakings of public utility, His Majesty's Government will have to control or 
participate in some of them. It will have to undertake some enterprises itself, as it is now 
doing in the case of electricity, water supply and irrigation;
(2) cooperative credit societies or such other institutions, as will really prove productive. The 
creation of silos, transportation and the production of certain commodities are important 
undertakings, and require even more capital and trading experience. However, a good 
number of individuals have already been engaged in these enterprises. Accordingly, His 
Majesty's Government should proceed in such a way as would be compatible with the interests 
of all concerned, that is the Government would share in the capital and the work of the 
undertaking with the company and individual concerned as a public corporation;
(3) settlement, that is provide land by way of purchase or chab chong for the people who 
have no land of their own or who are unemployed to cultivate or breed animals under the 
control and assistance of His Majesty's Government.5
Part IV concerns the improvement of the condition of agriculturalists and 
labourers. In this part, four undertakings are described: 1, extension of Co­
operative Credit Societies; 2, establishment of co-operative society stores in 
various localities; 3, silos for rice and other agricultural produce; 4, provision 
of land for agriculturalists who do not possess any land of their own.
The farmers were so affected by the slump in the price of crops and 
heavy interest charges that the problem of farmers' debt was vital. It is 
important to note that the role of co-operatives was emphasized as a means 
of settling the farmers' debt. Providing agricultural working capital to 
members of co-operative societies was important. In addition, reasonable 
prices for necessities and implements, by setting up co-operative society 
stores in the provinces, would be achieved. Establishing silos would mean 
that farmers would sell their crops at a good price. The government would 
also take into consideration milling to promote the interests of all concerned, 
including private enterprises. The farmers who did not own land would be 
provided with land, with the idea of setting up co-operative settlements. In
4 [bicL
5 ibid.
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order to clear and cultivate the land, loans would be offered by the co­
operative societies.
Mano explained that his plan was mainly based on agriculture, 
because agriculture was the backbone of the country. He did note attempts 
to assist commerce and industry but no concrete policies were mentioned. 
Mano made interesting points about foreign capital and government 
intervention in the economy.
We not only lack experience, but our capital is also small. W e have to depend on 
foreign materials in these regards. Accordingly, we should not think of acting independently by 
ourselves. We should, on the other hand, think of co-operating with them by forming a public 
corporation, in which His Majesty's Government has the largest share of the capital. At the 
present stage, however, we should concentrate on aiding and encouraging the existing 
agricultural undertakings or any future undertakings of the same nature.6
In conclusion, Mano suggested not rapid activity but steady work, 
assured by trials.
As regards the above programme, there are ways and means for His Majesty's 
Government to proceed with it within a short time. His Majesty's Government, however, will not 
be able to put the programme into operation throughout the Kingdom all at once. This matter is 
of great importance. It has to be thought over again and again. Experiments must be made, 
and it is only when a satisfactory result is assured that the work will be further extended.7
Mano's plan was underpinned by various principles and basic 
ideas. In his introduction, Mano stressed ‘liberalism’, respect for the right of 
private property and the liberty of the individual. However, the concept of 
‘state-socialism’ can be seen in sections of Parts III and IV. Government 
intervention in the economy, by creating state enterprises was mentioned. 
’Co-operatism’ played an important role. An extension of co-operative credit 
societies and the establishment of co-operative society stores were 
promoted. ‘Nationalism’ can also be seen, in that eliminating Chinese
middlemen and money-lenders would settle farmers' indebtedness.
6 Ibid.
7 ibid.
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However, there was no proposal to eliminate foreign influence from the 
economy entirely. The policies of the absolute monarchy can also be seen, in 
the proposal for the establishment of silos and in the survey of the country's 
resources, carried out by Dr. Zimmerman in 1930. In this respect Mano's 
plan involved a revival of some older economic policies. Relations with 
foreign countries was also emphasized, with foreign capital participation in 
state enterprise being recommended.
4.3. Komarakun's Economic Plan in 1933
Before examining the Komarakun plan, there are three points to be
considered. First, the early 1930's economic depression hit the farmers
seriously. There were several factors, including the high exchange value of
the baht, because Siam remained on gold, which brought about a rapid fall
in the domestic price of rice.8 According to Economic Conditions in Siam in
1934, by the British Department of Overseas Trade:
Re-adjustment and re-organisation in the wake of economic depression and political 
change have been the main task of Siam in 1934 and, though the task has by no means been 
completed, there can already be no doubt that the country has passed through a difficult
period with greater success than the majority of others faced with similar difficulties .....
Government has been able to turn its attention to general economic questions and to consider 
such important problems as the dependence of Siam on rice and the impoverished condition 
of the farmer and it may be hoped that it will shortly be in a position to embark on a constructive 
programme.9
It is important to note that Siam's national debt was small, and that the budget
8 Department of Overseas Trade, Economic Conditions in Siam at the close of the
third quarter, 1932, London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1933, p.8. ‘Prices of primary produce, 
already low, were further reduced by the high exchange value of the Baht in terms of 
currencies on a Sterling basis (it is with such countries that a large part of Siam's trade is done)
  the low prices realized for rice, farmers were compelled to sell, being unable to hold out;
and that commodity continued to go out of the country in large quantities through the year, 
the exports far exceeding any of the official estimates made of the total available for export.’
9 Department of Overseas Trade, Economic Conditions in Siam at the close of 1934,
London; H.M. Stationery Office, 1935, p.1.
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in 1932-33 produced a surplus, following drastic cuts in expenditure.10
The life of the farmers became worse with the decline in the price of 
rice. According to Economic Conditions in Siam, 1932, ‘the monetary return 
received by the growers was, however, insufficient to cover all their needs, 
and they had to dispose of such hoarded gold and gold ornaments as they 
possessed, resulting in a considerable export of those articles.’11 In addition 
to the decline in the price of rice, Siam faced difficulties in the international 
rice trade.12 These factors encouraged the government to present an 
economic plan, focusing on the development of local industries and the 
growing of crops other than rice.
The second point is to note the similarity with, and difference 
between, Mano's plan and that of Komarakun. Both authors were educated in 
England and believed in liberalism, yet their economic ideas were different. 
Komarakun’s economic ideas were based on the principles of liberalism, 
Mano seemed to be conservative. Both their plans were submitted to counter 
that of Pridi.
Komarakun's economic plan can be found in the National Archives,
S.R.0201.22/3. There is also a cremation book.13 He started his career in
the Ministry of Finance in 1908.14 He studied in England from 1910 to 1916,
graduating from the London School of Economics and Political Science as a
19 Ibid., p. 1. ‘After budgetary deficits in 1930-31 and 1931-32, in the following year
drastic cuts were made in expenditure and a surplus was realised on the ordinary budget of 
nearly nine and a half million ticals.’ With respect to the national debt: ‘When it is considered 
in addition that the National Debt is small {amounting in all to £7,928,069 and Ticals 
10,000,000) and that there exist an ample Treasury Reserve Fund, the condition of Siamese 
finances may well be the envy of most nations.’
11 Department of Overseas Trade, Economic Conditions in Siam at the close of the third 
quarter, 1932, London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1933, p.8.
12 For example, the Netherlands East Indies and Japan had closed their markets to 
Siam’s rice, and the imposition of import duties on rice entering Kwangtung province in China 
caused severe hardship for Siamese rice exports.
13 Pramuanwohan khong Phraya Komarakun Montri, Phimnuang nai ngan 
phraratchathan phloengsop, Maha-amnat-ek Phraya Komarakun Montri, Watthepsirintharawat, 
23 March 1962.
14 Phraya Komarakun also played an important role under the absolute monarchy. For 
example, he was appointed Minister of Finance on 1 April 1930.
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barrister at law. He worked for the new regime as Minister of Economic 
Affairs from June to December 1933. At that time, the National Economic 
Council (Sapha Setthakit) was established, and Komarakun was the 
President of the Council. He made a speech at its first meeting on 16 August:
The National Economic Council is one of the most important institutions in the country. 
Its duty is to deal with all economic problems, and these have a very wide scope, covering 
almost every branch of science and human activities.15
Komarakun's plan consisted of four main parts; general economy,
agriculture, industry and commerce. First of all, he noted that the National 
Economic Council was in a position to provide an economic programme for 
the government. The aim of this plan was to investigate the causes of the low 
selling price of rice, which had brought poverty to the people. Among the 
objectives of the plan were to utilise unused land, and to increase exports in 
terms of quantity and variety.
The first part of the plan concerned the general economy. In order to 
promote the general economy, ten measures were emphasized: government 
financial policy to create capital, the establishment of a Sapha Ngoentra 
(National Monetary Council), improvement of transportation, including 
railways, post, telephone, telex, roads, waterways and canals, air routes to 
link every part of the country, a search for new ways to promote foreign trade, 
investigation of mineral resources, production of new products and 
preservation of resources, expansion of science, a search for ways to 
expand the savings of the people, to provide education and training for those 
who wished to engage in commerce and industry and lastly, the 
establishment of a Thai Chamber of Commerce.
The second part of the plan concerned agriculture. In this part, there 
were five measures. First, the provision of capital through co-operatives,
setting up silos and rice warehouses, providing capital on the security of rice,
15 Bailey to FO No. 136, 18 August 1933, F6243/42/40, F0371/17175, PRO.
129
establishing a central agricultural credit institution. Second, establishing land 
co-operatives to provide land for landless farmers. Third, the expansion of 
experimental farms to reduce planting costs, improve quality, expand 
farming knowledge, and create work throughout the year. Fourth and fifth, 
the expansion of irrigation, and research and advice to farmers.
Concerning industry, three measures were considered. Firstly to 
regulate patents, trade marks, company names, design, samples and 
copyright. Second, to establish a state company, allowing the private sector 
to hold shares and lastly to enact laws concerning working conditions.
In order to promote commerce, four measures were suggested; to set 
up a warehouse for rice, to expand foreign markets, to establish internal and 
external agents in order to protect the quality of Thai products, and to 
promote Thai trade and companies.
In the conclusion, ten proposals for immediate government action 
were listed; expansion of credit co-operatives, examination of co-operatives 
for tenant farmers, expansion of transportation, establishment of rice 
warehouses, crop warehouses, encouragement of savings, expansion of 
foreign markets and the creation of commercial agents, establishment of a 
central agricultural credit institution, expansion of experimental farms and 
construction of irrigation works.
The last part of this section concerns Komarakun's economic thought. 
According to his cremation volume, he expressed views on the economy and 
on inflation.16 In the section on the economy, he defined 'Setthakit' in two 
words: ‘Settha’ means best, and ‘Kit’, work. On the other hand, in the west, 
‘economy1 is made of two words, ‘eco’ means house, ‘nomos’ means control. 
In English, it is easy to understand ‘economy’ as meaning ‘to control the
16 Pramuanwohan khong Phraya Komarakun Montri, Phimnuang nai ngan 
phraradchathan phloengsop, Maha-amnat-ek Phraya Komarakun Montri (Cremation Volume 
of Phraya Komarakun), Watthepsirintharawat, 23 March 1962. Setthakit khong rao, pp. 129- 
134, and Ngoenphitpokati, pp. 157-160.
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house’. This meaning applies to the private person, group, nation and world. 
This is sometimes called 'political economy’, which means to control the 
assets of a country. Buddha divided the necessities of life into four; food, 
shelter, clothing and medicine. However, in present times, two more factors, 
transportation and study, were necessary. He argued that depending on the 
same economics textbook for every country was impossible. For example, 
Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill were suitable for England, and Stalin for 
Russia. The Thai would imitate several models. Of the six factors mentioned 
above, Thais had enough food and shelter, but were short of clothes, 
medicine, transportation and education.
Komarakun argued that the word ‘ngoenfoe’ in Thai was used for 
‘inflation’. Inflation in English had two meanings; distend with air or gas and 
artificial or false condition of the currency. His point was that 
‘ngoenphitpokati’ (abnormal money) was a more suitable word for inflation.17 
He also defined the meanings of money, currency and cash. Komarakun 
quoted from an American economist: 'Money is the nothing you get for 
something before you get anything.’18 He distinguished between money and 
bank notes, in terms of their value. To put it another way, the value of money 
was based on the metal content, but this was not the case with bank notes. 
According to his definition, ‘inflation’ meant to issue more bank notes than 
products. The value of bank notes depends on the price of products. For 
example, as the demand for products increases, the price of goods would 
increase. On the other hand, as the demand for goods decreases, the price of 
goods would decrease. However, in inflation, the quantity of bank notes 
would be larger than that of products. Lastly, Komarakun noted the three 
reasons for inflation; government, bank and nation. When government faces 
a gap between revenue and expenditure, it has two choices; to increase
17 ibid", p 157.
18 ibid., p.158.
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taxes and borrow, or to issue bank notes. Banks also provide loans and 
credit to customers through issuing bank notes. When the people use money 
rapidly, the increased velocity of circulation would bring about inflation.
4.4. The Special Budget of the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 
1934
This section consists of three parts: first, a political conflict in 1934, 
second, a request for a special budget by the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and third, an argument between the Minister of Economic Affairs and the 
Financial Adviser about Phra Sarasas' economic plan. At that time the 
Minister of Economic Affairs was Phra Sarasas and he raised various 
controversial issues, including his economic plan.
In 1934, political conflict brought about many economic problems. 
On 29 March 1934, four ministers - Defence, Interior, Public Instruction and 
Economic Affairs resigned, and Pridi, Phra Sarasas Prabandh and Phra 
Sarasas Bolakandh took over the Ministry of Interior, Public Instruction and 
Economics respectively. They all belonged to the Pridi faction, and now they 
took power in the cabinet. Before they were assigned their positions, a 
severe political conflict occurred around the appointment of the Finance 
Minister. Chao Phraya Siridharmadhibu, the Minister of Finance, became 
powerless in dealing with the allocation of the budget. James Baxter, the 
Financial Adviser, said: The Budget was taken completely out of his hands 
and dealt with in detail by the whole State Council, that is, by 18 people 
sitting round a table.’13 Sridharmadhibu expressed a desire to resign, but 
was persuaded to remain in order to avoid a clash between the moderates 
and the extremists. That is to say, the Army wanted to push Rajawangsam
19 Coultas to FO No. 108, 10 May 1934, F3068/21/40. FO371/18207, PRO. Copy of a 
letter dated 17 April 1934 from Mr. James Baxter, Bangkok, to Sir Edward Cook, Cairo.
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into Finance, but the Pridi party recommended Phra Sarasas, Pridi's 
supporter. Controlling the key position of Minister of Finance would have 
brought about serious political conflict if Sridharmadhibu had resigned. Even 
though the Pridi faction did not succeed in pushing Phra Sarasas into the 
Ministry of Finance, they still controlled vital positions in the government. 
James Baxter was afraid of their influence:
Pradit has been made Minister of Interior, Sarasat, Minister of Economic Affairs. They 
have the advantage over all the Sridharmadhibus of having a plan, knowing what they want and 
meaning to get it. These two are at the moment the real Government. And their intention is 
undoubtedly to work for a socialist state. I do not believe they will succeed.20
Another political crisis occurred in August when Chote Khumphan and 
other members were arrested on a charge of conspiracy. At that time, Chote 
was Director-General at the Department of Commerce in the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs under Phra Sarasas. Chote has been mainly studied for his 
political thought, his ultra-nationalism, but other aspects, such as his 
economic ideas or his study in Germany should also be noted.21 After 
returning to Siam in 1933, with a degree of Dr. Rerpol (Politics and 
Economics) from Germany, Chote started a nationalist political movement.
20 Ibid.
21 See his cremation book, Ratthathamanun chabap pathomma-roek con thung 
patcuban nai kaan phraratchathaanphloengsop Doctor Chote Khumphan, 30 September 
2514. Chote was bom to a humble family on 29 May 1899. His first turning point came when 
he joined the Siamese Expeditionary Force (total members, 1,284) in 1917 and went to 
France. He returned to Siam on 14 October 1917, and decided to go to Germany for study. He 
was in Germany for fourteen years, from September 1919 to 1933. In 1925 he entered 
Berlin University, and received the degree of Diploma Kaufmann (Commerce). In 1929 he 
transferred to Leipzig University to study politics and economics for a PhD degree. He 
obtained the degree of Dr. RER.POL in 1932, and his PhD thesis was "Siamswirtschaftlicher 
Aufbau, Aussenhandel Und Zahlungsbilang". He came back to Siam in 1933, and entered the 
Ministry of Defence. He was transferred to the Ministry of Economic Affairs in August 1933, 
and was promoted to Director-General of the Department of Commerce in June 1934. He was 
arrested on a charge of conspiracy on 15 August 1934, and was detained in Mae Hong Sorn 
province for five years. In 1938, Chote was prosecuted on a charge of plotting against the 
government, and kept in prison. At the end of 1944, Chote was released under an amnesty of 
the government of Khwang Aphaiwong. He was elected M.P. in Bangkok in 1945. He played 
an important role in establishing the Democratic Party (Prachathipat) in 1946, with Seni Pramot 
and Kukurit Pramot. His nationalist ideas seem to have changed during his long detention. 
He retired from politics in 1952, and died on 24 May 1971.
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He thought much of Nation, Religion, and Justice, and distributed a 
medallion including these three words.22 The Premier, Phraya Phahon, was 
afraid of the influence of this movement and asked Dr. Chote to give it up. In 
the end, Chote gave up this project on condition that the Ministry of Public 
Instruction should attend to it. A British document, based on Dormer's 
interview with Chote, revealed a little of his political ideas.23 According to this 
document, Chote had a good relationship with Pridi, but did not agree with 
his ‘Marxist’ ideas. Dormer describes:
Dr. Joti then explained that his own activities were directed mainly to the elimination of 
the Chinese influence and power in Siam. This he would do by substituting co-operative 
societies for the Chinese traders and by the establishment of a central bank. He was not 
opposed to the introduction of foreign capital and European or American enterprise. He was 
concerned only with preventing the Chinaman from taking the major profits of Siamese trade 
and avoiding taxation. He was vague as to how his plan was to be achieved. He seemed ready 
to organise a new revolution if he got the chance .... He thought any form of democratic 
government hopeless in Siam, and asked only for a strong Government which would be willing 
to carry out wide economic reforms.24
This report also revealed the number of Chote's followers, 2,000, and that 
Chote was closely watched by the government. The real reason why Chote 
was arrested on 15 August 1934 is not clear, but the government charged 
him with acting against the Constitution of B.E.2476, which provides for the 
peace and good order of the people.25
Chote was one of the few Thai economists who had a foreign higher 
degree at that time. Chote saw economics as a practical science, and made 
money through the application of economics. His interest in business and his 
actual business experience in his early days pushed him into the study of
22 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 24 June 1933.
23 Dormer to FO No. 73, 22 March 1934, F3037/21/40, FO371/18206, PRO.
24 Ibid.
25 S.R. 0201.15/12. N.A. Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 17 August 1934, and 9 October
1934.
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economics in Germany.26 Thomas Silcok described Chote:
Chote was probably not the first trained economist in Thailand, though he must have 
been among the first few. He was almost certainly the first to teach economics as an academic 
subject. He must have been a stimulating teacher during the few years in which he taught.... 
Monetary phenomena clearly interested him in his youth, and he was one of the early
supporters of the idea of a national bank for Thailand Those aspects of economics which
were concerned with making money were, to Chote, the trivia of the subject. True economics 
was the study of the structure of one part of man's political life. This was why, to the very last, 
he fought against the use of the term Setthasat for economics.27
Chote's economic ideas during the 1930's can be seen in the
National Archives. Chote's letter to the Prime Minister on 31 August 1933
contained his ideas on dealing with the rice problem.28 He started by saying
that Siamese commerce was now in the hands of foreigners. For example,
even though foreign consumers paid about 20 baht for Siamese rice (60 kg),
Siamese farmers received only 2 baht. In order to sell rice directly to the
wholesaler and retail merchant, Chote suggested the establishment of a
company, Phanitchayakan Thai, with capital of two million baht. Half of the
capital would be provided by the government and the rest by the private
sector. The company would first purchase rice from the government
warehouse and mill it, by renting rice mills, to sell in the domestic market.
The second stage would be to establish its own rice mills. In the final stage,
the company would export directly to foreign wholesalers and retail
merchants, initially in the Malay peninsula, Hong Kong, Havana and Java.
He advocated the abolition of consulates where the company was involved in
trade, appointing the managers as deputy consul to save the government’s
26 According to Chote's cremation book, he demonstrated this interest when he went
to France with the Siamese Expeditionary Force in 1917. It is believed that Chote studied in 
Germany with private funds, which he gained from business. However, the National Archives 
document shows that Chote was supported by the King for some time. For example, a letter 
to Chao Phraya Sriphiphat from Boriphatra, dated 6 June 1931, shows that Chote was to 
receive financial support from the King for three years from 1 July 1930. However, suspicion 
of Chote's involvement in Prince Damratdamrong Thaewakun's cheque robbery in 
December 1930 terminated his financial support. In addition, Chote was asked to pay his 
debts by his landlady in Germany, and she asked for help from the Siamese Legation in Berlin. 
See the file of Chote Khumpan R.7 B.2.1./54. N.A.
27 Chote's cremation book. 'Kamwaiaalai khong Prof. Silcock’.
28 S.R. 0201.8/14. N.A.
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funds. The managers would first be responsible for selling Siamese rice and 
later other products. In addition, they would find suitable and cheap imports. 
Chote's plan seems quite similar to the proposal for the Thai Rice 
Company made by Phao Boriphanyutthakit in 1938. it seems that the latter 
was influenced by Chote's ideas. Chote named Phao Boriphanyutthakit as 
one of the nine members of the project committee, including Mangkorn 
Samsen, Luang Wichitwatakan and Chote himself.29 These four were well 
known for their nationalist political and economic ideas. Second, Chote 
aimed to eliminate middlemen, mainly the Chinese, from the rice trade. In 
this document, he did not mention the Chinese middlemen, but his hatred of 
the Chinese was clear.30 Chote also believed that co-operatives would 
improve the standard of living in Siam. However, his co-operatives were 
quite different from those in foreign countries. The government's role was 
limited to introducing, helping, and supporting co-operatives; the owner of 
the co-operative would be the people. Chote believed that co-operatives 
could eliminate middlemen.31
4.5. The Request for a Special Budget by the Minister of 
Economic Affairs, 1934
In this section two main points will be discussed. First, the request for a 
special budget by Phra Sarasas, the Minister of Economic Affairs, in 1934, its 
aims, plan, and the consequent dispute with James Baxter, the Financial 
Adviser. Second, the dispute over Phra Sarasas1 economic plan in 1934,
29 Ibid. The other members were Naiphantri Chamunsuraritphrutthikrai, Nai Kengseng 
Umrat, Nai Tikhow Sriwong, Naiphanek Phrasuriyasat and Nai Limkhun (ex-member of the 
Board of Commercial Development).
30 Chote blamed the Chinese for exploiting ihe Thai, and Chinese women for not being 
willing to marry Thais.
31 Chote’s cremation book. ‘Phu hai kamnoet’, by Khuwang Aphaiwong.
136
between Phra Sarasas and the foreign advisers.
A letter to the Prime Minister, Phahon, by Phra Sarasas, 9 August 
1934, can be found in the National Archives.32 In this letter, Phra Sarasas 
asked the government to spend three million baht in a special budget in 
order to deal with the economic crisis. He gave, as an example of a special 
budget, the Budgets Annexes and Budgets Industrials in France. Second, he 
stressed that expenditure was required immediately and that it would be too 
late to wait for a plan. Third, he maintained:
Capital expenditure should not be added to administrative expenditure. The two 
should be separate as is done in other countries. Capita! expenditure is an asset not a liability. If 
this expenditure is included in ordinary expenditure, the budget will not balance and harm may 
result.33
Phra Sarasas did not explain how he would use this special budget. He did 
not explain how the figure of three million baht was reached. This figure was 
equivalent to about half the expenditure of the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 
1934/35.34 However, one of his intentions was to establish state enterprises, 
such as the Siamese Paper Company.35 Phra Sarasas1 letter caused several 
arguments in the government. Chao Phraya Sirithamathibet, the Minister of 
Finance, sent a letter on this matter to the Secretary-General of the 
Cabinet on 13 August 1934.36 The Finance Minister criticized Phra Sarasas 
for submitting a new proposal in August, because supplementary estimates
32 (2)S.R .0201.22/11. N.A.
33 Ibid.
34 According to the Statistical Yearbook of Thailand 2480-2481 , the expenditure for the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1934/35 was 6,374,994 baht. This figure fell sharply to 
3,002,117 baht in 1935/36, but in 1936/37 increased to 11,403,747 baht. In general, 
budget allocations had been concentrated on Defence and the interior. For example 
Defence and the Interior accounted for 22%  and 23% of total expenditure in 1934/35. In 
contrast, the Ministry of Economic Affairs accounted for only 8.4% in the same year.
33 The proposal for the Siam Paper Company was connected with state participation in 
industrial undertakings, in which the government would subscribe 51 percent of the capital of 
1 million baht. According to a Foreign Office document, Phraya Phahon, Phra Sarasas and 
other members of the government, signed the company's prospectus, in spite of failing to 
approve a budgetary provision, or discussing it in cabinet. European firms in Bangkok were 
asked to join this scheme. See details in Coultas to FO No108, 10 May 1934 F3068/21/40 
F0371 /18207, PRO.
36 (2)S.R.0201.22/11 N.A.
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submitted by departments of state had already been discussed by the 
Finance Committee of the State Council at the end of July. At that time, the 
supplementary estimates of the Ministry of Economic Affairs had not 
appeared. The Finance Committee had already approved the supplementary 
budget and was prepared for it to be discussed in the Assembly. Second, this 
request did not specify concrete economic measures. Third, it was incorrect 
to ask for a budget first and submit a plan later. Regarding the Budgets 
Annexes and Budgets Industriels, the Minister of Finance maintained that 
they were different from the request by Phra Sarasas. The Minister of Finance 
did not agree with Phra Sarasas that capital expenditure should be 
separated from ordinary expenditure. The Minister of Finance thought that a 
balanced budget was extremely important.37
James Baxter, the Financial Adviser, played an important role in 
opposing not only Phra Sarasas' economic plan in 1934 but also his various 
economic policies. It is worth noting that James Baxter was looked upon as 
Phra Sarasas' sworn enemy.38 Baxter expressed his critical views on Phra 
Sarasas' proposal in three letters.39 The first letter to the State Councillor for 
Finance on 17 August 1934 concerned 'Budgets Annexes' and 'Budgets 
Industriels' in France. Phra Sarasas had stated that in proposing a special 
budget for 3 million baht, which he described as 'capital', he was following 
the example of France, which has 'Budgets Annexes' and 'Budgets 
Industries'. This was a highly significant statement because, 'if the analogy
with France is to be sustained, the State Councillor for Economic Affairs
37 Ibid., He wrote that: 'When revenue is not enough for expenditure, it should not make 
a budget balance by controlling figures in account.’
38 A FO document contains an interesting comment on Phra Sarasas, based on his 
interview with a British diplomat. ‘In further conversation, and in keeping with his pose of bluff 
heartiness, Phra Sarasasna did not conceal from me that he was encountering in the person of 
Mr. Baxter the most vigorous of all enemies to the adoption of his cherished schemes. Rather 
embarrassed by such a statement, I pointed out that the financial adviser represented the 
Treasury, and I remarked that in all countries it was the practice of that Department to examine 
critically the proposals of social reformers.’ See details in J.Crosby to FO No. 178, 27 August 
1934, F6014/21/40, FO371/18207, PRO.
38 (2)S.R.0201.22/11, N.A.
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proposes to use the 'capital' for the establishment of State Enterprises.’40
James Baxter defined 'Budgets Annexes' as ‘specialised budgets of certain
services showing receipts and expenditure and which disclose whether the
administration of these services results in a deficit or a surplus.’41 James
Baxter took a positive view on separate budgets by saying:
The advocates of separate Budgets for what may be described as the Commercial 
Services, state that the rules governing State budgets are unsuitable for State enterprises 
where the State is a merchant or an industrialist. It is for this reason that, for example, the 'Post 
& Telegraphs' and the 'Service dps poudres’ in France are ’Budgets Annexes1.42 
In this letter, James Baxter explained French ‘special budgets’. What he
tried to make clear was the unsuitability of the special budget for Siam.
It is not within the scope of this note to consider whether the system of ’Budgets 
Annexes' or the further stage of complete autonomy is good or bad. It is a matter of acute 
controversy in France and many students of French government finance are strongly opposed 
to the system as destroying budgetary unity and weakening parliamentary control. So far as I 
know, French practice is not copied elsewhere. The question of interest to us here is the 
relevance of the analogy used by the State Councillor for Economic Affairs. I confess I see
M A M A  43none.
His critical views were also seen in his conclusion:
I conclude, therefore, by expressing the opinion that there is nothing in the French 
budgetary system to justify the use of 'Budget Annexe' or 'Budget Indutriel' in respect of a 
demand for a credit for the improvement of economic conditions in Siam.44
The second letter was, 'Addition to Note on Demand for credit of Tcs.
3,000,000 submitted by the State Councillor for Economic Affairs on 17
August, 1934.’45 This letter examined Phra Sarasas' statement:
Capital expenditure should not be added to administrative expenditure. The two 
should be separate as done in other countries. Capital expenditure is an asset not a liability. If
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid. 'Budgets Annexes' are described as i) Fabrication des monnaies et medailles, ii) 
Imprimerie nationale, iii) Services des manufactures de I'Etat en Alsace et Lorraine, iv) 
Legion d'honneur, v) Service des poudres, vi) Ecole centrale des arts et manufactures, vii) 
Chemin de fer et port de la Reunion, viii) Postes, telegraphes et telephones, ix) Caisse 
nationale d'epargne, x) Caisse des invalides de la marine.
42 Ibid.
' 43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
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this expenditure is included in ordinary expenditure, the budget will not balance and harm may 
result.46
James Baxter insisted that capital expenditure was an essential part of the
budget, in spite of various budget forms. He explained that capital
expenditure was separate in the 2475 and 2476 Siamese budgets because it
was set against the internal loan. However, he was confident that capital
expenditure should be included in ordinary expenditure.
So far as I am aware, administrative and capital expenditure budgets are not shown 
separately in other countries. It is certainly not the usual, far from being the universal, practice. 
Siam has only done so for three years and will, in all probability, not do so again.47
Regarding Phra Sarasas' statement, ‘Capital expenditure is an asset not a
liability’, James Baxter noted that, ‘Capital expenditure may be an asset. That
depends on the results of the expenditure.,4B Concerning balancing the
budget, James Baxter criticized Phra Sarasas by pointing out that the
important point was not to balance the budget but to control state expenditure
in order not to exceed revenues, including loans and reserves.
Surely budgets do not balance by an accounting trick. They balance or they do not. If a 
State has resources, whether from reserves or from borrowing to balance its budget, ordinary 
and capital, it is of little importance whether the budget is presented in two sections - ordinary 
and capital - or in one. If, on the other hand, its budget is not balanced, the effect on the 
Treasury will be the same no matter into how many sections the Budget may be divided. “Harm 
will result" not from the form in which the budget is presented but from whether the State’s 
outgoings exceed its incomings including loans and reserves.49
The last letter written to the State Councillor for Finance mainly 
concerned Baxter's general views on Phra Sarasas1 request.50 He criticized 
Phra Sarasas for submitting his request after the State Council had approved 
the supplementary budget.51 Phra Sarasas, a member of both the Finance 
Committee and of the State Council, was blamed for not putting forward
46 ib ij
47 Ibid.
48 ibid.
49 ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid. Phra Sarasas submitted a proposal to the State Council on 11 August 1934.
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his proposal during the discussions on the supplementary credits in the 
Finance Committee. Baxter also argued that the request, lacking any specific 
economic measures, was too vague.
Third, Baxter discussed economic policy: The whole of political- 
minded Siam is aware that the role of the Government in economic matters is 
one of acute controversy.152 He pointed out that there were two economic 
policies at that time; one was government policy in the autumn of 1933, and 
the other was by Phra Sarasas, the State Councillor for Economic Affairs. 
The former thinks much of the role of private capital in the development of 
trade, commerce and industry; but the latter stresses government intervention 
- that is state-controlled enterprise rather than private capital. Baxter did not 
comment on these two policies directly. However, he gave the following 
impression:
I am not here concerned with the question of which of these two policies is in Siam's 
interest. It is, however, relevant to the purpose in hand to remark that since the official 
Government policy and that of the State Councillor for Economic Affairs are, as it would seem, 
different, perhaps even diametrically opposed to one another, it would seem impossible to 
demand of the Legislature a blank cheque to carry out an economic programme of which it 
knows nothing and of which it might not approve.53
Fourth, the effect of the world depression on Siam and Siam's 
economic structure was discussed. Baxter maintained that economic 
indicators, like the exchange rate, rice, rubber and tin exports, rice prices, 
unemployment, and the purchasing power of the people, were all sound.
Siam has, without any doubt, weathered the economic depression as well as any other
country and much better than most including her neighbours. On the contrary, there are signs
that she is beginning to rise from the depths to which the depression caused her to sink.54
Regarding Siam's economic structure, Baxter pointed out that Siam was fully 
dependent on an external factor, the price of rice in world markets.
52 ib ij —
53 ibid.
54 ibid.
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Siam's problem is to devise and build an economic structure which will ensure that a 
larger part of the prices paid by the consumer for her products finds its way into Siamese
pockets It can only be improved slowly and progressively by the creation and development
of a more efficient and less wasteful economic mechanism than now exists. This is the work of a 
generation or generations 55
In conclusion, Baxter pointed out that, ‘the problem of economic 
development is not primarily one of funds but of concrete projects on which 
public moneys could usefully be spent.’56
4.6. Argument between Phra Sarasas and Foreign Advisers
The conflict between Phra Sarasas and James Baxter seems to have been 
caused not only by their different ideas but also by personal dislike. In this 
section, Phra Sarasas1 relationship with the foreign advisers will be 
examined.
An article about Phra Sarasas' economic plan appeared in the Thai
newspaper, Krungtheep, on 24 June 1934.57 The article was copied in the
Bangkok Times on 28 June 1934.
The State Councillor for Economic Affairs, Phra Sarasasna Bolakhand, is to place his 
scheme for the development of the national economics of Siam before the meeting of the 
Assembly in August. The State Council has given permission for a sum of Tcs. 25 millions to be 
spent on the scheme, and it will later require a further sum of Tcs. 75 millions. For this purpose 
the Government will depend on the credit of the country.58
After the article appeared, Chao Phraya Sridharmadhibes, Minister of 
Finance, and James Baxter expressed their embarrassment. In a letter to the 
Prime Minister on 30 June 1934, the Finance Minister showed his concern. 
Although Phra Sarasas' economic plan had not yet been discussed in the 
State Council or the Finance Committee, the article might give the
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 <2)S
58 Ibid.
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impression that the government had approved the plan. Siridarmadibes was 
afraid of the effect of this on foreign countries. He was afraid of the disruption 
of commerce, and the effect in securing foreign loans. He maintained that the 
government should deny the news, claiming that the State Council had not 
approved the plan to spend money, and that this was only a private proposal 
of Phra Sarasas. James Baxter also severely criticized Phra Sarasas, in a 
letter dated 29 June 1934. He pointed out that the figures quoted in the 
Thai newspaper had been taken from the brochure which Phra Sarasas 
had printed and circulated. Baxter's argument focused on the responsibility 
of Phra Sarasas as Minister of Economic Affairs. He blamed Phra Sarasas:
That is to say, he, while a cabinet minister, acts as if he were a private individual. This 
would in most countries be considered a breach of etiquette so flagrant that the Government 
of which he was a member would publicly disavow him and demand his resignation.59 
In other words, Baxter thought that Phra Sarasas had appealed to the people
over the government. It is also worth noting that Baxter made comments on
Phra Sarasas' plan, although it is not clear whether Baxter could read Phra
Sarasas' brochure.60 Baxter described Phra Sarasas1 plan in these terms: 'I
believe that its adoption or rather its execution - a very different matter -
would mean economic and financial ruin to Siam. If I were a Siamese I
should fight it to the last ditch.'61 Baxter may have had biased views about
the plan because of his personal dislike of Phra Sarasas. In conclusion,
Baxter suggested that the State Council take immediate steps to discuss
Phra Sarasas' plan, and accept or reject it.
Another controversy arose over a comment by Phra Sarasas which
appeared in the Bangkok Times on 9 July 1934. In this article, Phra Sarasas
tried to remove misapprehension.
But this morning H.E. the State Councillor frankly admitted that there is a pretty
59 ibid
60 Phra Sarasas completed his economic plan on 14 July 1934.
61 {2)S.R.0201.22/9. N.A.
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general misapprehension - at any rate in the foreign community - as to the nature of his plan, 
and he said he would be glad to have such misconceptions removed. He then said in effect: - 
My plan will not com pete with commercial houses, or any existing commercial
enterprises The plan is to bring private enterprises into closer co-operation with the
administration in regard to economics. But people who know nothing of the proposed plan 
give free rein to their imagination, and think that it is a repetition of Luang Pradit's plan. It is 
nothing of the kind. It is absolutely a new plan which takes into consideration the economic 
welfare of the people, in conjunction with existing businesses and enterprises. I need co­
operation from all sides. In making this plan, I have not been a bit influenced by any existing 
plan whether that of the Soviets, or Chancellor Hitler or Signor Mussolini. I have been 
influenced only by the discussions and schemes of the old Economic Council, on which Mr. 
Raymond B. Stevens, Mr. James Baxter and Mr. Charles L'Evesque were prominent 
members.62
This last sentence brought about a serious argument between Phra 
Sarasas and the three foreign advisers, who criticized Phra Sarasas. 
There were three points. First, as Stevens put it, ‘the fact that I was a member 
of the old Economic Council does not entail that I am in full agreement with 
all the resolutions and conclusions they have adopted.’63 Baxter claimed to 
see Phra Sarasas1 intention: ‘he desired to remove misapprehensions in the 
foreign community as regards the nature of his Plan; the significance of the 
mention of the names of three foreign advisers is obvious.’64 Second, the 
advisers maintained that they did not know the contents of the plan. Stevens 
saw only a diagram or outline, but had not been asked his opinion by the 
government. They were quite sure that Phra Sarasas' plan was not based on 
recommendations or discussions which they had attended. Third, they 
blamed Phra Sarasas for commenting in public. Stevens argued that:
I am afraid that a State Councillor cannot properly commit a Government Official in a 
public statement without previously securing his consent, such an action may cause great 
embarrassment to the Official, because, on account of his position, he is not absolutely free to 
discuss, in an effective manner, the correctness of a statement in which he does not concur.65
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid. Letter to Phraya Phahon-phonphayuhasena by Stevens, 10 July 1934.
64 ibid. Letter to Chao Phraya Sridharmadhibes by Baxter, 10 July 1934.
65 Ibid. Letter to Phraya Phahon-phonphayuhasena by Stevens, 10 July 1934
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The counter-arguments can be seen in a document in the National 
Archives.66 Phra Sarasas wrote a letter to the Prime Minister on 31 August 
1934 denying all claims by the three foreign advisers. His letter was full of 
severe criticisms. He maintained that their claims damaged the prestige and 
trust of the Minister, and that they were just advisers. Phra Sarasas objected 
to every sentence in the advisers' letters. He said that it was a fact that the 
three foreign advisers were members of the old Economic Council: he had 
not used their names simply to reassure the foreign community. Second, he 
accepted that his plan had not been discussed in the State Council, or had 
been submitted as a full plan. It was well understood that it was not an 
official plan but his own private plan. Finally, he made it clear that he was 
merely influenced by the discussions, not dictated by them.
4.7. Boriphanyutthakit's Economic Plan
Boriphanyutthakit, Minister of Economic Affairs, submitted his economic plan 
to the Secretary-General of the Cabinet on 15 January 1938. It can be found 
in the National Archives, (2) S.R.0201.57.1/2. It consists of 16 pages, divided 
into three parts: promotion of six businesses, including rice, jute, rubber and 
the tourist industry, the establishment of freezer storage and the 
establishment of cotton and soybean oil manufacture, the establishment of a 
rice mill and third, a record of the proceedings of the cabinet concerning 
various projects of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Before examining the details of the plan, there are several points to be
considered. First, the plan had close connections with the establishment of
the Thai Rice Company in 1938 - it was a plan for the company. Second, the
plan was part of the nationalist policy of the People's Party. Third, arguments
66 (2) S.R. 0201.22/9. N.A.
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between various ministries at the cabinet meeting revealed diverse opinions 
on economic policy. There are four cremation books for Boriphanyutthakit.67 
According to two of them, his studies in Germany, Switzerland and France 
from 1909 to 1919 did not involve economics.68 However, his positions as 
Minister of Economic Affairs, Minister of Finance, and Minister of Commerce 
under the Phibun Government suggest that he had economic training.
This section consists of three parts: first, the background to the 
promotion of the rice business, the discussion of the plan at the cabinet 
meeting, and finally, a detailed examination of the rice mill plan.
Siam's economy depended on rice. The average annual value of 
rice exports was between 90 and 99 million baht at that time.69 The National 
Archives document pointed out that middlemen, mostly Chinese, dominated 
the profits from rice exports, earning 45 to 49 million baht per year. In fact, 
the Financial Adviser, Doll, estimated in 1937 that about 50 percent of the 
export value of rice was taken by the miller, rice trader, merchant, exporter 
and middleman.70 According to this paper, the new policy for the rice 
business would emphasize co-operatives. It was pointed out that co­
67 Phao Boriphanyutthakit, Phonek Phao Phianoet Boriphanyutthakit, Krasuang 
Setthakan phim pen anuson nai ngan phraracthanphioengsop Phonek Phao Phianoet 
Boriphanyutthakit Atit rattmontriwakan Krasuang Setthakan, (Cremation Volume of Phao 
Boriphanyutthakit), Watthepsirinatharawat, 18 November 1970. Phao Boriphanyutthakit, 
Anuson nuangnaingan phraracthanphioengsop Phonek Phao Boriphanyutthakit (Cremation 
Volume of Phao Boriphanyutthakit ), Watthepsirinatharawat, 18 November 1970. Phao 
Boriphanyutthakit, Ruamkodmai iae rabiap ngankhlangbangruang Krombanchiklang phim 
pen banakan Phonek Phao Boriphanyutthakit (Phra Boriphanyutthakit) , (Cremation Volume 
of Phao Boriphanyutthakit, W atthepsirinatharawat, 18 Novem ber 1970. Phao 
B o rip h an y u tth ak it, T h a n a k h a n h a e n g p r a t h e t ,  p h i m p e n  a n u s o n  naikan 
Whrarachthanphiioengsop Phonek Phao Boriphanyutthakit (Phra Boriphanyutthakit) 
(Cremation Volume of Phao Boriphanyutthakit), Watthepsirinatharawat, 18 November 1970.
68 Phonek Phao Phianoet Boriphanyutthakit, Krasuang Setthakan phim pen anuson nai 
ngan phraracthanphioengsop Phonek Phao Phianoet Boriphanyutthakit Atit rattmontriwakan 
Krasuang Setthakan, (Cremation Volume of Phao Boriphanyutthakit), Watthepsirinatharawat, 
18 N o v e m b e r 1 9 7 0 . Thanakhanhaengprathet, ph im pen anuson naikan  
Whrarachthanphiioengsop Phonek Phao Boriphanyutthakit (Phra Boriphanyutthakit)) 
(Cremation Volume of Phao Boriphanyutthakit), Watthepsirinatharawat, 18 November 1970.
69 According to James C.lngram, Economic Change in Thailand 1850-1970 , Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1971, the average annual value of rice exports in 1930-34 and 
1935-39 was 91,240,000 baht and 94,570,000 baht respectively: table III, p.38.
70 Ibid., p.72.
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operatives had problems in selling paddy, nor least when the price of paddy 
was low. There were several reasons for this. In rural areas, Chinese 
middlemen operated with a co-operative like business except that the co­
operative belonged to the merchant himself; this report described them as 
owners of the co-operative. In addition, the rice mills were dominated by 
Chinese. Furthermore, the Ministry of Economic Affairs had commissioned 
the Chinese to construct warehouses for rice. This made it difficult to 
purchase paddy except by relying on the Chinese. The government already 
had commercial co-operatives and transportation organizations, it 
should now have its own purchasing organisation. Furthermore, constructing 
a port would reduce reliance on the Chinese for transportation.
The plan for the rice mill called for a total investment of 500,000 baht,
and 25,552 baht for expenditure on the central rice market. This plan had 
been discussed in 1934 when Phra Sarasas was the Minister of Economic 
Affairs.71 Phra Sarasas established a committee to submit a detailed report 
to the Ministry of Finance. This committee considered a small-scale rice mill 
with 40 Kwien (ton) capacity. However, in 1937 a rice mill of at least 300 
Kwien capacity, for 24 hours operation, was discussed. At that time, some 
Chinese rice mills had a capacity of 500 Kwien.
In the cabinet discussion of this plan in 1938,72 the Minister of Finance 
supported the plan of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, saying that 
government initiative was vital because progress would be slow if the matter 
depended on the Thais. But he had a rather pessimistic opinion of the plan, 
pointing at the figures for estimated revenue of about 108 million baht and 
expenditure of 20 million baht. In addition, he said that the Asiatic Co. took 
more of the profit. At that time, British companies, the Anglo-Siam Co. and the
71 The records of the committee under the Ministry of Economic Affairs are not available.
72 The date was 26 January 1938.
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Borneo Co., were engaged in the rice trade.73 The Chinese rice companies 
were Wang Lee, Li Heng Chan and Sun Heng Lee.74 Boriphanyutthakit, the 
Minister of Economic Affairs, commented that in the past Siamese 
millionaires had existed in the rice business; but now only Chinese made 
fortunes. He also stated that his plan had been discussed in the committee of 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs when Phra Sarasas was the Minister. A 40 
Kwien capacity rice mill might be expensive because there were no 
economies of scale. A 300 Kwien capacity rice mill would make more 
sense; but making a profit would be difficult because the government could 
not cheat the people, saying that it was owned by Chinese. The important 
point was for the government to engage in the rice business. As the 
government faced difficulties in selling paddy purchased from farmers, 
buying paddy from co-operatives and selling it to its own rice mill should be 
considered.
Several negative comments were made about this plan. The Minister 
of Finance pointed out the difficulties of the rice business, giving the example 
of the Siam Kapmachon Bank which had several rice mills with severe 
deficits after 15 months of operation. The Minister of Justice indicated the 
shortage of talented men, and raised the possibility of operating the rice mill 
as a private company or state enterprise. The Minister of Defence argued 
that the 1932 revolution had not been successful because no one can 
control the price of rice. The government had established co-operatives in 
order to eliminate the middleman but the results had been poor. If the 
government established a rice mill, it would be able to control the price of 
rice. The problem was that farmers were suffering from low prices. The 
Minister of Finance argued that the government's influence on the rice
business would be marginal, because it dealt with just 0.5 percent of the rice
73 Sungsidh Piriyarangsan. Thai bureaucratic capitalism, 1932- 1960’, Master’s thesis, 
Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University, 1980, p.93, footnote.
74 ibid.
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trade.75 The Minister of Defence was against private ownership, pointing to 
the failure of a pulp factory. He supported the idea of establishment by the 
government, and later sale to the private sector. In contrast, the Minister of 
Finance supported private establishment and ownership.
According to this document, there were two main reasons for the 
establishment of the rice mill. It would transfer the rice business into the 
hands of Thais, first the government and then Thai merchants. Second, it 
would aim to avoid trouble in the rice market, created by the monopolised 
position of foreigners.
The government decided not to set up a rice mill right away but to 
rent existing private mills, for example, the Chinseng rice mill owned by Ma 
Lap Khun. The monthly expenditure for this rice mill was about 6,102 
baht.76 The production capacity was 500 Kwien per day (24 hours), the 
monthly capacity 15,000 Kwien.77 The cost of production was 41 satang per 
Kwien. The cost of coolie labour was 80 satang per Kwien. Tax and gunny 
sacks cost per Kwien, 3.91 baht.78 In total, the cost per Kwien was 5.12 baht.
This document noted the risks of the rice business, and suggested 
that the government was in a better position than private merchants to handle 
them. However, several problems were mentioned. For example, purchasing 
paddy in Bangkok would become difficult because small rice mills were 
being established in provincial towns. This had brought difficulties for the rice 
mills in Bangkok. There were two ways to deal with this problem. First, agents 
of the Department of Commerce would go into the provincial towns to 
purchase paddy through co-operatives and private farmers.79 The 
government could compete with private merchants in terms of higher prices
75 (2JS.R.0201.57.1/2. N.A.
76 The detailed breakdown for this figure is given on p.6.
77 One month was calculated as 30 days.
78 if rice was exported to Europe or Cuba, the cost of gunny bags was exempt.
79 At that time, there were more than 800 co-operatives and their total sales of rice were
about 23,000 Kwien.
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for the farmers. This was because the state railway offered special rates to 
the government.80 For the transportation of rice by ship, the government 
would also be able to compete with the small rice mills, by offering attractive 
prices. The main market for rice consisted of government agencies, civil 
servants, including army officers, the Penitentiary Department, hospitals, 
foreign companies, and export to Hongkong and Singapore.
The quality of rice had been a big issue, because the government had 
to decide the standard every year. Although merchants used ‘super’, 
‘special’, ‘A1 ’, ‘CT, and ‘C2\ the government fixed the new standard with 
foreign and Chinese merchants; "Government Standard NoT, ‘2’, '3', ‘4’, ‘5’.81 
This new standard was to limit the competition from small rice mills and 
stabilize the rice quality for foreign markets, which was essential to expand 
sales.82
Government intervention in the rice business was also achieved 
through the licence system. Rice mills, warehouses, transportation, brokers 
and the domestic market were all controlled by the Department of 
Commerce. The purpose of legal enforcement was to support Thai, Luk- 
Chin, and loyal Chinese.
The establishment of a central market by the government was 
recommended; in Bangkok, selling and buying rice outside this market 
would be prohibited by law. Rice boats from provincial towns coming to 
Bangkok were required to inform the registrar at the central market, and 
receive a selling licence. This card showed not only the class of paddy but 
also the place of cultivation. Rice millers were not allowed to purchase paddy 
from merchant without cards, and these cards were to be transferred from the 
merchant to the rice miller in the central market when they conducted
80 Total yearly volume of paddy transported by the railway was about 225,000 Kwien.
81 These standards were decided by the percentage of broken rice.
82 The government had suffered through the bad reputation of Thai rice in the 
international market, because of the lack of a permanent standard.
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business. For rice millers, a license would be issued to maintain the quality of 
rice. The Department of Commerce was responsible for the central market, 
and the price at the central market would be the market price which the 
Department of Commerce announced all over the country.
Sungsidh explains the success of the Thai Rice Co. in the following 
terms.83 He pointed to legal (political) enforcement. Existing Chinese rice 
millers had to give up their business, by renting out their mills to the Thai Rice 
Co.
Within a short period of time the Thai Rice Co, Ltd. became a large company with 
almost 50 rice mills. But the rapid growth of the Company was not alone according to the 
market system. The Company expelled the competitors by political influence rather, it was not 
because of its economic stability.,e4
Second, almost all of the directors of the company were Promoters and 
cabinet members.85 Third, strong support from the government came in the 
form of low rates on the state railway. Lastly, a monopoly, supported by the 
government, enabled the company to expand milling, trading and exporting. 
It is important to note that Thailand was the only rice exporter after 1940, 
because other Asian producers suffered from the war. According to 
Sungsidh: 'While the domestic price was 30 bahts per ton, the world price 
was about 200 bahts per ton.’88 The rapid increase in export prices caused 
domestic prices to rise, so that the government, in April 1941, began to 
control rice exports. The government recommendation to eliminate private 
rice mills in 1939 left rice millers with just two options; rent out their rice mills 
or mill rice for the company. These factors made the Thai Rice Co. not only an 
economic base for the People's Party but also very profitable. The 
government wanted to eliminate the Chinese middleman and rice millers,
but the Thai Rice Co depended on close co-operation with them.
83 Sungsidh Piriyarangsan. Thai bureaucratic capitalism, 1932- 1960’, Master's thesis, 
Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University, 1980, pp.95-106.
84 Ibid, pp.98-9.
85 ibid, pp.99-101.
86 ibid, p.102.
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4.8. Wilat Osathanon’s Proposal to Promote Siamese Trade
Wilat Osathanon submitted his proposal to promote trade to the cabinet on 1 
September 1934. He had attended a Buddhist association tour to Japan, and 
had visited Japan, Manchuria (including Harbin and Mukden city) and China 
(including Peking, Nanking, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Canton). During this 
trip he was convinced that Siam should try to promote trade with East Asia.
Wilat had studied in England and had been a civilian promoter. He 
married a daughter of Seow Hood Seng, and his wide overseas Chinese 
connections were used to expand his business. Judith A. Stowe notes: 
‘Vilas was related by marriage to a leading Bangkok Chinese family closely 
associated with the Kuomintang; hence he had links with a wide network of 
Overseas Chinese businessmen throughout South East Asia.’87 He held 
several government positions: Thai Trade Commissioner, Hong Kong, 1937 
to 1939; Cabinet Minister, 1939 to December, 1941; Director-General, 
Government Propaganda, 1939 to 1941. Wilat was also appointed director of 
various state enterprises, such as Thai Niyom Panich, Thai Niyom Insurance, 
Thai Niyom Bangrak, Thai Niyom Phanfa, Thai Salt Co, National & City Bank 
of Thailand and the Siam Commercial Bank.88
Wilat's proposal can be seen in the National Archives.89 This short 
document consists of seven pages, with several measures to promote 
Siamese trade. His first point concerned trade between Japan and Siam; 
broken rice exports to Japan (mainly Nagoya) were approximately 16 million
87 J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand: A Story of Intrigue, Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1991, p. 190.
88 Akira Suehiro, Capital Accumulation in Thailand 1855-1985, Tokyo: Center for East 
Asian Cultural Studies, 1989, pp. 131-2.
89 S.R. 0201.25/738. N.A.
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yen each year, and Siamese imports from Japan, per year, were about 17 
million yen. .He pointed out that while Japan had now stopped purchasing 
broken rice, imports from Japan had increased. Wilat had negotiated with 
Japanese civil servants and merchants over this issue, but it was now 
impossible to export rice to Japan. However, Wilat had asked Japan to help 
Siam, by purchasing Siamese goods such as cotton instead of rice.
His second point concerned the importance of China for Siamese 
trade. Wilat had visited Hsinking, the capital of Manchuria.90 He was 
impressed by the rapid development of the city and had met several high 
ranking government officials to discuss trade between Siam and Manchuria. 
He also recognized that Hong Kong was an important commercial centre. It 
was important for British goods going to southern China, Kwangsi, Tunnan, 
Fukien, Kiangsi and Hunan. He pointed out that the British government had 
given a loan to China to construct a railway from Canton to Hankow. Hong 
Kong was also important for Siamese trade. Siamese exports went to five 
main markets: Hong Kong 30%, Singapore 20%, Europe 20%, Japan 10%, 
and others, including Vietnam, Java and America, 10%. Wilat argued that the 
completion of the railway from Canton to Hankow would bring an opportunity 
for Siam to promote its trade. Wilat's main suggestion was to appoint a 
Siamese consul in Hong Kong.91 A consul would provide detailed and 
reliable commercial information: a foreigner as consul was useless - 
sending a capable Siamese was extremely important. Even though Hong 
Kong accounted for 30% of Siamese trade, the Siamese government had 
largely ignored this important market. At that time, Siamese merchants did 
not have their own warehouse in Hong Kong because of a lack of capital. 
Therefore they could not respond to price fluctuations in the Hong Kong
9° The Manchurian state was established on 1 March 1932. Hsinking is now called
Changchun.
91 At that time, the Siamese consul was a foreigner. Wilat blamed him for having little
interest in Siam: he did not know what a Siamese banknote was like.
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market. In this matter Siamese government support was required. Wilat 
argued that the consul should be a direct representative of the Siamese 
government. An expert or businessman with much experience in business 
would be suitable. He would collect not only statistics but practical business 
information, and find new markets for Siamese products.
His ideas were not new, but his proposal carried weight because of 
his travels in Asian countries. In fact, Wilat was appointed Trade 
Commissioner in Hong Kong from 1937 to 1939.
4.9. Middle Class Participation in Economic Issues
National Archives documents give evidence that many in the middle class 
submitted their suggestions or ideas to the government on dealing with 
various economic problems. It indicates that even the middle class was very 
interested in economic issues as well as political ones; some were 
apprehensive about a deterioration in the standard of living, particularly in 
rural areas.
Table 4-1 shows that 804 documents were submitted as petitions, 
proposals and opinions to the government from 1932 to 1939, but the years 
1932 and 1933 accounted for about 90% of that total.92 In their proposals 
and ideas, the middle class were positive.93 It is interesting to note that while 
the Khunnang class also participated in discussion, commoners or the 
middle class played a particularly important role. Topics of interest to the 
middle class and the khunnang class included the economy, taxes, the 
bureaucracy and ministries, education, law and salaries.
92 This figure is based on my own calculation, using the index of S.R.0201.25. N.A.
93 For example, in 'Sanukhwamhen1 (proposing ideas): in 1932, there were 59 by Nai, 7 
by Khun, 14 by Luang, 6 by Phra, 4 by Phraya, and 1 by a Caophraya. In 1933, there were 45 
by Nai, 3 by Khun, 7 by Luang, 2 by Phra, and 4 by Phraya.
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Economic topics were the major subject. During the two years 1932 
and 1933, 130 documents concerning the Siamese economy were 
submitted,94 accounting for about 18% of the documents in 1932 and 1933. 
Among the 130 documents, 64 (about 50%) were submitted by commoners, 
29 (22%) by nobility, 7 (5%) by army, navy, or police officers, and 1 by a 
member of the royal family, 29 (22%) by others.95 This shows that the 
middle class played an important role in expressing economic ideas to the 
government.
Among the 130 documents, commoners and the middle class wrote 
on various issues; tax, poverty, economic nationalism, finance, development, 
rural problems, manufacturing industry, commerce, how to reduce expenses, 
how to deal with the economic crisis, private companies, the Ministries of 
Finance and Economic Affairs, transportation and labour. Table 4-2 indicates 
that the major concerns were agriculture, economic problems, finance, 
requests to the government, economic development and tax. With respect to 
rural problems, most attention was paid to setting-up rice mills, the price of 
rice, how to deal with the farmer’s debts, export marketing and cooperatives. 
It is important to emphasize that the arguments by the middle class were as 
lively as those by the Siamese elite or within the government.
The contents of these documents depended on the background of the 
author. It is often difficult to describe their educational background and 
occupational experience because most documents lack this vital information. 
However, it would appear that some authors had quite high educational 
qualifications and considerable job experience. Among them, the merchants 
proposed practical solutions to economic problems. However some 
authors just expressed their feelings without substantial evidence or
94 This figure is calculated from the index of S.R. 0201.25. N.A.
95 S.R.0201.25. N.A. In the nobility, 29 figures consist of Phraya 11, Luang 11, Khun 5, 
and Phra 2. In others, 7 were a name without title, 4 were by ratsadon (people), 1 by 
mahachonchawna (farmer), 1 by merchant, 1 by canai (leader).
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knowledge about economics.
It is clear that economic nationalism was already rife within the 
middle class in 1932. For example, 9 documents were about economic 
nationalism and suggestions for the government to establish a weaving 
industry in order to sell to civil servants and students96 and not to encourage 
the people to buy foreign products.97 Positive ideas to employ more Thai 
rather than Chinese, Indian and other foreigners were explored.98 However 
they were emotional not intellectual or well thought-out anti-Chinese 
feelings. Setting-up a rice mill by Siamese, a proposal to use not foreign 
products but Thai ones, the establishment of a self-sufficient economy, were 
the main themes. Economic nationalism was not simply a product of Rama 6: 
in 1932, it was a common theme of the Siamese elite and of the Siamese 
middle class.
After the constitutional revolution on 24 June 1932, several 
economic plans or proposals appeared. They included Mangkorn Samsen's 
economic plan and H. Christiansen's plan.99 In the National Archives, there 
are other suggestions or proposals for the improvement of the Siamese 
economy. Among them, Luang Wuthithonnetirak’s plan seems to be 
particularly valuable. It was the second economic plan, after Mangkorn 
Samsen.100 He submitted the documents to the government, for the 
establishment of Samakhom Bamrung Setthakit on 25 July 1932. Luang 
Wuthithonnetirak (Amphan Sriphalin) graduated from law school in 1919, 
the same year in which Pridi graduated.
A letter from Luang Wuthithonnetirak to Thammasakmontri, President
96 S.R.0201.25/214. N.A.
97 S.R.0201.25/413. N.A.
98 S.R,0201.25/414. N.A. S.R.0201.25/415. N.A. S.R.0201.25/505. N.A.
99 See Mangkorn Samsen's plan in the previous chapter, and H. Christiansen's plan in
Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 1 December 1932.
100 Mangkorn Samsen submitted his plan to the Assembly on 4 July 1932.
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of the Assembly on 25 July 1932, suggested the establishment of the 
Samakhom Bamrung Setthakit.101 This plan consists of twenty-one pages, 
with eighteen sections. In the introduction, he emphasized that Siam was a 
rich country in terms of land, crops, forest and mineral resources. The aim of 
the Samakhom would be to improve the state, of the country, to have respect 
for religion, to establish lasting freedoms, and to improve commerce. His 
nationalist ideas can be seen in several aspects. The establishment of 
Samakhom would be at three levels; tambon, amphoe and changwat , 
under the supervision of the central Samakhom.
The main activity of Samakhom was to improve products, notably by 
the diffusion of information. For example, information on goods in the 
tambon, inventions, goods in demand, prices, markets and transportation 
costs would be reported to the Central Samakhom by members. Luang 
Wuthithonnetirak thought that information was vital to improve commerce. 
Concerning inventions, the committee of the Central Samakhom would offer 
awards for good ideas, and look for investors to establish companies. The 
committee would hold meetings every month to distribute information and 
knowledge: it would invite experts on commerce and handicrafts, and hold 
exhibitions of samples. Research on domestic, imported, and exported 
products would be carried out. When domestic products improved and sold in 
the domestic market, it would be time to export. Membership of Samakhom 
had several requirements - it was open to those resident in Siam for over 
fifteen years but persons who had a criminal record for theft or forgery, or 
did not respect religion and nation, were excluded. References were 
required from a current member. Only those who were of Thai origin could 
vote at membership acceptance meetings.102 The obligation of members
would be to improve goods, help inventions, and pass to others their
101 S.R.0201.25/83. N.A.
102 In the plan there is no mention of the Chinese. However it seems that he aimed to 
exclude the Chinese.
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knowledge of commerce and the activities of Samakhom,
The committee would be open to Thai nationals over thirty years old. 
Committee members would be elected by all members, and their term of 
service would be three years. Ten committee members for the central 
Samakhom would be selected by election. Their term of service would be 
three years, with three members being changed every year.
Luang Wuthithamnetikorn (Krawi Banditkun) became a barrister-at- 
law in 1919, after graduating from the law school of the Ministry of Justice. 
According to his cremation book, he worked for the government as a judge 
for almost all his life.103
His document on the economic crisis can be seen in the National 
Archives.104 The document has no date, so there is confusion over its timing. 
A description of the Mano and Phahon governments in the document 
indicates that it was submitted after the start of the Phahon government, 21 
June 1933. Luang Wuthithamnetikorn tried to analyse the causes of the 
Siamese economic crisis.
His opinions on the economic crisis consisted of 25 pages, divided 
into 15 parts. It can be summarised in five parts; cause and effect of the 
economic crisis, financial policy, co-operatives, law, and lastly, tax.
The first part of his document dealt with the causes and effects of the 
economic crisis. He thought that the security of the country was vital, and that 
the government should pay attention to the possibility of foreign intervention.
If the Siamese did not harm foreigners, intervention would not happen.
103 Anuson nai ngan phraratchathan phloengsop Luang Wutithamnetikorn (Krawi 
Banditkun), 22 August 2510.Luang Wutithamnetikorn was born on 24 ApriM893 and died in 
1967. He started his career as a judge in Thonburi provincial court in 1921. He was 
transferred to various provincial courts six times, from 1930 to 1947. In 1948 he was promoted 
to judge in the appellate court. In 1953 he became head of division of the appellate court, 
and from 1955 to 1958 he was head of department of the appellate court. In 1958 he 
retired and then taught law at Thammasat University. Luang Wuthithamnetikorn, Luang 
Wuthithonnetirak and Pridi graduated from law school in 1919.
104 (2)S.R.0201.22/1. N.A.
158
He pointed to following factors: bad economic conditions, breakdown of 
unity, jealousy, envy in politics, misdirection of the people and lastly, 
communism. He mentioned that the Siamese hate communists, but that 
there was a possibility of spreading communism in a period of bad economic 
conditions. Bad economic conditions would cause unrest. He noted the 
decline of the people by saying that Thais were in any case inclined to spend 
money and have wasteful habits. It was more difficult now to find a job, 
a job was now less profitable in the case of rice and other products and 
investment now did not yield enough return. The investor who used to make 
a profit now received no profit. The investor who used to avoid debt, now 
was a debtor. The people were now watching what the government was 
doing. If helping the people in a direct and rapid way was not discussed in 
the Assembly, the people would not be satisfied. He blamed the Mano 
government, saying that the people had lost faith in it. The Phahon 
government tried to help the people. Regarding members of Parliament, he 
thought that elected members had little ability - members appointed by the 
government would play an important role. Most of them had experience in 
the previous government, before the constitutional revolution. There were 
two ways to help the people; one was short - term investment, for example, 
providing land; long - term investment, including providing seeds, 
produced a result within four or five years. Government investment in 
irrigation and communication was recommended.
The second part of the document concerned finance. He pointed out 
that the money in circulation (110 million baht) was less than the reserves 
(130 million baht). Money in circulation per head was just 9 baht, and this 
figure was very low compared to developed countries like France (500 baht 
per head), Belgium (230 baht), and England (100 baht).105 It meant that
money in circulation in Siam was slow - rich merchants had a lot of
105 ibid. He did not give the source for these figures.
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purchasing power while the poor complained of not having enough money to 
spend. Therefore, the government should print more notes. Second, he 
suggested raising internal and external loans and starting a lottery.
In order to help the people, he thought that the government should 
play an important role. The government had power to spend money. The 
government could assist poor people by lending money at low interest rates - 
those who wanted to borrow must be a member of a co-operative. Co­
operatives would be the guarantor for the loan. Co-operatives seem to have 
been the backbone of his ideas. He mentioned the two types of co-operative 
in Europe; Schulze in Germany, and Raiffeisen in Prussia, but his co­
operative model was different from those two. He proposed the Samakhom 
Songkharo Sahakon (Association to Help Co-operative). This association 
would be the centre for co-operatives, and its function would be to control 
and coordinate co-operatives. According to his plan, membership would be 
open to everybody, and a membership fee would be required. Members 
would receive weekly or fortnightly newspapers. The function of borrowing 
and lending between co-operatives was emphasized. Co-operatives would 
belong to the central association noted above, and their function would be to 
play the role of a bank, by increasing capital or receiving capital through a 
lottery. When the government had sufficient capital, it would be possible to 
establish credit co-operatives, other types of co-operative, and silos.
He suggested several laws to help the people. For farmers, laws to 
regulate rates of rent, and laws to help farmers in debt were mentioned, but 
there was no detailed plan. He pointed out that debtors did not have any 
way to repay debts. Laws to protect the safety of private vehicle passengers 
was suggested. Laws were to protect not only land and waterway 
passengers, but small business from big business. In order to do this, rates 
of passenger fees would be fixed, and the number of vehicles would be
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regulated. In this context, he blamed big business (Chinese and foreign) for 
exploiting small businesses. In other words, the government should protect 
Thai merchants. Laws on savings banks would persuade the people to save 
money.
The last part of this document concerned the tax system, especially a 
liquor tax. He pointed out that illegal liquor caused harm to the state 
revenues. He explained the change from the tax farm system to direct state 
involvement in liquor distilling. Under the tax farm system, the government 
offered the contract once a year for sale of liquor in each district ( tambon or 
amphoe). The retail price was fixed. The merits of the tax farm system were 
that it increased the tender price, the distillers made an effort to produce 
good quality liquor in order to get more profit, and the government did not 
spend money to suppress illegal liquor, because it was the distillers’ 
responsibility.
Under the new system, the government was involved in distilling and 
selling. The government subcontracted to the private sector to distil, 
purchasing liquor at 20 litres for 3 baht; this was sold to a distributor. The 
government paid only a small fee to the distributor, and made a large profit, 
accounting for 14 baht out of the selling price of 19 baht.106 But the quality 
of the government liquor was bad, because the private subcontractors and 
distributors found it difficult to make a profit because of the low commission 
fees. They diluted the liquor by adding water. Liquor sold in the countryside 
was better than the government liquor, in terms of price, taste and strength. 
The distiller in the countryside made 2 or 3 times the profit of the 
government, in conclusion, he suggested the revival of a more flexible 
contract system, offering contracts for more than a year, and 
subcontracting to more than one distiller in order to improve quality.
"los Ibid. The government protit is calculated as follows; retail price, 19 baht per 20 litres, 
minus subcontract fee (distilling), 3 baht, minus distribution fees, 2.5 b ah t, = 13.5 baht.
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There were several important themes behind Luang 
Wuthithamnetikorn's ideas and proposals. His career and educational 
background should be noted. He was neither a promoter or member of 
parliament - he was a lawyer. His background was quite simitar to that of 
Mangkorn Samsen, who submitted the first economic plan after the 
constitutional revolution. Neither had studied abroad. Studying at the law 
school in Bangkok seems to have influenced Luang Wuthithamnetikorn. He 
may have studied French instead of English law, because the curriculum 
changed from English to either English law or French law in 1917. 
Studying French law included studying politics, economics, and 
philosophy.107 Pridi and Luang Wuthithamnetikorn had studied together at 
law school. Pridi entered law school in 1917 and graduated in 1919, which 
was the same year in which Luang Wuthithamnetikorn graduated.
The second point is that Luang Wuthithamnetikorn expressed 
nationalist ideas. He blamed Chinese and foreign merchants for exploiting 
small Siamese merchants. He also had much respect for religion and nation. 
He did not mention the monarchy or respect for the king. He hated 
communism, and said that bad economic conditions would bring about the 
spread of communism. The third point is his emphasis on self-reliance and 
mutual aid - he stressed liberalism rather than socialism. In other words, 
small government was preferred to big government. In his view, capital was 
not a fundamental problem in economic development. This idea was quite 
new among Siamese economic plans.
He was influenced by foreign thought to some extent. His description 
of cooperatives, or of the monetary situation in Europe showed his interest
in foreign countries. But he tried to modify foreign ideas for Siam. For
107 Nakharin Mektrairat, Kanpathiwat Sayam ph. s. 2475  (The 1932 Revolution in 
Siam), Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, 1992, pp.72-73. There were 901 graduates 
(899 male, and 2 female) from the law school between 1897 and 1932.
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example, he tried to create cooperatives which were suitable for Siam. But 
he did not succeed in expanding his ideas into a detailed plan.
Phien submitted his proposal in 1932.108 Phien had engaged in 
business for twenty years. He said that he had started in business without 
any working capital, but now had assets of eighty thousand baht. It is not 
clear what this business was, or why he wanted to join the People’s Party.
He had five main proposals: first, the establishment of a saw mill in 
Bangkok, to encourage Thais to engage in saw milling, supplying wood for 
public use. His anti-foreign views were strong, and he maintained that Thais 
could do business without relying on foreigners. Although he did not 
explain in detail how the saw mill would operate, he claimed it would create 
up to ten thousand new jobs. The government would play an important role in 
establishing the saw mill, as well as training Thai technicians. With the 
success of the government project, the government would act as an example 
in using Thai products. Second, the establishment of an electric rice mill for 
the army, prisons, civil servants and the people, aiming to eliminate the profit 
of foreigners.109 Third, the construction of warehouses for Siamese products, 
to encourage producers and consumers to increase quality and decrease 
prices, and to increase the popularity of Thai products. Fourth, the use of 
criminal labour for productive activities, using criminals to produce firewood 
for the railway department or logs for the government saw mill. Fifth, to 
support Thai goods and Thai merchants, so it would be possible for Thai 
goods to compete with foreign goods. He suggested that imports be 
restricted to necessities which Siam could not produce itself. He had the 
impression that education made the Siamese more nationalist, and
economic depression made the Siamese love their own goods.
108 STt.0201.25/178. N.A.
109 He did not mention Chinese merchants, it seems that he attacked mainly Europeans. 
The Thai phrase, 'Khon tang chat’ is always used in this document.
163
Another short document in the National Archives discussed 
nationalism.110 Wichien Supakarn suggested the establishment of a 
‘Samakhom Sinkha Thai’.111 He argued that the cause of the Siamese 
economic depression was the Siamese national character. The Siamese 
liked expensive foreign products. Most of the shops were in the hands of 
foreigners, who sent their profits to foreign countries. He thought that this 
was the main reason for Siam's economic stagnation. His suggestion was to 
change the Siamese national character. The establishment of a 'Samakhom 
Sinkha Thai’ would build skills and a commitment to promote commerce. At 
the same time, Thai products for Thai people’ would be promoted. The 
members of the People's Party would be expected to play a role in initiating 
this policy: for example, they would wear Siamese cloth. In this way, more 
Thai products would be sold. The retail shops would be run by real Thais, 
and competition from foreign shops would be excluded.112
Two further short documents dealing with nationalist ideas can be 
found in the National Archives. The first was by Sai Samonkrisana, sent to 
Phraya Mano, the President of the Economic Council, on 29 April 1933.113 
Sai wrote that he was not an expert on economic matters, and described 
himself as of low knowledge and low status. His document was divided into 
two parts; the causes of the weakness of Siam's economy, and its solution. 
Sai pointed out that the Thai were not engaged in commerce and industry 
but mainly in agriculture. This was the reason why foreigners became rich. 
He said that he had never met a rich Thai who had made a fortune through 
commerce, industry, or agriculture. He compared the Thai with the Chinese 
in terms of their attitude towards commerce. Thais ignored finance and the
110 S.R.0201.25/80. N.A.
111 The occupation of Wichien Supakarn is not mentioned.
112 The expression 'real Thai' might indicate anti-Chinese. However, he did not mention 
Chinese merchants. He did not explain how to prevent competition from foreign shops.
113 S.R. 0201.25/504. N.A.
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economy, and did not make an effort to know about commerce and industry. 
In contrast, the Chinese had been familiar with commerce for a long time. For 
example, even Chinese children knew how to buy cheap and sell dear. The 
Thai was inclined to like convenient and easy things. This placed commerce 
and industry in foreign hands. Even in the rice business, profits fell to the 
foreigner, because they dominated rice milling. The same applied to the 
timber trade. He repeatedly blamed the Thai, saying that they did not trust, 
understand, or help each other.
In the second part, Sai suggested the establishment of co-operatives. 
His idea was that co-operatives would be established as companies, to 
which all classes of people would join as shareholders. He suggested a 
revision of commercial law to reduce the stock per person to under one 
baht. This would encourage more people to participate. This company would 
engage in commerce, industry and agriculture, under the name 'Sahakon 
Phanitchakan haeng Siam camkat’. Sai recommended the establishment of 
a central bank to support the company, although again, he gave no details.
The last document concerned commerce, and was sent to the 
President of the House of Representatives in June 1932.114 Why were 
Chinese the dominant merchant, middleman, and money lender? His 
answer was that a great number of Chinese worked in shops. In order to 
encourage Thai merchants, he suggested that the government introduce a 
law to ensure that Thais were employed in companies, factories and shops. 
This would secure Thai managers in the future. He noted that commercial 
schools were useless, because of limited job opportunities - Thai graduates 
would find it difficult to find a job because they were Thai. Therefore they 
worked as clerks in the government. He noted that the Siamese Electric Co.,
114 S.R. 0201.25/188. N.A. The author's name was given as 'luksanasud' but no date 
was given.
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which employed Thai motormen as a concession, proved that Thais had the 
ability to work.
4.10. The Establishm ent of the Board of Commercial 
Development in 1920
This section examines various plans and proposals to assist commerce 
and trade by the Ministry of Commerce from 1920. There are two issues: 
first, the establishment of the Board of Commercial Development in 
1920; second, the setting-up of the Commercial Department with the 
appointment of the Principal Trade Commissioner in 1931.
This section examines the economic background of these plans, 
analyses them and considers the involvement of foreigners, especially 
foreign advisers and merchants. It is generally believed that the Siamese 
government in this period did not make a serious effort to encourage 
commerce and trade because of limited financial resources. According to 
Chatthip and Suthy: 'Local entrepreneurs did respond to economic 
opportunity for setting up local industry, but they received little support or 
attention from the government.’115 In addition, low tariffs, a small domestic 
market, and lack of raw materials, capital, and entrepreneurship were 
important.116
Why did the government establish the Board of Commercial 
Development in 1920 and the Commercial Department in 1931? There were 
serious economic crises around 1920 and 1931: even though the first crisis
115 Chatthip Nartsupha, Suthy Prasartset, and Montri Chenvidyakarn (eds), The Political 
Economy of Siam 1910-1932 , Bangkok: The Social Science Association of Thailand, 1981, 
p.6 The decline of local industries, like women's goods, the tanning industry, and tin ore 
processing is mentioned. See pp.8-9.
116 in 1855, the Bowring Treaty fixed import duties at 3 per cent ad valorem. It was not 
until the 1920's that Siam regained fiscal autonomy.
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did not bring about a long - term economic decline, the second created 
political and social conflict which contributed to the constitutional revolution 
of 1932. The appointment of Prince Chantaburi as the President of 
Commercial Development in 1920, and of Christiansen as the Principal 
Trade Commissioner in 1931 is important. Why did the government appoint a 
foreign merchant, Christiansen, as the Principal Trade Commissioner? The 
answer to these questions will involve both political and economic factors. 
The establishment of the Board of Commercial Development in 1920 was 
perhaps related more to political than economic factors. On the other hand, 
economic factors seem to have played a more important role in the 
establishment of the Commercial Department in 1931.
The establishment of the Board of Commercial Development (BCD) in 
1920 was a serious government effort to deal with a critical situation, 
caused by both external and internal factors. The worldwide shortage of food 
caused a keen demand for Siamese rice during the latter half of 1918 and in 
1919. This brought about a rapid increase in the local rice price.117 In order 
to protect the people, the government was forced to prohibit rice exports in 
July 1919.118 The worst was yet to come, for a tack of rainfall in the summer 
and autumn in 1919 caused a poor harvest. As a result, rice exports were 
seriously damaged. In fact, rice exports in 1920 fell almost 50 %. The British 
Consular Report in 1920 explained:
For the five years prior to 1919-20 the average annual export of rice in its various forms 
amounted to 1,070,370 tons. For the year ended March, 1919, the export was 845,323 tons 
only, valued in round figures at 132 million ticals or £10,161,260 at the then rate of exchange. 
During the year ended March, 1920, only 441,039 tons of rice and its derivatives were 
exported, but the effect of demand and high exchange was such that this unusually low
117 Department of Overseas Trade, Report on the Commercial Situation in Siam at the 
close of the year 1920, London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1921, noted that the price of 
white rice per picul in 1915-16 was, on average, 5.80 ticals; 11.40 ticals in 1918-19, and 22 
ticals in 1919-20. p.11.
118 Under the rice export prohibition, exports of broken rice were allowed under license in 
August 1920; in December of the same year, the export of all types of rice was permitted, 
subject to control. Exports were finally allowed without restriction from 1 February 1921.
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tonnage was valued at no less than 123 million of ticals, or £10,911,586 rendered into sterling 
at the average exchange of 11.28 to the £1.119
The sharp decline in exports brought about a deficit in the balance of trade 
for the first time in modern Siamese history.120
Under these circumstances, the King expressed the urgent need for 
the government to assist commerce. According to a translation of the 
proclamation, dated 28 August 1920, published in the Bangkok Times, the 
background to the establishment of the Board of Commercial Development 
was as follows:
At the present time, the first decree begins, all the countries of the world are striving to 
improve and increase their commerce by encouraging development and cultivation on a big 
scale on the part of the people. Siam also should, like other nations, hasten to take steps to 
expand her commerce. Hitherto the duty of this direction has been divided between a number 
of Ministries; but what has been done so far is not sufficient, as there has been no one whose 
business it has been to put his heart into this work and get the fullest results. For these 
reasons His Majesty is pleased to direct that the Department of Commerce and Statistics in the 
Ministry of Finance, whose special business it is to promote commerce, shall be advanced to 
the rank of a Ministry, and be under the direction of a special Commission for the furtherance 
of Commerce.121
This proclamation should be considered as part of a political struggle 
between the King and some influential Princes. The King, Vajiravudh, had 
been annoyed by the budget restraints imposed by the Minister of Finance, 
Prince Chantaburi. Financial reforms in 1913 had limited royal funds, such 
as travel expenses, maintenance of the royal palaces, and personal 
expenses. The King had to negotiate with the Ministry of Finance for 
increased expenses. In fact, the King received 10.25 million baht under the
119 The trade figures of the Department of Overseas Trade were based on the port of 
Bangkok, which covered over 80 per cent of the foreign trade of Siam. Department of 
Overseas Trade, Report on the Commercial Situation in Siam at the close of the year 1920, 
London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1921, p,11.
120 According to the Report on the Commercial Situation in Siam at the close of the Third 
Quarter, 1921, Department of Overseas Trade, London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1922, 
exports in 1920-21 had fallen to 66,138,025 baht, whilst imports were 147,331,831 baht, thus 
causing a 81,193,806 baht trade deficit. Statistical Year Book of Thailand in 1929-30 shows 
exports in 1920-21 at 90,492,501 baht, imports at 159,676,275 baht, therefore causing a 
trade deficit of 69,183,774 baht.
121 Bangkok Times, 23 August 1920.
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Royal Accounts in 1925, which was eleven percent of total government
expenditure, compared with Chulalongkorn's 10.37 million baht in 1910,
which was 18 percent.122 Prince Chantaburi, a son of Chulalongkorn, had
been Minister of Finance from 1908. During King Vajiravudh's reign, Prince
Chantaburi faced various requests from the King, for special travel expenses,
renovation of palaces, and the Wild Tiger Corps. But Prince Chantaburi
turned most of them down because of the limited budget. The King's first
attempt to undermine the power of Prince Chantaburi came in 1919. He was
ordered to become the Supervisor (Kamkap) of the Ministry of Agriculture, in
addition to Minister of Finance. The Ministry of Agriculture had been
neglected, in spite of its importance in the Thai economy. ‘Agriculture was
another ministry that was sadly neglected. It was so poorly managed that
from 1897 to 1899 it was temporarily disbanded.’123
In 1920 Prince Chantaburi was appointed President of the Board of
Commercial Development. Greene describes the King's intentions:
The King's strategy, it appeared, was to neutralize the power of Chantaburi by 
assigning him a plethora of duties. Wachirawut hoped that he would not be able to handle any 
one adequately and thus the actual control in the ministry would develop to assistant ministers 
whom the King was confident would be more manageable than Chantaburi. There was little the 
Prince could do in return. He could complain, but how could he bewail what seemed to be an 
increase in power. He could resign, but that would only allow the King to have more control 
over the state’s finances.124
It is therefore clear that the political factor, to undermine Prince Chantaburi's 
power, was at least as important as the economic factor.
The aim of the Board was to promote trade. It had two functions; 
consultation and executive. The Council of the Board, including officials of 
other Ministries, was to consult. It was described as follows:
 a consultative body whose duty is to aim at co-ordination and co-operation in
122 Calculated from Thailand Statistical Yearbook 2480-2481, p.283.
123 Walter F. Vella, The Impact of the West on Government in Thailand, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1955, p.349.
124 S.L.W. Greene, Thai Government and Administration in the Reign of Rama VI (1910- 
1925)', PhD thesis, University of London, June 1971, p.319,
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developing the wealth of the country: to submit their views on such matters to His Majesty the 
King; and to tender their advice to other Ministries and Departments on questions of a 
commercial nature. The Council is composed of officials of the Board, Members and 
Advisers.125
The Board was empowered to invite to its meetings any minister, any 
director-general, or any other official in any ministry, in order to brief the 
Board on any matter, or furnish it with expert knowledge. Every ministry and 
department with a seat on the Board was required, whenever any matter 
connected with the commerce of the country arose in their ministry or 
department, to submit it to the Board, so that there was coordination and 
cooperation.126 The members included the President, Vice-President, 
Minister of Finance, Minister of Lands and Agriculture, Commissioner- 
General of State Railways, Director General of Revenue, Director General of 
Customs and the Director of the Irrigation Department. The number of 
members was not limited, and any official who might be useful could be 
appointed or invited to attend meetings. The members did not include 
merchants or experts - all were civil servants. The advisers were the 
Financial Adviser, the Adviser to the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture and 
the Adviser to the Ministry of Commerce.
The executive functions of the Board were to encourage the 
commerce of the country, to find new openings for trade and to execute the 
policies of the Council. The relationship between the Council and its 
executive functions was not clear. The Bangkok Times noted that:
the terms of the appointment are vague, but they do emphasize the vital importance of 
the expansion of the country's trade. For that reason the Commission has aroused a little hope 
and a good deal of curiosity. Its purpose, one assumes, is not to teach the shipping companies 
to run their ships and avoid liquidation, or to teach any firm import or export business. Trade is 
to be increased, one presumes, by improving the economic position of the cultivator; and Siam 
is a fortunate country in that there is still time for such an advance to come as a gift from 
above.127
125 K.Kh.0301.1.28/10. N.A. K.Kh. stands for Office of the Financial Adviser.
126 ibid.
127 Bangkok Times, 28 August 1920.
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The Financial Adviser, W.J.F. Williamson, also gave his opinion on the 
functions of the Board of Commercial Development which were: (1) 
coordinating the activities of the government to assist the commerce of the 
country; and (2) providing the Ministry of Commerce with a ready means of 
consultation with other branches of the administration.128
In other words, the Board of Commercial Development, though an integral part of the 
Ministry of Commerce, is, I take it, merely a consultative and advisory body to whom the Minister 
of Commerce, in his capacity as President of the Board, submits important questions for 
consideration and opinion, and which he keeps informed of the progress of the various 
activities of his Ministry in order to stimulate the interest, and to obtain the assistance of, the 
other Ministries represented on the Board.129
4.11. The Establishment of the Department of Commercial 
Intelligence in 1931
In this section, there are three main issues. How was Siam affected by the 
1930s depression? Second, the different background to the establishment of 
the Board of Commercial Development in 1920 and the Department of 
Commercial Intelligence in 1931. Why did the Siamese government appoint 
a foreigner, Christiansen, as Principal Trade Commissioner in 1931? This 
appointment should be seen in the context of the East Asiatic Company's role 
in Siam. Thirdly, the financial chaos brought about by Britain's departure from 
the gold standard in September 1931 caused severe argument in the 
government. The Financial Adviser played an important role in the 
government's final decision. Why did the Financial Adviser strongly 
advocate that Siam remain on the gold standard?
The year 1931 was a bad economic year for Siam. The world
128 K.Kh.0301.1.28/10. N.A. Meetings of the Board of Commercial Development. 
Opinion by the Financial Adviser, 18 June 1923.
129 Ibid.
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depression was the most important factor. However, there was already a 
trade slump during the late 1920's. Total trade had decreased from a peak in
1927-28.130 But the annual report, 1931, of the British Foreign Office started:
In a year of world-wide financial and economic depression Siam can, at any rate, claim 
to have fared better than many more advanced and enlightened countries. The scarcity of 
population, if nothing else, has saved her from widespread unemployment. There have been 
no popular disturbances, no catastrophes of nature, and the Siamese peasant, with his easy­
going, contented temperament, his modest needs and simple tastes, has, at least, had as 
much to eat as in previous years. Those who have felt most the effects of world conditions in 
Siam are the foreign element, the Chinese and the European, and, in a lesser degree, the 
Siamese official class, particularly in the capital.131
In 1927-28, foreign trade reached a peak at 477,349,898 baht; the 
next year, it fell to 442,265,290 baht, and, in 1929-30, to 426,485,971 baht. 
When the world depression hit Siam in 1930, foreign trade in 1930-31 fell to 
316,527,778 baht, and in the next year, reached its lowest at 234,115,677 
baht. Compared with the peak in 1927-28, the total value of trade had fallen 
51 per cent.132 Rice export values had decreased 61 per cent in the four years 
from the peak in 1927-28.133 Volumes reached a peak in 1927-28, and fell 
40 percent to their lowest in 1930-31. However, volume increased 29.7 
percent in 1931-32,134 meaning that Siamese farmers were forced to export 
more rice because of the sharp fall in price.
One of the reasons for this long-term slump in the rice trade was the 
fall in the reputation of Siamese rice in foreign markets. There was a dispute 
over this issue between rice-mill owners and foreign merchants in Bangkok 
in December 1928. The dispute was that foreign merchants suffered serious
130 Total trade value in 1928-29 fell 7.35 %, and 3.6 % the following year. Exports in
1928-29 declined 8 .6% , and 13 % the following year. However, import value fell 5 .6% , and 
increased 8.9 % in 1929-30. Imports in the 1920's reached a peak in 1929-30. These figures 
are calculated from Thailand Statistical Year Book 2474-75.
131 Dormer to FO No. 7, enclosing Annual Report for 1931, 5 January 1932  
F1078/1078/40, FO 371/16260, PRO, p.1.
132 Exports in 1931-32 were 48 .6%  of the peak in 1927-28, and imports, 49.7% .
133 Export value per quantity of all rice and paddy declined seriously from 1929-30 to 
1931-32: 7.37 baht per picul in 1929-30 dropped to 6.02 the following year, and to 3.49 in 
1931-32. Calculated from Thailand Statistical Year Book 2472-73 and 2474-75.
134 ibid.
172
losses because Siamese rice was found to be deficient in terms of both 
quality and weight. The merchants proposed delivering rice into their 
godowns before it was shipped, in order to check weight and quality. The 
Record, published by the Board of Commercial Development, examined this 
problem:135
Before the war garden rice and field rice were always quoted separately on the London 
market, and Siam garden No.1 represented a very high quality of Siam garden rice. Nowadays 
both quantities are freely mixed by padi dealers in their boats before being delivered to the 
mills, and no such separate quotations are now obtainable.136
New standards like Super (up to 5% broken), Special (up to 15% broken)
seemed to be different from the old standards: ‘garden No.1, which now
represents 25% to 30% broken, is only a shadow of its former self. It is stated
that the Special of today is not so good as garden No.1 of even five years
ago.’137 However, the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture's examination of rice
showed no deterioration of quality, but minimising mixing was very
important. The Record pointed out that:
At present practically all the export rice is brought down to the Bangkok mills in the 
form of padi, and there is therefore nothing to prevent the dealers from mixing the grain from 
different provinces in their boats before delivery. But if the padi could be bought by the 
exporter in the district of its growth and milled there before being brought down to Bangkok, 
the possibility of mixing the different grains would be obviated, and it would be possible to 
quote garden rice and field rice separately once again.138
More steps to promote agriculture and commerce were tried in the
1930s than in the 1920's. In 1926 the Ministry of Commerce was
amalgamated with the Ministry of Communications and the Board of
Commercial Development. In 1931 the Department of Agriculture was
transferred and combined with the Botanical Section of the Ministry of
Commerce and Communications to form the Department of Agricultural
135 Ministry of Commerce, The Board of Commercial Development, T he  Present Position 
of the Rice Trade of Siam’, The Record, No.34, July 1929.
136 ibid, p.233.
137 ibid, p.233.
138 Ibid. p.234.
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Research. It was also in that year that a report by Zimmerman was published. 
This report recommended that the Siamese government diversify into 
cotton, tobacco and peanuts. Zimmerman argued for the importance of 
education by agricultural demonstration, and for the creation of an 
agricultural junior college. A Department of Agricultural Research was 
created in 1931.
The severe economic and financial situation forced the government to 
take action. The King's letter to Krom Phra Kamphengphet, dated 15 March 
1931, indicates the need to cope with a critical condition.139 The King 
suggested that the Board of Commercial Development engage in 
agricultural and aquatic research, in order to cope with the decline in rice 
exports. Chao Phraya Phichaiyat, Acting President of the Board of 
Commercial Development, decided to invite six outsiders to consider this 
matter. The background to this committee was quite different from that of the 
Board of Commercial Development in 1920. The establishment of the Board 
of Commercial Development in 1920 was driven by political factors more 
than economic, in that the King aimed to decrease Prince Chanthaburi's 
power.140 However, in 1931, the establishment of the Committee showed 
more positive economic concerns. The Committee consisted of six officials 
and six non-officials, appointed for a period of two years. The non-officials 
included representatives of the farmers, the rice millers, shipping, the 
International Chamber of Commerce and the Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce. Prince Sithiporn, H. Christiansen, Phraya Indhadhipati and 
Luang Ambhil Bhitax Ketra were the non-officials.141 At the first meeting of 
this Committee, on 27 April 1931, the scope of its work was discussed.142
139 R 7 . Ph.7/2 N.A.
140 See PhD thesis, Stephen L.W. Greene, Thai Government and Administration in the 
Reign of Rama VI (1910-1925)’, University of London, June 1971, p.319.
141 R.7. Ph.7/2. N.A. This document did not specify the positions of these persons.
142 K.Kh. 0301.1.28/18. N.A. pp. 1-6.
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The main issues were commercial matters, as well as agriculture, protection
of aquatic resources, and irrigation.
A further step was to create the Department of Commercial
Intelligence. Virginia Thompson noted several reasons for the trade slump:
Far Eastern markets were closing to Siam; Java, then Japan, and finally China and 
Malaya were placing taxes on Siam's rice. Siamese trade was left to look after its own interests, 
while competitors, because of their colonial status, enjoyed protected markets in Europe. The 
depression was teaching Siam that all her emphasis on expansion of production was unavailing 
without the assurance of markets.143
A document, Raigan Prachum Aphirathamontri Khlangthi 29/2473, explained
the need to establish the Department of Commercial Intelligence, relying on
the ideas of Krom Phra Kamphengphet.144
The government should help to look for market and trader, should improve products 
not only rice but others. Two countries in which the government was closely involved in the 
conduct of trade were Russia and Japan. It is necessary for us to establish the Department of 
Commercial Intelligence as soon as possible.145
According to the proposal, the Director and Assistant Director would
be foreigners - to find Siamese commercial experts would be difficult. The
Department would consist of external and internal branches. The external
branch would consist of commercial attaches and trade commissioners. For
the present, two branches were suggested, in Hong Kong and Singapore.
The Hong Kong office would cover China, Japan (including Korea and
Formosa) and the Philippines. The Singapore office would cover Malaya,
Java and Sumatra. It was natural to have offices in these countries because
they had been the main Siamese trade ports for a long time. Later a
commercial attache for Europe, in Germany at Hamburg or Bremen, would be
considered. Germany was chosen because it had no colonies, and would be
less discriminatory regarding tariffs. The duty of the trade commissioner
would be to Keep an eye on movements of markets, and for new openings
143 Virginia Thompson, Thailand: The New Siam, 1967, 2nd ed, New York; Macmillan, 
p.434.
144 R.7 Ph.8/8. N.A.
145 ibid.
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for Siamese trade.
On the other hand, the internal branch would be in charge of 
collecting domestic market information. In addition, a propaganda bureau 
would diffuse knowledge of Siamese products abroad. The internal branch 
was divided into four divisions; north, south, northeast and central, and one 
chief agent and two assistants would be stationed in each division.146 Their 
duty would be to supply the Department with regular information on the 
supply and prices of all commodities in their district.147
The document, Raigan Senabodi Saphathi 35/2473, 26 January 
2473, shows support from the Minister of Finance for the establishment of 
the Department. The document makes three points; it was necessary to find 
suitable export products, and this information should be kept in tabulated 
form. Second, the person who was in charge of this scheme should have 
experience as a civil servant. Third, it was a justified spending of public 
money, because it should secure good results. Mr. H. Christiansen was 
appointed Principal Trade Commissioner. The National Archives documents 
do not explain why this Danish trade expert was chosen. It appears that the 
Siamese government tried to create a balance among foreign advisers. The 
British had dominated the position of Financial Adviser since 1896, and the 
Americans the position of adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Foreign Office annual report 1931 summarised the 
establishment of the Department and appointment of Christiansen as follows:
Another new Department, also in the Ministry of Commerce and Communications, was 
created in April, namely, the Department of Commercial Intelligence, with the object of 
discovering markets for Siamese produce. Its head, with the title of Principal State 
Commissioner, is a Dane, M.Christiansen, formerly manager of the Bangkok branch of the East 
Asiatic Company, whose services have been loaned to the Siamese Government for a period 
of three years. M. Christiansen took up his appointment in July after a brief visit to Europe,
146 ibid. The centre of the 4 divisions, north, south, northeast, and central are Lampang, 
Tung Song or Haad Yai, Korat and Bangkok. See details in'Proposals for the Establishment 
of a Commercial Intelligence Department’.
147 ibid.
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during the course of which it was said that he had been requested to find a suitable man to be 
appointed Siamese Trade Commissioner at Hamburg, an important market for Siamese rice. 
Later on Trade Commissioners were to be appointed to Singapore and Hong Kong. Up to the 
time of writing none of these appointments had been made. However, this is probably due to 
the financial stringency, and there is no reason to think that the idea has been abandoned.148
The appointment of Christiansen raises a number of points. The
relationship between the East -Asiatic Company and his position as
Principal Trade Commissioner may have increased Danish influence over
Siamese trade policy. A British diplomat expressed caution:
The East Asiatic Company have strengthened their position greatly through the 
appointment of M. Christiansen, their managing director in Siam, as Principal Trade  
Commissioner and Director-General of the new Commercial Intelligence Bureau. British and 
American competitors were in this field, but it must be admitted that M. Christiansen's 
qualifications are exceptional.149
The East Asiatic Company had played an important role in trade in Siam. It 
had been established by a Dane, H.N. Andersen, in 1897. As the captain of 
the King's ship, he carried Thai teak to England in 1882 and made a huge 
profit.150 The East Asiatic Company was engaged in various businesses; 
shipping, general agents, insurance, rice mill, saw mill, and export and 
import.151 It is worth noting that the Danes were a substantial European 
community in Siam at the beginning of the twentieth century: 'the Danes 
constituted the second largest group of Westerners, 80, after the British, 
250, at the change of the century. Altogether 700 to 800 Europeans were at 
that time living in Thailand, mostly in Bangkok.’152 The development of the 
East Asiatic Company was built on the special personal relationship 
between H.N. Andersen and the Royal Family. Members of the Royal Family
148 Dormer to FO No. 7, enclosing Annual Report for 1931, 5 January 1932, 
F1078/1078/40, FO 371/16260, PRO, p.4.
149 ibid., p.9.
150 The Royal Danish Ministry of Education, Thai-Danish Relations: 30 Cycles of
Friendship, Bangkok: Pigkanes Press, 1980, p. 147.
151 Ibid., pp.147-159.
152 ibid., p. 147.
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held shares in this company, and the East Asiatic Company provided a ship 
for them to travel abroad. The influence of this company can also be found in 
various business contracts from the Siamese government. For example, 
there was severe competition between the British Peninsular and Oriental 
Steamship Company and the East Asiatic Company in bidding for the 
shipment of silver to England in 1931.
Second, Christiansen was considered a very competent merchant by 
the foreign and Siamese communities. One of his main business activities in 
the East Asiatic Company involved attempts to buy paddy directly from the 
peasants. James Ingram:
This was in 1931-32 when the East Asiatic Company (Danish) began to buy paddy 
directly from growers and to make advances to them at 10 percent interest on the security of 
mortgages. An elaborate system of organization was developed, but violent objections in 
some sectors of the government ended in abandonment of the project. The government was 
willing to see Chinese middlemen and moneylenders replaced, but not by other foreigners. 
The chief fear was that foreign companies would obtain possession of large amounts of 
riceland through foreclosure. The scheme was also opposed on the ground that it competed 
with the co-operative movement and might destroy it.153
A counter - argument can be found in the Royal Danish Ministry of Education 
book:
The company had no interest in destroying the middlemen as the relationship was 
good. The then manager of the Bangkok branch, Hakon Christiansen, may have been 
influenced by the Danish co-operative movement. He may also have suggested such ideas 
when he was on leave from the company to work as an advisor to the Ministry of Commerce, 
but when Virginia Thompson (p.383) claims that he was the man behind the government's plan 
to eliminate the middlemen, it is simply not true (conversations, Copenhagen, September 
1978).154
When Christiansen resigned as Principal Trade Commissioner in December 
1932, the Bangkok Daily Mail carried a friendly article, although the paper 
was well known for its critical and cynical comments on politics. The writer 
admitted the capability and sincerity of Christiansen, and pointed out his
153 j .  c. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand 1850-1970, Stanford; Stanford University 
Press, 1971, p. 73.
164 The Royal Danish Ministry of Education, Thai-Danish Relations: 30 Cycles of 
Friendship, Bangkok: Pigkanes Press, 1980, pp. 156-7.
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difficulties in coming to the government from the largest firm in Bangkok.
The fact remains, however, that the Government was unable to take full advantage of 
the talents and the energy of Mr. Christiansen. And we do not know but this fact proves that 
Mr. Christiansen's position in the Government has been impossible from the start. In other 
words, it may be that it set a precedent which should be avoided in the future. Siam always 
needs the service of good men, and, as we have said, we know of no better one than Mr. 
Christiansen for the task originally delegated to him, but it may be that we have learned that the 
precedent of taking such a man from the staff of a local commercial organization is not a good 
precedent. It makes the task of such a man difficult in the future. It is not fair to him and it is not 
fair to the Government.155
It is important to note that Christiansen submitted his economic plan in
December 1932.156
Third, the role of Christiansen in the financial crisis brought about by
Britain going off gold on 21 September 1931 should be mentioned. There
were severe arguments whether Siam should remain on the gold standard
or not.157 The whole of Siam’s currency reserve was held in sterling in
London, and the Government had other sterling holdings there. A Foreign
Office document argued that:
In view of the fact the country's financial business and external trade are conducted on 
a sterling basis, it was to be expected that the tical would follow sterling, but, nevertheless, the 
Government decided, with the advice of their financial adviser, to remain on the gold standard. 
To have followed sterling would have opened the door, in Mr. Hall- Patch's opinion, to 
uncontrolled inflation, besides rendering the budgetary position hopeless. The Banks, on the 
other hand, were strongly opposed to the Government decision, on the grounds that it would 
penalise exports and involve losses on forward contracts besides causing a serious exchange 
loss to themselves.158
The reasons why the Financial Adviser strongly opposed abandonment of 
the gold standard was explained in several Foreign Office documents.159 Hall 
-Patch saw the beneficiaries of leaving gold as follows; (1) the exporter
155 Department of Overseas Trade to FO No. 130, 5 December 1932, F456/456/40, 
F0371/17177, PRO. Abstract from the Bangkok Daily Mail 2 December 1932.
156 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 1 December 1932, p.24.
157 Benjamin A. Batson, The End of the Absolute Monarchy in Siam, Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1987. See Chapter VII, 'The Economic Crisis'.
158 Dormer to FO No. 7, enclosing Annual Report for 1931, 5 January 1932, 
F1078/1078/40, FO 371/16260, PRO, p. 14.
159 Dormer to Orde, No. 69/8/31, 14 November 1931.F7529/9/40, F0371/15531, PRO.
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(either European or Chinese); (2) the banks (mostly foreign); (3) rice miller 
(European or Chinese); (5) the producer.160 The producer, who is the most 
important element, is Siamese and he will receive, in existing conditions, the 
smaller share of the profits.’161 He also pointed out that most of the profits 
from the rise in import prices from gold standard countries would go into 
foreign hands. He compared the position of Siam with that of countries who 
had abandoned the gold standard, and suggested that those countries (a) 
had a heavy internal debt; (b) were highly industrialised; (c) had a central 
bank and an organised money market; (d) were equipped with an elastic 
fiscal system.162 He pointed out the danger of raising external loans with 
devaluation. He suggested not devaluation but a comprehensive plan 
covering budgetary equilibrium. Adaptation of the fiscal system, so as not to 
weigh too heavily on the producer but with a large element of elasticity, 
would be necessary to meet the needs and vicissitudes of an agricultural 
country. In addition provision of funds for the normal development of the 
country, provision of funds to finance such agencies and activities as may be 
necessary for Siamese products to compete successfully in the world's 
markets.163
On the other hand, Le May, Adviser to the Ministry of Commerce and 
Communications, had a quite different view. Le May's memorandum included 
two vital questions: 1. must Siam's currency be eventually linked with 
Sterling again?; 2. is there justification for believing in the economic and 
financial recovery of Great Britain in the near future, and her ability to 
maintain the value of her currency?164 His answer to both questions was 
yes. His arguments focused on two problems; the Foreign Debt Redemption
T i o  J b i J
161 ibid.
162 ibid.
163 ibid.
164 Johns to FO No. 70, 21 March 1932, F3700/200/40, F0371/16259, PRO.
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Fund, and the baht exchange. Regarding the Debt Redemption Fund, he
thought that it should be kept in the future in London in sterling securities,
because the debt was a sterling, not a gold one. Concerning the baht
exchange, Le May argued that some devaluation against sterling would be
inevitable. He had fear of a high value for the baht:
This country depends almost entirely on the cultivation of rice for commercial 
purposes; and the greatest danger is that, if the peasant can see no hope of profit, he will 
cease to plant rice for those purposes, and then good-bye to budget, currency, and credit.165 
In November and December 1931, the debate over economic policy
was carried out between the Ministry of Finance and Hall - Patch, and Prince
Purachatra, the Minister of Commerce and Communications. Batson notes:
On 12 November the Ministry of Commerce and Communications replied with a 
memorandum by H. Christiansen, the Principal Trade Commissioner, which, while not 
recommending an immediate devaluation, disagreed with many of Hall-Patch's conclusions 
and warned that if the high value of the baht undermined Siam's foreign trade there might be a 
disastrous fall in the government's tax revenues.166
In spite of the major objections of the Supreme Council, Hall-Patch 
succeeded in persuading the king not to devalue against sterling on 13 
November.
4.12. Foreigners’ Economic Ideas and Economic Policy
Foreigners had contributed to Siam's society in various fields, such as 
education, medicine, the press, the bureaucracy, government political and 
economic policies.
The total number of foreign officials in Siam had fallen from 187 in 
1920 to 58 in 1939 (see Table 4-3). One of the reasons for this decline was 
that the economic depression in the early 1930's forced the government to
165 ibid.
166 Benjamin A. Batson, The End of the Absolute Monarchy in Siam , Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1987, p. 190.
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cut expensive foreign officials. Among foreign officials, British dominated. 
For example, British accounted for 107 of the 187 in 1920, and 22 out of the 
58 in 1939.
In 1920 British advisers outnumbered those of all other nationality: the British and the 
Danes oversaw the police; the British and the French dominated the legal system; the British, 
French, and Italians executed public works; the British administered the airport and advised on 
mining and customs. Significantly, the British succeeded in monopolizing the important 
position of Financial Adviser between 1904-41 and 1945-51. The only other adviser enjoying 
similar prestige was the Foreign Affairs Adviser, a post consistently occupied by an American 
due to the limited nature of American colonial interests in South-East Asia.167 
In addition, most of the 9 Americans worked for the Ministry of Public
Instruction as academic staff at Chulalongkorn University.168 The Foreign
Office Annual Report in 1926 illustrated British influence in Siam as follows:
There is more British than any other foreign capital in the country; the British firms 
operating here have been established longer than any other except the Danish, and their 
operations are on a larger scale; the bulk of the foreign trade is in British hands; for the greater 
part of Siam's land frontiers marches with British territories; some 50,000 British Asiatic 
subjects live in Siam. It is to British universities that most of the students go whom the 
Government sends abroad for Western technical training, and most of the Siamese princes 
have, since King Chulalongkorn began the practice of sending his sons there, been educated 
at English public schools and at Cambridge or Oxford. The result is that there are few Siamese 
of position, at any rate in Bangkok, who cannot speak English; those who have not been to 
Europe have been taught it here as children; it is the first foreign language taken up by the 
great majority of the boys in the Government schools in Bangkok, and is generally recognised 
as the language of business and official transactions. It is true that, just as there is a tendency 
to iook more and more to the United States for foreign advisers, so there is a tendency to send 
more students for training to the United States or France. But the British connection is still 
strong. As will have been seen .... above, half the foreign advisers and experts in Siamese 
Government employ are still British; and it is not likely that, so long as London remains the 
financial centre of the world, the key post of financial adviser will be given to any but a British 
subject.169
The Foreign Office saw five positions as key posts; political adviser (then
167 Richard J. Aldrich, The key to the South: Britain, the United States, and Thailand 
during the Approach of the Pacific War, 1929-1942, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 
1993, p.49.
168 Waterlow to FO No. 17, 21 January 1927, F1889/1889/40, F0371/12535, PRO.
169 Waterlow to FO No. 39, enclosing Annual Report for 1926, 22 February 1927, 
F2874/2874/40, F0371/12535, PRO.
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American); financial adviser (then British); chief judicial adviser (then British); 
chief marine surveyor (then Danish); and assistant Director-General of Posts 
and Telegraphs (then Danish).170 With respect to economic policy in the 
early 1930's, the financial adviser, the adviser to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and the adviser to the Ministry of Commerce and Communications 
were crucial.171 The detailed number of foreign advisers in each Ministry is 
shown on Table 4-4.
Besides foreign advisers, European merchants also played an 
important role. In this section, two European economic proposals, those of 
J.E. England (British merchant) and H. Christiansen (the Principal Trade 
Commissioner) will be discussed. These economic ideas were submitted to 
the government after the constitutional revolution in 1932. It is important to 
note that not only foreign officials but also foreign merchants expressed their 
economic ideas to the government. In addition, an economic plan was 
presented by Christiansen.
J.E. England's document can be found in the National Archives.172 He 
submitted it to Phraya Manopakorn Nitthithada on 3 August 1932. J.E. 
England had been in Siam for over twelve years, and was engaged in the 
Siam rice trade for more than nine years.173 He supported nationalism in the 
rice trade, in spite of being a foreigner. To put it another way, he encouraged 
Siamese to engage in this business and blamed the Chinese for their 
exploitation of Siamese farmers. His idea was quite similar to that of 
Mangkorn Samsen. Secondly, he attacked the government silo scheme, and 
suggested the establishment of a Siamese company which would deal with 
the rice trade, including not only cultivation and milling but also
170 }bid.
171 See, chapter VII, T h e  Economic Crisis', in Benjamin A. Batson, The End of the 
Absolute Monarchy in Siam, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 187*235.
172 K.Kh.0301.1.37/65. N.A.
173 ibid. The life and detailed business activities of England are not considered here.
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transportation, and internal and external commerce. His idea, repeated in 
several Siamese economic plans, came to fruition in the establishment of the 
Thai Rice Co. in 1938.174
In an introduction, he argued:
What is well known is that the Siamese do not handle their own Country's 
commodities, of which Rice is the main article, but it is not until a period of depression such as 
being experienced at present arrives that it is fully realized that however well the foreign 
exporters may have conducted the business in the past, and however much they may have 
assisted the Country by their business, their main object has always been to make as much 
money out of the Country’s commodities as possible. In fact it has been in their interest not to 
cultivate the business instinct in the Siamese people. There is of course no doubt that the 
general aristocratic principles of the Siamese opposed to business generally has greatly 
assisted the foreign merchants in their activities.175
He classified foreign exporters in Siam into Chinese, Europeans, Japanese
and Indians. He attacked the Chinese. Chinese penetration of internal trade
had expelled Siamese from the transportation of paddy, and Chinese
middleman had exploited farmers and rice millers with high interest rates. He
thought that the government policy of introducing co-operatives had not been
successful. He suggested that farmers should know more about the cost and
selling price of rice.
The object here is to stop the Farmers having to pay exorbitant rates of interest so that 
the Paddy may come onto the market at the lowest possible cost of production, and here I may 
mention that the Farmers and most people in Siam are not aware of the actual relation between 
the cost of production of Paddy and the selling price of rice. I think this relation should be 
known, and an increased knowledge by the Farmer of the marketing of his crop should provide 
a stimulus to his activity.176
The Chinese also dominated the rice milling business. However, England 
thought that Siamese would be able to enter this business: ‘I do not see it 
necessary that rice-milling should be almost a monopoly of the Chinese in 
Siam. After all, it is only a question of management.’177 England gave the
174 Although there is no evidence that the establishment of the Thai Rice Co. in 1938 
was influenced by England's suggestion.
175 K.Kh.0301.1.37/65. N.A.
176 ibid.
177 Ibid.
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example of Mangkorn's success In rice milling. England was concerned
about Siamese rice millers exporting to the Chinese market through
Chinese agents in Hong Kong and Singapore under a consignment basis.178
He gave the example of Mangkorn: ‘Nai Mangkorn could no doubt also give
reliable information in this connection.’179 In other words, England believed
that the Siamese could monopolise the rice trade.
The Chinese are now attempting to enter the Western markets, and I think it is only the 
lack of organizing capacity and mutual distrust of each other that is preventing the Chinese 
from eliminating the non-milling European rice merchants altogether. If they could overcome 
these faults, this elimination would, I think, be only a matter of a few years.180 
But England considered the Siamese to be as efficient as the Chinese: ‘I
have no doubt that the Siamese could monopolize this trade just as
effectively as the Chinese might be able to do, provided they were effectively
organized.’181
England pointed out that European traders simply bought from rice
millers and sold to buyers in Europe and elsewhere in large quantity and with
a margin of profit. He raised the question, why did Siamese not enter this 
trade? The fail in quality of Siamese rice in European markets, for example 
in 1926, should be eliminated.182 The problem was that European merchants 
could not maintain standards because of price competition. Furthermore, 
they were relying on the Chinese rice millers. England noted the attempts of 
the East Asiatic Co. to run rice mills and to purchase rice directly from the 
farmers. Concerning the Indians, he said;
A few Indian merchants conduct business with Java, and this business has no doubt
178 ibid. England explained: ‘the bulk of this trade is done on what amounts to a
consignment basis, i.e. the Rice is shipped to the Chinese Agents at Hong Kong or 
Singapore, and although these Agents may be prepared to advance the money against the 
shipments, the actual amount available from the sale of the rice is not due to the consignee 
until after the rice is sold.’
179 ibid.
180 ibid.
181 ibid.
182 ibid. England wrote on the alleged deterioration of Siamese rice to the Department of 
Overseas Trade in London in October 1926.
185
been brought about by the big differences between the Banks' buying and selling rates. 
Indians in Siam are the principal importers of Sugar and Molasses from Java, and they sell Rice 
to Java to pay for the sugar, etc. thus doing away with the margin in the Bank's rates of 
exchange.183
He summarised his nine points;
(1) the trade in the productions of Siam should be diverted into the hands of Siamese as much 
as possible;
(2) transport of the Paddy from farm to mill should be re-diverted to the Siamese;
(3) the Farmers should be protected against exorbitant rates of interest;
(4) paddy of the highest quality should be produced at the cheapest possible price;
(5) the Farmers should have a knowledge of the actual marketable value of his produce;
(6) the Farmer should feel some of the benefit of a rise in market prices;
(7) there is no reason to suppose that the Siamese cannot successfully operate rice mills;
(8) there is no reason to suppose that the Siamese cannot establish efficient connections in 
those centres now operated by Chinese;
(9) there is every reason to believe that the Siamese could operate successfully in the 
Europe, Cuba, Java, Japan, India, and South African markets.184
These are quite similar ideas to those of Mangkorn Samsen who advocated
positive Siamese engagement in business. England believed that from the 
beginning, Siamese would be able to operate about 30 % of rice exports.185
In the depression, he saw that special factors, such as the monetary 
situation, were responsible for sharp decreases in consumption. For 
example, China had famine in spite of sufficient rice, and Russia had 
starvation, despite abundant Russian wheat in the international market.186 
England doubted the value of the scheme by Christiansen, the Principal 
Trade Commissioner, for a silo company. He wondered whether building 10 
silos would bring benefit to farmers. He pointed out the small capacity of 
silos. The scheme makes no effort at co-operation between the Farmers and 
the Rice Millers and the Rice Market. In fact, the tendency would be to play
into the hands of any one rice mill with a capacity of about 30,000 Tons a
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid.
185 ibid.
186 Ibid. He said; ‘It may perhaps be called a phenomenon of the relation between the 
actual agricultural cultivation and market prices of saleable produce that decrease in 
cultivation is co-ordinate with, and not a subsequence of, low prices; while an increase in 
cultivation is co-ordinate with, and not a subsequence of, high prices.1
186
year.’187 He added:
the Silo scheme becomes an unnecessary spending of money without co-ordinating 
the trade, and surely the middleman could be eliminated without the building of Silos. When 
the trade has been co-ordinated it might then be the time for reconsidering the question of 
building Silos.188
His proposal was to establish a company which would deal with the 
rice trade including cultivation, selling and buying, transport, milling, export, 
buying and selling gunnies, and the shipping business. His proposal was 
different from that of Boriphanyutthakit, Minister of Economic Affairs in 1938. 
England did not aim to create a state enterprise but a small private company 
which would be financed by subscribers and farmers. England’s idea was 
similar to that of Mangkorn. For example, there was no mention of inviting 
directors from the government.
In his proposal, the land for paddy cultivation would, at first, be
400.000 rai. He did not explain how this figure was calculated. He pointed 
out several difficulties, such as farmers' participation, security of loans to 
farmers, and quality of rice. He argued that finding a number of suitable and 
capable farmers was crucial. 'I believe that it is possible to obtain land­
owning Siamese farmers with the capabilities required to oversee at least
40.000 Rai each, provided, of course that the farms comprising the larger 
area were in the same district.’189
H. Christiansen's role as Principal Trade Commissioner has already 
been examined. It is important to note that he submitted an economic 
programme, reported in the local press, Thai Mai190 However, this is only 
an outline of the plan. The date he submitted the plan is not clear, but it 
seems to be before 1 December 1932, when he resigned as Principal Trade
187 ibid.
188 ibid.
189 ibid.
190 Thai Mai, 30 August 1933
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Commissioner.191 The Bangkok Times Weekly Mail noted:
he has prepared definite plans that shall be of much practical value in developing the 
vast possibilities of the country to the benefit of the Siamese people. Such development is 
essential, and we have every confidence that the first Principal Trade Commissioner has done 
enough to give it a good start.192
Christiansen argued that:
The methods of the Siamese farmer remain much the same as they have been for 
ages, so that the cultivator's present precarious position is not due to any shortcomings in this 
respect compared with previous years. The main reason for the drop in his income is the 
catastrophic fall in the price of rice, as of all other cereals, in the world market. Our system of 
production has been too inelastic to meet the changed market conditions.193 
He outlined the measures to be taken:
(1) Facilities for the farmer to obtain credit at a reasonable rate of interest: (2) direct 
communication for the farmers with the Bangkok market, on the lines started on a small scale by 
private enterprise, and proposed to be taken up by the Government through the Silo scheme; 
and (3) the establishment of fixed standard qualities of paddy and rice.194 
He also suggested improving cultivation methods, including seed selection,
and cultivating crops other than rice.
The minor plans examined in this chapter have several important 
points. According to the plans of Mano and Komarakun, it was clear that 
even the conservative groups acknowledged the necessity for state 
intervention in the economy. That main stream of economic policy was 
shared among the Siamese elites, the radical group of Pridi and Phra 
Sarasas, and the conservative group of Mano and Komarakun.
Second, middle class participation in discussion of economic issues is 
clear . That class was aware that the economic crisis originated with the 
world depression and suggested several ways to cope with it. Among their 
ideas, economic nationalism, whether anti-Chinese or anti-foreigner, was
rife. Import -substitution was advocated by both the Siamese elite and the
191 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 1 December 1932.
192 ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
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middle class.
Third, many similar plans or suggestions appeared after 1932. For 
example, Boriphanyutthakit’s plan for the rice mill in 1938 emerged from the 
Mangkorn Samsen, Chote Khumphan, and J. E. England plans soon after 
1932. The basic idea to protect for the Siamese farmer from the Chinese 
middlemen and Chinese rice millers was similar to that of Boriphanyutthakit.
Last, the role of foreigners was also important. The foreign advisers’ 
involvement in the discussion of economic plans showed that they opposed 
the plans which would damage their own interests.
Table 4-1 Num Dere of petitions and suggestions 1932-1939
i
Year Number :
1932 450 !
1 9 3 2 /3 3  26
1933..................
193 3 /3 4
238;
5
..........................
193 3 /3 5  2
1934 J 25
1 9 3 4 /3 5  2
1935 24
1936 6 
1 93 6 /3 7  1 ::.:...........
1 9 3 6 /3 9  1!
.1937..................
1938 J 
1 93 8 /3 9  !
........................ .2 ;......................  !
.......................4 :.........................  !
2i 1  .....................
1939 15
1 9 3 9 /4 0  1 ;
: . .......... . :
Total 804 j......................  t.........
!
(Source) S.R.0201.25. N.A.
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Table 4 -3  Foreign Officials in Thai Government Service,! 920 ,
1927 , and 1939 .
Date ; 1 9 2 0 * : 1 9 2 7 * * 1 9 3 9 * * *
Nationality
American 7 1? 5
British 10 7 64 22
Danish 21! 8 3
Dutch 1 : 1 1
French 24! 21 14
German 01 1 4
Italian 25; 14: 3
Japanese o ; 0: ?
Norwegians 1 j 1 1
Filipino 0! 0 [ 2
Portuguese 1 : o\ 1
Swiss 0; 1 1
Swedish 0! 0! 1
Others 0 j 1 i 0
Total 187 124! 58
Others in 1927  was Belgian.
(Source) *  and * * *  Richard J. Aldrich, The Key to the
during the Approach of the Pacific War, 1929-1942 ,
| Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, j 1993, p .379
i * *  from Waterlow to  FO, No. 17, 2 ! January 1927 , F 1 8 8 9 /
| 1 8 8 9 /4 0 , F 0 3 7 1 /1 2 5 3 5 . j
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Table 
4-4. 
Foreign 
Advisers 
by 
Ministry 
in 
1927
5Background and Summary of Economic Plans, and Analysis of
Economic Nationalism
5.1. Introduction
This chapter aims to focus on the background to, and provide a summary of, 
the economic plans examined in Chapters 3 and 4, and to expand on the 
argument regarding economic nationalism in Siam. There are several points 
to be considered, what were the motivations of those who submitted these 
plans? Were they related to the principles in the manifesto of the People’s 
Party, or to counter-measures to combat the impact of the world depression 
on Siam in the early 1930’s? What were the main features of these plans? 
Were they based on capitalism, socialism, or communism? How did the 
author’s educational background, including study overseas, influence their 
plans? What kind of foreign political and economic thought can be found in 
the plans? What were the main arguments between their Thai authors and 
the foreign advisers? Why did the government not respond to these plans 
positively and implement their ideas? Can it be said that these plans were 
mainly discussed not on an economic basis but as part of a political struggle 
against opponents of the People’s Party?
But the main theme of this chapter is to trace the origins of economic 
nationalism in Thailand. There are many arguments about these origins. For 
example, Vella argued that King Vajiravudh started to develop nationalism.1 
Another popular view is that nationalism started under the Phibun 
government from 1939. Terwiel quoted Thak: ‘A major political phenomenon
1 Walter F. Vella, Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the development of Thai nationalism, 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978.
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between 1939 and 1947 was the attempt to build nationalism in Thai society.
Previously, such an attempt was undertaken during the reign of Rama VI...'2
Batson maintained that the growth of a nationalist movement can be traced
back to 1936, with the influence of a nationalist-absolutist Japanese-inspired
state ideology.3 Terwiel found the roots of nationalism in the 1920’s and
early 1930’s. He pointed out that Luang Wichit Wathakan’s article ‘Bushido’,
published on 30 April 1933, indicated that Wichit had met Professor Inazo
Nitobe in the mid-1920’s.4 Terwiel notes:
Wichit writes on this topic with unreserved approval, paraphrasing Nitobe’s work in 
calling his philosophy the winyan or ‘soul’ of Japan, that which strengthened Japan and made 
it into the vigorous and powerful country of that moment. The roots of the dictatorial period of 
Thai nationalism thus go back in the case of Luang Wichit to the 1920’s, much earlier than most 
historians of Thailand lead us to believe.5
Terwiel also examined Chamrat Sarawisut’s writings of 1934 and 1935.6 
Terwiel thought much of his booklet Nangsue rueang chat Thai (A Book 
about the Thai Nation), which, consisting mostly of several authors’ work, 
including Luang Wichit, whom he considered a good example of early Thai 
totalitarian writing.
What kind of approach is most valuable to trace the origins of 
specifically economic nationalism in Thailand? Should it be considered in 
the context of political nationalism? Moreover the origins of economic 
nationalism might vary, like the origins of political nationalism. Terwiel 
points out:
It has also been argued that historians of Thailand have tended to describe nationalism 
as being a feature of specific reigns and rulers, and that this practice appears to have had a 
detrimental effect on the study of Thai nationalism as a whole. The history of the various stages 
of an ideology such as Thai nationalism is not served by this ‘on-off’ approach. It is much better
2 B.J. Terwiel, Thai Nationalism and Identity: Popular Themes of the 1930s‘, Craig J.
Reynolds, (ed), National Identity and its Defenders: Thailand, 1939-1989, Chiang Mai: 
Silkworm Books, 1993, p. 134.
3 Ibid., p. 135.
4 Ibid., p. 135.
5 Ibid., p.135.
6 Ibid., pp.138-141.
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studied as a phenomenon that, once arisen, moves, changes and develops as one of a range 
of competing ideologies.7
This approach will be used to analyse the origins of economic nationalism.
It was made clear in Chapters 3 and 4 that various social groups 
submitted economic plans. The post -1932 world made it possible for 
social groups which had been suppressed under the absolute monarchy to 
express their ideas on political, economic and social problems. Table 5-1 
shows eight Siamese authors of economic plans. Their social and 
educational backgrounds are very diverse. Only Phra Komarakun belonged 
to the old regime. Most were commoners, two were promoters and half 
were educated at Law School.6
The People’s Party and high-ranking officers of the old regime 
dominated the post-1932 parliament. Among the first seventy members, all 
were appointed by the new government; thirty-three were members of the 
People’s Party and thirty-two were civil servants, most of them high-ranking 
officials of the old regime.9 The thirty-three members of the People’s Party 
consisted of eight army and twenty-five civilian members.10 It is important to 
note that three merchants, Mangkorn Samsen, Manit Wasuwat and Sunchai 
Khutrakun, were chosen as representatives.11
The emergence of the middle class was a new factor in the early 
1930’s. According to the Statistical Yearbook for 1929, 93,967 were
employed as Professionals, 503,839 in commerce, 164,526 in Industry,
7 lbid.p.144.
8 it is not clear whether Mangkorn Samsen graduated from Law School. His name was 
not found in the list of graduates of the school. However, in an interview with his youngest son, 
Sakrai in August 1995 he said that his father studied at the school.
9 Eiji Murashima, ‘Democracy and the Development of Political Parties in Thailand 1932- 
1945’, Eiji Murashima, Nakharin Metktrairat, Somkiat Wanthana, The Making of Modern Thai 
Political Parties, Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economics, 1991, p.4. Nakharin Mektrairat, 
Kanpatiwat Sayamph. s. 2475  (The 1932 Revolution in Siam), Bangkok: Mun nithi khrongkan 
tamura sangkhomsat lae manutsayasat, 1992, p.218.
10 Nakharin Mektrairat, Kanpatiwat Sayam ph. s. 2475  (The 1932 Revolution in Siam), 
Bangkok: Mun nithi khrongkan tamura sangkhomsat lae manutsayasat, 1992, p.218.
11 Ibid., p.218.
196
and 367,105 in the service sector. The total was 1,129,437 persons, 15% of 
the labour force. The definition of ‘middle class’ in Siam at that time is 
difficult. However Nakharin defines it as the people engaged in commerce, in 
finance, independent professions, in manufacturing industry, or persons 
investing in new forms of production.12 He points out that clerks in trade or 
commerce houses, journalists and lawyers were important as the new 
middle class.13
In the commercial sector, the role of ‘Phokha Thai’ (Thai merchant) 
should be seen in the context of the economic policy of the new government 
after 1932. The idea of 'Phokha Thai’ was to promote commerce, trade, and 
manufacturing industry, not by foreigners and Chinese but by Thai 
merchants. This idea was advocated by various figures, including Mangkorn 
Samsen, and led to the establishment of the Siamese Chamber of 
Commerce in 1933. The important point is that most 'Phokha Thai’ were 
Chinese merchants with Thai hearts. In other words, their desire to adopt the 
'Samai Mai’ (New Age) and to promote Thai goods was different from that of 
the older generation of Chinese merchants, who originated as tax farmers 
and compradores. Nakharin argues that the middle class in Siam consisted 
of two groups; middle class merchants with an interest in the development 
of manufacturing industry, thinkers, writers and journalists who did not 
receive financial assistance from the government; and those who had been 
tax farmers, compradores, together with the new generation of Chinese rice 
merchants, who had received financial assistance from the government.14
Economic plans and ideas were submitted not only by the Siamese 
elite but also by the middle class. After the constitutional revolution the lower 
middle class were more inclined to express their ideas on politics, economic
12 Ibid., p.84.
13 ibid., p.86.
14 ibid., p.105.
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problems, society and social problems. However, even before the revolution, 
for example in 1931, several lawyers raised the social problems of the 
farmers,15 and middle-class civil servants, lawyers, businessmen, clerks 
and farmers strongly expressed their ideas. These ideas and suggestions are 
found in the documents in the National Archives.16 These documents dating 
from 1932 to 1933 were discussed in the previous chapter. Nakharin 
explained the reasons for a decline in the number of documents from 1934: 
the revolution in response to the peoples’ expectations had taken place to 
some extent, the government established a Division of Advertisement on 3 
May 1933, thus bringing the peoples’ voices to radio broadcasts, a filing 
system change kept files in each Ministry after 1933.17 The large numbers of 
documents in 1932 and 1933 shows the high middle class interest in the 
New Siam.
In these files can be found unique and interesting economic ideas. 
Sanga Caroenying submitted his views on economic issues to a member of 
the People’s Party in September 1932.18 He suggested the establishment of 
rice mills to remove Chinese exploitation, requested a reduction in the forest 
tax so that farmers could make a living by cutting trees, support for Thais to 
engage in commerce and Thai support for Thai products. His first 
suggestion, explaining the necessity for Thai rice mills, focused on how the 
Chinese middlemen and Chinese rice mill owners exploited the Thai farmers 
in various ways, including forcing them to sell padi at the lowest price, or 
cheating when measuring the rice. He argued that the People’s Party 
should set up 2 to 4 Thai rice mills, with the purpose of exporting to foreign
15 Nakharin Mektrairat, Khwamkhit khwamru lae amnat kanmuang nai kanpatiwat Sayam 
2475  (Thought, Knowledge and Political Power in the Siam Revolution of 1932), Bangkok: 
Sathaban Sayam suksa samakhom sangkhomsat heng prathed Thai, 1990, p.116.
16 See the file S.R.0201.25. N.A,
17 Nakharin Mektrairat, Khwamkhit khwamru lae amnat kanmuang nai kanpatiwat Sayam 
2475  (Thought, Knowledge and Political Power in the Siam Revolution of 1932), Bangkok: 
Sathaban Sayam suksa samakhom sangkhomsat heng prathed Thai, 1990, pp. 114-5.
18 S.R.0201.25/111. N.A.
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countries. He pointed out that Thai farmers were forced to sell padi to 
Chinese because few Thai engaged in rice milling. He stressed that Thais 
would be able to carry out every aspect of this business, using Thai labour 
and asking Thais to participate in providing capital. He proposed setting up a 
rice mill company, by collecting capital from Thai farmers.
Two further suggestions were to request a reduction in the taxation of 
farmers because of the deterioration in their condition during the years from 
1932 to 1935, caused by falling prices. Farmers were looking for an 
opportunity to cut timber as an alternative living but the high forest tax made 
it difficult for them. He asked that this tax be cancelled or reduced. On the 
other hand, the tax on companies and big saw mills should be kept. 
However, small timber businesses should be helped. The last suggestion 
was to encourage Thais to engage in commerce. His basic idea was to ask 
Thais to purchase Thai products in Thai shops.
It is difficult to identify the author, by occupation, or educational and 
social background. He expressed a wish to join the People’s Party, but he did 
not refer to his relationship with the Party. There are two aspects to be 
considered. First, his main theme was economic nationalism, and an anti- 
foreign, especially anti-Chinese, view was stressed. It is important to note that 
even the middle class expressed strong economic nationalism soon after the 
1932 revolution. Second, the establishment of a Thai rice mill had been 
advocated by an ordinary person. Even though he lacked a detailed plan, his 
economic nationalism, his emphasis on the self-reliance of the Thai, was 
already common at this time. In other words, he wished to eliminate Chinese 
dominance of the rice business to avoid relying on the Chinese. This 
reminds us of the plan by Chote Khumpan in 1934.
The other document was submitted by Rien Phiuphum on 20
January 1933.19 One issue was to ask the Ministry of Commerce and
19 S .R .0201.25/89. N.A.
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Communications to buy and sell products for the people throughout the 
country. A second was to set up a commerce and industry school. His idea 
was only briefly mentioned, so it is difficult to fathom his intention. His social 
background was briefly mentioned - he was 18 years old and lived in Khon 
Kaen, he was a graduate of junior high school.
Another proposal, to set up a ‘Samakhom Bamrung Sinkha Thai,’ 
was made by Thanim Laohawilai and Sawien Osathanukhrow. This had 
some impact, because a few Thai newspapers published articles on this 
issue. Their proposal was filed in the National Archives.20 Thanim was a 
clerk in a store and Sawien was a policeman. Their document consisted of 
two parts. The first was a letter to Mano, the chairman of the People’s Party 
executive committee, on 1 August 1932. In this letter they pointed out that 
although a few Thais engaged in commerce, dealing with high quality Thai 
products as well as imported goods, Thai products did not sell well like 
imported goods. The reason was lack of support from the people. The aim of 
this proposed association was to promote Thai products and industry. They 
stressed that this aim had nothing to do with government policy, the idea 
was based on self-reliance. The six aims of the association were: to 
encourage Thais to use Thai products, to make Thai products more well 
known, to support Thai products by raising their quality, to support the 
position of Thai manufacturers and Thai merchants, to introduce issues 
related to commerce and to develop industry. They asked permission to 
set up this association from the executive committee and the People's Party. 
They also asked the Party to send a representative to a future meeting to 
discuss plans and activities.
The second letter to Mano on 6 August 1932 by Thanim further 
explained the six aims of the association. The first aim, to encourage Thais
to use Thai products, was explained by the need for self-reliance in Siam
20 (2) S.R.0201.52/2. N.A.
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because of the depression. Relying on imports, and with exports 
decreasing,, the trade gap was widening. He suggested five reasons to 
support this first aim: (a)Thailand belonged to the Thai people; (b) if Thais 
had products to sell, Thais would be willing to buy them, money will stay in 
Thailand and will increase the Thai people’s happiness; (c) if Thailand has 
industry, labour will have work; (d) having industry will make Thailand 
progress, Thais will use science - ail these will improve the country; (e) 
having a large number of Thai manufacturers and Thai merchants will give 
choice. He suggested four concrete measures: (a) to invite all editors of 
newspapers to be honorary committee members of the association; (b) with 
the cooperation of the editors, to write articles for the newspapers about the 
association; (c) to educate teachers and students about nationalism and 
economic nationalism; (d) to expand the numbers of members.
The second aim, to make Thai products more well known would need 
advertising and salesmanship. The association would set up an advertising 
division to cultivate support for its purposes, and to help all members 
engaged in commerce with advertising, marketing, selecting statistics and 
searching for markets. The establishment of shops by the association and 
training of commercial students was also planned. The third aim, to support 
Thai products by raising their quality, would be achieved by setting up a Thai 
products improvement division. The fourth aim, to support the position of Thai 
manufacturers and Thai merchants, would be difficult to achieve without the 
association. He pointed out that Thai merchants were lacking in the following 
respects: they had little knowledge compared with foreigners of the 
manufacture and distribution of products, they had no interest in improving 
their knowledge of commerce and manufacturing and they had not had an 
opportunity to practice their commercial skills or even to read textbooks about 
commerce and finance. The association planned to publish a newspaper on
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commerce, in order to spread news of Thai products and foreign commerce. 
The fifth aim was to be carried out by advertising and salesmanship. The last 
aim, to promote Thai industry, involved the association supporting Thai 
products and advertising Thai products: and it would be necessary for the 
Thai people to invest in industry.
Several points arise from this document. It was submitted not by a big 
commercial figure but by a mere shop clerk and a policeman. It is interesting 
that a common clerk has such strong views on economic nationalism. Their 
explanation of economic nationalism was quite simple, but their argument 
got to the heart of the matter. Even though they did not use the word 
‘Chinese’, it would appear that their aim was to eliminate the Chinese and 
foreign merchants. Second, their idea to emphasize advertising and 
marketing was innovative in the Siam of the time. It can be assumed that his 
experience as a clerk caused them to stress the importance of commercial 
knowledge. Third, their idea to use the mass media, newspapers, was new, 
although some newspapers had already shown an interest in economic 
matters. Fourth, although their association shows some similarity to the 
Siamese Chamber of Commerce founded in 1933, it is not clear whether it 
was their intention to develop the association as a chamber of commerce. 
Lastly, it is important to note that their interest included not only commerce 
but also manufacturing industry, notably domestic industry.
Thai Mai responded to their views with an article about the 
association on 26 October 1932.21 It was in favour of the association, 
arguing that there would be no problem in securing capital. It suggested 
profit sharing among the members, similar to capital participation in a co­
operative society.
The few examples above show that the middle class submitted
economic ideas and suggestions based on economic nationalism. They were
21 Thai Mai, 26 October 1932.
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not always constructive and practical. Even so, not only the Siamese elite 
but also ordinary people had expressed their ideas on economic issues.
5.2. The Establishment of the Siamese Chamber of Commerce
The establishment of the Siamese Chamber of Commerce in 1933 is now to 
be examined: why was it established? What kinds of Siamese merchant 
joined? Did the Chamber of Commerce have an influence on the 
government?
Lek Komet played an important role in establishing the Siamese 
Chamber of Commerce. Lek Komet was one of the few Thai merchants with 
a wide knowledge of commerce, foreign languages and foreign countries. 
He was just a graduate of a temple school, but studying English for four 
years with a native speaker gave him opportunities to work in foreign shops 
as a clerk.22 His long work experience in two foreign shops led him to earn 
400 baht a month as a compradore.23 World War I was a turning point - it 
enabled him to start his own business because Germans in Siam had been 
arrested. His shop, named ‘Hang Komet’, sold medicine and perfume and 
was successful.
A business trip to Europe in 1920 was paid for by a foreign company 
which aimed to trade with Siam. He spent one year in Europe. In England, 
Komet travelled to various places including Manchester, the centre of the 
cotton industry, where he spent three months, Glasgow, Birmingham, and 
Sheffield. He also visited Japan. In the latter half of the 1930’s Komet 
expanded his business with Japan. He travelled to Japan in 1936 for three 
months to inspect Japanese commerce. In 1937 he set up a branch of the
22 See his personal history in his cremation book, Lek Komet Anuson, Hokankha Thai 
(The Siamese Chamber of Commerce) Phimchamruai naiwara kanchapanakitsop, Nai Lek 
Komet, Na Men Watmaktkasatriyaram, 5 May 1962.
23 Ibid. He started work as a clerk with a monthly salary of 30 baht.
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Thai Phanit Co. at Kobe, and sold Thai animal skins to the Ministry of 
Defence in Japan. After World War II, he visited Japan as a representative of 
the Bangkok Chamber of Commerce, with officials of the Ministry of 
Commerce to conclude changes in the commercial treaty between Japan 
and Thailand.
A business tragedy, caused by fire and poor health, made him 
abandon ‘Hang Lek Komet’ . After this he expanded his business with 
Japan, and started a newspaper business called Thai Mai.
The development of the Siamese Chamber of Commerce was 
described in several books.24 Wirat Phuengsunthon wrote a history of the 
Chamber.25 He stressed the problem of the name of the Siamese Chamber 
of Commerce in Thai, the lack of funds and staff, and the various moves of 
office. He did not mention the extent to which the Chamber of Commerce 
exerted influence on the government, nor the kinds of policies or projects it 
carried out. According to his description, the Siamese Chamber of 
Commerce seemed to be more a social club for Thai merchants than an 
economic pressure group. However, his description offers an insight into the 
personal relationships around Komet in the Chamber of Commerce, and the 
various problems after its establishment.
A gathering of six people, including Phraya Phirompakdi and Lek 
Komet, at Komet’s house on 16 December 1932 made the decision to set up
24 For example, Lek Komet’s cremation book, Lek Komet Anuson, Hokankha Thai (The 
Siamese Chamber of Commerce) Phimchamruai naiwara kannapanitsop, Nailek Komet, Na 
Meruwatmakusatriyaram, 5 May 1962. Wirat Phuengsunthon, ‘Prawat hokankha Thai lae 
samakhom phokha Thai (History of Siamese Chamber of Commerce)’ in Lek Komet’s creation 
book. Another is Wirat Phuengsunthon, Prawat Samakhom Phokha Thai (The history of the 
Siamese Chamber of Commerce), Bangkok; The Thai Chamber of Commerce, 15 October 
1971.
25 He wrote a  history of the Chamber of Commerce in the two books above.
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a Siamese Chamber of Commerce.26 The name in Thai was a big issue, 
because at that time there was no definite translation of ‘Siamese Chamber 
of Commerce'. Chote Khumpan suggested 'Sapha Phanitkanhaengsayam’ 
but Komet considered 'Sapha Kankha’ or 'Hokankha' more suitable, in the 
end members chose ‘Hokankha’ . On 8 June 1933 the Siamese Chamber of 
Commerce was registered as an association, using the form ‘Hokankha’. The 
government considered ‘Sapha’ as reserved for government institutions.
The National Archives documents on the Siamese Chamber of 
Commerce show several important points.27 A letter from Phraya 
Phiromphakdi, president, to Luang Thamrongnawasawat, secretary-general 
of the cabinet, on 17 January 1934, explained the need for a Siamese 
Chamber of Commerce, the eight aims of the Chamber of Commerce, and 
the problem of choosing a name in Thai. Phraya Phiromphakdi pointed out 
that most Thai merchants did not help each other. In developed countries 
there were chambers of commerce. In Siam, foreigners set up their own 
chamber of commerce, and Chinese merchants used their own chamber of 
commerce. Therefore a Siamese Chamber of Commerce was necessary to 
promote commerce, with close cooperation between the government and 
Thai merchants. The eight aims of the Siamese Chamber of Commerce were: 
1) cooperation between merchants and the people; 2) to exchange 
knowledge concerning commerce; 3) to help Thai merchants as much as 
possible; 4) to promote contacts between domestic and foreign merchants; 5) 
to improve and diffuse domestic products as much as possible; 6) to provide 
training in commercial principles; 7) to link the work of the government and
of Thai merchants and 8) to carry out all functions of a chamber of
25 Wirat Phuengsunthon, Prawat Samakhom Phokha Thai (The history of the Siamese
Chamber of Commerce), Bangkok: The Siamese Chamber of Commerce, 15 October 1971. 
Though the date noted was 16 December 1933, the actual date seemed to be in 1932. The 
date for registration with the government was 8 June 1933; another source, 5 0 phi Hokankha 
Thai (50 years of the Siamese Chamber of Commerce) put the date at 16 December 1932; 
p.27.
27 (2) 0201.52/15. N.A.
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commerce.
The key committee members were Phraya Phiromphakdi, the 
chairman, Lek Komet, vice-chairman, Phraya Sapasinthanakitkaset, 
secretary-general, Mi Kasemsuwan (Kimseng Kimsuwan), treasurer, Chua 
Phenphakkun, reception committee, Thongdi Israkun, librarian. The total 
number of committee members was twenty-five,26 but the National Archive 
documents listed eighteen, the founders of the Chamber. The total number of 
ordinary members was forty-six, twenty-nine commoners and thirteen 
khunnang.
Among the committee members, Phraya Phiromphakdi and Phraya 
Phakdi-norasaet were particularly influential business leaders at the time. 
Phraya Phiromphakdi (Boonrawd Setthaburt, 1872-1950) was one of the few 
real Thai (not Chinese) merchants, who started to manufacture beer in the 
early 1930’s.29 Studying English in school with a native speaker and at the 
Sunantarai school, prepared him as a teacher and he passed the 
examination of the Ministry of Education; he wanted to be a bureaucrat but 
the advice of the British headmaster of the orphanage in which he worked 
turned him towards business.
He started at Hang Kimsenglee as a rice miller and saw miller and as 
a clerk when he was twenty one years old. After working at Kimsenglee for 
four years, he moved to Dickson & Co., a saw mill with a British owner, six 
years work experience here gave him wide knowledge of the timber 
business. He started a timber business on his own account, in 1913 he 
established Bang Luang Co. with the owner of Kim Seng Lee to engage in a
28 Wirat Phuengsunthon, ‘Prawat hokankha Thai lae samakhom phokha Thai (History of 
Siamese Chamber of Commerce)' in Lek Komet Anuson, Hokankha Thai (The Siamese
Chamber of Commerce), Bangkok Phimchamruai naiwara kannapanitsop, Naiiek Komet, Na 
Meruwatmakusatriyaram, 5 May 1962. Wirat Phuengsunthon, Prawat Samakhom Phokha Thai 
(The history of the Siamese Chamber of Commerce), Bangkok: The Thai Chamber of 
Commerce, 15 October 1971.
28 Prawat Chao Phraya Woraphongphiphat Phraya Phiromphakdi prawat rong bia (The 
history of Phiromphakdi and his beer factory), Bangkok: Ongkan Khru-sapha, 1963.
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ferry business over the Chaophraya river. A plan to construct a bridge over 
the river by .the government in 1928 made him change direction.
Travel to Java and Sumatra led him to submit an application to 
construct a brewery in January 1931. He also travelled to European 
countries, Germany, England and Italy, to inspect breweries and to order 
machinery in 1932. After the constitutional revolution, the Boonrawd Brewery 
Co. Ltd was established in 1933. His business was important. First, 
according to Suehiro, Boon Rawd Brewery held a prominent position in a 
capital - intensive industry, following Siam Cement.30 Most Siamese 
industry was in light manufacturing, such as cigarettes, matches, leather, 
ice, aerated water and coconut oil. Second, his company was a family 
business, and the Privy Pursue Bureau was not involved, as it was in the 
Siam Cement Co. Third, Boon Rawd Brewery survived severe competition 
from foreign beer in the 1930's without government support, until the Phibun 
government raised the import tariff on beer from 1939. Lastly, his desire to 
improve quality was a life theme; sending his sons to Germany to study, or 
inviting experts from foreign countries showed his passion for technology.
Phraya Phakdi-norasaet (Lert Saetthabut, 1872-1945) was known for 
the white bus business.31 He was born in 1872, the same year as Phraya 
Phiromphakdi, and his educational background was similar. Working in 
various jobs in his youth, such as low - level clerk in foreign trade houses, 
teacher, or customs officer, he started his own business under the name 
‘Ran Nai Lert1 in 1895. In his shop he sold various products, such as the 
Singer sewing machine, tinned food and other foreign goods. Selling soda in 
cooperation with the Borneo Co. made him a fortune, but a later decision by
38 Akira Suehiro, Capital Accumulation in Thailand 1855-1985, Tokyo: Centre for East
Asian Cultural Studies, 1989, p.39.
31 Phraya Phiromphakdi and Phraya Phakdi-norasaet were related. This information is
based on his crem ation book. A lainai Lert khunying Sin Phakdi-noraset 
phimnainganphraratchathemphloengsop Phraya Phakdi-norasaet (Lert Saetthabut) (the 
cremation book of Phraya Phakdi-norasaet), Na Watthepsirintharawat, Phiriyakit, 18 April 1946.
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the Borneo Co. to operate on its own ousted him from his position. Therefore,
with about twenty thousand baht, he turned to selling foreign books, coconut
oil and tin plate; these businesses ended in the red. He was the first Thai
merchant to sell bicycles and start a hotel business. Suehiro describes Nai
Lert’s ice and bus business:
From 1912 he extended his business to ice making, and in 1925 he set up the most 
modern ice manufacturing plant (Siam Ice Works) in Thailand. From 1913 he imported Ford cars 
and started a bus transportation business. This mass-transit business soon became the core of 
Nai Lert’s vast business activities.32
In 1925, when Bangkok suffered from floods, Lert helped the people with his 
boats, so that he was awarded the name and rank "Phraya 
Phiromphakdinaraset".33
In the 1930s his business was diversified and he had 437 
employees.34 ‘Hang Nai Lert’ consisted of six divisions: stock investment, 
bus business and hire, foreign products, estate, Thai products, provincial 
business and accounting. The bus business and estate were the core.35 The 
bus business consisted of five bus lines, three boat lines and two 
cargoboat lines. His business was also concerned with various foreign 
products and Thai products. Three shops were located at Chieng Mai, 
Tonyaburi and Minburi.
The establishment of the Siamese Chamber of Commerce will be 
examined in terms of its role as a political or economic pressure group. 
Several commercial associations were set up by Chinese and foreigners 
before 1933. Punnee Bualek pointed out that there were fourteen Chinese
32 Akira Suehiro, Capital Accumulation in Thailand 1855-1985, Tokyo: Centre for East 
Asian Cultural Studies, 1989, pp.359-60.
33 Chali lamkrasin, Loert Samantao: Racha rotme khon-raek haeng krung Sayam  (Loert 
Sammantao : The first bus king of Siam), Bangkok: Ruangsin, 1981, p.47.
34 s.R. 0201.8/21. N.A. This figure is given in the profile of ‘Hang Nai Lert’, enclosed in 
the letter from the Minister of Economic Affairs to the Secretary-General of the Cabinet on 2 
November 1933.
35 Ibid. According to the balance sheet of 1933, the profit of the four divisions were: 
estate, 102,431 baht; bus and hire division, 91,767 baht; Thai products, 65,811 baht and 
foreign products, 2,473 baht.
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commercial associations founded between 1909 and 1937.36 Among them, 
the Chinese Chamber of Commerce was the most important. The roie of the 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce was closely related to political activity in 
China, as for example in September 1931 when a Japanese products 
boycott was imposed. European merchants established several associations, 
such as the Siam Importers Association in 1909, the Bangkok International 
Chamber of Commerce in 1913, and the Fire Insurance Association of 
Bangkok in 1914.37 The aim of these associations was to promote European 
business unity, and to protect European interests against the Chinese 
business community.
This is one example of how the Chinese Chamber of Commerce acted 
as a pressure group on the government. When the government introduced 
the Banking and Insurance Tax Act in August 1932, the Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce submitted a petition to the government. The aim of this law was to 
tax those who conducted exchange business without registration as a 
bank.38 In other words, it aimed to tax the mainly Chinese exchange 
business. Tan Siew Meng, President of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 
submitted a petition to the government on 28 February 1933.39 His main 
argument was that the taxes on deposit banks and exchange banks were 
different; the exchange banks had to pay about ten times more, and 
consequently Chinese exchange banks would not be able to survive the
36 Punee Bualek, Laksana khong naithun Thai nai rawang Songkhramlok khrangthi 1 
thung 2  (ph. s. 2457-2483) (The character of Thai capitalists during the inter-war period (1913- 
1940), Bangkok: Sathaban teknoloyi Sangkhom, 1994. See the list, pp.40-43.
37 ibid., p.38. There were 21 members of the Siam Importers Association, and 59 of the 
Bangkok International Chamber of Commerce.
38 The British diplomat, Dormer reported: 'I am informed by Mr. R. Stevens, the American 
adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who probably played a chief part in its drafting, that the 
act was based on the banking law in force in the Philippine Islands, but that the taxes imposed 
are about half the rates enforced there.’ Dormer to FO No. 164, .5  August 1932, 
F6585/200/40, FO 371/16260. See also Dormer to FO No. 166, 8 August 1932, 
F6853/200/40, FO 371/16260, PRO. ~
39 (2) S.R.0201.52/6. N.A. See translation of the former document and discussion of the 
Banking and Insurance Act In English in K.Kh. 0301.1.32/62. N.A.
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competition from the deposit banks. In a letter to the State Councillor of
Finance on 28 February 1933, Tan Siew Meng described how Chinese
exchange banks contributed to the Siamese economy:
I have once informed your excellency that these Chinese Exchange Banks are 
important middlemen for the rice millers who sell drafts. These Exchange Banks facilitate the 
business of the rice millers by mutual trust without resorting to guarantees or bills of lading as 
required by European Banks. If these Exchange Banks will have to close down, the rice millers 
will suffer considerably.40
But the government pointed out that there was no evidence to support the 
imaginary calculations made by the Chamber, and no consideration was 
given to the petition.41
Yet the role of the Siamese Chamber of Commerce was minor 
compared to that of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. The documents on 
the Siamese Chamber of Commerce in the National Archives fail to show 
that the Chamber influenced the government.42 In addition, the Chamber’s 
own history and Lek Komet's cremation book mainly dealt with minor 
matters, such as the name of the Chamber in Thai or the several moves of 
office. Wirat pointed out that financial difficulties were constant, and that self- 
reliance was tried before asking help from the government.43 There was no 
financial support from the government. Why did the powerful and important 
members not act as a pressure group? It might be that each individual 
business faced a difficult situation in the 1930’s, so that their main concern 
was to protect their own business rather than develop the Siamese 
Chamber of Commerce. The financial difficulty of ‘Hang Nai Lert’ in the early 
1930’s, and Phraya Phiromphakdi’s struggle to survive against foreign 
competition may well have absorbed their owner’s energies. The Siamese
40 K~Kh.0301.1.37/62 N.A.
41 Ibid.
42 (2) 0201.52/15. N.A.
43 Wirat Phuengsunthon, Prawat Samakom Phokha Thai (The history of the Siamese
Chamber of Commerce), Bangkok: The Thai Chamber of Commerce, 15 October 1971.
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Chamber of Commerce rarely tried to influence the government.
5.3. The Role of the Mass Media During the Reigns of Rama 6 
and 7
The role of the mass media during the reigns of Rama 6 and 7, particularly of
newspapers, is now to be examined. According to the bibliography of
periodicals and newspapers printed in Thailand between 1844-1934,
produced by the Thai National Library, the number of daily newspapers
started under Rama 6 and Rama 7 was 22 and 60.44 Table 5-2 shows the
rapid development of periodicals and newspapers during the reigns of Rama
5, 6, and Rama 7. Another document in the National Archives shows the
number of applications to publish newspapers during the reigns of Rama 6
and Rama 7, as 82 and 70.45 However, the life of a new newspaper was
generally short, and few survived more than three years (see Table 5-3).
The rapid development of newspapers took place from the mid -1920s.
Table 5-4 shows that the peak year was 1932. Batson notes: 'A major
development of the late 1920s was the expansion of the Thai press and the
growth, at least in Bangkok, of a ‘public opinion’ that encompassed a larger
part of the educated class.’46 The circulation and quality of these newspapers
in the early 1920s was described by a British report:
That the Press of Siam is still in its infancy is amply demonstrated by the fact that the 
number of publications, which appear to posses a reading public, is only about twenty-five. All
44 Warasan lae nangsuphim nai prathed Thai sungtiphim rawang ph. s. 2387-2477  
(Periodicals and Newspapers Printed in Thailand between 1844-1934 : a bibliography), 
Bangkok: Serials Unit, National Library, Department of Fine Arts, 1970. The number of 
periodicals which began publication under Rama 6 and Rama 7 were 127 and 96.
48 R.6. N.20.1.N.A.; R.7. M.26.3.N.A. These figures included monthly, weekly and daily
newspapers and magazines. These files show owner, editor, the date of issue, aim, headoffice 
and printing house.
46 Benjamin A Batson, The End of the Absolute Monarchy in Siam , Singapore: Oxford
University Press,1984, p.71.
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of these are published in Bangkok and it is doubtful if more than 1500 copies altogether are 
distributed daily throughout the Provinces.47
There were several reasons for such a rapid development of the press 
from the mid-1920s. First, the Education Law, enforced In 1921, made every 
child between the ages of seven and fourteen years attend school. Table 5- 
6 shows how rapidly the number of students expanded during the 1920s and 
1930s. A British report noted: The education law of 1921 will, undoubtedly, 
exercise a greater influence on the Press of Siam than any previous 
legislation. During the year 1922, the number of new schools established 
was approximately 4000.148 This law brought about an immediate expansion 
in literacy, although an accurate literacy rate seems difficult to obtain 
because of changing definitions: the literacy rate in 1911 and 1937 is given 
in Table 5-5.
Second, rapid political and economic change took place during the 
1920s and early 1930s. For example, reckless expenditure by Rama 6 and 
the effect of the world depression from 1929 caused dissatisfaction among 
various social groups, including civil servants, army officers, merchants and 
farmers. Foreign and domestic news became more important for most of the 
people, who wanted more information which affected daily life. Although 
some criticism of the government or persons reflected only personal 
dissatisfaction or envy, there were articles with constructive political and 
economic ideas before and after 1932. Also, intellectuals, including 
Siamese students abroad, came back to Thailand during the 1920s, and 
they were often asked by the press for their opinions on current issues.
What kind of role did the newspapers play before and after 1932? In 
view of the low circulation and poor literacy it could be argued that the
47 ‘Memorandum of the Vernacular Press’ This report was written by Mr. Cotter, student 
interpreter, and enclosed in Greg to FO No.215, 31 December 1923, F 366/220/40, 
FO371/10348, PRO.
48 Ibid.
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newspapers had little influence on public opinion.49 However, the role of 
newspapers was important for the following reasons. Before 1932 the 
newspaper was the only mass medium, and the expansion of education 
brought about an increase in their significance. It was not until the late 
1930s that the role of radio became more significant. Second, who 
subscribed to and read the newspapers? As newspapers circulated mainly 
in Bangkok, the readers were assumed to be civil servants, army officers, 
merchants, lawyers, clerks, foreigners, teachers and students. In other words, 
the upper class and middle class were the main readers. It is clear that few 
farmers outside Bangkok had access to newspapers. Third, in general 
before 1932 there was more freedom of the press, and the newspapers 
attacked the royal family, the kunnang class, government policy and the 
political system. The lack of a severe Press Act and low literacy were two 
reasons for having such freedom. However, after 1932 the situation 
changed; censorship was enforced, and various newspapers were closed 
several times. A new Press Act was enforced by the government, which 
became aware of the threat of newspapers to government. Fourth, there 
were Thai, Chinese and English newspapers. English newspapers had quite 
small circulations compared with Thai and Chinese. The number of 
Europeans living in Thailand during the 1910s and 1920s was less than 
2,000.50 In addition, the number of Siamese who could read English seems 
to have been very small. However, some English newspapers were
48 The circulation of newspapers is difficult to estimate. However two US diplomatic
documents, US, 892.911/6, 13 February 1925, and US, 892.911/15, 23 February 1937 have 
figures. The former gave estimates for five papers, Bangkok Times, 1,000, Siam Observer, 
1,000, Bangkok Daily Mail (English), 600, (Thai), 4,500 to 5,000, Chino-Siamese Daily Mail 
(Chinese), 2,000, Nagsue Bimb Dai (Thai), 3,000. The latter covers 26 papers, but the figures 
for Siamese papers was the same as Table 5-8. But the English papers were Bangkok Times, 
1,200, Siam Chronicle, 4,000 and the Chinese papers circulations were slightly different: 
Tong Hua Min Poh, 5,000, Tong Min Yit Poh, 5,000, Wah Sen Yit Poh, 6,000-7,000, Wah 
Khiew Yit Poh , 5,000-6,000, Hwa Siew Yer Pao, 1,000, Min Kok Yit Poh, 4,000-5,000, 
Bangkok Morning News, 4,000-5,000.
50 Constance M. Wilson, Thailand: A Handbook of Historical Statistics, Boston: G.K. Hall
& Co, 1983, p.30. There were 1813 Europeans in 1919, and 1920 in 1929.
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considered important, because they reported not only domestic but also 
foreign news through a news agency like Reuter. Some newspapers, like the 
Bangkok Times , which survived from 1887 to the 1940s, were considered 
quality papers. Last, high-quality discussion of the political system, economic 
problems and social problems took place in the newspapers. Later a few 
examples will be examined.
There are two further issues to be considered concerning newspapers 
in the 1920s and 1930s. First is the subsidy from the government to the press. 
There was the argument that freedom of speech in the mass media would be 
limited by government financial support. National Archives documents show 
that four newspapers, Bangkok Times, Bangkok Daily Mail, Siam Observer 
and Nangsue Phim Thai each received a subsidy of 8,000 baht in 1927.51 
Other newspapers asked the king for a subsidy. Pheng Bunnak and Horn 
Ninlarat Na Ayuthaya, owners of Thai Num and Kanmanto, each asked for 
a subsidy of 8,000 baht, because of deficits caused by severe competition 
from other papers.52 During that time the effectiveness of the subsidy was 
doubted by the government and there was discussion over whether to 
continue the subsidy to the press. A memorandum noted:
The reason for the subsidy was the desire of the government to control the policy of 
the paper. There was ample justification for this policy at the time it was adopted. All of these 
papers were published in English and undoubtedly had influence among the foreign 
population. At that time our foreign relations were difficult. The old treaties were still in effect; 
and newspapers by adverse criticism would create difficulty and trouble for His Majesty’s 
Government. The situation now is very different. All the old treaties have been revised and the 
Government is free from foreign interference. There is in force a new Press Law which amply 
protects the public interest.53
51 ‘Memorandum on Newspapers Subsidy’, 30 December 1927, R7.R.L.19/6.N.A. The 
annual subscription for each newspaper was: Bangkok Times, 60 baht, Siam Observer, 50 
baht, Bangkok Daily Mail (Thai edition), 25 baht; Bangkok Daily Mail (English edition),35 baht.
52 Letter to the king from Pheng Bunnak and Horn Ninlarat, 14 December 1927, 
R7.R.L.19/6. N.A.
53 R7.R.L.19/6. N.A.
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This memorandum suggested purchasing a hundred copies of each 
newspaper instead of giving a subsidy. A cabinet meeting held on 1 February 
1928 explained that the subsidy had been initiated during the reign of Rama 
5, and that in spite of receiving a subsidy, some newspapers, such as Siam 
Free Press , had annoyed the government so much that it had decided to 
purchase the paper. As a result of this discussion, the government decided 
not to continue the subsidy but to purchase copies instead. The petition from 
Thai Num and Kan Man To was rejected.
In general there was more freedom of the press under the old regime 
than the new.
Government control of the press under the old regime was a curiously inconsistent 
affair. To judge by certain articles, the press was as free as in Europe; and many discontented 
Government officials sought an outlet for injured feelings through this medium.54 
It was in 1919 that a newspaper act was enforced. Table 5-7 shows the
various newspaper acts from the 1910s to the 1930s. Firstly, the newspaper
act of 1919 was gentle in terms of censorship. Until 1927, the qualifications
of editors were not defined, so that some Thai newspapers were owned by
foreigners. The British Foreign Office noted;
With a view to controlling such newspapers, a “Books, Documents and Newspapers 
Law” was promulgated in January last [1919] but this Law has, up to the present, been to 
some extent evaded by appointing as editors the nationals of countries exercising extra­
territorial privileges. The three outstanding instances of this policy are the 'Kammakan' 
(Labour), the ‘Pikat Torpedo' (Torpedo destroyer) and th e ' Yamato’. In the case of the first two, 
the duties and responsibilities of owner, manager and editor are vested in Dutch subjects and 
in the third, in a Japanese subject.55
Until 1927 the press had considerable freedom of speech. In fact the
54 Virginia Thompson, Thailand: The New Siam, New York: Macmillan, 2nd.ed., 1967, 
p.791.
55 'Memorandum on the Vernacular Press’, R.7.R.L.19/6. N.A. According to Warasanlae 
nangsuphim nai prathed Thai sungtiphim rawang ph. s. 2387-2477  (Periodicals and 
Newspapers Printed in Thailand between 1844-1934 : a bibliography), Bangkok: Serials Unit, 
National Library, Department of Fine Arts, 1970, Kamakorn and Pikat Torpedo were classified 
as weekly magazines and the owner of Kamakorn was Sri, that of Pikat Torpedo was Samai 
Wiraphan. Kamakorn was published from 1922 to 1926, and Pikat Torpedo from 1923 to 
1924. Yamato was registered as a daily newspaper and the owner was Ai Miyakawa, a 
Japanese. This paper survived from 1923 to 1924.
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press sometimes attacked the old regime’s policies and the extravagance of 
the palace under Rama 6. Press criticism extended to civil servants, and on 
occasion to the private life of the king and his entourage. Greg, a British 
diplomat, reported:
It would of course be a mistake to attach too much importance to these publications, 
many of which die almost as soon as they see the light of day, but the existence of a native 
press at all is a new feature and at any rate connotes an element of independent public opinion 
in a country where all forms of organised and constitutional criticism are debarred. Not the least 
remarkable aspect of this press has been the singularly outspoken condemnation of 
expenditure on unproductive Departments, like the Ministries of War and Marine, and of the 
vagaries and extravagance of the Palace and Court favourites.56
The Press Act of 1927 was a turning point in terms of censorship,
because organised criticism was forbidden, and the press became an 
unimportant arena of political comment. The important clauses included 
imposing requirements for the education level of editors, and clause 18 ( 
concerning the granting of licenses) which excluded army officers, civil 
servants and non-residents in Siam from publishing political views. Clause 
19 allowed the government to revoke a license if a paper published articles 
which threatened public order and good morals, or which alarmed foreign 
powers which had treaty relations with Siam.57 After the revolution in 1932, 
censorship became more frequent. According to Landon, ten newspapers 
were closed down either temporarily or permanently between 2 June and 
29 November 1932, seven times the number closed from May 1933 to April 
1934.58
Table 5-8 lists the major newspapers in the 1920s and 1930s. Among
56 Greg to FO No.215, 31 December 1923, F366/220/40, FO371/10348, PRO.
57 Atcharaphon Kamutphitsamai, Panhaphainaisangkom Thai kon kanpatiwat 2475: 
Phapsathon cakngankhienthangnangsuphim (Social Problems in Thai Society before the 
1932 Revolution: From the Aspect of Newspaper writings), Bangkok: Sathaban Thai 
Khadisuksa (Thai Khadi Research Institute) Thammasat University, 1989. The Books, 
Documents and Newspapers Law in 1927 is considered on pp.422-435.
58 Kenneth P Landon, Siam in Transition: A Brief Survey of Cultural Trends in the Five 
Years since the Revolution of 1932, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1968, p.49.
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them the government owned Nangsue Phim Thai, and Sri Krung , Sayam 
Rasadorn and Thai Mai were considered quality papers and were popular 
among the people. It is often difficult to identify the owners of newspapers, 
because of limited sources. One example is the Srikung Press Co. This 
was founded by Sukri Wasuwat, who was the owner as well as editor. When 
he passed away, his younger brother, Manit, succeeded as director until 
1933. Srikung was published from 1926 and was the first paper to use 
modern methods of publishing and printing. Another newspaper, Sayam 
Rasadorn, sold from 3,000 to 30,000 copies before World War II.59 Manit’s 
educational background was equivalent to Matayom 8, and he had worked 
as an interpreter in the Ministry of Finance; in addition, he had worked in 
the Samsen electric power plant. Manit was a member of the House of 
Representatives from 28 June 1932 to 15 November 1933.60 His businesses 
also included the Sri Krung Cinema Co, the manufacture of photograph 
records, and Sri Krung Hall. The Wasuwat family is famous for starting new 
businesses, such as the cinema ‘Sri Krung’, metal mould production, 
records, a cinema house, new style comics and as photographers.61
The various newspapers after 1932 can be classified as pro-regime or 
anti-regime. The People’s Party approved freedom of speech in theory but 
there was more severe censorship. During that time newspapers were often 
used to attack political enemies. Nakharin pointed out that newspapers in 
1932 and 1933 were classified into three main groups; pro-People’s Party
59 Prakat Watcharaphon, Thamniap Khonnangsuphim  (Pressman’s Residence),
Bangkok: Dokya, 1990, pp.276-277. See the description of Manit Wasuwat on pp.274-283.
60 Another pressman, Net Phunwiwat, was also appointed a member of the House of
Representatives. His educational and career background were quite different from those of 
Manit. Graduating from Nairoi School, appointed second lieutenant in 1910, he participated in 
the R. S. 130 attempted revolt. Receiving a 20 year prison sentence (later reduced to 12), he 
was released in 1924. Later he joined Sri Krung press and worked with Manit. Nakharin 
Mektrairat, Kan patiwat Sayam ph. s. 2475  (The 1932 Revolution in Siam), Bangkok: Mun nithi 
khrongkan tamura sangkhomsat lae manutsayasat, 1992, p.312.
61 Prakat Watcharaphon, Thamniap Khonnangsuphim  (Pressman’s Residence),
Bangkok: Dokya, 1990, p.280.
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and support for socialism, 24 Mithuna, Satcang, Kammakon and 
Chaloemratthammanun\ anti-People’s Party, Krungthep Daily Mail, Thai Mai 
and Chuai Kammakorr, and a neutral group, Prachachat and Sri Krung,32 
Among the anti-government papers, Krung Thep Daily Mail was particularly 
important. A brief history of the paper is given in Table 5-8. It was American- 
dominated and the royal family took part in the business.
The Daily Mail, which had been bought out by Rama VI, had became a drain on the 
Privy Purse; and in 1927 the king sold it to his father-in-law, Prince Savasti. In 1928 this 
anglophile Prince hired as editors an American-Jewish journalist, A.A. Freeman. Technically 
well-equipped, Freeman was a crusader, who employed tabloid methods.63 
The paper focused on corruption in the government, and had mild liberal
political sentiments. After the revolution in 1932, the paper was strongly
against the People’s Party, and sought to promote the vested interests of the
old regime. Phya Phahon, the Prime Minister, expressed dissatisfaction with
the Krung Thep Daily Mail (Thai edition), the Bangkok Daily Mail (English
edition) and Seriphap, which he alleged, (in a letter to the Minister of Interior
on 28 July 1933), caused disorder among the people.84 The Bowaradej
revolt in October 1933 brought about the closure of the Siam Free Press
because of its involvement.65 After receiving the order to close, M.L. Cha-an
Israsak, the editor of the Siam Free Press, sent two letters to Phya Phahon.
In the first, dated 14 November 1933, he maintained that the Krung Thep
Daily Mail and Seriphap were not the government’s enemies, although the
62 Nakharin Mektrairat, Kanpatiwat Sayam Ph. S. 2475  (The 1932 Revolution in Siam), 
Bangkok: Mun nithi khrongkan tamra sangkhomsat lae manutasayasat, 1992, p. 109. He also 
pointed out that Prachathipatai aimed to promote western democracy.
63 Virginia Thompson, Thailand: The New Siam, New York: Macmillan, 2nd.ed., 1967,
p.793.
64 (2) S.R.0201.92/2. N.A.
65 Virginia Thompson, Thailand: The New Siam, New York: Macmillan, 2nd.ed., 1967,
p.797. T he  Government's attitude towards the press was not softened by the revelation that 
the Daily Mail had served as Bangkok headquarters for Bovaradej; and its Siamese editor Nai 
Louis Girivat, was given a life sentence.’
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papers did not flatter the government.66 The second letter, dated 20 
November 1.933, pointed out that the 200 employees of the Siam Free Press 
would be in serious difficulty and asked for help from the government. He 
argued that the true aim of the government in closing down the Krung Thep 
Daily Mail was to stop newspapers which would be against the government, 
particularly at a time of crisis.67
Many articles about Siam’s economic problems appeared in the press 
before and after 1932, either as editorials or as special features spread over 
several weeks. The writers usually used pen-names, like numbers 111, 222, 
333, or a simple Thai name suggesting occupation or political stance. For 
example, 555 was a pen-name for Phra Sarasas, and 555’s articles often 
appeared in Thai Mai, Phrachachat and other papers. Rama 6 often used 
the press to air his ideas on political and economic issues. Table 5-9 shows 
how various articles appeared under various pen-names from the 1910’s to 
the 1930's. Three examples will be considered here. The first two were 
written by Kasikorn, that is Prince Sithiporn, and the last by 555, Phra 
Sarasas.
The first article appeared in two Thai papers, Phim Thai and Daily 
Mail from September 1928 to January 1929.68 The argument thus continued 
for almost half a year, and two important figures, 555 and Kasikorn, 
contributed. These articles also appeared in the English newspaper, the 
Bangkok Times Weekly Mail. The main argument concerned Kasikorn’s 
doubts over the suitability of road construction as proposed by 555. Kasikorn
66 Virginia Thompson, Thailand: The New Siam, New York: Macmillan, 2nd.ed., 1967, 
p.797. T h e  Government's attitude towards the press was not softened by the revelation that 
the Daily Mail had served as Bangkok headquarters for Bovaradej; and its Siamese editor Nai 
Louis Girivat, was given a life sentence.’
67 ibid.
68 R7 M.26.4/38. N.A.The dates for Phim Thai were, 22, 23, 28, 29 September 1928; 
1,2, 3 ,4  January 1929. In Daily Mail, 1 4 ,1 5 ,1 6 ,1 8 , 19 December 1928.
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pointed out that in general, water transportation would be more suitable in 
terms of costs, while farmers far from water could use the railway.69 There 
was then an argument over responsibility for the construction of roads. 555 
maintained that it was the central government’s responsibility to construct 
roads, Kasikorn doubted whether tax payer’s money should be used in this 
way, and maintained that each Monthon (province) should undertake 
construction of roads.70 Kasikorn objected to three reasons given by 555 for 
road construction. These reasons were; administrative and defensive, 
recreational and economic advantage.71 Kasikorn’s attack mainly concerned 
the third reason, and he maintained that road construction should be divided 
into city and rural roads. Rural roads were more important, in terms of 
distribution from villages to cities. However, water transportation was cheaper 
than land transportation. Although construction of roads to railway stations 
would be necessary, the low cost of cartage in the dry season raised doubts 
about road construction: 'if roads do not reduce transportation costs, roads 
have no economic justification.’72 Also ‘roads can reduce transportation 
costs, however, if there is no agricultural product to carry, roads have no 
economic justification.’73 Kasikorn pointed out three problems; the 
construction of roads by public agency would mean involving the Ministry of 
Finance; the construction by private agency would increase the cost; the lack 
of sufficient crops would make it impossible to construct roads. He 
concluded:
A road is economically justified, if the cost of transport of produces by such road is 
cheaper than by any other means, and provided also that the quantity and value of produces to 
be transported is sufficiently large as to enable the producers thereof to pay for the 
construction and upkeep of the road.74
89 Ibid., Phim Thai, 22 September 1928.
70 ibid., Phim Thai, 23 September 1928.
71 Ibid., Daily Mail, 14 December 1928.
72 Daily Mail, 15 December 1928. My translation from Thai to English.
73 ibid. My translation from Thai to English.
74 ibid. Only this part was originally written in English.
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Detailed calculations were made of construction costs and financing from the 
land tax,75 as well as comparisons of railway and road transportation costs 
from Chiang Mai to Bangkok.76 Kasikorn maintained that constructing roads 
at that time would benefit foreigners rather than Thais. Moreover the forest 
was a capital asset - destroying forests to make roads was therefore 
unacceptable.77
Another of Kasikorn’s articles appeared in the Bangkok Times Weekly 
Mail from January to March 1931.78 The title was ‘Siam’s Economic 
Problems’ and various topics - including the high exchange rate, stagnant 
rice exports, Chinese middlemen’s involvement in deteriorating rice quality 
and how to construct warehouses - were considered. He showed that the 
high exchange rate had brought about a drastic fall in the trade surplus 
and rice exports:
Perfection in Siam can only be arrived at by steadily expanding our exports, which will 
bring money into the country most certainly and surely. And as far as Siam is concerned, the 
fundamental business of increasing the exports lies with the cultivators of the soil. If 
modernisation is required and necessary, why not begin with the farmers in the country and 
improve his methods?79
While Kasikorn blamed the high exchange rate for the stagnation of rice
exports he was neutral about the baht remaining on the gold standard,
pointing out the need for a stable currency.80
Concerned with the decreasing trade surplus, he mentioned the
problem of a tight financial situation in Siam.
In view of the very large invisible imports the position is decidedly unsatisfactory. With 
the ever-diminishing trade account and the high gold value of the tical, there is a larger 
demand for foreign currencies, and a large amount of the cash available in the money market in 
Siam is fizzling out to other foreign countries. There have been heavy purchases of foreign
75 ibid., Daily Mail, 16 December 1928.
76 ibid., Daily Mail, 19 December 1928.
77 ibid., DailyMail, 18 December 1928.
78 See the date in table E-9.
79 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 14 January 1932.
80 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 16 January 1932.
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currencies by bankers and financial speculators and indeed by all who had money at all. By this 
time most of the liquid money resources in the hands of the local banks and private financiers 
has been transferred to Europe, Hongkong, etc.81
His main argument focused on the role of the Chinese middlemen,
and he warned of the rapid growth of the Chinese population in the country,
saying that the ‘wolf is not only at the door but is really inside our house.’82
He mentioned the heavy Chinese involvement in the rice business, as rice
millers, middlemen, speculators, carriers, distributors and shippers. His
main argument concerned the deterioration in rice quality caused by the
Chinese middlemen. For example by mixing fat and thin rice and mixing
short and long rice, they created a bad reputation for Siamese rice in Europe.
They also kept rice in bad conditions in the warehouses.
If a suitable quantity of uniform paddy is not supplied to the miller, a much smaller price
will be paid Therefore, the points to consider are exactly, how these two parties - 1 mean
the export trader and the cultivator - are to meet and work hand in hand together. Of course 
their interests are interdependent, and it is to their mutual advantage to eliminate the 
middleman together.83
Kasikorn aimed to improve rice quality to expand exports. In other words, he
wanted to produce cheaper and better quality rice in order to strengthen
Siam’s position in the world market. He mentioned the Japanese
government’s domestic rice monopoly, taking over from the middleman.
Kasikorn argued that cooperation with foreign business would be necessary
to eliminate the Chinese middleman.
He assessed the scheme of the East Asiatic Company to encourage
direct sales by the cultivators and to improve paddy varieties. Kasikorn
proposed setting-up the scientific storing of grain, the storage warehouse
(godowns) with elevators.
In America, and in highly commercialised Western countries, the co-operative 
associations and companies established for grain storage, especially the co-operative elevator
81 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 12 February 1932.
82 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 4 March 1932.
83 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 5 March 1932.
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societies, store the grain in a most scientific and economic way. They also possess large capital 
to enable them to make advances to farmers, before the actual disposal of the grain. How is 
Siam to take action on the same lines?84
According to him, godowns should be close to a railway station, a main 
road, river, or creek. There would be at least five or six apartments for the 
different grades of paddy. In addition, building an elevator, costing a few 
hundred baht, was necessary, this would be repaid in a few months, 
compared with the cost of hiring of a coolie.
The last part of his article was concerned with organisation and 
finance. It was clear from his title, ‘Co-operative Grain Storage in Siam’, that 
Kasikorn thought well of cooperatives. He expected more from the farmer’s 
own initiative, and was doubtful about strong government intervention.
The lines of organisation should not be purely a Government creation or the result of a 
temporary windfall from some philanthropist. Co-operative credit societies have existed for 
many years in Siam, and the fact of their expansion being very slow, is due to their being a 
Government creation - they are still more or less in the stages of "spoon fed" conditions up to 
this moment.85
Concerning finance, there were two alternatives, for the society to purchase 
the grain from the farmers, second, for the society to store the grain and give 
a receipt to the farmers. As the first required a huge amount of capital and 
loans to the society by banks and capitalists it would be impossible. 
Therefore, Kasikorn concluded: The second scheme of financing appears to 
me as to be more suitable to the conditions of Siam, and as more likely to 
appeal to the cultivator, as it removes from his suspicious mind, all possible 
taint of middlemen profiteering’.86
From these two examples, it is clear that Prince Sithiporn [Kasikorn]
84 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 11 March 1932.
85 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 12 March 1932.
86 ibid.
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raised fundamental issues to improve the Siamese economy.87 It is important 
to note that these ideas were developed before 1932, the second being 
concerned with the impact of the world depression in the early 1930's. It is 
also important to note that Prince Sithiporn argued the point of view of the 
farmers. His anti-Chinese, anti- middleman, views are clear. However, his 
support for the East Asiatic Company’s scheme shows that he was not anti- 
Western. Lastly, he supported initiatives from the bottom, from cultivators, 
and cast doubts on the efficiency of high-level decisions by government.
Phra Sarasas wrote many articles on political, economic and social 
problems in various newspapers before and after 1932. Table 5-9 shows 
only some of his economic articles which appeared after 1932. He used the 
pen name 555, and he was critical of the absolute monarchy before 1932. 
He explained his pen name in his book, My Country Thailand.
During his reign there was a newspaper publishing house in Bangkok owned by an 
American, issuing two dailies, one in Siamese and one in English. Special articles appeared 
from time to time in both papers written by a freelance who used the pseudonym of 555, who 
was a militant revolutionary. At first the writer attacked neither the King nor his government, but 
simply brought into contrast what were being done in Siam and in the democratic countries, 
which gave the readers plenty of food for thought. Later when he became known he began to 
drop dark hints of the drawbacks and the dangers which Siam had been and would be courting 
unless his advocacies were adopted. His articles raised acute controversies and gradually 
moved from the stage of novelty to general adoption. They were accepted without cavil by the
87 Prince Sithiporn was one of the few members of the royal family who showed a deep 
interest in farming and science, and made a great contribution to the development of Siamese 
agriculture. He was born in 1883, the fourth child of Krom Phra Nares Voraridh (the son of King 
Mongkut) and Mom Suphap. He was sent to England in 1891 for ten years, attending Harrow 
and then studying mechanical engineering at City and Guild’s Technical College, later part of 
London University. His family’s tight financial condition made him return to Siam in 1901. He 
worked for the Ministry of Finance and a 14 year career led him to be Director General of the 
Opium Department. However in 1921 he resigned and started a farm by purchasing 40 
hectares at Bangberd. At this farm, he experimented with various crops such as corn, 
watermelons, cabbages and Virginia tobacco. He also founded a monthly agricultural journal, 
Kasikorn (Farmers) in 1926 and as editor and contributor wrote many articles in order to diffuse 
useful information on farming to farmers. In 1932, after the revolution, he was appointed 
Director General of the Department of Agriculture. Following the Prince Boworadet Revolt in 
1933, he was imprisoned for 11 years. In 1948 he served as Minister of Agriculture. He died in 
1971. See his detail life in his cremation volume, Botkhwamkhong lae kiawkap /W.C. Sithiporn 
Kridakorn, Bangkok: Samakhom Sangkhomsat haeng PrathetThai, 1971.
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young Thai who went into rapture over them.88
One example of a 555 article should be discussed here. It concerned 
the views of Doll, the Financial Adviser, on Chinese foreign remittances.89 
Doll had suggested that the amount of Chinese remittances from Siam was 
39 million baht per year, which he considered serious for Siam’s finances. 
555 did not agree, arguing that the figure should be remittance per person. 
He used data from the Foreign Trade Association, 'Kingdom of Siam’, which 
indicated that the Chinese population of Siam was 2.5 million, and he 
assumed that each Chinese sent to China less than 15 baht per year. 
Further assuming that the Chinese monthly income was not less than 10 
baht on average, a yearly income of 120 baht, thus meaning that each 
Chinese spent 105 baht in Siam a year, which 555 thought was useful for 
the Thai nation. Lastly, 555 pointed out that Doll did not mention how much 
westerners sent out in remittances. He assumed that the figure would be 
much more than 15 baht per head per year.
5.4. The Origins of Economic Nationalism in Siam
This section will consider the origins of economic nationalism in Siam. In 
general there are two views on the origins of political nationalism: that it 
began in the reign of Rama 6 (1910-1925) or that it began in 1939, under 
Phibun. Regarding nationalism, Thinaphan argued:
A major political phenomenon between 1939 and 1947 was the attempt to build 
nationalism in Thai society. Previously, such an attempt was undertaken during the reign of 
Rama VI when the absolute monarchy used nationalistic sentiments to counter the economic 
stronghold of the Chinese, to resist the threats of European expansionism, and to instil in the 
minds of the people love and loyalty 1or the three major national institutions, namely, the
88 Phra Sarasas, My Country Thailand, Bangkok: Golden Service Co, 6th.ed., 1960,
p.131.
89 Thai Mai, 13 June 1936.
225
nation, religion and the monarchy.90
The term ‘official nationalism’ has been used by Benedict Anderson to
describe nationalism in Siam.
These "official nationalisms" can best be understood as a means for combining 
naturalisation with retention of dynastic power, in particular over the huge polyglot domains 
accumulated since the Middle-Ages, or, to put it another way, for stretching the short, tight, 
skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire.91
Anderson’s point is that the model of modernisation used in Japan and Siam
in the later nineteenth century was different because Japan’s model was to
catch up with the Western countries, particularly Europe, so that Japan
focused on the development of military power and the education system. On
the other hand, Rama 5’s model was not Europe.
Nonetheless, Chulalongkorn regarded himseif as a moderniser. But his prime models 
were not the United Kingdom or Germany, but rather the colonial beamtenstaaten of the 
Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, and the Raj. Following these models meant rationalising and 
centralising royal government, eliminating traditional semi-autonomous tributary statelets, and 
promoting economic development somewhat along colonial lines.92 
This analysis seems to offer an explanation why economic development was
so slow, and why political and social factors, for example, maintaining the
vested interests of the elite, was the first priority. Anderson also pointed out
that relying on foreign labour, particularly Chinese, was intended to leave
Thai society largely undisturbed.
According to Vella, Vajiravudh (Wachirawut) was a strong nationalist,
with a passion for Great Britain. His ideological complexity, a mixture of
Western and Siamese traditions and cultures, makes it difficult to unravel.
Vella noted: ‘The inspiration of Vajiravudh’s nationalist program was, first
and foremost, Great Britain, the Western nation Vairavudh knew best, at this
90 Thak Chaloemtiarana (ed), Thai Politics: Extracts and Documents 1932-1957, 
Bangkok: The Social Science Association of Thailand, 1978, p.243.
91 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism , London, New York: Verso, revised ed., 1991, p.86.
92 ibid., pp.99-100.
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time a nation caught up in imperialist enthusiasm.’93 But Anderson had a 
different view:
The target of this nationalism, however, was neither the United Kingdom, which 
controlled 90 per cent of Siam’s trade, nor France, which had recently made off with easterly 
segments of the old realm: it was the Chinese whom his father had so recently and blithely 
imported 94
But did Rama 6 initiate economic nationalism? The king was not interested
in economics or finance, and was not aware of an economic crisis.95 The
king did not realise the severe economic condition of the farmers, arising
from the depression in agricultural prices.
The King took strong exception to the “loud laments” that the Thai peasantry was 
impoverished and exploited. The Thai were not poor: there was no starvation in Siam; the 
people even had money enough to indulge in gambling. The "so-called poor people in 
Bangkok", he said, "are quite rich" compared with the urban poor in Europe. As for people in 
the countryside, “Our provincial people do not lack necessities; they have got decent roofs 
over their heads, and ground to til! and cultivate”. The only "poor” people in Siam were 
extravagant spenders in Bangkok whose luxurious tastes ran beyond their means.96 
In spite of such views, the king did initiate some economic measures, such
as the establishment of the National Savings Bank, the Cooperative
Movement, the Siam Cement Company in 1913, and the Siamese
Steamship Company in 1918.
It is valuable to see Vajiravudh’s economic nationalism in a political
rather than economic context. Anderson suggested two reasons why the
king expressed strong anti-Chinese views in his famous pamphlets: The Jews
of the Orient (1914) and Clogs on Our Wheels (1915). One was a general
strike by Bangkok’s Chinese merchants and workers which challenged the
93 Walter F. Vella, Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism , 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978, p.xiv.
94 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism , London, New York: Verso, revised.ed., 1991, p.100.
95 Walter F. Vella, Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism , 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978, p. 170.The workings of economics and finance 
were something of a mystery to Vajiravudh, and on occasion he admitted as much. In 1912 he 
wrote, "When I come to the question of finance, ! never feel quite happy about it, because I 
never had a head for finance”.’
96 ibid., p.170.
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king's authority in 1910; and the Chinese revolution in 1911, which brought 
an end to the Celestial Monarchy in Peking. ‘Second, as the words “Jews” 
and “Orient" suggest, the Anglicised monarch had imbibed the particular 
racism of the English ruling class.'97 The king’s criticism of foreign imports 
and Chinese labourers in an essay in 1915, and his views in the press on 
how to foster Siamese commerce and industries, illustrated his belief that it 
was not the government’s but the people’s responsibility to improve the 
economy.98 There was only a small role for the government in economic 
development The king wanted the people to show self help, and rejected 
strong government intervention.
For commerce and industries to flourish and grow, the proper business men, men of 
integrity, to direct commercial and industrial concerns must be forthcoming as well as a 
sufficient number of labourers. If people in our own country would only realise this elementary 
truth, there would be a little more energy among our Siamese business men, and a little less 
fanciful talk. What is the use of always blaming the Government for not making industries 
flourish in Siam? What do you think business men are there for? Do you think all you need to 
do is to look like splendid millionaires, and loll about in your arm-chairs planning the latest
additions to your gorgeous m ansions? If you do not help yourselves, how could you
expect the Government to help you?99
Although it can be said that Rama 6's economic nationalism was an
official nationalism, what was its relationship to the economic nationalism of 
the press before and after 1932, and to the economic plans after 1932? One 
important point is that the later economic nationalism was advocated by the 
public, mostly the middle class. The early 1930s, after the onset of the world 
depression, saw articles and leaders voicing economic nationalism in 
various papers.100 After 1932, petitions from the public exhibited strong
97 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, London, New York: Verso, revised.ed., 1991, p.101.
98 See a summary of the essay in Walter F. Vella, Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the 
Development of Thai Nationalism, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978, pp. 172-3.
99 Ibid., p.173.
100 Atcharaphon Kamutphitsamai, Panhaphainaisangkom Thai kon kanpatiwat 2475: 
Phapsathon cakngankhienthangnangsuphim (Social Problems in Thai Society before the 
1932 Revolution: From the Aspect of Newspaper writings), Bangkok: Sathaban Thai 
Khadisuksa (Thai Khadi Research Institute) Thammasat University, 1989, pp.286-319.
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economic nationalism. Thus by 1932, economic nationalism was clearly 
felt among the people. Although the public, or middle class, did not possess 
a vivid economic nationalism, they exhibited anti-foreigner or anti-Chinese 
feelings in the press and petitions. H.G. Deignan, an American missionary in 
Siam during the 1930s:
During the decade just past the Government has initiated a positive program aimed at 
raising the standards of living of the common people and especially of the peasants who
constitute the great majority The political aspect of the program leaned heavily toward
economic nationalism, in an endeavour to counteract the excessive proportion of foreign 
capital in the country and to encourage more active participation by the Thai in the building-up 
of their own land.101
Terwiel also has much to say on the origins of nationalism in 
Thailand.
It has also been argued that historians of Thailand have tended to describe nationalism 
as being a feature of specific reigns and rulers, and that this practice appears to have had a 
detrimental effect on the study of Thai nationalism as a whole. The history of the various stages 
of an ideology such as Thai nationalism is not served by this ‘on-off approach. It is much better 
studied as a phenomenon that, once arisen (and we have argued for its origins to be placed in 
1893), moves, changes and develops as one of a range of competing ideologies. Even in the 
case of particular rulers having an extraordinary preoccupation with nationalism, such as Rama 
VI, elite-directed nationalism became significant in Thailand’s general history mainly because it 
met with a receptive audience,102
Neither is the ‘on-off’ approach sufficient to explain the continuity of 
economic nationalism, from the reign of Rama 6 to Rathaniyom in 1939. It is 
important to focus on the continuity and development of the ideology. For 
example, Luang Wichit Wathakan, who played an important role in promoting 
Rathaniyom under the Phibun government, had favoured a free - market 
approach and laissez-faire private enterprise development in August 1932. 
His views appeared in an editorial in Thai Mai:
We should follow a liberal policy. The government should not establish factories by 
itself, but rather set down guidelines and let the private sector get on with things....We only
.101 B.J. Terwiel, Thai Nationalism and Identity: Popular Themes of the 1930s’, in Craig J. 
Reynolds (ed.), National Identity and its Defenders: Thailand, 1939-1989, Chiang Mai: 
Silkworm Books, 1993, p. 137.
102 ibid., p. 144.
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want the government to provide us with a stable, secure framework to work in, then we can do 
things for ourselves. This way is fully in accord with our assertion that we have become 
independent or Thai [son? kap thirao rong kan wa rao daiitsaraphap ru’pen Thaitem thi]. If, on 
the other hand we look to the government to find us work, we are not really free.103
As already noted, there is an argument whether the origins of
economic nationalism can be found during Rama 6, around 1932, in the 
economic plans after 1932, or in Rathaniyom, introduced by Phibun in 1939? 
But there was a continuity in economic nationalism, regardless of the 
various ideological differences of these periods. However, there is a vital 
question - how did ideas develop or relate to each other in different 
periods?
Economic nationalism in Thailand can be divided into two aspects: 
anti-foreigner, especially European, and anti-Chinese. It might also be 
pointed out that economic nationalism in Thailand was negative. It was not 
applied to nation-building, as in Japan, which aimed to create a powerful 
country with a strong economy and a strong army. The reason for this 
weakness is that the People’s Party did not have concrete aims before taking 
power. In spite of announcing its six principles the government did not foster 
industry and commerce until 1939. Why did it take such a long time to 
implement economic nationalism after the revolution in 1932? It is not 
possible to argue that Phibun created his own ideology of economic 
nationalism, which aimed to eliminate the Chinese and secure strong state 
intervention in the economy. These ideas had already appeared in various 
economic plans after 1932. On the other hand, anti-foreigner, anti-European, 
feeling was not as strong as anti-Chinese. Siam’s economy at that time 
relied on Europeans, especially the British, not least the Financial Adviser, 
and this would make it difficult for the government to confront foreign
103 Scot Barme, Luang Wichit Wathakan and the Creation of a Thai Identity, Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993, p.77. See his economic views, pp.75-79. Wichit 
had several occupations in 1932: civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, part-time 
lecturer at Chulalongkorn University, editor of Thai Mai, and writer for Duang Prathip.
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interests. It was only during the war that the government challenged 
European economic dominance.
In its ideological aspect, economic nationalism’s main concern was 
to weaken the vested interests of the old regime, the royal family and 
khunnang class. To put it another way, there was no policy to foster 
manufacturing industry or commerce, in spite of emphasising self-reliance. 
However, in the mid -1930s, several projects, such as a cotton mill, paper mill 
and sugar mill were established as state enterprises (see table 5-10). These 
projects aimed to increase self-sufficiency.
it will be realised that these industrial ventures, few as they are, are still in their infancy. 
At the same time they have been the subject of wide publicity and discussion and there is 
reason to suppose that, should these initial efforts meet with success and money become 
more plentiful, capital will be more readily forthcoming for the operation of wider schemes.104
There are several important points to be made about anti-Chinese
policies. The Chinese were targeted because they dominated commerce, 
trade and industry. The government used the Immigration Act or the 
Registration of Aliens Act to curb the number of immigrants from China during 
the 1930s, and in 1939 discrimination against Chinese economic activities 
was increased through the Salt Act and the Tobacco Act. Why did the 
government wait until 1939 to implement anti-Chinese laws? The answer is 
difficult to find because it depends on circumstantial evidence. The two 
important figures, Pridi and Phibun, shared the same ideology for state 
intervention in the economy. However, their economic interests were 
different, Pridi wanted to promote Thais in business while Phibun sought 
self-sufficiency in order to prepare for the war. Pridi noted:
We may compare our Siamese people to children. The government will have to urge
them forward by means of authority applied directly or indirectly to get them to cooperate in any
kind of economic endeavour. If we continue to go along in the old paths, our revolutionary
change of government will have accomplished nothing of value because we will not have
attained our most important objective, which was to correct the grievances of the people. The
104 Crosby to FO No.30, enclosing Annual Report for 1934, 30 January 1935, 
F1931/1931/40, FO 371/19378, PRO.
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plan which we are to use should rest on the best knowledge of our day, on a well-coordinated 
policy, and on a definite method of procedure. Socialism is such a scientific system.105
In this chapter, there were three main points. First, the analysis of the 
evolution of the Siamese Chamber of Commerce illustrates the limitation of 
the political and economic power of the new type of merchants, the Pho Kha 
Thai. Although their ideas, Siamese business for Siamese people, were new, 
their commercial background as small or medium sized merchants did not 
bring them direct influence on the government. The Siamese Chamber of 
Commerce failed to function as a commercial pressure group.
Second, the mass media played an important role before and after 
1932. The major newspapers were important in expressing the concerns of 
Siamese intellectuals and the middle class. It is also important to note that 
serious arguments over economic issues often appeared in the mass media 
before 1932.
Lastly, the origins of economic nationalism were discussed, whether 
they are to be found in the reign of Rama 6, around 1932, or from 1939. 
The continuity and discontinuity between each period of economic 
nationalism will be examined in Chapter 8.
105 k.L. Landon, The Chinese in Thailand , New York: Russel! & Russell, reissued, 
1973, pp. 175-6.
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Table 5-1. List of authors
Name
1. Mangkorn 
Samsen 
1888- 1947
2. Pridi 
Phanomyong 
1900-1983
Origin Education Career
Chinese Law School public prosecutor, lawyer,
merchant owner of various businesses,
rice mill, coconut oil plant, 
mining, sugarcane 
plantation and refining plant, 
M.P.
a commoner Law School Promoter (leader of civilians)
France 1920-27 Cabinet Minister 
B A  in law at Cane Minister of Interior, 1934-36
3. Phra 
Sarasas 
1889-1966
PhD in law and 
diploma in political 
economy at 
Sorbonne
a commoner France 1923-32
studied economics 
and other social 
science at 
Sorbonne
4. Phya Mano Sino-Thai 
1886-1948
5. Phra Komarakun 
1891-1961
6. Luang 
Wuthithamnethikorn 
1893-1967
Law School 1902 
-3, England, 
barrister at law
England 1910-16 
LSE, barrister at 
Law
Law School
Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
1936-38, Minister of Finance,
1938-41, P.M. 1946
a teacher at Royal Military 
Academy, a diplomat In the 
1920’s, exile in France 1925- 
32, Minister of Economic 
Affairs, 1934, stay in Japan
1936-41, and 1942-45
Lawyer, Judge in Supreme 
Court, P.M. and the Minister 
of Finance, 1932-3
Privy Councillor, 1927, 
Minister of Finance, 1929, 
M.P.1933, President of 
Economic Council, 1933
a judge in provincial courts, 
1930-47
7. Wilat Osathanon Sino-Thai England 
businessman
8.Boriphanyutthakit
1893-1970
Royal Military 
Academy, 1906 
Germany
civilian promoter, Siamese 
Trade Commissioner, HK,
1937-9, Cabinet Minister,
1939-41
Minister of Economic Affairs, 
1935
(Source) Various cremation books.
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Table 5-2. Number of new periodicals and newspapers 1 8 6 8 -1 9 3 4 :
l ....................................
j Period ■ Rama 5 Rama 6 ! Rama 7
1 (1 8 6 8 -1 9 1 0 ) (1 9 1 0 -1 9 2 5 )  (1 9 2 5 -1 9 !35) .............................
i Periodicals 47 127 96
Newspapers
(D aily) 17 22; 6 0 :
1
(Source) Periodicals and newspapers printed in Thailand between
1 ............. .....................1 1844-1934 a bibliography, \ Serial Unit National Library,
)i Department of Fine Arts, Bangkok, 1970.
Table 5-3. Length of publication of newspapers 1 9 1 0 -1934
Period : Rama 6 (1 9 1 0 -1 9 2 5 ) ; Rama 7 (1 9 2 5 -1 9 3 4 )
unknown 2 I 3 7 1
less than 1 year 9: 10:
1 year ■........................  1 ;.............................;.................... ... 8 ...............................
2 years 4; 1:
3 years o: 2:
4 years 2 ; 1
5 years 1 0;
6 years 2! 0:
7  years 0! 1 ;
9 years 1 0 ;
Total ; 23 *  ; 60;
* Sayam Rasadorr?! (Thai) was published from 2463 (1 9 2 0 ) to 2 4 6 8  (1 9 2 5 ) and
from 24 7 4  (1 9 3 1 ). Therefore the length of publication is counted twice.
(Source) ■ Same as Table 5-2.
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Table 5-4. Number of newspapers founded per year.
2453 1 9 1 0 /1 1 ) 1
24 5 4 1 9 1 1 /1 2 ) 1
2455 1 9 1 2 /1 3 ) 0
2456 1 9 1 3 /1 4 ) 1
2457 1 9 1 4 /1 5 ) 1
2458 1 9 1 5 /1 6 ) 1
2459 1 9 1 6 /1 7 ) ..............P.:..............................................................
24 6 0 1 9 1 7 /1 8 ) ............0...............................................................
2461 1 9 1 8 /1 9 ) ..........  V ..............................:...............................
2462 1 9 1 9 /2 0 ) ............3 .................................:..................
2463 1 9 2 0 /2 1 ) . 1
2 4 6 4 1 9 2 1 /2 2 ) 1
2465 1 9 2 2 /2 3 ) .............. 4 :..................................................
246 6 1 9 2 3 /2 4 ) 4
2467 1 9 2 4 /2 5 ); 2
2468 1 9 2 5 /2 6 ) 4:
2469. 1 9 2 6 /2 7 ) 8^
2 4 7 0 1 9 2 7 /2 8 ) . 6;
2471 1 9 2 8 /2 9 ) 3;
2472 1 9 2 9 /3 0 ) 4:
2473 1 9 3 0 /3 1 ): 5.
2 4 7 4 1 9 3 1 /3 2 ): 6:
2475 1 9 3 2 /3 3 ); 18:
2476 1 9 3 3 /3 4 ); ............ 6 ; ........................... ;..............................
; (Source) Same as Table 5-2.
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Table 5-5. Uteracy and illiteracy figures in 1911 and 1937.
1911! 1937!
! persons ! % ! persons i %
Total population 8, 266, 408! 100! 14, 464, 105! 100
Males 4, 122, 168! 49.9! 7 ,3 1 3 ,5 8 4 ! 50.6
Females 4, 144, 240! 50.1; 7 ,1 5 0 ,5 2 1 ! 49.4
Literate* 922, 728! 11.2; . 312, 17811 21.6
Males 833,972; 10.1! 2 ,3 8 7 ,3 5 9 ! 16.5
Females 88, 756! 1.1! 734 ,42 2 ! 5.1
Illiterate [ 6, 412, 509! ! 6, 879, 007!
Males 2, 781, 284 ; 2, 668, 620!
Females 3, 631,225! j 4 ,2 1 0 ,3 8 7 !
* The figure of ..literacy in 1 9 1 1 of 11.2%Js.ai.rTiost certainly^ 
j excludes theL . p p p u l a t i o n  ofBangkok ..where, presumably
| higher than in the country as a whole. Consequently the 'improyement' in literacy
| , to 21.6% in 1937, was less ..substantial than
(Source) C M. Wilson, Thailand: A Handbook of Historical Statistics,
Boston: G.K.Hall 1983, pp.30-31. !
Table 5-6. Students and Teachers, by Education Level, 1920s and 1930s.
!Students*
Year Total Primary Secondary Special**
1920/21 181,946! 169, 148 12, 220 578
1921/22 217, 247! 202, 748 13, 734 765
1925/26 592, 297! 573, 052 17, 984 . 1, 261
1930/31 677, 699! 656, 553 19, 053 2, 093
1935/36 1 ,1 5 2 ,2 4 2 ! 1, 081, 978 37, 118 33, 146
1939/40 1, 689, 962*** ! 1, 629, 769 50, 418 9, 775? ; r j...........................
! Teachers
Year ! Total Primary Secondary Special
1920/21 5, 076! 4, 348 709 19
1921/22 5, 730! 5, 021 683 26
1925/26 11, 921; ......... io , 884 923 114
1930/31 .14, 297; 13, 172 987 138
1935/36 ! 24 ,059 ; 21, 119 1, 831 1, 109
1939/40 48, 550! ..... _....44, 863 2, 710 977
* Does not Include students in private schools. j  j
*.*. Includes students taking courses in agriculture, commerce, arts and crafts, 
and domestic science after having completed lower secondary school.
.*** .j.n.?.!ydes. 3 2 .students enroljed in the Jirst_ kindergarten class. |
(Source) I Same as Table 5-5, pp.65-66. ! _____ |_________
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9. Charoen 
Krung 
1.2472 
(1929) 
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.!.?• Pr?muan 
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6The Co-operative Movement in Siam
This chapter considers the history of the development of co-operatives in 
Siam, the problems and obstacles they faced, and lastly the ideas or 
thought behind co-operatives.
6.1. The Development of Co-operatives
In this part several fundamental questions are raised. How do we understand 
the origin of co-operatives in Siam? Is it related to economic nationalism in 
Siam? What was the main purpose in establishing co-operatives? Was it to 
eliminate the Chinese middlemen and money-lenders, or to foster economic 
development? As there were different types of co-operative, why did the 
Siamese choose one rather than another ? To what extent were foreigners, 
including foreign advisers, involved in the co-operatives?
The first co-operative society in Siam was the Wat Chad society on the 
outskirts of Pitsanulok, established in 1917. However, the origins of the co­
operative can be traced back to the reign of Rama 5 (1868-1910). One of the 
reasons for its establishment was the poverty of the farmers who were 
required to invest in agricultural tools and land to meet the demand for rice 
for export. They had to rely on money-lenders for capital. During the reign of 
Rama 5, the Siamese Government tried to provide agricultural credit for 
farmers through the establishment of an agricultural bank, but this idea failed 
because of lack of security and management control. In the early part of the 
reign of Rama 6 (1910-25) there were proposals for the establishment of 
either co-operatives or a savings bank. For example, the national archives
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file, R6. Kh15/5, contained proposals for the establishment of a savings bank 
and a co-operative society in order to alleviate the poverty of the farmers.1 
There the term ‘co-operative’, in Thai, Sahakon , was not used, but 
Muupenkhana . In 1912 the Belgian, O. Collet, proposed the creation of a 
mortgage bank.2
Rice, being almost the only source of the revenues of its people, is the object of an 
important export-business In spite of the wonderful richness of the soil, the rule of mono­
cultivation, which has prevailed, makes that Siam is too much dependent from the only result of
her rice-crop  Important capital advanced at normal conditions would permit the
development of the culture which is now existing, as well as the creation of new agricultural 
industries, sugar, cotton, etc. The latter would bring to the ploughman a new source of 
revenues and to the State new taxes, which are necessary for the general development of the 
country. The creation of a mortgage bank would answer this aim, for, incorporated with a new 
country, the credit on mortgage is always the principal factor of new initiative.3
This proposal was rejected by the government for several reasons, including 
the lack of familiarity with banks among farmers. As farmers were not 
familiar with banks, having a few banks would not produce much of an impact 
on the countryside. Gambling by farmers was also a factor, for it meant that 
they would not be willing to deposit their money in a bank.
Another turning point came when the Siam Commercial Bank had 
serious financial troubles, caused by the failure of the Chino-Siam Bank in 
December 1913.4 At that time the Ministry of Finance considered turning the 
Siam Commercial Bank into a loan bank through government finance. This 
idea came in 1914 when the Ministry of Finance invited Sir Bernard Hunter, 
the manager of the Madras Bank, to offer advice on the financial crisis. 
Hunter made two proposals, the establishment of a National Loan Bank and
1 R6 Kh15/5. N.A. Minister of Agriculture to King, 1 February 1912.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. (This is a direct quotation, please note the English is incorrect.) O. Colet’s
Mortgage Bank Plan written in English is filed here.
4 Borisat Beng Sayam Kammanjort Thunjamkat plianpen Thanakhan Thaiphanit camkat,
Anuson 60 Phi, (The Change from Siam Kammacon Co. Ltd. to Siam Commercial Bank Ltd., 
memorial 60 Years), Bangkok: Thai Khasem,1967, pp.26-34.
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of cooperatives.5 The first involved setting up a National Loan Bank with a 
capital of 6.5 million baht, through government finance to the Siam 
Commercial Bank.6 This proposal was strongly opposed by the Siam 
Commercial Bank, as Siam would lose its only commercial bank and 
exchange bank. In the second proposal, Hunter described a feature of 
Siamese society as ‘co-operation’. Krommunphityalongkon, the first Director- 
General of the Department of Commerce in the Ministry of Finance, 
translated ‘co-operation’ as ‘Sahakon’. In 1915 a Cooperative Division was 
set up under the Department of Commerce and Statistics in the Ministry of 
Finance. In summary, in this early stage, the idea of cooperatives was 
developed alongside proposals for the establishment of a loan bank.
The purposes of establishing co-operatives were varied. Firstly, it
aimed to provide credit for indebted farmers. In Siam the debt of farmers had
been a big issue, as there was no state financial institution to provide credit.
In general farmers were forced to rely on money-lenders, who charged high
interest rates. A book published by the Ministry of Commerce and
Communications in 1930 noted:
The reason why borrowing money from private money-lenders affords no prospect of 
advancement is that the money-lender is usually lending out money on indifferent or poor 
security to the individual cultivator, and therefore has to charge a high rate of interest as 
insurance against loss; whereas an organised credit institution, such as a Bank, will only lend 
money on good security and can therefore rest content with a moderate rate of interest7
Zimmerman’s rural economic survey in 1930-1931, and Andrew’s 2nd rural
5 'Phrawatikan sahakon nai prathet Thai’ (The Development of Co-operatives in
Thailand) in Khroprong 60 pi khong ngansahakon (Memorial of 60 years of cooperative), 
Bangkok: 1977, pp.10-11.
6 K.Kh.0301.28/12. N.A. See the Memorandum on Sir W.B. Hunter’s Report on the
Establishment of a National Bank for Siam, in August 1922, by G.H. Ardron, the manager of the 
Siam Commercial Bank. See also ’Financing of the proposed extension of the Co-operative
' Credit Movement.’
7 Ministry of Commerce and Communications, Siam: Nature and Industry, Bangkok:
1930, p.252.
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economic survey in 1934-1935, showed how farmers were being exploited 
by money-lenders who demanded high interest rates, and also suffered from 
the poverty of the soil.
Secondly, the co-operatives appeared to aim at the elimination of the 
middlemen. In general middlemen purchased paddy from farmers to sell to 
rice millers. The problem was that the farmers were usually indebted or in a 
bad financial position, and therefore were forced to sell their paddy cheaply. 
Farmers could not hold back paddy to wait for higher prices because of a 
lack of silos or warehouses. Thus middlemen made high profits. The official 
documents on co-operatives did not show exactly how to get rid of 
middlemen. However, this was an important issue discussed in government, 
as Phraya Jotuk’s proposals showed.8
Thirdly, co-operatives aimed to increase the productivity of agriculture. 
As agriculture was the backbone of the Siamese economy, it was vital to 
tackle the problems of farmers in order to promote agriculture. Farmers 
lacked not only working capital and sufficient equipment but also fertiliser, 
improved seed and agricultural knowledge. A pamphlet on the Co-operative 
Credit Movement, published by the Department of Commerce and Statistics 
in 1915, explained:
Agriculture in Siam is, today, seriously handicapped from the lack of sufficient capital to 
fully develop the resources of the soil. For efficiency and economy of production easy access 
to capital at moderate rates of interest is essential.9
This pamphlet, written by Prince Bidyalongkorn (Krommunphityalongkon), 
was presented at the first meeting on cooperatives held at the Ministry of 
Finance in November 1915. Consisting of 18 pages, it was written to
8 R7. Ph.7/14. N.A. Discussion and recommendation on Phraya Jotuk’s proposals. The
sub-committee of the Board of Commercial Development discussed Jotuk's proposal on 22 
January 1931. Also see K.Kh.0301.1.32/8. N.A. ‘Proposal by Phya Joduk, Director in the 
Department of Local Chinese Affairs, to foster Siam’s Rice Industry.’
9 Bangkok Times , 2 December 1915. A summary of a rough translation of this 
pamphlet can be seen in Bangkok Times, 2 December 1915, ‘Co-operative credit in Siam’. 
Other abstracts of the pamphlet can also be seen in Bangkok Times  ^ 3 December 1915, and 
Siam Observer, 3 December 1915.
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establish the basic principles of cooperatives.
Lastly, the establishment of co-operatives had connections with the 
economic nationalism of Rama 6. As agriculture was the economic 
backbone, it was essential to protect agriculture, especially rice cultivation, 
for Siamese farmers. Walter F. Vetla has identified three approaches in the 
economic nationalism of Rama 6.10 The first was the introduction of an arts 
and crafts curriculum into schools, aimed at the creation of a new class of 
craftsmen, who would encourage Thais to buy local products. A second 
approach was to provide credit to farmers in order to reduce their 
dependence upon Chinese money-lenders. This would involve the 
establishment of a National Saving Bank in 1913, and the creation of credit 
co-operatives in 1917. A third approach involved direct government 
sponsorship of new economic enterprises, such as the Siam Cement 
Company in 1913 and the Siamese Steamship Company in 1918.
However Rama 6’s thinking on economic nationalism was sometimes 
contradictory. For example, the king emphasised anti-Chinese feeling and 
told the Siamese to purchase not foreign but Siamese products. Velia 
notes:
in an essay of 1915 whose title translates into English as “Wake Up, Siam”, the King 
dealt exhaustively with the theme of the economic dimensions of nationalism. The essay 
started with a definition of the problem. At one time, Vajiravudh wrote, the Thai people 
produced the articles they needed. With the advent of peace and prosperity, the expansion of 
foreign trade, and immigration of Chinese labourers, the Thai came to rely excessively on 
foreigners. Foreign imports drove Thai manufactures out of the market. Cheap foreign labour 
replaced Thai workmen in many crafts and industries. The Thai accepted the new emergent 
economy because it was convenient. The Thai, who “by nature do not like to work hard”, were 
content to leave manual labour to the Chinese. The Thai became lazy, giving up skills they 
once had, depending on foreigners for products they once made. Locally, the Chinese took 
over food marketing in Bangkok; they dominated the construction industry and carpentry
10 Walter F, Veila, Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the development of Thai nationalism, 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978, pp.171-172.
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trades. The international market supplied machinery, petroleum, benzine, coal, sugar, and 
cloth. Some of these imports were necessary, but not all. Petroleum for lamps could be 
replaced by locally produced coconut oil. Homegrown castor oil could easily supplant imported 
lubricating oil. Siam had once been self-sufficient in sugar and cloth and could be again. The 
disadvantages in economic dependence were apparent enough in peacetime; they would 
expand manifold in wartime and make Siam extremely vulnerable.11
But the King did not recognise the poverty of the farmers. He thought
that Siam was in a good economic condition.
The King took strong exception to the “loud laments" that the Thai peasantry was 
impoverished and exploited. The Thai were not poor: there was no starvation in Siam; the 
people even had money enough to indulge in gambling. The “so-called poor people in 
Bangkok”, he said, "are quite rich” compared with the urban poor in Europe. As for people in 
the countryside, “Our provincial people do not lack necessities; they have got decent roofs 
over their heads, and ground to till and cultivate". The only "poor” people in Siam were the 
extravagant spenders in Bangkok whose luxurious tastes ran beyond their means.12
Secondly, the economic nationalism launched by Rama 6 had its
limits. The persistence of the Sakdina system and of imperialism forced the 
Siamese economy to be dependent on Chinese and foreigners, it also meant 
that insufficient state money was allocated to economic development. The 
external threat to Siam was so great that defence was more important than 
economic development. The lack of fiscal autonomy as a result of the 
Bowring Treaty of 1855 made it difficult for the Siamese government to raise 
revenue. Thirdly, the Sakdina system meant that the Siamese elite, the royal 
family, high officials, some prominent merchants, protected their vested 
interests rather than pursue economic development. These points were 
discussed in chapter 2.
The history of the first co-operative society in Siam can be traced back 
to 1917. There are many documents on the cooperative movement in the
11 Ibid., pp.172-173.
12 Ibid., p. 170.
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National Archives.13 Siam adopted credit co-operatives. Before explaining 
why, it is useful to see the aims of the co-operatives as explained in a book 
published in 1915 by Prince Bidyalongkorn: to provide credit at cheap 
interest in order to relieve the capital shortage, to train the people to help 
each other, to teach people thrift, to improve the morals of the people, 
encouraging them to refrain from gambling and drinking, and to provide an 
education.14 This pamphlet pointed out the main advantages of co­
operatives for farmers. The main principle was co-operation - mutual help 
was repeatedly stressed, with many examples, such as in borrowing money, 
purchasing rice, seed selection, acquiring agricultural equipment and selling 
rice. It is important to note that the government took the initiative in promoting 
co-operatives, but stressed voluntary participation by the farmers. 
Government intervention in the co-operative was limited, and the decisions 
of the co-operative committee were respected. The membership of each co­
operative was limited to 50 people. Selecting members involved the 
following considerations:
(a) members must all live in the same village;
(b) they must know one another well;
(c) they must be persons of good reputation, and not easily given to
13 Documents on co-operatives are filed under various Ministries, such as Agriculture, 
Finance, Commerce and Communications, the Interior, and Chief Secretary to the Cabinet. 
The Record, published by the Ministry of Commerce and Communications in English, reported 
on the co-operative movement fourteen times from October 1922 to 1937. There is a MA 
thesis on the co-operative movement during the reign of Rama 6 and 7 by Pranee Glumsom, 
‘Kankaepanha setthakit thi kiawkap chawna doywithikan sahakon nairatchasamai 
Phrabatsomdetphra Mongkutkiaocaoyuhua lae Phrabatsomdetphra Pokklaocaoyuhua’ 
(Cooperative measures in solving economic problems related to peasants during the reigns of 
King Rama VI and King Rama Vli), Department of History , Graduate School, Chulalongkorn 
University, 1986. See also the history of the cooperatives in 50 pi khong Sahakon nai 
phrathedt Thai (50 Years of Cooperatives in Thailand), 1967, sahakon kaisong heng prathet 
Thai.
14 Pranee Glumsom, 'Kankaepanha setthakit thi kiawkap chawna doywithikan sahakon 
nairatchasamai Phrabatsomdetphra Mongkutkiaocaoyuhua lae Phrabatsomdetphra 
Pokklaocaoyuhua’ (Cooperative measures in solving economic problems related to peasants 
during the reigns of King Rama VI and King Rama Vil), Department of History , Graduate 
School, Chulalongkorn University, 1986, p.68. This book was titled Sahakon, and was written 
by Phraratchawongtho Krommunwithyalongkon in 1915.
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quarrelling;
(d) some at least must be able to read and write, for the purpose of 
acting on the committee and keeping the society’s accounts.15 
The management of the co-operative was entrusted to a committee, 
consisting of six members, including a chairman, treasurer, secretary, and 
three others. The pamphlet did not provide detailed information on funding, 
so that government financial assistance was not clear. The pamphlet noted 
that the security was personal, meaning that when a member needed a loan, 
two other members should act as guarantors.
The first type of co-operative society in Siam was Raiffeisen, which 
originated in Germany. The reason why this type was selected was that the 
government considered it vital to provide capital for the farmers. The 
principles of the Raiffeisen co-operative were unlimited liability, limited 
physical area, non-profit sharing and free services. The work was initially 
undertaken by the Co-operative Division of the Ministry of Finance in 1915. 
The problem of financing was solved by an advance of 300,000 baht from the 
Siam Commercial Bank, guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance. The 
Registrar of Co-operative Societies was empowered to establish and register 
societies, and to authorise borrowing within the limit cited above. It is 
important to stress that financial flexibility in establishing societies and 
advancing loans to members was limited. In other words, the co-operative 
movement was an experiment from the start. The first co-operative society 
was established in Pitsanulok, a poor area with low population and lack of 
capital. Initially two places, Lopburi and Pitsanulok, were considered. The 
Record notes:
It was ultimately decided to employ part of the money in relieving the wants of a group 
of villages in the Lopburi district, which is thickly populated, and where the cultivation of rice is 
being commercially developed to an ever increasing extent, and where the farmers are
‘Report of the Co-operative Movement in Siam’, Record, No.6, October 1922.
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systematically exploited by the money-lender: and the other part in providing capital to a group 
of villages in the Pitsanulok district, which is sparsely populated and where the people, who are 
poor, have but lately migrated from the South. The idea in this tatter case was to use the 
organisation thus formed as a basis for future colonisation, as vacant land is plentiful and the 
cost of clearing it does not require a large amount of capital.16
When the first co-operative was established, no special law was
enacted, only an amendment to the Law of Association, passed in 1916. This 
limited the co-operative to a credit co-operative only. Expansion in activities 
became possible only with the Co-operative Societies Act, 1928. Then the 
Co-operative Societies Amendment Act, 1933, and the first and second Co­
operative Societies Amendment Acts, 1934, were promulgated.17 Among the 
amendments the most important was to increase the funds available for 
establishing cooperatives from the Treasury.
Table 6-1 shows the expansion of co-operatives from 1916/17 to 1925. 
The early history of the co-operative movement in Siam may be divided into 
two periods, from 1916/17 to 1922, and from 1923.18 In the first period, co­
operatives operated on personal security: this meant that the members were 
not required to produce property as security, but personal standing acted as 
the guarantee for a loan. In the second period, material security was used, 
this meant that a member must transfer to the co-operative the ownership of 
his land as security for his loan. According to Table 6-1, the expansion of 
co-operatives varied each year. For example there were no new co­
operatives in 1921 and 1922 because of lack of funds. The years 1917 and 
1919 were difficult, because of the failures of the rice crop, owing to a flood 
in 1917 and a drought in 1919, and this pushed the farmers into setting up
co-operatives. Yet the expansion was rather slow. The Ministry of
16 Ibid.
17 See details in Twelfth Report on The Co-operative Movement in Siam for B.E.2476 
(1933-34)' the Record, Voj.XV, First to Fourth Quarter, 1935 pp.80-1; and Thirteenth Report 
on the Co-operative Movement in Siam for B.E.2477 (1934-35)’, The Record, Vol.XVI, First to 
Fourth Quarter 1936, p.82.
18 The Siamese budget calender was April to March, so that B.E.2459 was April 1916 to 
March 1917.
255
Commerce and Communications admitted this:
the progress of the movement may appear rather stow, as only 77 societies had been 
formed in ten years. It is, however, still in the experimental stage, and working within a very 
narrow limit of capital. Whenever the amount of borrowed capital approaches the limit laid down 
by the Government, the formation of new societies has to stop till sufficient capital has been 
accumulated from the repayment of the loans made to older societies. It wiil be seen, 
therefore, that the extension of the movement depends chiefly on the amount of capital 
available.19
Table 6-2 shows the development of cooperatives from 1925 to 1944. 
From this table three points can be made. First, until the constitutional 
revolution in 1932, the progress of the cooperative movement was slow. 
Second, after the revolution, the constitutional government promoted 
cooperatives in order to combat the effects of the world depression. From 
1933, more than one hundred cooperatives were established. Third, rapid 
progress was brought about by Phibun’s government from 1938. More 
financial assistance was available during this period (1939-1944), and the 
number of cooperatives and members increased rapidly, from 1,797 to 4,747 
societies, and from 36,465 to 115,435 members.
One of the main reasons why the constitutional government promoted 
cooperatives was to deal with the economic depression in the rural areas, 
caused by a serious fall in the price of paddy. The Record reports:
The price of paddy in the rural districts in B.E. 2474 [1931J only came to two-fifth’s of 
that at the beginning of B.E. 2473 [1930], the original price of 50 Baht per kwien having 
dropped to 20 Baht. In B.E. 2475 [1932] and B.E. 2476 [1933], prices decreased further and 
one kwien of paddy only fetched one third of the original price quoted before the economic 
depression.20
Financial assistance to the cooperatives had been mainly provided by 
the Siam Commercial Bank from 1916 to 1932, and it was only after the 
revolution in 1932 that government funds were used. The loan from the
Siam Commercial Bank was initially for 300,000 baht, with a government
19 The Ministry of Commerce and Communications, Siam Nature and Industry, Bangkok, 
1930, p.258.
20 ‘Twelfth Report on the Co-operative Movement in Siam for B.E. 2476 (1933-34)’ 
Record, Vol.XV, First to Fourth Quarter B.E. 2478, p.81. A Kwien is equal to 2,000 litres.
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guarantee. An additional cash credit of 200,000 baht was granted by the 
Siam Commercial Bank in 1928, bringing the total working capital to 
500,000 baht. In 1929 the government increased its guarantee to the Siam 
Commercial Bank for a further loan of 500,000 baht, making the total working 
capital 1,000,000 baht. A further 500,000 baht was added in 1932, bringing 
the total capital of the cooperatives to 1,500,000 baht. The funds available 
from the Siam Commercial Bank was thus limited to 1,500,000 baht. Loans 
to cooperatives were limited to this amount. Further loans would be 
available only by repayments from older cooperatives.
In 1933 and 1934, the annual budgetary allocation to the cooperatives 
was 700,000 baht; this was increased to 1.4 million baht in 1936, and by a 
further 1 million baht in 1937. Another source of funds, besides the Treasury 
and Siam Commercial Bank, became available following cooperation 
between the Minister of Agriculture and the head of the Savings Bank 
Department.21 A 5.5 million baht loan from the Government Savings Bank, 
with a Government guarantee, was allocated for 1938 to 1940, with interest at 
4.5 % every three months.22 After Phibun became Prime Minister in 1938, 
further financial assistance was available. The Report of the Financial 
Adviser states;
A new departure in the method of financing the Co-operative Movement was 
introduced at the beginning of B.E.2483 [1940] by the issue of the 4.5%  internal loan of Baht 
25,000,000, of which Baht 20,000,000 was reserved for the development of the Co-operative 
Movement. The first issue was made on the 1st April B.E.2483 [1940] in connection with the 
debt conversion referred to above 23
21 Phanit Ruamsil, 'Nayobai kanphatthanasethakit samairathaban comphon Por. 
Phibunsongkhram tangtae ph. s. 2481 thung ph. s. 2487 (The Economic Development Policy 
of the Field Marshal P . Phibunsongkhram’s Administration, 1938 -1944)’, M.A. Thesis, 
Department of History, Chulalongkorn University, 1978, p.295.
22 ibid, p.295.
23 Report of the Financial Adviser in connection with the Budgets of the Kingdom of 
Thailand for the intraocular year 1st October B.E.2482(1939) to the 31st December B.E.2483 
(1940) and the Year B.E. 2484(1941), Bangkok Times Press, 1940, p.10.
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In addition, the establishment of the Central Credit Institution was advanced 
by the Co-operative Societies Act of B.E.2486 [1943].24 This institution aimed 
to provide loans, facilities for deposits and facilities for the settlement of bills 
among cooperatives.
The world depression increased agricultural indebtedness. As the 
price of rice as well as the price of land fell during the early 1930’s, farmers 
with loans were in a difficult situation to meet interest and principal payments. 
Zimmerman’s survey in 1930 indicated how much agricultural indebtedness 
increased in the Central Plain. (This issue will be discussed later.) The 
government was forced to propose measures to cope with these problems, or 
it might face a serious political and economic challenge. Two memoranda 
presented by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in December 1932 
showed the government’s thinking. The first, on 15 December 1932, 
consisting of 13 pages in English, and was titled, 'Settlement of Rural Debts 
in the Provinces By Reconciliation or Conversion, and the Establishment of a 
Central Bank and Co-operative Societies to finance Farmers’.25 This 
memorandum described how and why indebted farmers were forced to sell 
their property:
At the present time, the value of land is very low and therefore very little money is 
realised when the property is sold by auction. Hence whenever the creditor demands the 
repayment for the debt, the debtor is left almost without anything, even the very house he 
lives in. In the end the debtor is regarded as a pauper. The consequence is, some of them 
rent farms to cultivate while some turn to labourers. At the present time, the position of the 
debtor is very desperate, and each day time draws nearer when he will have to relinquish the 
right of ownership. This state of affairs discourages the debtor, he no longer wishes to attempt 
to make a living, because no capitalist is inclined to make a loan. The consequence is, the 
farmer has to carry on as the best he can, thus bringing about a gradual degradation of 
agricultural condition.26
24 Phanit Ruamsil, ‘Nayobai kanphatthanasethakit samairathaban comphon Por.
Phibunsongkhram tangtae ph. s. 2481 thung ph. s. 2487 (The Economic Development Policy 
of the Field Marshal P . Phibunsongkhram’s Administration, 1938 -1944)’, M.A. Thesis, 
Department of History, Chulalongkorn University, 1978, p.298.
25 K.KH.0301.1.37/72. N.A.
26 ibid., pp. 1-2.
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The memorandum also mentions the problems of the creditor who was 
not able to collect his loans because of the declining value of the land. 
Selling land by auction would not bring in enough money to cover the loan. 
In addition, assuming ownership of land, the creditor would have to rent it out. 
There was no guarantee that the creditor would collect the rent in full 
because of the severe economic conditions.
This memorandum quotes the figures for agricultural indebtedness in 
the central provinces from Zimmerman’s rural economic survey in 1930. Most 
of the farmer’s loans came from relatives or moneylenders. Loans from 
relatives were not considered dangerous because they were small and 
probably had no collateral. The loans from moneylenders in the central 
provinces were estimated at about 74,000,000 baht by Z im m e rm a n .27 The 
central provinces consisted of Monthons Krunthep, Ayudhya, Pitsanulok, 
Ratchaburi and Prachin.
In order to deal with agricultural indebtedness, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Commerce considered three measures: a moratorium, 
settlement of debt by the establishment of a government credit institution, 
and settlement of debt by reconciliation or conversion. A moratorium was 
considered an easy method, but would not provide a solution. It would not 
reduce the farmer’s indebtedness, because he would be forced to repay in 
the future. Therefore the moratorium idea was rejected.
The establishment of a credit institution was then considered. As Siam 
had had the co-operative credit society since 1917, the government 
considered other types of credit institution, such as the Landschaften (Co­
operative Land Mortgage Bank) of Germany, the Credit Foncier of France, the
27 This figure was calculated as the average debt per family (190 baht) times 650,000 
families, making 123,500,000 baht. The average debt per family was based on 600 families 
surveyed in the Central Region. Of the 123,500,000 baht, two-fifths were loans from 
relatives, leaving about 74,000,000 baht. Carle C. Zimmerman, Siam: Rural Economic Survey, 
1930-31, Bangkok: Bangkok Times Press, 1931, pp.199-204.
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Agricultural Bank of Egypt, and the Desabank and Deaslombong of Java. 
However, the government rejected these ideas:
(1) Because of the fall in the value of land, the decrease in the income of the people. 
At present the amount of the cultivator’s debt is higher than the price of land placed as 
security. Besides the interest which has to be paid is beyond the repaying capacity of the 
cultivator. (2) This is a time of financial depression and the Government has not sufficient funds 
to finance credit institutions in their undertaking to repay all the rural debts, because at present 
the revenue of the Government has fallen and it has to exercise stringent economy.28
Lastly, debt reconciliation, which means to reduce the amount of the
debt to a level representing the present value of the land, was examined. 
Three points were considered. Firstly, the benefits should be considered for 
both the creditors and debtors. Secondly, the government’s financial 
situation was so severe that government money should be used as little as 
possible. Lastly, it was important to prevent the country’s economic 
condition from being damaged further.
This proposal was related to the establishment of a central bank and 
the expansion of the co-operative movement. The basic idea was that the 
central bank would be responsible for reconciliated debts, by issuing stocks 
guaranteed by the government to the creditors. The stock would be 
redeemable after 20 years, with an interest of 6% per year. On the other 
hand, the debtor would have to be a member of a co-operative society, and 
would pay a lower interest rate (about 9%) to the central bank. Under this 
plan, the ability of farmers to repay the central bank was not an issue, 
because the reconciliated debts were neither higher than the value of the 
land or more than the cultivator’s repaying capacity, for interest and principal. 
To control repayment by the cultivator, the cooperative society would be 
suitable, because of the close mutual knowledge of its members. In this 
arrangement, the society becomes the debtor of the central bank. There are 
two types of loans to farmers. The first is the large, long-term loan, which
28 K. Kh.0301.1.37/72. N.A. p.4.
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would be in stocks after reconciliation. The second is the small, short-term 
loan, which will be provided by the cooperative society, borrowing from the 
central bank.
The first stage of this scheme would take place in the five years from 
1933 to 1937, establishing 2,480 cooperative societies, with 7,600,000 baht 
assets.
The second memorandum dealt with the establishment of central 
bank cooperative credit, and the procedure of debt reconciliation. This 
memorandum explains the financial cooperation between the central bank 
and cooperatives. According to the memorandum, there were three main 
aims: (a) to settle people’s debts by issuing debentures or stocks instead of 
cash, (b) financing cooperative societies, from which cultivators may borrow,
(c) buying up land belonging to those who do not cultivate it themselves, by 
paying them in debentures or stocks instead of cash, and selling or letting the 
land to cultivators who have no land of their own.29 The head office would 
be in Bangkok, and the changwat treasuries would be used as branches in 
the provinces. The capital of the bank would come from three sources: loans 
from holders of debentures or stocks, (in connection with debt reconciliation), 
an internal loan by the government, and fixed deposits from the public. Loans 
to cooperatives from the bank would be divided into two types: long- term 
loans, up to twenty years, in order to issue debentures or stocks to creditors; 
and short-term loans, up to four years, to cultivators for cultivation expenses. 
The memorandum adds: This Bank is an institution independent from any 
governmental department and has its own Board (including representatives 
from Ministries and Departments concerned), appointed by the Government 
as a directing body.’30 The profit of the bank would come from the difference 
between interest on debentures or stocks at 6% per annum paid to
29 ibid., p .141.
30 Ibid., p. 142.
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creditors, and the 7.5% per annum from cooperatives. Later, in lending to 
cooperative members, the bank would make a profit from the difference 
between loans at 7.5% to members and the internal loan at 5% per annum. 
Loans at such low rates would be available only to members of 
cooperatives.
The role of cooperatives in this scheme was little different from their 
existing role, except that each member was required to transfer to the 
cooperative the title-deed on his land as security to cover the amount of his 
long-term loan. In other words, material security was required for long-term 
loans. Short-term loans, such as for cultivation expenses, required only 
personal security, with two members of the cooperative acting as guarantors.
This plan was discussed by the sub-committee on agricultural debt 
and cooperatives of the Economic Council on 14 April 1933.31 It did not 
support the plan for two reasons; firstly, it estimated the cultivators' 
indebtedness at over 100 million baht and secondly lack of sufficient staff 
would make it difficult for the government to collect payments from the 
farmers to cover interest and amortisation.
6.2. Problems and Obstacles for the Co-operatives
There were several problems and obstacles in the way of the development of 
co-operatives in Siam. First, the government started the movement without 
positive farmer participation. In other words, the government decided 
everything, and the farmers were simply asked to participate. There is no 
National Archives document reflecting suggestions from the farmers before 
the setting up of the first co-operatives in 1917. The co-operative movement
was driven from the top by the government. The farmers’ participation was
31 Ibid. The members of this sub-committee were Prince Sithiporn Kridakara, Chairman, 
Raymond B. Stevens, Prince Vivat Chaiyant, James Baxter, Luang Dejsahakara and Phra 
Pramon Panya, secretary.
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small during the 1920’s. Moreover membership was open only to farmers 
with land. Tenant farmers were excluded, although they desperately needed 
help. The Bangkok Times admitted: The present national crisis is not to be 
solved by the co-op credit movement; but none the less the fact that that 
movement is giving a new and better outlook on life to over 2,000 families is 
an immense gain.’32 Another article noted:
The fact that the farmer is so largely out of the hands of the money-lender is part of the
present-day problem it would take at least a thousand years for the movement to solve the
national problem; Such problems are not solved in a year, but if seriously tackled the work
of raising the economic status of the agricultural community should yield national results in a 
generation, or say, fifty years.33
Second, the movement did not expand rapidly at this early stage 
because of financial limitations. Even though loans to the co-operatives were 
increased three times, (through the Siam Commercial Bank), to one million 
baht in 1929, setting up new co-operatives always depended on finance. 
Only when an existing co-operative repaid a loan could a new co-operative 
be established.
Third, the legal basis of the co-operative was unstable at this early 
stage, because only an amendment to the law of association was used. It 
meant that only credit co-operatives were allowed. As the law of association 
did not permit the sharing of profit other types of co-operatives, such as 
consumption, production, wholesale and retail, were tried only in a later 
period.
Fourth, the shift from personal security to material security in 1923 
created an argument over the effectiveness of material security. Le May, the 
adviser to the Ministry of Commerce and Communications, supported 
personal security in favour of material security.34 First, he described how the
change occurred:______
32 Bangkok Times, 11 July 1931.
33 Bangkok Times, 17 July 1931.
34 K.KH.0301.1.37/72. N.A.The Case for Personal Security against Material Security in 
the Rural Credit Co-operative Movement.1 This document was written on 20 July 1931.
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in B.E.2466 (1923-24) the Board of Commercial Development which was considering 
the extension of the Movement as a result of the visit to Burma and India of the Registrar and 
myself, decided upon a change in the nature of the security to be demanded from the 
members of all Societies created in the future, and introduced the principle of material security 
for loans advanced. I protested strongly at the time against this change on the ground that the 
new form of security was entirely opposed to the essential principle on which Rural credit Co­
operative Societies were formed, but I was generally overruled.35 
Le May thought much of the principle of co-operation. Material security would
promote individualism which would contradict the principle of co-operation.
He pointed out the merit of personal standing:
Each loan should mean so much earning capacity, so much producing power for the 
individual borrower. The guarantee consists in the expectation that each member of the 
society, knowing that he stands to lose his all by the default of the other, will exert moral 
pressure on his co-members to ensure that they use for a proper productive purpose the 
money which they have borrowed and duly repay it at the appointed time. The security in fact 
lies in the use of each loan for genuine productive purposes, the honesty and thrift of the 
members, the watchfulness they exercise over each other, the moral influence which they 
bring to bear upon dishonest or unthrifty co-members and the feeling of solidarity which is 
usually awakened by association for a common purpose. These represent the essential 
elements of co-operation in its perfected form, and it is in the presence of these elements that 
the business aspect of co-operation also finds its best security.36 
Le May pointed to the case of India, where the sale of assets frequently
failed to cover the societies’ debts, because they realised less than their
valuation. He also suggested that when offering material security, the
purpose of the loans was not always sufficiently examined. That is to say,
the loan is not made on the merits and capacity of the borrower, but purely on
the supposed value of land.’37 Finally he argued that there was considerable
disparity in the costs of setting up a society, depending on whether it used
personal security or material security. Material security implied more than
personal security: the original 60 societies established under personal
standing required a total of about 270,000 baht, or an average of around
4,500 baht per society. In contrast, in 1929 the creation of 37 new societies
35 Ibid., p.1.
36 Ibid., pp.5-6.
37 Ibid., p.7.
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cost no less than 383,000 baht, or over 10,000 baht per society.
Fifth, there was the problem of the indebtedness of farmers, which was 
to be reduced by the establishment of co-operatives. However, the co­
operatives had done very little to reduce indebtedness. The statistical data 
on farmer’s debt comes from the survey conducted by Zimmerman in 1930,38 
which made clear the role of money-lenders in rural Siam. Zimmerman 
pointed out that in general money-lenders were engaged in three activities: 
lending money, marketing agricultural produce and providing supplies to the 
farmer. This made it difficult to analyse how much they made from each 
activity. The degree of debt depended on whether the region was 
commercialised or not. The farmers in the central region were most in debt. 
About half the families in the central region were in debt at the end of 1930, 
and the average debt per family was 190 baht39 Zimmerman estimated that 
half of the farmer's loans in the north was provided by relatives and friends, 
who would not cause trouble to the cultivator. The figure in the Central 
Region was 40%. In general small loans were obtained from neighbours in 
all regions. Zimmerman’s survey did not show the extent to which the 
Chinese moneylenders were creditors. However the general role of 
Chinese moneylenders was known. The role of moneylenders varied from 
region to region, and also by the type of loan. In the Central Region, medium 
loans were obtained from merchants and padi buyers, and large loans from 
moneylenders in the district and in Bangkok. In the North, large loans came 
from moneylenders in the cities, particularly Chiengmai. In the South and 
Northeast there were few medium-sized loans. Medium and large loans were 
usually secured by land. Second, interest rates varied from region to
38 Carle C. Zimmerman, Siam Rural Economic Survey 1930-31, Bangkok: The Bangkok 
Times Press,1931. See Chapter X, ‘Agricultural Credit’, pp. 195-223.
39 Ibid., pp.200-201. The average debt of a family at the end of B.E.2473 [1930] was: 
North, 30 baht; South , 10 baht; and Northeast, 14 baht. The families with loans per 100 
families was: Centre, 49 families; North, 18 families; South, 18 families; and Northeast, 11 
families.
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region. In the Central Region they were from 15% to 30% per annum, though 
reaching as high as 60%/° Third, in the Central Region loans were obtained 
primarily for the purchase of land, then for farming expenses, food, and 
other expenses.41 Land loss occurred often in the Central Region, much 
less in other regions.
A letter from the royal secretary general to the Minister of Commerce 
and Communications in 1930 shows the government was anxious not to let 
land be handed over to foreigners and capitalists who did not engage in 
farming, but to keep land for Thais who really cultivated it.42 The letter 
indicated that the expansion of cooperatives would protect the land. Another 
letter from the Minister of Commerce and Communications to the royal
secretary general suggested the expansion of cooperatives and staff.43
Zimmerman noted;
These summarised results lead to the conclusion that the credit problem of the 
country is to be found at present principally in the central sections and around Chiengmai. 
Provincial cities in the other districts also have credit problems in their districts among the 
farmers nearest to town. Further they show clearly that the Siamese peasant is still living 
according to the credit habits of the self-sufficing time yet with the risks of commercial 
agriculture. He makes debts too often for consumptive purposes rather than for purposes of 
production. Consequently, too much of his money which he borrows is not put to work but is 
consumed without adding to his income.44
Sixth, the Co-operative Department had insufficient staff. As the
movement proved successful, the government could not provide sufficient
staff or financial assistance. Although some competent staff and experts were
engaged, the lack of adequate staff was evident. The foreign involvement
was represented by J.A. Cable, the British adviser to the Department of
40 (bid. p.207. Interest in the North was from 15% to 24%. In the South, from 30% to 
36%. In the Northeast, 24% to 36%. Zimmerman also estimated the average interest rates as 
follows; Centre, 23%; North, 21%; South, 32%; and Northeast 32%.
41 lbid.p.207. In all other regions, the primary purposes of loans were food, followed by 
farming expenses, and purchase of land.
42 R7.Ph.9/1. N.A. Chaophya Mahithon to Krommaphra Kamphaengphet Akharayothin, 
15 April 1930.
43 Ibid. Kamphaenphet Akharayothi to Chaophya Mahithon, 2 May 1930.
44 Carle C. Zimmerman, op.cit, p.208.
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Commerce and Statistics from the beginning in 1915. A letter from the 
Minister of Agriculture to the Prime Minister on 28 January 1936 explained 
the need to hire a British expert on cooperatives in order to develop other 
types of cooperative.45 However, in the cabinet meeting on 5 February 1936, 
the proposal was rejected, because the work of the Co-operative Department 
was poorly organised.46
Seventh, dissatisfaction arose among poor farmers because the 
movement gave advantage to rich farmers. This dissatisfaction appeared in 
a demonstration against the cooperative scheme. The Bangkok Times 
reported:
The Government is making quite a big effort to extend the co-operative movement, all 
over the country, in order to improve the condition of the agriculturalists. But about five 
thousand farmers have combined together to submit to the Government a petition against its 
present co-operative scheme. They counted th a t, instead of assisting them in their plight of 
indebtedness and opposition from the middlemen, the present policy only serves as an 
instrument for the rich to utilise in oppressing the poor further. That being so, these 5,000, 
who belong to Minburi, Nakon Nayok, Chaxoengsao, Samud Prakarn and some parts of 
Bangkok, have combined in planning another co-operative movement which they have 
submitted to the Government through their representatives 47
The petition sought to free the farmers from indebtedness, and help them to 
purchase and sell goods. The farmers presented twelve principles which 
can be divided into three. The first was to increase production and assist in 
financial aspects such as to invite new farmers to become members in order 
to set up silos to store paddy and other produce until they could be sold at 
reasonable prices, to establish a co-operative shop to sell necessities at 
reasonable prices, to set up a savings bank to receive deposits from farmers 
and facilitate financial settlements, such as the payment of taxes, principal, 
and interest. The second was that careful consideration should be given in
45 S. R.0201.19/36. N.A.
46 ibid.
47 Bangkok Times, 16 July 1934. The Co-operative Movement. New Proposals'. This 
article was a rough translation from The Nation (Thai) on 14 July 1934. According to the article, 
fifty of the representatives arrived in Bangkok on 11 July, and seven met the Premier to hand 
in the petition.
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the settlement of debts: proper rules and reasonable interest rates should be 
applied to members of cooperatives in settling debts between them and the 
farmers, the credit account of farmers should be checked every year, and 
evidence be required when the farmer was unable to cultivate his land. The 
third was the management of cooperatives: members sons and daughters 
should have the protection of the cooperative, half the co-operative board 
should be appointed by the Co-operative Department, the other half by the 
farmers concerned, all cooperatives should be subject to the control of the 
Co-operative Department of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, profits should 
be divided between members after the repayment of debt to the government 
and that members of the executive committee would receive monthly wages 
or temporary allowances. But the important point was that the farmers still 
relied on the assistance of the government, even though they were not 
satisfied with the current cooperative scheme.
6.3. The Ideas and Thought Behind Cooperatives
Even though the proposal for cooperatives was introduced from the West,
rural cooperation had existed in Siam for a long time. The Ministry of
Commerce and Communications’s book in 1930 described this cooperation:
While the padi is growing it demands no labour, and, until it is reaped, nothing is done 
beyond a little spasmodic bird-scaring by children. With the reaping time, all are busy again. As 
a rule, each man ploughs his own land, but planting and reaping are usually done with the aid 
of his neighbours, the whole village turning out and working together on each owner’s field in 
turn. This labour in common is the occasion for much merry-making, the young men and 
maidens, glad of the chance of meeting, planting and reaping all day amid bouts of repartee 
and bursts of laughter, and finishing up with a hearty feed at the expense of the owner of the 
field, followed by music and other amusements.48
The problem in analysing cooperative thought in Siam is that the official
documents are rather limited. For example, the introduction of the Raiffeisen
48 The Ministry of Commerce and Communications, Siam: Nature and Industry , 
Bangkok, 1930, p.210.
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form of cooperative to Siam was briefly mentioned in an official document, 
but gave little detail on Raiffeisen’s thought and its suitability for the kingdom. 
Books and pamphlets on cooperatives published in the mid-1910’s were 
mainly written to educate farmers in the purposes of cooperatives, only the 
practical benefits of cooperation were discussed. The only insight into the 
thought behind the cooperatives is to be found in the cremation books of 
those who were engaged in the cooperative movement in the 1920’s and the 
1930’s. Therefore, a brief reference to the important figures engaged in the 
cooperative movement is in order.
(1) Rama 7
The King’s speech on cooperatives in 1927 indicates how he saw the 
role of cooperatives. The King met members of the Ban Don Cooperative 
Credit Society as well as delegates from twenty-four other cooperative 
societies in Pitsanulok province during his tour of the North in January 
1927.49 The King was interested in the movement, made a brief speech, and 
also wrote a personal statement on cooperatives. In his speech he stressed 
the benefits of cooperation, These societies are a very important 
development, because they increase the wealth of the people, and apart from 
that they teach the members the value of mutual help. A group co-operating 
in any work can do what the individuals cannot.’50 In a personal note the 
King wrote how he was impressed with the value of the movement:
The visit which I have for the first time paid to-day to this meeting of the Ban Don Co­
operative Society has made me fully realise the value of the Co-operative Movement and its
growth The great educative value of Co-operation lies in the fact that it leads people to
use their minds in common in their work for a living and that it gives an opportunity for the 
development of an un-selfish spirit. Its success will depend on the loyalty of each one of the 
members to his Society. For this reason the Co-operative Movement is one sure means of 
bringing prosperity to Siam, and of improving its economic conditions, by adding to the wealth 
of the members and by promoting cordial friendship in the community. It is certainly one of the
49 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 8 January 1927.
50 ibid.
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most important undertakings that the Government has introduced into Siam.51
(2 ) Krommunphityaiogkon
Krommunphityalongkon was the first Thai to study the principles of 
cooperatives in the world, and a key civil servant in promoting the 
cooperative movement in its early period. In 1914 he was appointed Director- 
General of the Department of Commerce and Statistics in the Ministry of 
Finance. He was known to be the author of the book on cooperatives which 
appeared in 1915, and also wrote several articles. His cremation book 
includes one of his speeches and articles.52
His speech to the members of a credit cooperative society in Lopburi 
province on 10 February 1924 sought to provide some fundamental 
knowledge on cooperatives. First he argued that the purpose of the credit 
cooperative was to clear up old debts at high interest by means of a low 
interest rate loan from the society, and then to use this loan for cultivation. He 
also pointed out that the cooperative was used not only in Siam but in 
other countries. There were four points in his speech. First, that member’s 
participation should be voluntary. Second, there must be no discrimination 
between members whether they were rich or poor, every member had one 
vote. Third, cooperatives work only for themselves, in other words, only the 
members receive benefit from the society. Last, every member should be 
honest.
He argued that there were two purposes of cooperatives - saving and 
self-reliance cooperation. Drinking alcohol, gambling, having high interest 
loans, having to sell rice when the price is low, were seen as examples of
51 Ibid.
52 Phraniphonbangruangkiawkapkansahakon khong Phraratchaworawongthoe  
Krommamunphittyalongkon kap ruang Phittyalongkonmunlanithi, (Writings on some subjects 
about cooperatives by Phraratchaworawongthoe Krommunphittyalongkon and Phityalongkon, 
f o u n d a t i o n ,  civi l  s e r v a n t  on c o o p e r a t i v e s )  k h a r a t c h a k a n s a h a k o n  
phimcaeknainganphraratchathanphloengsop Phraratchaworawongtho Kromunphityalongkon 
Na Phramenluang Wat Thepsirintharawat, 22 March 1949. See part 1.
270
waste. Saving was important to create wealth for the nation. The richness of 
a country depends on the people.
Another article in this cremation book suggests that cooperatives in 
Burma had been the model for Siam.53 The Siamese official in charge of 
cooperatives examined foreign text books, and decided to choose the type of 
cooperative which was most suitable for Siam. Second, although the type of 
cooperative for Siam was based on the Burma model, some improvements 
were included. Third, he blamed the administrators in charge of the 
cooperatives in Burma for the failures which occurred. The Burma 
government appointed high officials to cooperative administration, but they 
were often transferred to another section. In other words, he blamed the 
British administration for not encouraging cooperative experts.
(3) Chaophraya Wongsanupraphat
He was the Minister of Agriculture and then Minister of 
Communications under the absolute monarchy: he was again appointed 
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce after the revolution.54 He was not 
involved in the cooperative movement himself, but his son, Luang 
Detsahakorn (Det Sanitwong) was a key member in the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Commerce after the revolution. His cremation book was 
titled Sahakon and included various articles about cooperatives. 
Chaophraya Wongsanupraphat did not write these articles, but the 
Department of Cooperatives contributed them. Some reviewed the 
development of cooperatives in Siam since 1932, and also outlined the
principles of cooperatives. One article, ‘Lakkanlaekancatsahakon’
53 ibid., ‘Sahagon nai Phama’ {Cooperatives in Burma). There is no note of the date of 
this article.
54 He was born on 21 June 1876, the second son of Prince Sanitwong. His educational 
background involved military study in Denmark: he went to Denmark as a child in 1882 and 
came back to Bangkok in 1893. His'major positions were: Minister of Agriculture from 
December 1909, Minister of Communications, 1912-1926, and Minister of Agriculture and 
Commerce 1932- 1933. He died on 20 October 1940.
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(Principles and establishment of cooperatives) is worth examining * 
Consisting of thirty-four pages, it focused on three points: the principles of 
cooperatives, comparisons between company and cooperative and 
obstacles to cooperatives.
First there are four principles. The first principle is for people to gather 
together, to remove poverty by means of cooperation. In the founding of the 
cooperative movement in Rochdale, England, in 1844, the members worked 
together. Another aim was to prevent farmers losing their lands to their 
creditors - the founding of credit cooperatives by Raiffeisen and Schulze- 
Delitzsch was mentioned. The second principle was equality between 
members. There was to be no discrimination among members in terms of 
wealth, poverty, sex, race, or religion. Equality was seen in the division of 
profits and the right to vote in meetings. The third principle was the 
willingness of people to join cooperatives - whether they would like to join 
willingly or not, whether they understood the purposes of cooperatives or 
not. The last principle was that cooperatives exist for the benefit of members. 
Cooperatives were not a charity organisation, but an organisation for the 
people to gather and help each other. In addition to these principles, the 
honesty of members was important.
The second part focused on the differences between a company and 
a cooperative. Cooperatives give importance to membership while 
companies on investing capital. The profit of a company is divided on the 
basis of the shareholder’s stocks, but the profit of a cooperative is 
determined by the performance of its members. In the case of a cooperative 
shop, the profit is divided among members by the amount of their purchases. 
In a company voting power is decided by the number of stocks, in a
55 Sahakon phim nainganphraratchatthanphloengsop Naiphon-ek Chaophraya  
Wongsanupraphat (M.R. Sathan Sanitwong) (Cooperatives printed on the occasion of the 
funeral of General Chaophraya Wongsanupraphat) Na Susanluang Watthepsirinatharawat, 29 
March 1942, pp.4-37.
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cooperative every member has one vote. The purpose of a company is to 
pursue profit, that of a cooperative is to improve economic conditions, the 
moral code, and welfare of its members.
This article also mentions obstacles to the development of 
cooperatives. Establishing a cooperative requires the full cooperation of the 
people; the expansion of the movement made it difficult to inspect and 
supervise, because of a lack of sufficient staff.
In conclusion, the development of the cooperative movement in the 
1930’s was slow, and only had a limited impact on agriculture, in terms of 
capital provision and membership. Although most of the economic plans 
which were examined in Chapters 3 and 4 made much of the role of co­
operatives, in reality the government made slow progress. Crucial in this 
were the insufficient capital allocations by the government and the lack of 
sufficient staff in the Department of Cooperatives. The need to expand 
financial resources was often stressed by experts and government 
committees. This is a clear example of the point that the government 
responded to the farmers’ hardships in an indifferent way, in spite of 
acknowledging the need for action. Although the number of societies 
increased after 1932, their influence was a mere drop in the ocean. Most of 
the expansion took place with the Phibun government from 1939.
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Table 6-1 Number of Societies and Membership
Year B.E. 1 Numbers Membership* Membership**
2459 (1916/17) ! 1 16 47
2460 (1917/18) ! 12 144: 166
2461 (1918/19) | 1 19' 21
2462 (1919 /20 )! 12 248 253
2463 (1920 /21 )! 34 628 638
2464 (1921/22) j 0 0; 0
2465 (1922/23) ! 0 0 . 0
2466 (1923/24) ! 4 67 82
2467 (1924/25) ; 5 79 84
2468 (1925/26) 1 8 123 123
Total: 78 1, 324 1, 414
N o te .*fig u re o fn ^
** figure of membership at the end of the year.
(Source)[..'Fourth...Reporton the.Co-pperat^  
The Record, I October 192 6 .1
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Table 6-2.....Co-operativesJn.Xhajland_f r o m 925 to 1944
Year Societies at thd New societies 1
B.E. (A.D.) end of the year! during the year! end of the year! during the vear
2468 (1925/26) 77 i 1, 414!
2469 (1926/27) 77) 0! 1, 390: -24
2470 (1927/28) 81! 4!
2471 (1928/29) 91! • 10; 1, 629!
2472 (1929/30) ! 128! 37!
2473 (1930/31) ! 128! 0! 2, 221!
2474 (1931/32) j 150! 22! 2, 498!
2475 (1932/33) 1 183! 33!
2476 (1933/34) ! 326! 143! 4, 846!
2477 (1934/35 ) i 439! 113!
2478 (1935/36) ! 562! 123! 8, 013!
2479 (1936/37) ! 770! 208!
2480 (1937/38 ) i 921! 151;
2481 (1938/39) 1 1, 240! 319! 20, 637!
2482 (1939 /40 )* 1, 797! 557! 36, 465!
2483 (1940 /41 )* 2, 263! 466!
2484 (1941/42) I 2, 998! 735! 73, 817!
2485 (1942/43) 1 3, 532! 534!
2486 (1943/44) ! 4, 205! 673! 105, 758!
2487 (1944/45) i 4, 747 ! 542! 115, 435!
* ...Coppe_ratlve ...CreditJ>°cieti^ and
Tand..Improvement Societies.
■{Source)_Phanit Ruamsil, 'Nayobai kanphatthana Setthaklt samai comphon Por
.Phibunsongkhram.tangte_ph._s...2481-2487'_.(The Econqmic.D^
of the. Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkhram AdministrationT 1938-1944), MA thesis,
Department ...of ..Hjstory, Chulalqngkor^ p. 293. |
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7Proposals for a Central Bank
7.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the various plans for a central 
bank or a national bank after 1932, and explore the relationship between 
these plans and the establishment of the Bank of Thailand in 1942. Plans for 
a national bank had been considered before 1932, in order to provide 
agricultural credit or relieve the farmer’s indebtedness. Some of these plans 
were briefly mentioned in the previous chapter. The main aims of the plans 
after 1932 were: to counter the effects of the world depression, to reduce 
the farmer’s debt, or to promote nationalism.
This chapter consists of a brief introduction, Kimpong Thongthat’s plan 
for a national bank in 1935, James Baxter's, the Financial Adviser’s, 
comments on a central bank in 1933-34, Phraya Suriyanuwat’s plan for a 
national bank in 1933, the establishment of the Thai National Banking 
Bureau in 1939 and the establishment of the Bank of Thailand in 1942.
The main arguments in this chapter are as follows - What were the 
main reasons to submit plans for a central bank? Were they political or 
economic? Sometimes a plan might originate from a political context or a 
political conflict. What is the relationship between the plans before 1932 and 
those after 1932? Did the constitutional revolution have an impact on the 
post-1932 plans? Did the effects of the world depression encourage the 
plans? What was the attitude of the Financial Adviser on this issue? From the 
PRO documents it is clear that the attitude of the Financial Adviser changed
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during the 1930’s. Why and how did these changes occur? Why was the Thai 
National Banking Bureau established in 1939? At that time Pridi was the 
Minister of Finance, and this had been a theme in his economic plan in 
1933. Pridi was the key person in the establishment of the Thai National 
Banking Bureau. Another context should be considered: economic 
nationalism, Chatniyom, from the Phibun government in 1938. The 
establishment of the Thai Central Bank in 1942 was influenced by the 
relationship between Japan and Thailand, it was the result of a political 
issue.
Siam was on the silver standard until 1902.1 Until 1902, three foreign 
banks issued their own paper money, although the circulation was small and 
limited to the Bangkok area.2 In 1902 a Department of Paper Currency was 
set up to issue a paper currency. The adoption of the silver standard caused 
instability in the foreign exchange. The fall of silver in terms of gold in the last 
few decades of the nineteenth century caused a fall in the exchange value of 
the baht against sterling. The baht fell from 8 baht per pound around 1871 to 
21 baht per pound in 1902.3 This depreciation of the baht against sterling 
disadvantaged Siam in imports from England, such as railway materials, 
and reduced the prospects of borrowing from abroad. At the same time the 
depreciation of the baht against the pound did not encourage exports 
because all that time Siam exported mainly to silver standard countries. 
Between 1902 and 1908 the baht was tied to the gold standard. However the 
gold standard did not always bring stability to the Siamese currency, 
because silver coins represented a large part of the money supply.
Had it been possible to convert the money in circulation into a truly token money when
1 See details in T he  Currency History of Siam (1902-23)’, The Record, No.10, October 
1923, and No.11, January 1924.
2 They were: Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the Chartered Bank, and Bank de r 
Indochine.
3 T he  Currency History of Siam (1902-23)’, The Record , No. 10, October 1923, No.11, 
January 1924, p.4.
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the gold-exchange standard was adopted, Thailand would have avoided much future trouble. 
This could have been done either by reducing the weight and finesse of the baht, or by 
replacing coins with paper money. The first alternative was rejected because the government 
feared that such a move would seriously undermine public confidence in the money. Silver 
coins could not be replaced by paper money for the same reason. The circulation of paper 
money increased rapidly after its introduction in 1902, but it was fully convertible and was 
backed by a strong currency reserve of silver and foreign exchange. Silver coins continued to 
comprise the bulk of the money in circulation.4
Another crisis occurred at the end of the First World War, with a
sudden rise in the price of silver. This was caused by an enormous demand
for silver in India.
The major part of the money supply was still made up of silver coins. In 1919 it was 
estimated that 103 million Baht of silver coins were in circulation. There was a real danger that 
silver coins would be melted down and exported as bullion as the world price of silver was high 
- in spite of the ban on the export of this metal from the country. The Thai Government 
consequently tried to combat this danger by appreciating the exchange of the Baht. In 
September 1919, the Government raised the exchange rate from 13 Baht to one pound 
sterling to 12 Baht to one pound sterling. The rate was raised several times until November
1919 when the rate was fixed at 9.54 Baht to one pound sterling.5
The money mechanism in Siam during the 1920’s and the 1930’s can 
be said to have been quite simple - it depended on the flow of trade and 
capital.
Basically, the mechanism was an automatic one, driven by the flow of trade, and 
"managed” only in the sense that certain rules were fixed by the government. Once the 
exchange rate was set, the government stood ready to buy and sell at that rate, but no other 
control was exercised. The government’s role was a passive one, and the supply of money 
adjusted itself according to the flow of trade and finance. When the export trade was booming, 
the internal circulation of money tended to increase because more foreign exchange was 
earned than was required to pay for imports and remittances. The excess was sold to the 
Treasury in exchange for baht, which increased the internal circulation. When the export trade 
was slack for any reason, the reserve process was set in motion and the supply of money 
decreased. ’Normally’, the supply of foreign exchange at the stabilised rate slightly exceeded 
the amount demanded, and the Treasury purchased the excess with new issues of currency.
4 James C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand 1850-1970, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1971, pp.153-4. Ian Brown, Siam and the Gold Standard, 1902-1908, 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 10, no.2 (September), pp.381-99.
5 Paul Sithi-Amnuai, (ed), Finance and Banking in Thailand A Study of the Commercial 
System, 1888-1963 , Bangkok: Thai Watana Panich, 1964, p.25.
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The increased note circulation was fully covered by the foreign exchange acquired 6
A brief description of the banking system before 1932 is necessary in
order to explain why plans for a central bank appeared after 1932. In the 
late nineteenth century, modern banking was mainly carried out by foreign 
banks. They were the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. (1888), the 
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China (1894), and Banque de 
L’lndochine (1897). The first two banks were British and the last was French. 
Their business was confined to financing the export and import trade. Even 
though small Chinese exchange houses, ‘Puay Kuan’, existed, their role 
was limited to carrying out remittances to China.7 It is important to note that 
at that time the western banks worked mainly with European trading houses 
and some influential Chinese-Siamese merchants. The Siamese people 
were not familiar with the Western banks, and the banks did not offer deposit 
or loan services to the Siamese. In the early twentieth century, several 
Siamese and Chinese banks were established. Among them, the Siam 
Commercial Bank was the most important. Its establishment was supported 
by the government, which provided capital. It broke the European monopoly 
of the exchange business, it had support and help from foreign banks, first 
German, later British, and the government assisted it through various crises, 
particularly the fall of the Chino-Siam Bank in 1913. Prince Mahit, the 
Minister of Finance from August 1896, was the key person in promoting the 
‘Book Club’ in 1904, which became the Siam Commercial Bank in 1906.8 
Government participation was carried out through the Privy Purse Bureau 
(Phra Khlang Khang-thi), it provided 300,000 baht, or 10% of the registered
6 James C. Ingram, op.cit., pp.159-160.
7 See the role of ‘Puay Kuan* in Paul Sithi-Amnuai, (ed), Finance and Banking in 
Thailand A Study of the Commercial System, 1888-1963 , Bangkok: Thai Watana Panich, 
1964, p.36.
8 See the role of Prince Mahit in the ‘Book Club' and the Siam Commercial Bank, in Ian 
Brown, The Elite and the Economy in Siam c.1890-1920 , Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, 1988, pp. 125-135.
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capital.®
The management of the Siam Commercial Bank was carried out by 
foreigners and by Thais. Three of the seven directors were foreigners, and 
one of them, F. Killian of the Deutsch-Asiatishe Bank, played an important 
role as manager of the foreign department. Even though the share capital of 
the foreign banks, the Deutsch-Asiatishe Bank (Germany) and the Danske 
Landmannsbank (Danish) was less than 20 % of the total, European 
directors, German and Danish, dominated the foreign department, in terms 
of management and their skill in the foreign exchange business. It is 
important to note that British banks and British managers were not invited to 
join the Siam Commercial Bank, because of the dominance of British 
commercial banks in Siam. In general, the management of the Siam 
Commercial Bank was divided between a Thai manager in the domestic 
department and a foreign manager in the foreign department. Although the 
foreign department made profits from exchange business, the domestic loan 
business caused losses through mismanagement by the local manager, 
who offered major loans and overdrafts on insufficient security. This 
mismanagement became clear when Joo Seng Heng (Chalong Naiyanat), 
the owner of the Joo Seng Heng Bank (later the Chino-Siam Bank) was 
appointed local manager of the Siam Commercial Bank in 1910. In order to 
protect his business, Joo Seng Heng mismanaged the Siam Commercial 
Bank to the point of collapse when his Chino-Siam Bank went into 
bankruptcy in 1913.10 The collapse of the Chino-Siam Bank had a great
9 On 25 January 1908 Baeng Sayam Kammachon Chamkat, the Siam Commercial Bank, 
was established with 3 million baht capital. Of the 3,000 shares (each 1,000 baht), the big 
shareholders were Prince Mahit (503), Phra Sapphakanhirankit (340) shares, Deutsch- 
Asiatishe Bank (330), Kim Seng Lee (300), and the Danske Landmannsbank 240. Punee 
Bualek, Wikkro Naithun Thanakhanphanit khong Thai Pho.So.2475-2516  ( A study of Thai
. Commercial Bank capitalists 1932-1973) , Chuialongkorn University, 1986, p.9.
10 Ian Brown, The Elite and the Economy in Siam c.1890-1920  , Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1988, pp. 135-144. The relationship between the Siam Commercial Bank and 
the Chino-Siam Bank, and Joo Seng Heng’s involvement in both are fully described.
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impact on business in Bangkok, and led to the collapse of the biggest rice 
mill, the Siam Rice Milling Company. The total losses of the Siam 
Commercial Bank were so huge that most of its capital issue (3 million baht) 
was wiped out.
Initially, these (losses) had been placed at around 2 million baht, but a detailed 
examination of the bank’s accounts undertaken by a European official from the Ministry of 
Finance revealed that the Siam Commercial had lost no less than 5,747,000 baht.11 
in the end, the government decided to reconstruct the Siam Commercial
Bank through a new 3 million baht share issue. The Privy Purse invested
1,634,000 baht in the issue in order to maintain its position as a major
shareholder. This government support was crucial because it showed the
government’s willingness to intervene directly to promote an indigenous
bank. There were several reasons for it to support the bank. First, the bank
had been strongly supported by the government from the beginning.
Second, the bank was the only Siamese bank which conducted loan and
foreign exchange business on a large scale. Third, in order to maintain a
Siamese interest in foreign exchange and lending activity, the bank was
essential - otherwise European banks would dominate Siamese banking
again.
Foreign Office documents show the thinking in Siam on national 
banking in the early 1930’s. For example, one document shows young 
members of the Economic Council eager to set up a central bank but foreign 
advisers were doubtful.
Mr. Baxter is, I gather, experiencing some difficulties from the younger members of the 
Economic Council. They still hanker after devaluation and are toying with the idea of a central 
Bank, while some are much struck by some theories of Mr. J.M. Keynes and are agitating for a 
managed currency. All are quite oblivious of the facts that nobody in Siam has the slightest 
idea of how to institute a central bank or to manage a currency, even if the exports and imports 
of Siam were such as to make a managed currency theoretically possible. Mr. Baxter has drawn 
up a plain-spoken memorandum (which he showed me) on the former subject wherein he has 
not minced matters. He has pointed out that foreign experts would be essential to the
Ti Ian Brown, op.cit., p.142.
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establishment of a central bank 12
Another Foreign Office document, written by Baxter, the Financial
Adviser, explained his difference of opinion over a central bank with the 
Siamese officials. Baxter was strongly against the idea for several reasons:
Two days ago the Minister of Economics told me that there is a strong pressure in 
favour of establishing a Central Bank to which the Currency would be handed over. It was 
obvious that he did not think that this pressure could be resisted. I don't think Siam is yet ready 
for a Central Bank but should be very much concerned if the kind of Central bank which is 
being advocated had any of the orthodox characteristics of its fellows elsewhere. It does not 
aim at blocking but clearing the way to inflation. Here are two of the canons of its most 
prominent exponent, a) “If the Bank has a reserve consisting of gold or the medium of 
exchange of a gold standard country to an amount of Ticals 1 million, it then has the right to 
issue Ticals 2 million of notes." The additional million, be it observed, is not to be covered by 
anything else, b) “Notes up to 40% of the total issue are to be issued against mortgages on 
land" the land to be valued on the somewhat mystical conception of ‘"productive value". It is 
made quite clear that “productive value" is not “market value" but something much higher. It is 
difficult to make out what. It would seem to be the value when rice is about double its present 
price. You may find it hard to believe that I haven’t invented (a) and (b) above, or that anybody 
can take the proposal seriously. They are cold fact and do not strike even Siamese ministers as 
in any way foolish. We live on this finance plain in Siam.13
The origin of Baxter’s hostility might reflect his wish to defend British 
banking interests, fear of the insecurity of the Thai financial system, and fear 
of financial unorthodoxy which would lead to inflation.
7.2. Kimpong Thongthat’s plan In 1935
Kimpong’s plan for a national bank can be seen in National Archives 
documents.14 There are two documents. The first, a memorandum, is on how 
to deal with domestic economic problems, the second, an answer to four
12 Bailey to FO No. 151, 14 September 1933, F6762/380/40, F0371/17177, PRO.
13 J, Baxter to Siepmann, 17 November 1933, enclosed in Dormer to Orde, 20 
November 1933, F7580/380/40, F0371/17177, PRO.
14 (2) S.R.0201.50.2/3.N.A.
282
points about the establishment of a national bank, made to the committee of 
the Economic Council in the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Kimpong’s plan raised basic questions as to why Siam had difficulty 
in establishing a national bank but his arguments were not always logical.
Although little is known about his life and business, it is a fact that he 
played an important role in expressing his ideas on a national bank as a 
member of the Economic Council. His business involved trading, importing, 
groceries, rice exporting, mining and saw milling. According to Suehiro’s 
survey of registered limited companies in Bangkok, 1912-1933, Kimpong 
owned twelve companies out of a total of 164. They were four mining 
companies, three trading, two importing, one saw milling, one rice exporting 
and one grocery company.15 He was a Chinese merchant, but his life was 
little known beyond this.
Before explaining his analysis and reasoning, which is rather 
muddled, the gist of the two documents will be briefly described. Before 
submitting this memorandum, Kimpong sent a letter to the Minister of 
Economic Affairs, on 12 December 1934.16 In this letter, he pointed out the 
importance of customs duty, that is protection, as a basic industrial policy. 
He recommended a law to restrict some imports, in the way other countries 
used quotas. Although he admitted that this would undermine the 
development of the world economy, he pointed out that Siam was a small 
state. He also noted that England changed from free trade to protection in 
order to cope with the world economic crisis. Kimpong believed in free trade 
in principle, but he was concerned to show how Siam could deal with the 
economic crisis. Following this introduction, there were five pages concerned 
with the domestic economy.
15 Akira Suehiro, T h e  Rise of “Thai" Capitalist Groups During the Inter-War Period’, 
unpublished paper for the Thai Studies Conference-SOAS, London, 1993. See the list of 
registered limited companies in Bangkok, 1912-1933.
16 (2) S.R.0201.50.2/3.N.A. Kimpong Thongthat to the Minister of Economic Affairs, 12
December 1934.
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In this memorandum, Kimpong advocated establishing a national 
bank. However, he did not include a detailed plan of a national bank. He 
pointed out the serious effect of the world depression on Siam, and 
mentioned the little interest shown by the Siamese about capital resources. 
He emphasised that the shortage of capital was a vital problem for Siam.
He believed that solving this financial problem would settle other 
problems. In order to solve it, the stabilisation of the monetary system was 
vital. Some countries used devaluation to cope with domestic economic 
problems, but this would not be possible in Siam, he suggested, because 
Siam lacked financial organisation. Therefore the establishment of a central 
bank and an agricultural bank would be necessary in order to protect Siam’s 
finances when the international exchange deteriorated.
Another of his points was that the Siamese capital structure had 
deteriorated. Siamese export markets had changed, as China had 
established a customs tariff against Siamese products and as Japan became 
a rice exporter. Kimpong pointed out that Siam did not have any influence on 
the world market. In order to deal with this situation, he suggested 
cooperation between three organisations - a central bank, an agricultural 
bank and co-operatives. A national bank would support an agricultural 
bank, which in turn would assist co-operatives. Another issue was how to 
cope with fluctuations in the foreign exchange. Kimpong suggested 
establishing a special committee for foreign exchange if the government 
found difficulty in setting up a national bank. Having such a committee would 
embarrass foreigners in Siam, and it might have less ability than a national 
bank, but it would be better than nothing. Once a central bank was 
established, there would be an opportunity to set up an agricultural bank, a 
commercial bank and an industrial bank. From there, organizations such as 
insurance companies and building societies would be developed.
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In practical terms, Kimpong suggested a cooperation between an 
agricultural bank and a federation of cooperative societies. Giving as 
examples Hotokusha in Japan, and the principles of Federick William 
Raiffeisen in Germany, Kimpong advocated cooperatives.17 He particularly 
stressed the importance of education, for diligence and saving, in 
cooperatives. He also noted the introduction of new crops, developing new 
export products, stopping food imports, and establishing commercial 
organizations.10 if the cost of transportation by railway could be reduced, he 
said trade would expand.
The second part of Kimpong’s proposal, consisting of ten pages, was 
written on 1 May 1935. The proposal was an opinion on four problems about 
establishing a national bank, placed before the Economic Council in the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. The argument expanded on the following four 
questions. Is it impossible to set up a national bank because of a shortage of 
men of talent? Is it unnecessary to have a national bank because Siam is an 
agricultural country? Siam should not have a national bank because when it 
is established it cannot be a central bank because of the lack of commercial 
banks. Siam should not have a central bank now, it should wait for other 
types of banks to be established before setting up a national bank. These 
four points had been raised by the Economic Council.
In his introduction Kimpong maintained that there were two problems; 
an economic problem and an international political problem - the unequal 
treaties. He did not explain the second problem. For the economic problem, 
he stressed the influence of war, using the cases of Germany and Japan. He 
paid more attention to Japan. Although Japan was recognised as the most 
powerful country in the East, she had experienced difficulties. Kimpong gave
as an example the crisis of 1923, caused by earthquake, flood and fire. As a
17 Kimpong quoted Yoshida's book, a peasant sage ot Japan, and Cahill’s enquiry into 
agricultural credit and agricultural cooperation in Germany.
18 For example, Siam imported millions of baht of food.
285
result of this crisis, Japan had lost about one-eighth of its wealth. Seventy-six 
banks had gone bankrupt, he suggested, and there had been a severe 
financial crisis. The Bank of Japan had only sixty million yen: she provided 
nine hundred and fiftynine million yen by issuing paper money. Thus the 
financial crisis was prevented by the Bank of Japan.
Following this introduction, Kimpong noted the lack of men of ability. 
He considered this the final problem, in other words, once the other three 
problems had been sorted out, this would solve itself. The important point 
was that the nation was suffering from economic depression and was waiting 
for government help. Kimpong believed that the immediate setting up of a 
national bank would help the economy. He pointed out the main functions of 
a national bank - credit sponsor, credit organiser, national credit regulator 
and a lender of last resort. To the problem of a lack of men of talent, Kimpong 
stressed that hiring foreign experts would be useless in both economic and 
political terms, therefore hiring should be limited to two persons of different 
nationalities for three years. After that Siamese would replace foreigners.
In recruiting men of talent, Kimpong suggested three sources; M.P.s, 
civil servants and Siamese merchants. All candidates would be required to 
be patriotic, honest, diligent, have a keen sense of responsibility, decisive, 
patient, have good intelligence and know foreign books. Kimpong stressed 
that Siam had no problem in looking for men of talent. He was convinced that 
Siam after the 1932 revolution had capable men.
For the second problem, whether a national bank was necessary for 
Siam because it was an agricultural country, Kimpong replied with several 
case studies. He emphasised that this was not a period of laissez faire and 
freedom of trade, but a time of economic war. Kimpong thought that Siam 
was not disadvantaged by being an agricultural country. He gave examples 
of agricultural countries in Europe, such as Yugoslavia, Rumania, Denmark
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and Sweden, which had national banks. Comparing land area, population 
and agricultural population, he pointed out the benefits of a national bank in 
an agricultural country, in terms of creating credit and offering loans to 
farmers. He mentioned the case of Denmark, which depended on dairy 
farming, exporting butter and salt meat, and with a population of just 3.5 
million could expand its business in Siam, through the East Asiatic 
Company. In addition, a marine state like Sweden could achieve 
development with a central bank. Kimpong’s main point was that a central 
bank was necessary, regardless of the type of country, whether an 
agricultural or marine state.
On the other hand, neighbouring countries such as India, Java and 
Vietnam did not have a national financial institution. This was explained by 
colonial rule and unequal trade treaties. He compared France as ruler, with 
Vietnam as the colony, in terms of financial organisation. There was a huge 
gap between an advanced financial state like France and an 
underdeveloped one like Vietnam, lacking financial organisation.19 His point 
was that it was necessary to have a national financial institution if the state 
wanted to protect its independence.
The third question was dealt with quite briefly because there was no 
principle in this matter. A national bank in the early years was not necessarily 
a centre of banks - therefore Siam could set up a national bank first which 
would then develop as a centre of banks. Kimpong summarised this point; 
setting up a national bank should be carried out soon, even though the 
functions of a national bank were not yet fully prepared and defined.
The fourth problem was whether setting up a national bank should
wait until there were enough other banks. First Kimpong mentioned invisible
imports and invisible exports. According to him, invisible exports meant
19 He referred to Sir Robert Cahill C.M.G., The economic condition in France dated June 
1934, for conditions in Vietnam.
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Siamese working in foreign countries sending remittances back to Siam. 
Siam had no invisible exports, and only a few factories, like saw mills, rice 
mills and ice making factories. He raised the question: how many Siamese 
were engaged in commerce and manufacturing? Farmers accounted for 
eighty percent of the labour force. The fourth problem concerned countries 
that had overseas workers or many merchants. For example, Yugoslavs in 
America sent not less than one million gold dollars per year to their 
homeland, thus making it an important export income. This encouraged 
exchange and consumption in their homeland, so that other banks were 
established prior to a national bank. In Siam, people depended on the 3 
British banks in spite of the presence of the one Siamese bank. He had the 
impression that if Siam adopted a policy of setting up a central bank only 
after the creation of other banks there would be a long wait.
In the end, Kimpong asked the government to prepare a Bank Law, 
setting up exclusive rights for a national bank, a Charter Act for the National 
Bank and Articles of Association for the National Bank.
These two documents were related. Points in the first document are 
explained in the second. There are several issues to be discussed here. First, 
although Kimpong expressed his strong wish to set up a national bank, he 
did not include a detailed plan of a national bank. It seems that Kimpong 
simply suggested the idea, and then the practical responsibility was left to 
the Economic Council. It is a mystery why he did not submit a detailed plan 
after preaching the necessity for a national bank. This is in contrast to 
Phraya Suriyanuwat’s plan, because Phraya Suriyanuwat submitted a 
detailed plan with little explanation why a national bank was necessary.
Second, Kimpong’s explanation and argument were often so confused 
that they are difficult to follow. For example, he stressed that without a
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national bank it would be difficult to stabilise the exchange rate. However this 
argument does not make sense, because at that time the Ministry of Finance 
carried out that function.
Another example is in his use of the term 'financial institutions’: the 
meaning of this term was vague, it indicated not only a national bank but an 
agricultural bank, or a commercial bank, at different times. More important, 
Kimpong discussed his plan for a national bank with that for an agricultural 
bank and co-operatives: his argument sometimes led to emphasis on an 
agricultural bank rather than a national bank.
His proposal was considered important in spite of the lack of detail. 
Several discussions were held in the Cabinet and in the Ministries of 
Finance and Economic Affairs. This is evidence that at least two people, 
Kimpong and Phraya Suriyanuwat, were aware of the critical financial 
condition of Siam and made an effort to suggest solutions. Financial policy, 
especially exchange policy, was a hot issue both before and after the 
constitutional revolution of 1932. For example, when Britain went off the gold 
standard in 1931 there was much discussion within the government. 
However this did not develop into a proposal to establishment a central 
bank, rather to keep the separate financial functions in different ministries 
(this argument was discussed in Chapter 4). On the other hand, the 
discussions after 1932 indicated that the proposals to establish a central 
bank were not based on an analysis of the political and economic conditions 
of Siam but on the passion of nationalism. In this context, Kimpong’s 
proposal came from a greater appreciation of the real problems facing 
Siam.
Fourth, Kimpong has been historically neglected, and even his 
business interests have not been fully studied because of limited sources. 
However his arguments for a national bank were not always fully logical, as
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shown above. According to his documents in the National Archives, 
Kimpong seems to be intelligent because he was familiar with the history of 
world finance, quoting from various English books. Moreover as a 
businessman, how could he not acquire a wide knowledge about finance? 
Phraya Suriyanuwat had the impression that Kimpong had absorbed a wide 
knowledge about finance from reading many books. However Phraya 
Suriyanuwat’s judgment of Kimpong might be too kind. It is a fact that he 
used many quotations from western textbooks, but his arguments lacked 
precision. For example, he noted the importance of a national bank’s 
independence from political interference. Yet in the Siam of the early 1930’s 
there was doubt whether such a powerful national bank was really 
necessary. Kimpong missed this vital point.
Fifth, Kimpong raised some interesting themes: devaluation, the 
importance of economic independence, economic nationalism, a national 
bank free of politics. He expressed strongly nationalistic ideas on trade and 
commerce in spite of being Chinese in origin. He might be considered a 
Sino-Siamese with a Thai heart, like Mangkorn Samsen. His ideas on 
protection were quite reasonable, because he explained that a small country 
like Siam had no other way to protect her interests. Although he did not deny 
the value of employing foreign experts, he clearly aimed to foster Siamese 
experts as soon as possible, giving foreigners only short contracts. In the 
documents Kimpong did not mention the foreign Financial Adviser, James 
Baxter, nor did he try to attack him, a strong enemy of his proposal. Perhaps 
Kimpong thought to persuade the other members of the Economic Council on 
the merits of his proposal, rather than cause problems by referring to a 
foreign adviser. Lastly, his argument on the exchange rate was important 
because it was raised by a real merchant. Yet he did not expand his 
argument - for example, by calling for a devaluation of the currency. His
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aim was to protect the exchange, by establishing a national bank. It might be 
imagined that his export and import business was affected by the unstable 
exchange: he was sure that stability of the exchange was vital for the 
development of the economy.
Phraya Suriyanuwat’s memorandum on Kimpong's proposal 
appeared after Kimpong submitted his plan.20 This memorandum is 
important because it provides an understanding of the impact of Kimpong’s 
plan on the Siamese government and the background to its discussions. It 
also makes it clear that a high ranking officer like Phraya Suriyanuwat was 
impressed by Kimpong’s proposal.
Phraya Suriyanuwat confessed that he did not know Kimpong 
personally, but was quite sure that he was Chinese, because of his name, 
and thought that he was a real Siamese patriot.21 He suggested that 
Kimpong had gained a wide knowledge about finance from reading, and 
emphasised that Kimpong was interested in the development of the Siamese 
economy in spite of being Chinese. Phraya Suriyanuwat had the impression 
that it was better to consult Sino-Chinese than some foreigners, who were 
inclined to pursue their own interests separate from those of the Thai. In the 
cabinet meeting, the Minister of Agriculture supported the idea of establishing 
a national bank as soon as possible, and expressed fear of the Siamese 
economy falling into the hands of a few people or being at the mercy of 
foreigners. This would cause danger. The wish of the Minister of Economic 
Affairs to invite Kimpong to the cabinet meeting as an expert, because the 
government lacked an expert on this subject, was criticised by Phraya
20 The date of this memorandum was not given. However, the report of the cabinet 
meeting is 14 June 1935, and the other letter from the secretary-general to the Minister of 
Economic Affairs is 15 June 1935. Both were mentioned in Phraya Suriyanuwat’s 
memorandum.
21 Phraya Suriyanuwat mentioned that Kimpong’s Chinese family name was Segim.
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Suriyanuwat. He felt it a pity that the Minister had used the lack of an expert 
as an obstacle to the establishment of a national bank. Phraya Suriyanuwat 
noted that the Economic Council was negative, he also raised a fear of the 
influence of the Ministry of Finance on the Economic Council. He particularly 
mentioned Baxter, the Financial Adviser, as an expert on finance. The 
Ministry of Finance and Baxter had been against the proposal for a national 
bank for a long time.
Phraya Suriyanuwat then considered the same four problems which 
had been discussed by Kimpong. Regarding the alleged lack of men of 
talent, he held the same view as Kimpong. Phraya Suriyanuwat thought that 
Siam had enough money to hire foreign experts for short periods, such as 
two or three years, for them to teach the Siamese. An interesting point made 
by Phraya Suriyanuwat was that the salary of experts should not be lower 
than that of the Financial Adviser. This suggests that he thought much of 
experts, because at that time, the Siamese government paid the highest 
salary to^  its Financial Adviser. Concerning hiring experts, Phraya 
Suriyanuwat suggested several sources, such as the Bank for International 
Settlements in Switzerland, Sweden, and the League of Nations. He 
considered it important to hire experts from a neutral country or from an 
international organisation, because there was nothing there to interfere with 
Siamese interests.
He was also convinced that foreign capital was necessary for Siamese 
economic development. He suggested that foreigners could participate by 
purchasing shares in a national bank, provided that the government held 
more than fifty percent. Phraya Suriyanuwat emphasised the relationship 
between Siam and foreigners. He was sure that the economic development 
of Siam would need foreign capital, because Siam lacked local capital.
The second problem, of Siam being merely an agricultural country,
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was dismissed by Phraya Suriyanuwat - establishing a national bank was of 
benefit to all nations, not only agriculture and industry but all small interests 
needed loans. The proposed national bank should help such people rather 
than big companies. A principle of the proposed bank would be to make an 
effort to secure quick repayment of debt.
Phraya Suriyanuwat examined the case of Yugoslavia, an agricultural 
country with a national bank. He analysed the case of the Credit Anstalt of 
Vienna. Misconduct by the manager threatened bankruptcy, and this 
caused concern in England and America. A bank collapse would have 
serious effects across Europe and America. Consequently rescue 
measures, such as debt deferment, were introduced. In the world recession, 
capitalists were not confident, so that loan periods became short, one week 
or one month. The panic spread rapidly to Germany, which had insufficient 
resources to repay debts to the U.S.A. and France. Hoover, the US 
President, fearing that depositors would withdraw from the German central 
bank, decided to halt German repayments for up to one year. Phraya 
Suriyanuwat argued that these lessons should apply to the Siam 
Commercial Bank.
The third problem, that the bank would not be a centre of banks, was 
dismissed with the argument that members of the Economic Council did not 
definitely wish the government to establish a national bank. As to the fourth 
problem - was there a need to wait until there were more commercial banks? 
Phraya Suriyanuwat noted that there were several foreign and Chinese 
banks in Siam, but the only Siamese bank was the Siam Commercial Bank. 
He cynically commented that the latter aimed to assist mostly foreigners, 
and Siamese received little help.
In conclusion, Phraya Suriyanuwat supported Kimpong’s plan and 
implored the cabinet to prepare a draft law for the House of Representatives.
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The last part of this section explores how the government responded 
to Kimpong’s plan and what discussions took place. A letter from the Minister 
of Economic Affairs to the Prime Minister on 14 May 1935 shows the 
Ministry’s views on Kimpong’s plan. It contained four important points. First, 
although the Ministry realised the necessity for a bank or credit institution in 
order to secure the financial needs of the nation, it did not wish to issue 
more bank notes, as this would reduce the value of the Siamese currency. 
Therefore the Ministry asked the Economic Council to consider this matter. 
Second, the Economic Council, on examining the proposal, argued that 
establishing a national bank would be necessary one day. Third, the 
Ministry thought that setting up a financial organisation was very urgent. This 
should be considered by experts, by hiring foreigners, or asking help from 
the League of Nations. However, it was first necessary to establish a 
committee consisting of financial experts, in order to report on present 
conditions, ways to improve, and on the establishment of a financial 
organisation. Lastly, the Ministry wanted the cabinet to accept the proposal in 
principle and set up a committee. If the cabinet was ready to discuss this 
issue, the Minister would ask permission to invite Kimpong to explain. In 
this letter, the term ‘financial organisation’ was used several times but 
whether this indicated a national bank or a central bank is not clear.
A letter from the Secretary-General to the Minister of Economic Affairs 
on 15 June 1935 indicated that although the cabinet examined Kimpong's 
plan on 12 June, the Ministry of Economic Affairs did not agree to a careful 
examination because the Economic Council did not agree with Kimpong’s 
proposals. Therefore the Secretary-General asked the Economic Council to 
examine the matter again.
At the meeting of the Economic Council held on 3 July 1935, critical
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views about Kimpong’s plan were voiced. Among the seven members 
attending, Mom Chao Sakonwannakon Worawan and Phraya 
Chaiyodsombat expressed the view that the time was not ripe for setting up a 
central bank or a national bank. They thought that the only function of a 
central bank was as a centre of banks. If it aimed to offer direct loans to the 
people, the Siam Commercial Bank already carried out this function. They 
thought much of the role of co-operatives in the development of Siam, and 
raised doubts whether issuing bank notes by a central bank or a national 
bank would increase credit. For example, Germany issued many bank notes 
in spite of having little gold; consequently the value of the mark fell sharply. 
They also mentioned the possibility of setting up a committee separate from 
the Ministry of Finance in order to protect finance from politics. In spite of 
these views, they again argued against the establishment of a committee, 
because of the alleged lack of men of talent; hiring foreigners should not be 
allowed; and they doubted whether this committee would give better results 
than the present government control. Kimpong made objections to these 
views: there would be no financial organisation without a central bank, which 
would control currency and credit; other banks would depend on a central 
bank.
This meeting concluded that it was not necessary to set up a central 
bank; hiring a financial expert to consider the matter was supported; and it 
was necessary to set up an agricultural bank first. The President of the 
Economic Council argued that the establishment of a central bank would be 
necessary in the future, but a lack of experts would make it necessary to hire 
experts. He said that the government should employ a nationality which 
would be useful to Siam.
There was also a meeting of the Economic Council soon after 
Kimpong submitted a letter to the Minister of Economic Affairs on 12
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December 1934. This meeting of the Economic Council, on 20 December 
1934, gave a clear picture about what to do and what not to do. First of all, 
the Economic Council considered it suitable for Phraya Chaiyotsombat to 
make notes on the establishment of a central bank and an agricultural bank. 
Second, it would be necessary to establish a central bank or a national bank 
some day. However, the immediate need was to support agriculture, 
because it lacked capital, was severely affected by the economic crisis, and 
was the backbone of the country.
There were four things to do: to control the exchange, increase credit 
for business, offer finance for commerce, and assist agriculture through an 
agricultural bank. A central bank could not assist agriculture directly. 
Having an agricultural population of four million and lacking capital, the 
government made loans to agriculture of only two hundred thousand baht per 
year.
In contrast, there were five things not to do (or rather there was no 
need for a central bank to carry them out). The first concerned the duties of 
a central bank. It had six functions: to issue bank notes and control currency, 
to receive deposits from the domestic banks, to hold government reserves, 
to be the agent for finance between the government and foreign countries, to 
manage credit by meeting the demands of the market through controlling the 
reserves of the commercial banks and to look for credit for the country in an 
emergency. The first function, of issuing bank notes and controlling the 
currency, was already carried out by the Ministry of Finance, with the trust of 
Thais and foreigners. Second, it was necessary to assist agriculture, which 
had total debts of seventy million baht in the central part of Siam. In order to 
deal with this problem, the Department of Co-operatives needed to expand 
over a period of twelve to fourteen years, which would need an expenditure 
of four million baht per year, whfch at present was not available. Therefore it
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was not necessary to set up a central bank. The third point was that a central 
bank would require commercial banks. How could it be a central bank if 
there were no other banks? If the central bank was the only bank, it would be 
a risk for the country. Fourth, in the establishment of an agricultural bank or a 
central bank, Siam was still not aware of the problems which needed to be 
solved. In hiring experts, they should have the data beforehand. Lastly, how 
would a central bank acquire capital? It was impossible to issue bank notes 
without reserves.
In conclusion, much of Kimpong’s analysis and reasoning is rather 
muddled. The particular functions of a national bank were never adequately 
defined. In fact he frequently appears to be talking about an agricultural 
bank. But, on the other hand, he did raise some interesting themes: the 
advantages of devaluation, the importance of economic independence, 
economic nationalism and having a national bank free from politics. Phraya 
Suriyanuwat appears to have thought well of him; and he was a member of 
the Economic Council. And yet much of what he wrote is confused. Perhaps 
this reflects the thinness of economic expertise in Siam in this period.
7.3. James Baxter’s Opinion on a Central Bank
James Baxter, the Financial Adviser, submitted a memorandum on central 
banking on 11 September 1933. With it he wrote a letter to the State 
Councillor in charge of the Ministry of Finance.
In this letter Baxter expressed his opinion on a central bank. First he
believed that the gold standard was the fundamental idea behind central 
banking.
In general my note assumes that the gold standard prevails since this is the
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fundamental idea underlining modern Central Banking. The consensus of financial opinion is 
that gold is still the least unsatisfactory standard of value, its restoration is the declared aim and 
object of every nation. Countries now on a gold basis are struggling heroically to maintain this 
position and the restoration of a free gold standard is the end towards which countries at 
present off gold are striving.22 
Second, Baxter argued:
It seemed to me, however, that the necessary'preliminary to a discussion of Siam’s 
special problems was an expose of the nature and functions of Central Banks as understood in 
the world of to-day. One must, however, face the cold fact that the subject of Central Banking 
is a highly specialist one and altogether beyond the comprehension of the great mass of the 
laity.23
In order to carry out this complicated task, Baxter recommended that the
Siamese government listen to experts from the Bank of England and the
League of Nations. He thought that expert external advice was vital. Third,
he talked about the political influences on a central bank.
The key to the understanding of the post-war development of Central Banking is to be 
found in the desire, indeed the necessity, to remove a country’s currency from the orbit of 
political influences. Experience has abundantly proved that monetary policy should be 
independent of political contingencies 24
Therefore, control of the note-issue should be placed in the hands of a
central bank. Lastly Baxter drew attention to an interesting paradox between
control of the currency by a central bank and inflation in Siam:
In view of the motives inspiring the creation and re-organisation of Central Banks 
during the last decade, it is somewhat of a paradox to find that the movement in Siam in favour 
of the removal of the control of the currency from the Government and of the handling of it over 
to a Bank is to clear and not to block the path to inflation. The movement is fraught with peril. 
The economic well-being of the Kingdom is at stake. The evils of inflation are, or should be, too 
well known to need detailed description.25
James Baxter’s memorandum on Central Banks, written in English,
explained the main functions of a central bank. He emphasised that the sole
right of note issue was a fundamental modern concept. The establishment
22 (2) S.R.0201.50.2/1. N.A. James Baxter to the State Councillor in Charge of the 
Ministry of Finance, 1 September 1933.
• 23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
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and reorganisation of central banks in the post-war period had aimed to
stabilise currencies and prevent inflation. He stressed that the restoration of
the gold standard had been sought in order to achieve stable currencies. He
also explained the differences between the gold standard and the gold
exchange standard.
Expressed in its simplest terms a free gold standard means the obligation of the 
Currency Authority to buy and sell gold on demand at a fixed purity. The gold-exchange 
standard system is in its essence the same, the difference merely being that a country elects a 
link between its currency and gold not directly but through the medium of an external currency 
based on gold.26
There were two reasons why the state should not be the currency
authority. A central bank was better than the government in maintaining the
stability of currency, by controlling the volume of credit, the note-issue, the
gold reserve, or through the discount rate. Past experience showed the
temptation for governments to print notes. He again emphasised that the
independence of the currency authority from political influence was vital.
The Currency Authority need not necessarily be a Central Bank although this is 
normally the case in highly developed industrial and commercial countries because a Central 
Bank has other important functions besides that of currency control.27 
He mentioned two countries, India and Siam, in which the government
controlled the currency. With respect to Siam:
Siam is not, in my opinion, ready for the institution of a Centra! Banking system. This, 
however, does not necessarily mean that the Currency should remain in the hands of 
Government. The question of the establishment of a Currency Board or Currency Commission 
independent of Government is dealt with in a separate memorandum 28
Close cooperation between the state and the central bank would be
necessary. Sometimes government intervention would be required if the
central bank failed. Baxter pointed out that before the war control of the
central bank by the state was emphasised but since the war, the
independence of the central bank and non-intervention by government, had
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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been the trend. Baxter saw the Bank of England and the Reichssbank in
Germany as independent of government, the State Bank of Russia as
subordinate to government. However, all states should have the final right to
intervene with the central bank.
A national crisis such as war must, however, be sharply distinguished from the 
exigencies of party politics and controversy. The danger of State control of currency lies in the 
temptation to Government to treat its political difficulties as justifying a course of action only 
permissible in an emergency of an entirely different order.29
Baxter then described the capital and administration of a central bank.
There were three types of capital: the first was entirely subscribed by the
general public; the second by the state and the public; the third by the state
alone. In administration, the rights of share-holders should not compete with
the public interest. Almost always, the governor or president was appointed
by the state; the board members, as independent officials, should not be civil
servants, directors of private banks, bill discounters, or bill brokers. With
respect to note-issue and reserves: ‘In some countries the law specifies the
reserves to be held against the combined total of note-issues and current
accounts or "other immediate liabilities". In others the reserve requirements
apply to note-issue only.’30 in most countries, gold was used to cover a
minimum percentage of the note-issue, but these regulations varied
considerably between different nations. The part of the note-issue not
covered by gold should be covered by short-dated, first-class paper, such as
drafts, bills of exchange and acceptances.
It may not be out of order to mention specially in view of certain ideas current in Siam at 
that moment that the practice of Central Banks is to cover the note-issue completely either by 
gold or short-dated paper of impeccable quality. There is no uncovered portion and issues 
covered by mortgages on real estate are above all other things barred.31
The Central Bank was the commercial banks’ bank. By the
concentration of bank reserves in the central bank, the latter can control the
29 ibid
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
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credit supply, through buying and selling bills and securities. Baxter 
described the main functions of a central bank: 1) the issue of notes, 2) 
dealings in precious metals and foreign exchange, 3) discounts and loans, 4) 
deposit business especially in relation to commercial banks and 5) clearing 
house arrangements.32 The second function, foreign exchange, was vital for 
countries on a gold exchange standard.
The abandonment of the gold standard by Great Britain in September 1931 converted 
a number of goid-exchange standard into sterling-exchange countries. Since that date a 
considerable number of Governments including that of Siam have deliberately adopted the 
sterling-exchange standard. For all such countries, dealings in sterling are obviously an integral 
part of their currency policy.33
The loans made by central banks were short term, three months, and 
on secured credits such as gold, first-class short-dated bills, and the highest 
class of securities. More importantly, the shares of companies and loans on 
real estate were not allowed because they were too risky. In principle there 
was no need for a central bank to make profits through investment. Although 
some central banks accepted deposits from the public, interest was not paid 
in general. The main function of the deposit business of central banks was to 
secure reserves from the commercial banks and to keep government 
balances, in order to control the supply of credit.
In conclusion, Baxter pointed to areas from which central banks were 
usually prohibited - any commercial undertaking, possession of real estate, 
and making unsecured loans or allowing overdrafts. Moreover, only short­
term maturities, such as short-dated government securities, could be held, 
not long-term government securities.
The creation of a central bank is not a thing to be light-heartedly undertaken. If 
undertaken at all it should only be after a full and careful investigation of Siam’s need for a 
Central Bank and of Siam’s capacity to administer such an institution should the need be 
proven. Nothing should be done except on the advice of a foreign expert body. Nor should
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
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Siam feel that this involves any loss of dignity on her part.34
Several points arise from Baxter’s memorandum. First, it seems
important to investigate his motivation. A nationalist-driven movement to 
establish a central bank was clearly at work in Siam. However, its arguments 
were based not on practical, basic knowledge but on psychological desire. 
Baxter’s memorandum aimed to introduce basic knowledge. Second, Baxter 
clearly opposed the establishment of a central bank. He stressed that setting 
up a central bank was complicated and would require great preparation. 
Baxter described in his memorandum the important functions of central 
banks, so that the Siamese government could learn valuable lessons. Third, 
it appears that he did not trust Siamese officials to listen to advice on a 
central bank. He pointed out that even the library of the Ministry of Finance 
did not have sufficient books on central banking, and he was certain that 
foreign experts would have to be hired. Fourth, it is clear that he believed that 
the gold standard was central to the work of a central bank. He feared that 
inflation, based on an increase in the note-issue, without the discipline of the 
gold standard, would cause financial disaster in Siam. Lastly, Baxter raised 
the vital question - why did Siam need a central bank? After all, the Ministry 
of Finance had carried out many of the functions of a central bank for a long 
time. In these circumstances, the only reason to establish a central bank 
was to exclude political influence. However, this argument seemed 
inappropriate because the Ministry of Finance and the Financial Adviser 
had made strong efforts to secure a balanced budget in order to prevent 
inflation. Another important reason for his opposition could be a fear that 
the Ministry of Finance and the Financial Adviser would lose influence - what 
he most feared was that an independent central bank would challenge the 
authority of the (British) Financial Adviser.
34 ibid.
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7.4. Phraya Suriyanuwat’s Plan
This section considers Phraya Suriyanuwat’s central bank plan and his 
economic thought. As he was one of the major Siamese economic experts 
and a high ranking officer both before and after 1932, it is necessary to 
examine why and how he submitted his plan.35 He was not only famous for a 
bureaucrat but also for the first Siamese economist because he wrote the first 
economic textbook Sapphasat in Thai in 1911.36 National Archives 
documents show that Phraya Suriyanuwat made various suggestions on 
economic and financial matters after 1932, as well as his central bank plan.37 
There are two sources for his central bank plan. The Thai National 
Archives,38 and his cremation book.39
Before submitting his plan, Phraya Suriyanuwat wrote two letters to the 
Prime Minister, Phahon, in June 1934, to tell him of his intentions. The first 
letter, written on 16 June 1934, gave the important information that his plan 
was based on his book, Setthawitya Lem 3. He explained that he had written 
a section on central banking in his book, now in press, and he was sending 
this section to the Prime Minister, for the Ministry of Finance to examine.
5 He was born in April 1862 and had an education in Penang and Calcutta. He started his 
civil servant career in 1876, and moved to the Ministry of Interior in 1880. He joined the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in 1887 and stayed in Europe, including Britain and France. He came back to 
Siam in 1905 and was appointed Minister of Public Works, and became Minister of Finance in 
1906. He resigned in 1907. After the 1932 revolution he was also a member of the Economic 
Council in the Phahon government.
36 See Phraya Suriyanuwat’s economic thought in Chatthip Nartsupha, The Economic
Thought of Phraya Suriyanuwat’, in Vichitvong na Pombhejara (ed.), Readings in Thailand's 
Political Economy, Bangkok: Bangkok Printing Enterprise, 1978, pp.402-13, and Ian Brown, 
Economic thought in early twentieth-century Siam’ in Manas Chitakasem and Andrew Turton 
(ed.), Thai Constructions of Knowledge, London: School of Oriental and African Studies 
1991, pp.84-98.
^  S.R.0201.8/20.N.A. This file contains Phraya Suriyanuwat’s various economic and
financial suggestions to the government after 1932.
33 (2) S.R.0201.50.2/2.N.A.
33 Ruang Thanakhanhaengchat khong Phraya Suriyanuwat (The Central Bank of Phraya
Suriyanuwat) , Nai Manit Wasuwat, Phimcek nai ngan Phraratchathanphloengsop 
Mahaammatek Phraya Suriyanuwat, Nameeruwat Thepsirinatharawat 11 February 1937
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Although Phraya Suriyanuwat was convinced that James Baxter, the 
Financial Adviser, would strongly oppose him, he thought that hearing 
Baxter’s opinion might be useful.
The second letter was written on 17 June 1934. Phraya Suriyanuwat 
made three points. He asked the government to issue a law giving exclusive 
rights of a central bank, he maintained that the initial capital would be 20 
million baht, the government committing 10 million baht and the public 10 
million baht; he said that the government should issue only convertible 
notes and the amount of the note-issue should not exceed 50 million baht.
Phraya Suriyanuwat stressed that with cooperation from foreigners, it 
would be possible to collect 10 million baht, if parliament approved. He 
was sure people in Japan, China, and Europe, would participate. Japan 
had surplus capital, and intended to have an influence in Siam, and China’s 
political instability would encourage capital outflows. Although he was 
confident about raising the capital, he felt that an important obstacle would 
be the Ministry of Finance, which would not approve a central bank handling 
the government’s revenue and expenditure. In conclusion, Phraya 
Suriyanuwat emphasised the important role of a central bank, especially in 
offering loans. He maintained that the plans of every ministry would be of 
no use without a central bank.
Phraya Suriyanuwat’s plan consisted of twelve pages, including a 
draft written in Thai and English. Referring to the Bank of England, Bank of 
France, Bank of Germany and Bank of Scotland and Ireland, he noted the 
ordinary functions of a central bank - such as selling and buying debt, 
offering current account and fixed deposits, and managing foreign 
exchange, and among these he stressed that it was important for a central 
bank to have enough gold reserves to support the exchange.
In examining the relationship between a central bank and the
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government, Phraya Suriyanuwat said that government should protect the 
bank from failure. For example, a central bank's investment in property, 
gardens, fields, forests and mines are prohibited because of the possibility of 
a fall in value. Phraya Suriyanuwat saw the Bank of England as a model - a 
central bank should receive tax revenues and manage expenditures, 
instead of the Ministry of Finance. One important aim of a central bank would 
be to offer small-scale credit, not exceeding fifty baht with security. 
Offering credit to companies - in commerce, industry and handicrafts - would 
help bring about prosperity. However, the risk of bankruptcy and loss of 
loans suggested that the bank should not offer loans easily, and for not more 
than six months.
The draft of a central bank was written in Thai and English. The name 
of the central bank would be The National Bank of Siam’: it would be 
established in Bangkok, and would be expected to support and develop 
agriculture, commerce and industry. There would be fifteen functions of the 
bank. The first to fourth concerned capital. The total share capital would be 
fixed first at twenty million baht, possibly increasing to 40 million baht.40
The fifth to eighth concerned the main functions of the bank. The bank 
could buy and sell gold, silver, and drafts in foreign currency, negotiate bills, 
and give loans. It was not allowed to buy shares or make investments in 
land, farms, plantations, rice-fields, forests, mines, fisheries, or ships. Gold, 
silver, precious stones, jewels, bonds and other securities could be held in 
the bank's vaults. The ninth to eleventh concerned the exclusive right to issue 
legal tender in Siam. The maximum note-issue would be 50 million baht, 
and the consent of the Prime Minister, authorised by a special act of the 
Assembly, would be required to exceed this amount. The value of bank notes
40 (2) S .R .0201.50 .2/2.N.A. The allocation of new shares was as follows: ‘The old
shareholders to have the preference to subscribe for the new shares at the price to be 
decided by the Board of Directors of the Bank, which shall not be less than its normal value 
augmented by each share’s part of the Reserve Fund.’
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should be covered at least 50% by gold in the deposit of the bank, the 
remainder by drafts in local and foreign currency. The bank notes could be 
redeemed in legal tender coin. The twelfth point concerned the management. 
The board would consist of eleven members, divided into two groups. The 
Governor and five members nominated by the Prime Minister, and five 
members selected by the shareholders. The thirteenth concerned disposal of 
net profits:
a) to the reserve fund 10% of the net profits until the fund amounts to 50% of the 
Share Capital; b) to the share-holders 6% of the paid up Capital. This dividend of 6% being 
paid on the shares for the last and previous years; c)the Surplus to be divided into 7 parts, 4 
parts to the Government and 3 parts to the Share-holders 41
The fourteenth point concerned the bank’s role as agent of the government; 
and the last allowed the government to contribute up to 50% of the capital.
There are a number of points to be made about Phraya Suriyanuwat’s
plan. He was flexible over the bank’s capital structure. Although the
government would control up to 50% of the capital, the rest was open to
Siamese and foreigners. Europeans, Chinese and Japanese were
considered potential investors. He was well aware of the difficulty of raising
capital from the Siamese, the only possible source was foreigners. Second,
he paid much attention to the bank's note-issue, and indirectly suggested
that it should be carefully controlled in order not to cause inflation - his
general approach was conservative and orthodox. There was a big
difference here between Kimpong and Phraya Suriyanuwat. Phraya
Suriyanuwat had a more realistic picture, driven not by the passion of
nationalism but by academic and careful consideration. Third, it is clear that
Phraya Suriyanuwat maintained that the central bank should handle
government revenues and expenditures instead of the Ministry of Finance,
although there was no explanation of the point. This might be his weakest
section . Furthermore, the main justification for a central bank was not well_ _
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explained.
Another source for Phraya Suriyanuwat’s ideas on a national bank 
was his cremation book by Manit. Phraya Suriyanuwat’s national bank, a 
document of forty two pages, consists of several articles from the Thai 
newspaper Srikrung published in 1934 and 1936.42 Although the cremation 
book was edited by Manit, the author of the articles is Phraya Suriyanuwat. 
He explained his plan in detail and tried to persuade the reader of the 
necessity for establishing a national bank. The volume consists of seven 
main sections: policy to improve the stagnant domestic economy, the 
character of national bank, the establishment of a national bank, the reason 
why the economy is stagnant, important principles of a national bank, policy 
for the bank and national bank. Here it is useful to discuss Phraya 
Suriyanuwat’s thought on the economic development of Siam, using the 
valuable work of Sirilak Sakkriangkrai.43
From Sirilak it is clear that Phraya Suriyanuwat stressed the 
importance of state engagement in the economy. Sirilak pointed out that 
Siamese industry was underdeveloped because of lack of participation and 
support from the government.44 In fact only the Siam Cement Co. had been 
supported by the government; private companies such as Boon Rawd 
Brewery, had had little government support. In addition the low import tariff 
of three per cent, forced on Siam by the western powers from the Bowring 
Treaty of 1855, had acted as an obstacle to the expansion of Siamese 
domestic industry. Although treaty revision in the mid -1920s had brought 
fiscal autonomy, the Siamese government had not shown any real interest in
42 The dates of these articles are 11 May, 3 July, 11 August, 14 August, 15 August, 18 
August in 1934; and 16 April, 18 April, 22 August, 26 August in 1936.
43 Sirilak Sakkriangkrai, 'Naewkhwamkit thangsetthakit khong Phraya Suriyanuwat nai 
Setthawitthaya Lem 3 ’ (The economic thought of Phraya Suriyanuwat in Setthawitthaya Lem 
3), Sirilak Sakkriangkrai (ed.), Phraya Suriyanuwat (Koet Bunnak) Naksetthasatkhonraekkhong 
muang Thai (Phya Suriyanuwat (Koet Bunnak): Thailand’s First Economist), Bangkok, Thai 
Wathana Phanit, 1980, pp.33-56.
44 lbid.,p.45.
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promoting domestic industry.
Phraya Suriyanuwat proposed to establish protective tariffs against 
imports in order to expand domestic commerce, handicrafts and industry.45 
He also sought to protect jobs for Siamese against foreigners, particularly 
the Chinese. Phraya Suriyanuwat proposed to levy a fee on all foreigners, 
including Chinese, who competed for Siamese jobs.46 Such protectionism 
was common. Pridi, Mangkorn and Kimpong had proposed it, particularly 
import restrictions.
Third, Phraya Suriyanuwat advocated the introduction of a new tax 
system which aimed to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor. He 
pointed out that the main source of tax revenue was the poor, through the 
capitation tax, and that the rich contributed little to the government’s tax 
revenue. He maintained that the government should collect tax not from the 
poor but from the rich.47 The disparity in income could be seen not only 
between rich and poor but also between country and town. Phraya 
Suriyanuwat pointed out that people in rural areas were disadvantaged in 
several respects, such as access to police, doctors, hospitals and schools.48 
Phraya Suriyanuwat tried to secure a re-distribution of wealth by a new tax 
system, abolishing the capitation tax and introducing an inheritance tax or 
confiscating the assets of the Sakdina,49
Fourth, Sirilak compared the model of Japanese economic 
development with Phraya Suriyanuwat’s ideas. In Japan, Sirilak pointed out, 
the government played an important role in promoting industry, relying on 
government guarantees, low interest loans, and new taxes like the land tax.50
45 lbid.,p.44.
46 lbid.,p.45.
47 ibid., p.42.
48 lbid.,pp.42-43.
49 lbid.,p.52. The capitation tax was abolished on 1 April 1939. An inheritance tax was in 
place from 1935 to 1938. Its failure was explained by the few number of rich people, and a 
general reluctance to invest in commerce, ibid.,p.54.
50 lbid.,p.50.
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An interesting point made by Sirilak concerns the difference between 
Japanese practice and Phraya Suriyanuwat over economic development 
strategy. In Japan, private companies had the freedom to engage in 
business and became rich rapidly with government support. In other words, 
Japanese companies gave low wages to labourers, and this exploitation 
made it possible for the capitalists to accumulate capital.51 But Phraya 
Suriyanuwat wanted to reduce the power of the capitalists and increase the 
capital of the poor and financial policy was expected to do this.52
Fifth, the role of the foreign investor in Siam is sometimes confused in 
Phraya Suriyanuwat’s argument. He welcomed foreign participation in the 
national bank because Siam lacked capital. However, Sirilak pointed out 
that Phraya Suriyanuwat opposed foreign loans to promote business and 
industry in Siam.53 Manit’s volume also shows the problem of depending on 
foreign capital.54 Foreigners would send profits back to their own countries, 
so that they would not be used in Siam. Sirilak argued that Phraya 
Suriyanuwat’s national bank should raise capital from the Siamese.55
Lastly, the role of a national bank was discussed. However in the 
absence of clear definitions, there is considerable confusion. For example, 
Phraya Suriyanuwat did not distinguish the functions of a central bank and a
51 ibid.,p.5i.
52 Ruang Thanakhanhaengchat khong Phraya Suriyanuwat (The Central Bank of Phraya 
Suriyanuwat) , Nai Manit Wasuwat, Phimcek nai ngan Phraratchathanphloengsop 
Mahaammatek Phraya Suriyanuwat, Nameeruwat Thepsirinatharawat, 11 February 1937, p.35.
53 Sirilak Sakkriangkrai, ‘Naewkhwamkit thangsetthakit khong Phraya Suriyanuwat nai 
Setthawitthaya Lem 3 ’ (The economic thought of Phraya Suriyanuwat in Setthawitthaya Lem 
3), Sirilak Sakkriangkrai (ed.), Phraya Suriyanuwat (Koet Bunnak) Naksetthasatkhonraekkhong 
muang Thai (Phya Suriyanuwat (Koet Bunnak): Thailand’s First Economist), Bangkok, Thai 
Wathana Phanit, 1980, p.40.
54 Ruang Thanakhanhaengchat khong Phraya Suriyanuwat (The Central Bank of Phraya 
Suriyanuwat), Nai Manit Wasuwat, Phimcek nai ngan Phraratchathanphlengsop Mahaammatek 
Phraya Suriyanuwat, Nameeruwat Thepsirinatharawat, 11 February 1937, p.36.
55 Sirilak Sakkriangkrai, ‘Naewkhwamkit thangsetthakit khong Phraya Suriyanuwat nai 
Setthawitthaya Lem 3 ’ (The economic thought of Phraya Suriyanuwat in Setthawitthaya Lem 
3), Sirilak Sakkriangkrai (ed.), Phraya Suriyanuwat (Koet Bunnak) Naksetthasatkhonraekkhong 
muang Thai (Phraya Suriyanuwat (Koet Bunnak): Thailand’s First Economist), Bangkok, Thai 
Wathana Phanit, 1980, p,40.
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national bank. It is clear that Phraya Suriyanuwat considered a national 
bank an important institution to support commerce and industry through 
loans, to support the poor with loans.56 But this has nothing to do with a 
central bank. However, offering loans through the local administration to 
develop the economic infrastructure - such as power stations, water 
supplies, irrigation and transportation - could be a function of a central 
bank.57 Phraya Suriyanuwat’s national bank can be said to be a mixture of 
a central bank and an industrial bank. Although Phraya Suriyanuwat 
stressed the importance of making loans to commerce and industry, there 
was no detailed explanation. Moreover, although government initiative in 
the economy was emphasized, no explanation was given of how the shift 
from the private sector to state intervention would be achieved.58 I n 
conclusion, Phraya Suriyanuwat proposed a national bank to promote 
economic development but in mixing up the functions of a central bank and 
a national bank, the issue was confused.
7.5. The Establishment of the National Banking Bureau in 1939
There are several points to be discussed in this section. First, Pridi 
Phanomyong, the Minister of Finance, and Prince Viwat, the first Thai 
financial adviser, played crucial roles in the establishment of the Bureau. But 
they had different views on the Bureau, Pridi had a nationalist motivation;
the emphasis on economic factors came from Prince Viwat. Second, the
53 Ruang Thanakhanhaengchat khong Phraya Suriyanuwat (The Central Bank of Phraya
Suriyanuwat), Nai Manit Wasuwat, Phimcek nai ngan Phraratchathanphlengsop Mahaammatek 
Phraya Suriyanuwat, Nameeruwat Thepsirinatharawat, 11 February 1937, p.2.
57 Ibid.,p.2.
58 Sirilak Sakkriangkrai, ‘Naewkhwamkit thangsetthakit khong Phraya Suriyanuwat nai 
Setthawitthaya Lem 3 ’ (The economic thought of Phraya Suriyanuwat in Setthawitthaya Lem 
3), Sirilak Sakkriangkrai (ed.), Phraya Suriyanuwat (Koet Bunnak) Nakseiihasatkhonraekkhong 
muang Thai (Phraya Suriyanuwat (Koet Bunnak): Thailand’s First Economist), Bangkok, Thai 
Wathana Phanit, 1980, p.53.
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economic situation around 1939 was quite sound, with a secure trade 
surplus and balanced budget. The fundamental question is why was the 
Bureau, with some functions of a central bank, created in spite of the slow 
development of commercial banking in Siam? To put it another way; foreign 
banks dominated the exchange business, foreign merchant houses and 
small Chinese banks dominated the rice export business. There was no 
organized credit market, making loans to commerce, manufacturing or the 
service sector. The foreign banks did not need a bureau with the functions of 
a central bank because their main concern was the foreign exchange 
business, and the domestic Chinese banks were not expected to benefit from 
the bureau because of the lack of an organized credit market. Third, the role 
of the foreign Financial Adviser will be examined. In general, the financial 
advisers were against the idea of a central bank, for several reasons. When 
Pridi invited Doll to be Financial Adviser, he was expected to play an 
important role in the establishment of Pridi’s central bank. How did Doll 
respond to Pridi’s idea? What was the difference between Doll and Baxter, 
the previous adviser, on this issue? Lastly, the establishment of the 
National Banking Bureau in 1939 should be seen in relation to the plans by 
Kimpong and Phraya Suriyanuwat.
When Pridi was appointed Minister of Finance under Phibun in 
December 1938, he moved to set up a central bank. He invited W.A.M. Doll 
to be Financial Adviser, to be involved in the central bank plan, and made 
Prince Wiwattanachai Chaiyant, called Prince Viwat, the first Thai adviser to 
the Treasury after the 1932 revolution. Doll was doubtful about Pridi's central 
bank plan; he considered that the time was not ripe. A British Foreign Office 
official recounted Doll’s opinion on Pridi’s central bank plan;
Luang Pradist has been long connected with the agitation for a Central Bank and I 
have a feeling to-day that he is still hankering for it. As you know, this agitation gets no 
sympathy from me. Apart from the country not yet being ready for a Central Bank, the capital for
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the Bank would have to be found out of the Treasury Reserve: and at the present moment the 
Treasury Reserve simply could not stand it.59
But in the end, Doll was persuaded by Pridi to draft an act for the
establishment of a national bank. At the time the relationship between Pridi
and Prince Viwat was not good, because Pridi emphasized the political
reasons for the bank while Prince Viwat worried about the dangers of
inflation for political reasons. T.H. Silcock describes their relations:
In his early days as financial adviser Prince Viwat had devoted effort to cooling the 
ardour of the Finance Minister, Pridi Phanomyong, for a central bank. He was afraid both of the 
inflationary dangers of Pridi’s view that a central bank could overcome the government’s 
difficulties in collecting revenue, and also of the financial hazards of starting an institution 
dealing in such large sums of money with so few qualified officials.80
Before examining in detail the establishment of the National Banking
Bureau in 1939, the fundamental question, the necessity for a central bank
in Siam, must be considered. Charoen Chinalai and P. Sithi-Amunuwai
describe this problem:
To many people in Thailand, even the learned, the principles of finance and the theory 
of money were a closed book during the 1930’s; it was not surprising therefore that the 
Treasury, during that time, opposed the idea of a central bank mainly on the ground that it 
could render little service to the country. The urgent institutional need for the country then was 
thought to be an organised system for agricultural credit - a problem outside the scope of 
central banking. Furthermore, it was argued that Thailand’s banking business was mainly in the 
hands of foreign bankers who would not use the facilities offered by a central bank even if it 
were established. Without being able to hold the cash reserves of the commercial banks, a 
central bank could not function. The prerequisite for a central bank must be a national banking 
system. This was not in existence in Thailand then, and even the Thai banks then operating 
were under foreign management.61
This argument is accurate, the role of a national bank or a central bank in 
the economic plans of the time was always to support the establishment of 
an agricultural bank, but this is outside the scope of central banking.
59 W.A. Doll to Sir Otto Niemeyer, 30 December 1938. Enclosed in J. Crosby to G. 
Howe, 2 January 1939, F352/242/40, FO 371/23590, PRO.
60 T.H.Silcock, ‘Money and Banking’, T.H.Silcock, (ed.), Thailand: Social and Economic 
Studies in Development^ Canberra: Australian National University, 1967, p. 178-9.
61 Charoen Chinalai and P. Sithi-Amunuai, T h e  Commercial Banks and the Bank of 
Thailand’, Paul Sithi-Amnuai (ed), Finance and Banking in Thailand: A Study of the Commercial 
System, 1888-1963, Bangkok: Thai Watana Panich, 1964, p.97.
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Furthermore, the lack of commercial banks, especially Siamese banks, 
meant that there was no organized credit market requiring a central bank 
with control over the cash reserves of the commercial banks.62
Doll thought Pridi’s aim in establishing a state bank was for political 
reasons. He wrote to Sir Otto Niemeyer, Governor of the Bank of England :
i would particularly draw your attention to Luang Pradit’s ideas on a State Bank, which 
he is determined to have for political reasons. You will see that he is prepared to be entirely 
guided by the Bank of England in the form his bank should take and he has charged me with 
the duty, during my leave, of putting myself in touch with the Bank in order to get their 
opinion.63
Coultas, Charge d’Affaires at the British Legation in Bangkok, reported on 
Pridi’s ideas to the Foreign Office:
It will be observed that, if these draft proposals are followed, the State Bank, if 
established, will at its inception be little more than an extension of the Treasury and be vested 
with only the less important functions of a central bank. For the moment Luang Pradist, who 
desires at present only to make political capita! out of its establishment, will, it seems, be 
satisfied with the shadow of a State Bank and be content to postpone his pursuit of the 
substance until a latter date.64
There are several questions to be considered concerning Pridi and the 
Financial Advisers. First, why did Doll agree to submit a draft enabling an 
act for the establishment of a state bank given his poor view of Pridi’s 
ideas?65 Second, when Doll returned to England on this matter, Pridi 
appointed F.R. Dolbeare, an American Foreign Affairs Adviser in Siam, as 
Financial Adviser as well. Why did Pridi do this? It would appear that 
although Doll was persuaded to draft the act, he was still opposed to Pridi’s
32 Ibid., p .3 3 .12 banks were established in Siam between 1888 and 1941. Of the 12, 7 
were foreign banks, consisting of three British, two Chinese, one French, and one Japanese.
63 Coultas to FO No. 192, 17 April 1939, F4039/242/40, FO 371/23590, PRO.
64 ibid.
65 ibid. Doll described Pridi’s plan for a state bank as follows: T he  attached note sets out 
the Minister’s ideas on his project of a state bank. It is important to remember that they are only 
ideas. He wants a State Bank largely for political reasons and has told me that his real desires 
are limited to - 1. An extension of the Treasury able to cope with Government payments by 
Treasury Drafts. 2. attachment to this extension of the Currency Department but without any 
change in the existing Currency Act. 3. The creation of a separate entity to deal with these two 
activities. 4. The label over the door showing that it is a separate entity.’
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national bank. The British Foreign Office sent him a telegram:
I fear that you misjudge the situation. Luang Pradist, for reasons of his own, is 
determined to have his national bank; and, if you are not prepared to help him, he will discard
your advice My strong recommendation is that you should make the best of a bad job and
cease further opposition to his scheme.66
It would appear that Pridi appointed the American as Financial Adviser in
order to reduce Doll’s position in the Ministry of Finance. Crosby, the Charge
d’Affaires, offered a critical comment on Doll’s response to Pridi:
Pradist has just asked Dolbeare to go on being his adviser as regards the National 
Bank even after Doll's return. Moreover, as you know, a Thai Financial Adviser was appointed 
in addition to Doll some months ago, so that, when Doll gets back, there is a very fair chance of 
his being side-tracked. The Thais are very good at that game; if they dislike a man they just 
leave him to draw his pay, without consulting him or giving him responsible work to do.67 
Third, why did Pridi appoint Prince Viwat as the first Thai Financial Adviser? It
is important to remember that Prince Viwat had criticised the memorandum
on a central bank in October 1934 when he was Director-General of the
Revenue Department. In this memorandum there were four suggestions.68
First, the government should establish a central bank. Second, the bank
should have a gold reserve fund. Third, in order to accumulate gold for the
reserve fund, the government should engage in forestry, saw-milling,
mining, for export. Lastly, the government would undertake these activities
by means of loans from the central bank. But Prince Viwat pointed out that
central banks could not make loans to government or municipalities to
engage in mining, construction or on electricity generation. The function of
a central bank was to control the domestic currency.69 Regarding the gold
reserve fund, he pointed out that this would be a sterling fund, held in
London, not in Bangkok. Held in London it would benefit British financial
66 Crosby to FO No.108, 25 September 1939, F10435/242/40, FO 371/23590, PRO.
67 Crosby to Howe, 6 October 1939 (32/65/39), F11140/242/40, FO 371/23590, PRO 
Wiwattanachaiyanuson, Thanakanhaengprathet Thai (Bank of Thailand) Phimnaigan
Phraradchathan phoengphrasop Phraworawongthoe Phra ongchao Wiwattanachai Nameru 
Watthepsirinatharawat, 1 April 1961, p.60.
69 Ibid. p.61.
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institutions, not Siam. He raised a fundamental question: what would be the 
benefit of bringing the fund back to Siam to cover imports? If it was used to 
purchase imports, the baht would be just paper.70
Four points contributed to the success in establishing the National 
Banking Bureau, according to a Bank of Thailand publication.71 The first is 
that when the second world war broke out in Europe in 1939, the British 
controlled Siam’s foreign exchange. Therefore, many Siamese withdrew 
their money from the British commercial banks in Siam: a National Bank was 
thus required to support the commercial banks. Second, the government 
made three internal loans - for agriculturalists, for industrial development, 
and for the municipalities - with a total of 60 million baht over 30 years. 
Therefore it was necessary for the government to have an organisation to 
arrange these loans. Third, it was necessary for the government to have a 
financial organisation to promote its commercial policy based upon 
Chartniyom (ultra-nationalism). Lastly, the government needed an 
organisation to support the establishment of a Borisat Changwat (Provincial 
Company).
The National Banking Bureau was established in the Ministry of 
Finance, to manage government loans, accept government funds on 
deposit, and receive part of the commercial banks’ cash balances for the 
purpose of cheque clearance.72 It is interesting to point out that the British 
diplomats and bankers did not regard the Bureau as a threat to British 
interests. FitzGerald of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
noted:
70 ibid. pp.61-2.
71 Thanakhan Haeng Prathet Thai (Bank of Thailand), 50 Pi Thanakhan Haeng 
PrathetThai 2485-2535 , (50 years of the Bank of Thailand, 1942-1992), 10 October 1992, 
p.50.
72 Crosby to FO No.541, 3 November 1939, F12003/242/40, FO 371/23591, PRO. p.5. 
See the translation of the Act for the Establishment of the Thai National Banking Bureau, 
B.E.2482 (1939).
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you will have gained the impression that I do not consider Thailand ‘ripe’ yet for Central 
Banking but if they must have a Central Banking System and found it on well-acknowledged 
lines I do not fear its competition with the British Exchange Banks.73
Doll’s view of Pridi’s national bank was highly critical:
Withdrawal of Government funds from the market and their centralisation in a National 
Bank must in any case disorganise Siamese banking structure. Under present war conditions 
such disorganisation must be greatly increased. Strongly urge that consideration of creation of 
National Bank be therefore postponed for the present.74
The Bank of Thailand, established in December 1942, had a quite 
different background from that of the National Banking Bureau in 1939. The 
outbreak of World War II in 1939 and Thailand’s neutrality saw an expansion 
in exports, especially rice. The British Empire was Thailand’s main trading 
partner and settlements were in sterling. However, the Japanese-Thai Pact 
in 1941 and the Thai declaration of war against Great Britain and the United 
States in January 1942 forced Thailand to have close links with Japan. 
Financial and commercial relations with the West came to an end. Thailand’s 
external assets held in Allied countries were confiscated, and the sterling 
exchange standard was ended. The baht was now linked to the yen. For 
Thailand, only Japan and her Allies were trading countries. For example, in 
1941, 36% of Thailand’s total trade had been with Japan. This jumped to 
72% in 1942.75
The Japanese government asked the Thai government to accept three 
principles: to fix the baht at par with the yen, to settle trade and financial 
transactions between Thailand and Japan in yen and to establish a Central
73 Ibid., p.9. FitzGerald gave his views on the functions of central banking:- the issue of 
notes, dealing in foreign exchange, deposit business, discounts and loans, and control of the 
commercial banking system. He examined each function in Siam: the government already 
controlled the issue of notes and foreign exchange. The lack of sufficient commercial banks 
made it difficult to secure deposits and control the commercial banking system. The British 
exchange banks did not engage in discounting local bills and loans in Siam. Therefore he was 
opposed to a central bank in Siam. See in detail, pp.7-9.
74 Doll to Crosby, 22 September 1939, F10393/242/40, FO 371/23590, PRO.
75 Paul Sithi-Amnuai (ed), Finance and banking in Thailand: A study of the commercial 
system, 1888-1963 , Bangkok: Thai Watana Panich, 1964, p.57.
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Bank with a Japanese adviser and a Japanese head of department.76 The
first caused a baht devaluation against the yen of about 36%, leaving
Japanese imports from Thailand much cheaper, while Thailand would pay
a higher price for imports from Japan. Prince Viwat felt that Thailand had no
choice but to accept the first and second principles.77 But he was afraid that
the establishment of a Central Bank by a Japanese initiative would cause
inflation in Thailand, through the issue of Japanese military scrip:78
an institution fully equipped with a Japanese staff might have been set up to control 
Thai currency. On the other hand, graceful acceptance of the suggestion and adoption of it as 
one’s own would certainly prevent pressure and might consequently avoid foreign control of 
the national currency.79
His two main aims - to prevent inflation by the issue of Japanese military
scrip, and to prevent the appointment of a Japanese adviser and Japanese
head of department - were achieved. However, the pact between Thailand
and Japan forced Thailand to supply the Japanese military with all the baht
they required, against yen credits in Tokyo. Furthermore, the baht
devaluation against the yen created a high demand for baht, which forced the
Bank of Thailand to issue more notes.
To put it in a nut-shelt, the problem before the Treasury was to prevent the use by the 
Japanese of their own military scrips and to maintain the Baht as the sole currency of the 
country. This object could only be achieved by providing the Japanese with Baht funds. As the 
Treasury was already unable to make both ends meet, it had no choice other than to issue new 
notes and face the danger of an inflation, which it hoped to minimise by endeavouring to 
restrict as much as possible the extent of Japanese expenditure. The Treasury further 
attempted to safeguard the future of the currency, in so far as lay in its power, by insisting upon 
gold in return for the notes.80
Although facing inflationary pressures, Prince Viwat maintained gold rather
76 Wiwattanachaiyanuson, Thanakanhaengprathet Thai (Bank of Thailand) Phimnaigan 
Phraradchathan phoengphrasop Phraworawongthoe Phra ongchao Wiwattanachai, Nameru 
Watthepsirintharawat, 1 April 1961, pp.67-8.
77 lbid.,p.68.
78 ibid.,p.80.
79 Ibid. The second part, Kanthang Thanakhan Haeng Prathet Thai (The establishment 
of the Bank of Thailand) p. 58. The memorandum about the Bank of Thailand was written in 
English by Prince Viwat in July 1944. See his memorandum, pp.53-71.
80 lbid.p.125.
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than yen as the cover for issuing notes. He negotiated to purchase gold from 
the Japanese government, and the Bank of Thailand acquired 26.7 million 
grams, valued at 129 million baht, from Japan. The Bank of Thailand was 
asked to deposit that gold, and its existing gold, with the Bank of Japan.81
In conclusion, the Bank of Thailand was established for political 
rather than economic reasons. Although several plans for a central bank 
appeared after 1932, they had no direct effect on the establishment of the 
Bank of Thailand in 1942, while the establishment of the Thai National 
Banking Bureau in 1939 was related to Pridi’s political ambitions.82 The 
existence of the Thai National Banking Bureau in the early 1940s made it 
possible for the Thai to argue that they did not need a Japanese adviser 
and Japanese head of department in the Bank of Thailand.
In conclusion, the Bank of Thailand was established for political 
rather than economic reasons. Although several plans for a central bank 
appeared after 1932, they had no direct effect on the establishment of the 
Bank of Thailand in 1942, while the establishment of the Thai National 
Banking Bureau in 1939 was clearly related to Pridi’s political ambitions. The 
existence of the Thai National Banking Bureau in the early 1940s made it 
possible for the Thais to argue that they did not need a Japanese adviser 
and a Japanese head of department in the Bank of Thailand.
A central bank or national bank were also important in three plans, 
those of Mangkorn Samsen, Pridi, and Phra Sarasas, which were examined 
in Chapter 3. However, there were also vague definitions of banks in the
plans of Kimpong and Phraya Suriyanuwat. Although every author felt it
S'* Ibid., p.81. The amount of Thai gold deposited with the Bank of Japan was 38.8 million
grams.
82 ibid. The second part, p.60. Prince Viwat wrote: T h e  middle of the year 2481 (1938)
found a new Finance Minister installed in the Treasury and upon his initiative, the question of
establishing « Central bank was again taken up but it was finally decided that at least some
gesture should be made for political reasons and opportunity taken to train young men in the 
routine business of deposit banking. The question was the form that the gesture should take’.
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necessary to find finance for agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce, this 
weak point was repeatedly attacked by the financial adviser.
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8Conclusion
This conclusion focuses on three points: the ‘bureaucratic polity’ model of 
Riggs, the government’s responses to the plans and proposals and the 
origins of economic nationalism in Siam.
The slow implementation of economic policy in Siam in this period 
can be explained by Riggs' bureaucratic polity model. However, careful 
examination of it will show certain significant weaknesses.
According to Riggs, power in Thailand is placed in a ‘bureaucratic 
polity’ which contains the armed forces, police, and civil administration, so 
that political parties, the Assembly, and interest groups fail to control 
bureaucracy.
The actual political system that was set up in 1932 corresponds to the implicit premises
of the June manifesto. Cabinet members, for the most part, have been officials who have risen 
to political eminence: and in the conduct of their roles as members of a ruling circle, cabinet 
politicians have shown themselves more responsive to the interests and demands of their 
bureaucratic subordinates than to the concerns of interest groups, political parties, or 
legislative bodies outside the state apparatus.1
Riggs’ framework of the 'bureaucratic polity' is useful to see how the
various cliques in the ruling circle competed with each other to gain power 
and their close reliance on influential Chinese entrepreneurs. In other words, 
politicians and the bureaucracy demanded an economic base, and in return 
the Chinese looked for political protection and economic concessions.
1 Fred W Riggs, Thailand: The Modernisation of a Bureaucratic Polity, Honolulu, East- 
West Center Press, 1966, p.312.
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Riggs’s study shows their close relationships.2 However his application of 
the model to the early 1930s, particularly after 1932, seems to have several 
weak points. Girling attacks the Riggs model as follows:
First, Riggs overstates the purely factional content of political rivalry. As he sees it, 
national politics is simply a struggle for power and advancement of interests among competing 
factions and cliques. In this context, such ideas as ‘Right’ and ‘Left’ or ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ 
have no meaning. This overlooks the fact that state intervention in economics as opposed to a 
laissez-faire approach was an important issue in Thailand during the period Riggs describes. 
Moreover Sarit’s takeover in 1958 was a turning-point, not just in the replacement of one 
patronage group by another, but also in basic economic strategy, which in turn had important 
political implications.
In the second place, Riggs was unduly influenced by the ‘consensus’ model of Thai 
politics which played down the conflicts and the cleavages in Thai society in the belief either 
that they were unimportant or that, if important (as were the obvious differences between a 
small ruling elite and a large, subject, rural population), Thai society was sufficiently 
prosperous, contented, or apathetic to contain these differences. Riggs implicitly holds the 
view that only elite politics counted.
The third weakness is the way Riggs tends to combine the military and civilian 
components of the bureaucracy, without adequately distinguishing between the military as a 
separately recruited ‘caste’ with its own loyalties, interests and goals, and the civilian 
administrators, characterised by different forms of education, professional expertise, career 
structure and personal expectations.
Finally, Riggs’ concentration on factional motivation (the material interests of 
bureaucratic leaders) overlooks the objective effect of political-economic linkages in sustaining 
unrepresentative regimes.3
Relying on Girling’s argument, my study exactly illustrates Riggs’s first
and second weak points. His model cannot explain why state intervention in 
the economy became central from the mid-1930s. The ideological 
arguments covered in Chapters 3 and 4 show that it did not come from a 
factional or struggle within the ruling circle. Pridi’s plan came from the 
manifesto of the People’s Party, Mangkorn's was that of a private merchant, 
and Phra Sarasas aimed to deal with the economic crisis caused by the 
world depression. These important plans came from outside the bureaucracy,
2 Ibid., see Chapter IX, ‘Politics, Administration, and High Finance’, pp.242-310.
3 John L.S. Girling, The Bureaucratic Polity m Modernizing Societies: Similarities, 
Differences, and Prospects in the ASEAN Region, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1981, pp.10-11.
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but were influential on decision-making. It might be said that these people 
belonged to the Siamese elite and that these plans originated from their 
faction or clique. However, my study shows that their plans aimed not to 
expand their economic base but rather were ideological, in that they had a 
view as to how the Siamese economy should be directed. Moreover, there 
was an ideological conflict over state intervention in the economy (Pridi and 
Phra Sarasas) and a laissez-faire strategy (Mangkorn). Besides these three 
figures, minor plans or projects which were discussed in Chapter 4 also 
reflected this ideological conflict. The ideological - economic arguments 
which originated with Pridi led to the state intervention in the economy which 
took place in the Phibun period. This argument clearly contradicts Riggs’ 
view that
national politics becomes more simply a struggle for power as an end in itself among 
competing cliques and factions. In this context, such ideas as ‘right’ and ‘left’, ‘conservative’ 
and ‘liberal’, ‘clerical’ and ‘anti-clerical1 have no meaning. The question is merely ‘Who rules?’ 
not ‘What does he stand for?4
Secondly, Riggs’ model is not suitable to explain the diversified,
dynamic and changing Siamese society before and after 1932. As he 
focused only on the Siamese elite, other important groups of the middle 
class, including lawyers, merchants, clerks, teachers, journalists, students 
and the press are completely missing. Nakharin’s work illustrates a dynamic 
Siamese society before and after 1932, by focusing on the various social 
strata including the middle class.5 My study, in Chapter 5, also shows the 
importance of these political, economic and social strata in society. There are 
two points to be made here in contrast to Riggs’ model. Firstly, the economic 
plans and ideas originated not only from the Siamese elite but also the 
middle class and the press. The planners mentioned in Chapters 3, 4, and 5
4 Fred W Riggs, Thailand: The Modernisation of a Bureaucratic Polity, Honolulu, East- 
West Center Press, 1966, p.212.
5 Nakharin Mektrairat, Kanpatiwat sayam ph.s.2475 (The 1932 Revolution in Siam), 
Bangkok: Mun nithi khrongkan tamra sangkhomsat lae manutsayasat, 1992.
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had various occupations and educational backgrounds. Lawyers and 
merchants showed a keen interest in economic issues, including how to 
deal with the economic depression. It might be said that these plans and 
ideas of the middle-class and the press did not have any direct influence on 
the government, but this requires further study of the Assembly’s 
proceedings. Although Riggs does not think much of the functions of the 
Assembly, major issues were discussed there.
Riggs notes: By taking official positions and consenting to the formation of the State 
Council, the promoters of the revolution effectively surrendered their power over the 
bureaucracy. Thenceforth, political struggles took place within the bureaucracy, between its 
rival cliques. Both the monarchy and the parliamentary and party apparatus became 
decorations, utilized and maintained primary as means of legitimizing decisions made behind 
the closed doors of the governmental machinery.6
Pasuk and Baker suggested: Under the 'permanent' constitution enacted in late 1933, 
the People’s Committee was replaced by a British-inspired system of a Cabinet responsible to 
a partially elected Assembly, However, various provisions limited the effectiveness of the 
Assembly. Only half of its members were elected, the election process was indirect, election 
candidates had to be vetted by the appointive members, and political parties were forbidden. 
The government could control this Assembly through the appointive portion, and was never 
seriously inconvenienced by its strictures or deliberations.7
Vital questions are raised by these two quotations, was the Assembly’s 
function simply to legitimize the decisions of the government or was there 
serious confrontation between the government and the Assembly?
Before answering these questions, the election system and an 
analysis of MPs in the 1930s must be noted. After the 1932 revolution, 28 
June 1932, the first national representative assembly opened with a total of 
seventy members, all of whom had been appointed by the new military
leadership. Among them, thirty-three were members of the People’s Party,
6 Fred W Riggs, Thailand: The Modernisation of a Bureaucratic Polity, Honolulu, East- 
' West Center Press, 1966, p. 162.
7 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, Kuala Lumpur, 
Oxford University Press, 1995, p.256.
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and most of the remainder were high-ranking officials of the old regime. In the 
1930s, there were three elections (1933, 1937, and 1938). During these 
elections, there were two types of member: the first-category member through 
election (indirect in 1933 and direct in 1937 and 1938), and the second- 
category member appointed by the ruling clique. In 1933, 78 of the first- 
category members were indirectly elected and consisted of 21 lawyers, 16 
civil servants, 15 merchants and 11 retired or resigned civil servants.8 
Among the 78 second-category members, 47 were members of the People’s 
Party. During these three elections various social classes were elected to 
the Assembly (See Table 8-1). There were many lawyers and merchants 
and civil servants. The first-category members were important because they 
voiced the voter’s concerns.
Confrontation between the cabinet and the assembly occurred several 
times, for example, over Pridi’s plan. The Assembly could use a no- 
confidence vote, and this tactic was successful twice, in September 1934 
and in July 1937. The first arose from dissatisfaction with the international 
rubber agreement, and the latter over a crown lands scandal. The former 
brought about the resignation of Phra Sarasas, the Minister of Economic 
Affairs. The latter was a setback for the government. Liang Chaiyakal, the 
Ubon representative, revealed in the Assembly that he had found that crown 
land in Bangkok was being sold off at low prices to members of the ruling 
clique, including government ministers and promoters.9 The cabinet 
resigned.
The two cases above illustrate that the Assembly was not simply
decorative as Riggs maintained, and that the government was sometimes
8 Nakharin Mektrairat, Kanpatiwat sayam ph.$.2475  (The 1932 Revolution in Siam), 
Bangkok: Mun nithi khrongkan tamra sangkhomsat iae manutsayasat, 1992, p.277. All 
members were male and the number of university graduates was 21.
9 Liang named thirty-four people in this scandal, including Prince Aditya Dib-abha, the 
senior regent, Phibun, Adul, the police chief, Phya Phahon’s (Prime Minister) wife, and Phya 
Ritthi, the Minister of Agriculture. See detail in Judith Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand: A Story 
of Intrigue, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1991, pp.95-97.
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seriously inconvenienced by its strictures and deliberations. Murashima’s 
study of political parties between 1932-1945 also assesses the role of the 
assembly in terms of its opposition to the government. The other form of 
opposition was that coming from first-category assembly members who 
demanded the legalization of political parties and the establishment of a 
multiparty system.’10 In the assembly, various economic issues were 
debated: for example, Mangkorn Samsen’s debate whether to join the 
international tin scheme in the 1930s.
Mangkorn’s position in the Assembly is shown by his letter to Phahon, 
the prime minister, on 29 June 1933.11 in this letter, he says he is doubtful 
about the People’s Party manifesto, particularly the third principle, that a 
national economic plan must be drawn up to ensure the economic well-being 
of the people, and the new government must provide work for every citizen 
and will not allow people to starve. The reason why he is doubtful about the 
government’s economic plan is that bureaucrats are neither familiar with nor 
expert in agriculture, industry or commerce. Even though they have some 
knowledge, this knowledge is based on foreign textbooks. In fact, commerce, 
industry and handicrafts were almost entirely in the hands of foreigners in 
Siam and most of the people were farmers. The important point is that 
Mangkorn saw the root of the problem as a lack of bureaucrats who have the 
minds to promote industry, rather than their lack of knowledge.
Mangkorn made several statements in the Assembly in 1932 and 
1933.12 On 26 August 1933 he mentioned that his economic plan was
10 Eiji Murashima, 'Democracy and the Development of Political Parties in Thailand 1932- 
1945’ in Eiji Murashima, Nakharin Mektrairat, Somkiat wanthana, The Making of Modern Thai 
Political Parties, Tokyo, Institute of Developing Economics, 1991, p.53.
11 S.R.0201.8/18. N.A.
12 Mangkorn’s statements are recorded in Minutes of the National Assembly 
(Raigankanprachum saphaphuthaenradsadorn), Samaithi 20/2475, 55/2475, 4/2476, 
14/2476, 21/2476, 24/2476 and 21/2477.
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submitted to the Assembly.13 Pridi also referred to Mangkorn’s plan, saying
that it was the duty of the People's Party to examine it.14 On 17 August 1933
he proposed a decree to insure farm land for damage.15 His sympathy for the
lower class of civil servant caused him to propose a kind of social insurance
system for them on 16 February 1935.16
His last statement concerned the tin problem. The main argument
concerned the participation of Siam in the tin cartel which imposed quotas
on production. When Siam joined the cartel in July 1931, its quota was fixed
at 10,000 tons, only 5 per cent below the 1929 production, and it was to be
exempt from any subsequent restriction on production.
During the life of the tin cartel Thailand succeeded in obtaining extremely favourable 
quotas. The governm ent had a strong bargaining position which it exploited
successfully Thailand was a relatively small producer (6 percent of world production in
1929), but she was the fourth largest tin producer and, to add the crucial fact, her tin-producing 
districts lay just across an unguarded border from Malayan tin-producing districts. The success 
of the cartel scheme might well have been endangered by tin smuggled into Thailand and sold 
as Thai tin.17
Mangkorn made two points in the Assembly. The first was that the 
mining bill in 1930 was inhuman, that the labour, and that not Thais but 
foreigners, especially Chinese, were forced to work in very bad conditions. 
He aimed to improve the working condition of the mining labourer. The 
second was about the quota. He asserted that Siam should not join the tin 
cartel. The government stated that the quota guaranteed the price of tin; but 
most merchants doubted this explanation. Luang Wichitwathakan opposed 
Mangkorn, explaining that the purpose of the tin cartel was to protect the tin 
market from a sharp fall in price. Even though Wichit supported the quota
13 Ibid., 20/2475. There is no record of how his economic plan was discussed in the 
Assembly.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 14/2476. His proposal for insurance had nothing to do with the government’s
budget because the farmers would pay for their own insurance.
16 Ibid., 21/2477.
17 James C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand 1850-1970, Stanford, Stanford
University Press, 1964, p. 109.
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system, he asserted that Siam should not accept an unfair quota. Mangkorn 
urged the government to form a special committee, including civil servants 
and experts, to discuss the matter.
The assembly in the 1930s had at least two functions: it was an extra- 
bureaucratic body which could attack the government with a no-confidence 
vote, and it was a forum for opendebate on various issues. Pasuk and Baker, 
and Riggs slide over those important aspects.
How were the economic plans treated by the government? How did 
the various government departments handle these proposals? Did the 
departments have the machinery or expertise to make use of them? Were 
they a source of tension between ministers? In what ways did political and 
administrative considerations account for the delay in the implementation of 
new economic proposals? It is difficult to give clear-cut answers to these 
questions, because the relevant documents in the Thai National Archives 
unfortunately did not contain sufficient information. There are some 
documents relating to Phra Sarasas, Kimpong Thongthat, Phraya 
Suriyanuwat, Komarakun and Wilat Osathanon. However, British Foreign 
Office documents cover the responses to Pridi, Phra Sarasas and other 
plans.
The first point is to examine how the economic plans were treated by 
the government. Did the government consider them carefully or ignore 
them? The delay in the implementation of economic proposals by the 
government in the 1930s might give the impression that the government 
showed little interest in economic matters, in spite of the many plans after 
1932. However, the proceedings of the Assembly suggest that severe 
argument took place in the government.
Besides such discussions, the Siamese government carried out
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several economic surveys, often hiring foreign experts. For example, van der 
Heide and his irrigation scheme in 1903, Dr. Zimmerman’s rural economic 
survey in 1930/31, James Andrew’s rural economic survey in 1934/35 and 
Phra Sarasas’ economic survey in 1934/35. Despite comprehensive work 
and several useful suggestions and recommendations being made to the 
government by the experts, the government was slow in implementation. For 
example, van der Heide’s large-scale irrigation proposals in 1903 were 
eventually rejected by the government. Zimmerman’s rural economic survey 
in 1930/31 recommended to the government that it diversify into cotton, 
tobacco and peanuts in order not to rely on rice alone, but little was done.
In order to understand the reasons for the delays, it is useful to see 
the period after 1932 as one of complex confrontations. There were at least 
four major confrontations, which were closely related to each other and 
sometimes overlapped. The first appeared between the bureaucracy and the 
private sector. According to Riggs, the bureaucracy did not think much of 
those in the private sector, like merchants, lawyers, newspaper writers and 
factory owners. The bureaucracy ignored most of the suggestions from such 
people, and focused on the power struggle between their various cliques. In 
general, these suggestions came in the form of petitions and the government 
paid little attention to them. However, in spite of the concentration of power in 
the bureaucracy, the new social strata including the press and the middle 
class showed a keen concern with Siamese political, economic, and social 
issues, as examined in Chapter 5.
The second confrontation took place between the Siamese elite and 
the middle class. The rapid change in institutional structures after 1932 gave 
wider opportunities for the ordinary Siamese to air their concerns on various 
matters relating to politics, economy, society and education. Before 1932, 
public participation had been quite limited. For example, economic matters
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were considered in cabinet meetings, various ministries and the Board of 
Commercial Development, but these institutions were dominated by the 
Siamese royal family and the Sakdina class. Only petitions to the King or the 
newspapers reflected middle class opinions. However, after 1932, the 
creation of the National Assembly brought about a wider argument on 
political, economic and social issues. The elected and appointed 
representatives raised vital themes such as the political system or economic 
nationalism in the Assembly. In addition, regional representatives, 
particularly from the Northeast, challenged the government by revealing the 
crown lands scandal in 1937.18
The third confrontation appeared in economic policy and centred on 
state intervention vs private enterprise. This confrontation first appeared in 
economic plans. For example, Pridi and Phra Sarasas against Mangkorn 
and J.P. England. The fundamental stance of the government was not to 
foster private business. Many examples, such as Pho Kha Thai (Thai 
merchants), the Siamese Chamber of Commerce and the business crisis of 
Nai Lert were examined in Chapter 5, and showed a cool response from 
government. But the important point is that, in spite of ideological differences 
within the Siamese elite, the radical group of Pridi and Phra Sarasas and the 
conservative group of Mano and Komarakun both felt that the state should 
be a major player in the economic field.
The last confrontation focused on whether to attack agricultural 
problems or foster private commerce and industry. This confrontation 
appeared in the economic plans - Pridi, Phra Sarasas, Mano and Komarakun 
against Mangkorn, the Siamese Chamber of Commerce and Pho Kha Thai 
(Thai merchants). Farmers were much more important than business for the 
government, the latter did not have any great influence on government
18 See details in Judith A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand; A Story of intrigue, Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1991, pp.95-98.
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policy at all. This was discussed in Chapter 5. Although a new type of 
merchant saw the period after 1932 as a golden opportunity to start and 
expand businesses, they were small and medium sized merchants, not 
established or wealthy like Lamsam. They had no close connections with the 
People’s Party. From this point of view, their advocacy of economic 
nationalism might have been an ideal slogan to justify the expansion of 
their business, a reflection of their ambition to gain political and economic 
power.
The government response to some of the plans should be mentioned
here. Regarding Pridi’s plan, the government response was briefly noted in
Chapter 1 and Chapter 3. However, there is one more point, Phraya Mano’s
comment on Pridi’s plan. Phraya Mano’s comments were seen in the minutes
of the meeting of a committee to consider Pridi’s plan on 12 March 1933.19
Mano, the prime minister, strongly opposed Pridi’s plan in principle but his
wish to support the co-operatives was clear:
But if I believe that the course decided upon here leads to ruin, I shall have to oppose 
It. And if it is carried over my head I shall have no recourse but to resign. But if we agree to 
announce merely that we are going to enlarge the credit facilities of the co-operative societies 
of the sort that are now serving the farmers, or that we are going to enlarge the co-operative 
society stores, I am willing to agree to that much.20
He added: The granaries, the business of transportation, and the rice
mills, shall be organised as government-owned corporations.'21 These
quotations indicate the gist of Mano’s plan of 1934 and show that state
intervention in the economy was advocated by Pridi and Mano in spite of
their ideological differences.
Another response to Pridi’s plan was that of the British Minister to
Siam. J. Crosby, the British Minister, had the impression that Pridi was not a
communist.___________
19 Thak Chaloemtiarana (ed.), Thai Politics: Extracts and Documents 1932-1957,
Bangkok, Social Science Association of Thailand, 1978, pp.161-185.
20 ibid., pp. 180-181.
21 Ibid., p.184.
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After perusing Luang Pradit's manifesto I have come to the conclusion that he is not, 
strictly speaking, a Communist after all. At least, I can find in his programme no reference to the 
class war, to the elimination of the bourgeoisie or to the assumption of power by the 
proletariat, which are, I believe, distinctive features of the gospel preached by Karl Marx.22
But he criticised Pridi’s plan:
But even so, and whilst it is no business of mine to discuss the soundness in principle, 
or the practicability of the views entertained by advanced Socialists at home, I would submit 
that any attempt to put them into execution by persons of Luang Pradit can only spell ruin for a 
country like Siam, which has but just emerged from a regime of absolute monarchy and in 
which there exists as yet neither a true public opinion nor any experience of the working of 
democratic institutions. The features which strike one chiefly on reading Luang Pradit’s 
programme of action are his childish method of approach to socialism, the naive manner in 
which he marshals his arguments on behalf of it and , above all, his confident assumption that 
the new Economic State can be fashioned here and now all of a piece.23
The most severe criticism appeared from the King, Rama 7, in the form
of a lengthy paper which attacked Pridi’s plan in detail.24 He argued that 
Pridi s plan would not be suitable for Siam because it denied the individual’s 
rights by nationalisation of land, capital and labour. The conclusion of this 
paper was harsh:
However, what I know for a certainty is that the proposed economic plan is identical to 
that of Russia’s. What is not certain is who the imitator is; does Stalin imitate Luang Pradit or 
vice versa? Indeed, their economic plans are identical in every detail. The differences are only 
in names. Russian-Thai, wheat-rice; the same thing is to be feared; the same method to
deceive people is utilised Therefore, if this economic plan is to be administered in our
country, our government is helping to support the Third International whose purpose is to 
change the world to communism move closer to its target25
The King added: There are plenty of other ways available to help the 
people, like persuading them to set up cooperatives like they are doing in 
Denmark.’26
In February 1934 a special commission was set up by the government
22 Crosby to FO No. 182, 1 September 1934, F6016/123/40, FO371/18208, PRO.
23 Ibid.
24 Thak Chaloemtiarana (ed.), Thai Politics: Extracts and Documents 1932-1957,
Bangkok, Social Scienre Association of Thailand, 1978,pp. 193-236.
25 Ibid., pp.234-5.
26 ibid., p.236.
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to investigate whether Pridi was a communist.27 For this commission, two 
foreign experts, Robert Holland and Monsieur R. Guyon, were requested to 
draw up a joint memorandum to define the features of communism and they 
asked Pridi various questions on political, financial, social and economic 
issues. After this investigation, Pridi was cleared of being a communist. But it 
is easy to see the severe damage caused by this ideological conflict.
There was also confrontation with foreign advisers over Phra Sarasas’ 
plan, discussed in Chapter 3. in general, the foreign advisers and community 
were keen to maintain their vested interests and attacked any plan which 
might intervene in foreign business. The Financial Adviser severely attacked 
Phra Sarasas’ plan. James Baxter, the British Financial Adviser, sent three 
letters to the State Councillor for Finance regarding Phra Sarasas’ plan.28 
Baxter considered the core of the plan to be National Bank and raised forty 
questions on that issue in order to attack Phra Sarasas.29 He also sent in 
general comments on the plan:30
It is not an exaggeration to say that it aims at introducing fundamental changes in the
existing economic structure Proposals of such radical import cannot be accepted and
claims of such high nature cannot be admitted except after careful and detailed 
consideration 31
Baxter attacked the vague vision of Phra Sarasas’s national bank. Baxter 
made a clear distinction between a national bank and a central bank, and 
concluded that Phra Sarasas’ national bank was not a central bank. He 
questioned how a state-controlled national bank could acquire 49% of its 
capital from the private sector.
Baxter’s strong criticism appeared in his letter to the State Councillor
27 ibid., p. 186-192.
28 k .Kh.0301.1 .37/86.N.A. The dates of these letters were: 14 May 1934, 4 June
1934; and 29 June 1934.
29 Ibid., Forty questions were filed in the letter 14 May 1934.
30 ibid. Baxter wrote general comments on Phra Sarasas’ plan on 11 June 1934.
31 Ibid.
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for Finance on 29 June 193432
You share my view on the fundamental unsoundness of proposals at the heart of Phra 
Sarasas’s programme. I believe that its adoption or rather its execution - a very different matter - 
would mean economic and financial ruin to Siam. If I were a Siamese I would fight it to the last 
ditch, There is no step from which I would recoil and no risk should decline to run to ensure that 
the Plan was rejected.
The government response to the other plans and proposals is difficult
to uncover because of the incomplete documents in the Thai National 
Archives. Some documents, however, indicate how the government in 
cabinet meetings and how various ministers responded to some plans. The 
files on Komarakun, Mano and Wilat Osathanon, and the central bank plan 
of Kimpong Thongthat and Phraya Suriyanuwat contain some information. 
Kimpong’s file has sufficient evidence as to how the government responded. 
There are fourteen official letters there regarding his plan.33 Three 
institutions, the cabinet, the Economic Council and the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs were involved with the plan. The Economic Council could not reach a 
conclusion in spite of several meetings.34 The Ministry of Economic Affairs 
supported the plan despite the final opposition of the Economic Council.35
Other documents suggest that the cabinet dealt with some plans. For 
example, the cabinet requested that Wilat’s plan be discussed in the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs.36 Suriyanuwat’s central bank plan was sent to the 
cabinet, the Ministry of the Interior and the adviser of the Office of the 
President of the Council of Ministers.37 Baxter, the Financial Adviser, was
32 ibid. The letter was written by James Baxter to Chao Phya Sridharmadhibes on 29  
June 1934.
33 S .R .0201 .50 .2 /3 .N.A.
34 ibid. The cabinet meeting on 12 June 1935 pointed out that the Economic Council
had not come to a conclusion on Kimpong’s plan. The meeting of the Economic Council on 3
July 1935 finally opposed Kimpong’s plan.
35 ibid. This is the letter from the Minister of Economic Affairs to the Prime Minister, 18 
July 1935.
36 S. R.0201.25/738. N. A.
37 (2)S .R .00201.50.2/2.N.A.
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again negative towards Suriyanuwat’s plan.38 This attitude was persistent, 
that Siam was not then in a position to set up a central bank. This kind of 
argument was analysed in Chapter 7, together with Pridi’s attempt to set up 
the National Banking Bureau, including the Financial Adviser’s response.
In addition to the foreign advisers’s opposition, the Ministry of 
Finance persisted in its conservative principle to maintain balanced budgets 
and to be cautious over capital-intensive projects. This attitude was seen in 
Boriphanyutthakit’s plan for the Thai Rice Company in Chapter 4. There was 
also tension over the decision whether Siam should remain on the gold 
standard when Britain left gold on 21 September 1931.
The government’s slow implementation of economic plans in the
1930s is clear. A typical case was the cooperative movement, as shown in
Chapter 6. Agricultural development, based on cooperatives, was a major
theme in the 1930s in most of the plans. However, only slow and
experimental implementation was carried out after 1932. Political instability,
lack of clear ideology, the existence of the Sakdina System and the lack of
fiscal autonomy explained Siam’s economic underdevelopment in Chapter
1, and several further economic factors were mentioned in Chapter 2. It is
also a fact that the government set up several committees, including the
Economic Council, and carried out several economic surveys. Discussion in
several related ministries or in various committees delayed a final decision.
Complicated and unclear decision-making in the government in the 1960s
was explained in Riggs’ account. Even though this model was concerned
with that later period the 1960s, it might be useful for the 1930s. Riggs
explained the operational code of a bureaucratic polity.
As much as possible, reduce the work load for officials. This refers especially to the content of 
bureaucratic work -i.e., avoid the necessity of making hard decisions, of having to choose 
between alternatives which would necessarily alienate and antagonise other officials,
38 ibid. Phraya Suriyanuwat noted Baxter’s opposition to his plan in a letter to the Prime 
Minister on 16 June 1934.
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especially those in the hierarchy.39
These features had appeared by the 1930s.My study shows that
several committees, like the Economic Council, were set up, and discussion 
of economic issues by foreign and Siamese experts took place. In addition, 
several economic surveys, including that by Zimmerman, were carried out in 
the 1930s. However, the process of decision-making was not clear, as Riggs 
found out in the 1960s, although there is far less evidence on which to judge 
the performance of the bureaucracy in the 1930s.
The last part of the conclusion is concerned with economic 
nationalism. Economic nationalism was prominent in most plans. Economic 
nationalism implied either the adoption of a self-sufficient economic system 
or anti-Chinese and anti-foreigner sentiments. The former was discussed in 
the economic plans of the Siamese elite but the latter was argued by various 
social groups, including the middle class. Pridi and Mangkorn supported a 
self-sufficient economic system in different ways, Pridi for socialism, 
Mangkorn for capitalism, in spite of their ideological differences, their main 
goal was to foster infant industries and reduce unnecessary imports, 
particularly of luxury goods. Mangkorn gave many examples of import 
substitution industries: food stuffs, canned milk, sugar and molasses, flour, 
raw materials, kerosene, benzine, light industry products, rubber products, 
electrical appliances and matches, gunny bags, machinery, metals, paper, 
cotton products and tobacco. The new government responded to these 
import substitution proposals by starting to produce cotton, sugar and paper 
as ministry projects in the mid-1930s. Mangkorn’s plan encouraged the 
government to promote import substitution. It is not clear whether the initial 
state enterprises in the mid -1930s had the clear purpose of creating a self­
39 Fred W Riggs, Thailand: The Modernisation of a Bureaucratic Polity; Honolulu, East- 
West Center Press, 1966, p.327.
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sufficient economic system or were just an experiment to expand the 
economic base of the People’s Party, particularly among army groups. This 
needs to be further studied. But it is clear that the mid-1930s was a turning 
point, at which leaders of the People’s Party shifted from non-intervention to 
state intervention in the economy.
Anti-Chinese and anti-foreigner feelings were also expressed by 
various social groups. For example, Pridi and Mangkorn raised this issue 
when arguing that a self-sufficient economy and import substitution would 
remove Chinese and foreign economic dominance. But neither condemned 
foreigners directly, perhaps because they feared causing trouble in the 
foreign community in Siam. In contrast, Phra Sarasas could be more hostile 
to foreign capital.
The middle class expressed their economic nationalism more directly. 
Some were simply anti-Chinese, but a few authors were more precise, as 
for example, in Thanim Laohawilai and Sawien Osathanukhrow’s plan for 
‘Samakhom Bamrung Sinkha Thai’, Wichien Supakarn’s idea for a 
‘Samakhom Sinkha Thai’, or Luang Wuthithonnetirak’s plan to set up a 
'Samakhom Bamrung Setthakit’ to encourage Thais to buy more Thai 
products.40
In National Archives file S.R. 0201.25 (Rongrian lae 
Sanukhwamkhithen, Petitions, proposals, opinions) there are many 
documents from members of the middle class. In total, 804 documents were 
submitted from 1932 to 1939, but the years 1932 and 1933 accounted for 
about 90% of that total.41 In their proposals and ideas, the middle class were 
positive.42 Topics included the economy, taxes, the bureaucracy and
40 (2)S.R.0201.52/2.N.A.; S.R.0201.25/80. N.A.; S.R.0201.25/83.N.A.
41 This figure is based on my own calculation, using the index of N.A. S.R.0201.25. The 
details: 450 in 1932, 26 in 1932/33, 238 in 1933, 5 in 1933/34.
42 For example, in Sanukhwamhen: in 1932 there were 59 by Nai, 7 by Khun, 14 by 
Luang, 6 by Phra, 4 by Phraya and 1 by a Caophraya. In 1933, there were 45 by Nai, 3 by 
Khun, 7 by Luang, 2 by Phra and 4 by Phraya.
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ministries, education, law and salaries.
Economic topics were the major subject. During the years 1932 and 
1933, 130 documents concerning the Siamese economy were submitted,43 
accounting for about 18% of the documents presented in 1932 and 1933. In 
the 130 documents, commoners and the middle class wrote on various 
issues: tax, poverty, economic nationalism, finance, development, rural 
problems, manufacturing industry, commerce, how to reduce expenses, how 
to deal with the economic crisis, private companies, the Ministries of Finance 
and Economic Affairs, transportation and labour. With respect to rural 
problems, most attention was paid to setting-up rice mills, the price of rice, 
how to deal with the farmer’s debts, export marketing and cooperatives. It is 
important to emphasize that the arguments by the middle class were as lively 
as those of the Siamese elite or those of the government.
It is clear that economic nationalism was already rife within the 
middle class in 1932. However, it was emotional, not intellectual, not well 
thought-out. Anti-Chinese feelings, setting-up a rice mill by Siamese, a 
proposal to use not foreign products but Thai ones and the establishment of a 
self-sufficient economy were the main themes. Economic nationalism was 
not simply a product of Rama 6. In 1932, it was a common theme of the 
Siamese elite and the Siamese middle class.
The origins of economic nationalism have been discussed by various 
scholars, it remains a complex issue.
In the English-language literature, there are several studies of 
Siamese economic nationalism, among them, Thai Nationalism and Identity: 
Popular Themes of the 1930s’, by B.J. Terwiel.44
There  are] two widely-held assumptions. One is that the attempt at nation building
43 This figure is calculated from the index of S.R. 0201.25. N.A.
44 b. J. Terwiel, ‘Thai Nationalism and Identity: Popular Themes of the 1930s’, in C. J. 
Reynolds, (ed), National Identity and Its Defenders: Thailand, 1939-1989 , Chiang Mai: 
Silkworm Books, 1993, pp. 133-155.
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under Rama VI halted with his death in 1925. The second assumption is that in 1939, after 
fourteen years of neglect, the attempt to build nationalism was taken up again. These 
assumptions are based, consciously or unconsciously upon the idea that Thai history can be 
meaningfully periodized in the rise and fall of particular individuals (in this case Rama VI and 
Phibun Songkhram).45
There are several studies which focus on Thai nationalism by looking
at an individual figure. The first is W. F. Vella, Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and
the Development of Thai Nationalism, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1978. His main concern was how Rama VI tried to foster a spirit of
nationalism among the Thai through various mechanisms, including the
establishment of the Wild Tiger Corps, and his plays, poems, speeches and
articles. Although Vella stressed Rama Vi's ideological approach to
nationalism, he also noted Rama Vi’s economic nationalism.46 With respect
to the economic nationalism of the late 1930s, there are two accounts;
Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian (1995), Thailand’s Durable Premier: Phibun
through Three Decades 1932-1957, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press;
and Thak Chaloemtiarana (ed.) (1978), Thai Politics, 1932-57, Bangkok:
Social Science Association of Thailand.47 Kobkua argues:
In essence, Phibun’s central theme of nation-building embraced nationalism and 
patriotism as an overall ideological force knitting together various activities while the socio­
cultural and economic reforms provided the instruments for transforming ideas into reality.48 
Vella and Kobkua show how these two figures initiated nationalist issues.
This was a ‘top-heavy’ nationalism.
Recent work indirectly suggests that 1932 saw the birth of economic
nationalism. For example, there is Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker
(1995), Thailand: Economy and Politics, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University
45 Ibid., p. 134.
46 Walter F. Vella, Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism,
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978, pp. 167-175.
47 in the former, Chapter 3, 'Socio-cultural Reform', pp. 102-162. In the latter,
Thinaphan Nakhata, 'National Consolidation and Nation-Building, 1939-1947 ’; 'On 
Nationalism’, see pp.243-322.
48 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun through Three
Decades 1932-1957, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 105.
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Press.49 Akira Suehiro (1989), Capital Accumulation in Thailand 1855-1985
, Tokyo: Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, examines economic
nationalism from 1932 to 1947.50 These two works introduce the various
authors, Mangkorn Samsen and Pridi, and follow the various economic
policy changes from 1932.
Following the above, there are now three views on the origins of
economic nationalism: that it was born in the reign of Rama VI (1910-1925),
in the 1932 revolution, and in 1939. But the main argument concerns the
continuity or discontinuity between these periods, it is important to note that
the key figures in each period were different, and that the character of
economic nationalism changed slightly or drastically from period to period.
To put it another way, the major figures changed, from the king, to the
Siamese 6lite and the middle class in 1932, to Phibun in 1939. Therefore the
character of economic nationalism also changed between these periods.
Regarding the nationalism of Rama VI, Anderson noted:
The target of this nationalism, however, was neither the United Kingdom, which 
controlled 90 per cent of Siam's trade, nor France, which had recently made off with easterly 
segments of the old realm: it was the Chinese whom his father had so recently and blithely 
imported. The style of his anti-Chinese stance is suggested by the titles of two of his most 
famous pamphlets: The Jews of the Orient (1914), and Clogs on Our Wheels (1915) 51
Anderson also pointed out that Rama Vi's nationalism was an official 
nationalism.
It goes without saying that Wachirawut also began moving all the policy levers of official 
nationalism: compulsory state-controlled primary education, state-organized propaganda, 
official rewriting of history, militarism - here more visible show than the real thing - and endless
49 Pasuk Phongpaichit, Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1995. Chapter 4, 'Rice Barons, Bankers, and Generals', notably 
pp. 112-117.
50 Akira Suehiro, Capital Accumulation in Thailand 1855-1985 , Tokyo: Centre for East 
Asian Cultural Studies, 1989. See Chapter 4, ‘Economic Nationalism: 1932-1947', pp. 106- 
134.
51 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, London: Verso, 1996, p. 100.
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affirmations of the identity of dynasty and nation.52
Concerning the economic nationalism of Rama VI, Vella draws
attention to his views on poverty in Siam, his view that defence was more 
important than economic development, his lack of interest or knowledge of 
economics and finance. Vella pointed out that Rama VI did not favour 
government participation in the economy, arguing that this was the 
concern of the people, businessmen and farmers. ‘It was the responsibility of 
all the people to improve Siam’s economic lot. Businessmen should invest in 
Siamese industries. Farmers should plant crops to compete with imports. And 
consumers should buy Thai products whenever possible.’53
In 1932 the character of economic nationalism changed, and the new 
Siamese elite and the middle cfass proposed different views. The key figures 
were Mangkorn Samsen, Pridi, Phra Sarasas and various members of the 
middle class. As already examined in Chapters 3 and 4, state intervention in 
the economy on the basis of socialism can be seen in Pridi and Phra 
Sarasas. In Mangkorn Samsen, economic self-sufficiency, relying on import 
substitution, and a major role for private enterprise. In the conservative 
group, respect for private ownership and property. This was a crucial 
change from Rama VI. A more important point was that now that the focus of 
economic nationalism was to save the farmers, the majority of the people, 
from poverty, by eliminating or reducing the power of Chinese middlemen 
and money lenders. This implied two major changes from Rama VI. The 
farmer’s poverty was given priority by the new government in 1932; Rama 
VI had ignored the farmer's poverty. Rama Vi’s nationalism was strongly 
anti-Chinese: now it concentrated on reducing Chinese economic power. 
There were now practical measures to deal with the Chinese problem.
In 1939 these measures came into force, under the Phibun
52 Ibid., p. 101.
53 Walter F Vella, Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism,
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978, p. 174.
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government. Phibun’s nationalism, including Ratthaniyom, the State 
Degrees, is closely examined in Kobkua.54 But Kobkua does not fully explore 
the relationship between the economic nationalism of 1932 and that of 
Phibun in 1939.
Phibun’s economic nationalism is said to be influenced by the socio-economic 
environment of the majority of the Promoters who, on the whole, belonged to the petty 
bourgeois class. Both Phibun and his leading adviser, Wichitwathakan, for example, were 
members of that class. It was therefore logical that having rejected the ideas of utilising the 
peasantry as their main political power base, as suggested by Pridi in his Economic Plan, and 
having also rejected the co-operation of the old ruling clique who still wielded great influence 
over the bourgeois and foreign compradores and entrepreneurs, the People’s Party under 
Phibun's leadership decided to identity as their power base the petty bourgeois class from 
within and outside the bureaucratic system.55
An important argument here is the role of Wichitwathakan in Phibun’s
economic policy. Kobkua stresses Wichitwathakan’s influence on Phibun.
The intellectual force behind this economic blueprint was Wichitwathakan, whose 
thoughts on the nationalist economic system were well expounded in his book, Anakhot. In 
sum, Wichitwathakan’s economic proposals rejected both the old socio-economic of the 
absolutist days, the Sakdina System, and the socialist system embodied in Pridi’s Economic 
Plan. In their place, he introduced the nationalist economic system based on individual 
ownership of land, accompanied by the state’s effective guidance and supervision.56 
Barme’s study of Wichitwathakan suggests that in the early 1930s he had
been a keen advocate of a free-market approach.57 This implies that Wichit
changed his views from laissez-faire, private enterprise-oriented
development, to state intervention in the economy. But he remained
committed to individual ownership of land and property. Another argument
to be explored is whether Phibun’s economic policy was a product only of
Wichit.
These three views on the origins of economic nationalism ignore the
54 Kobkua Suwannathat-pian, Thailand’s Durable Premier: Phibun through Three 
Decades 1932-1957, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995. See Chapter 3, 'Socio­
cultural Reform', pp. 102-162.
55 Ibid., p. 145.
56 Ibid., p.145.
57 s. Barme, Luang Wichit Wathakan and the Creation of a Thai Identity, Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993: see pp.75-80.
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relationship between the three periods. It was pointed out by Terwiel that 
Thai historians usually focus on specific reigns and rulers when describing 
nationalism.
The history of the various stages of an ideology such as Thai nationalism is not served 
by this ‘on-off approach. It is much better studied as a phenomenon that, once arisen, moves, 
changes and develops as one of a range of competing ideologies. Even in the case of 
particular rulers having an extraordinary preoccupation with nationalism, such as Rama VI, elite- 
directed nationalism became significant in Thailand’s general history mainly because it met with 
a receptive audience.58
Although Terwiel pointed out the defects of the ‘on-off’ approach, he
does not fully explore his own alternative.59 For example, when looking at
economic nationalism in the 1930s, particularly after 1932, he quoted H. G.
Deignan, an American missionary.
During the decade just past the Government has initiated a positive program aimed at 
raising the standards of living of the common people and especially of the peasants who
constitute the great majority The political aspect of the program leaned heavily toward
economic nationalism, in an endeavour to counteract the excessive proportion of foreign 
capital in the country and to encourage more active participation by the Thai in the building-up 
of their own land’ (Deignan 1943:18).60 
Terwiei’s criticism of this is:
Deignan and other contemporary analysts have rightly identified the advent of 
economic nationalism with the outcome of the 1932 revolution. The setting-up of state 
enterprises, such as the import organisation of the Ministry of Defence (the Fuel Division) and 
the Siam Cotton Mill in 1933, are the first practical results of this policy. They have failed to 
observe, however, to what extent this new economic nationalism was linked up both with the 
much-publicized propaganda of the Sixth Reign and also with the development of a radical 
reform of Thai nationalism.61
Terwiel’s views can be challenged. The economic nationalism of the
1930s was shared by various social groups, including the elite, the middle
53 B. J. Terwiel, Thai nationalism and identity: popular themes of the 1930s’, in C. J.
Reynolds, (ed), National Identity and Its Defenders: Thailand 1939-1989, Chiang Mai:
Silkworm Books, 1991, p. 144.
59 Terwiel stressed Chamrat Sarawisut’s writings of 1934 and 1935, as strong evidence
in support of his argument that ‘nation-building’ began well before 1939, even before 1936,
when Batson thought it began. See the final part of Chamarat’ book, Withirakchat (How to
Love the Nation), translated on pp. 145-148.
60 ibid., p. 137.
61 Ibid., p. 137.
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class and the mass media. The elite-oriented, top-heavy nationalism of
Rama VI had changed, and had become more accessible to the people.
Second, the early 1930s economic nationalism should be linked more firmly 
to Phibun’s economic nationalism. Terwiel does not really explain the 
significance of the economic nationalism of the early 1930s. In spite of 
criticising the ‘on-off’ approach, he risks relying too much on a particular
source or figure when looking for the origins of economic nationalism in
Siam.
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Table 8-1 Occupationat Distribution o fth e .A s^m blyJ 933-1938
 ...................   Election's Year! \
First-category members! 1 93 3 1 1937j 1938
Occupation I
1. Businessmen j 15 181 20
2. Government 16 | 38! 27
Officers | |
3. Retired 1 1 1 8! 9
Government Officers i
4. L a w y e r s ! 21; 1 5 1 24
.5.r....Jpumalists i 3 i 11 3
6. Physicians and ] 2 1 2\
Pharmacists
7. Farmers 8 | 5 ! 7
8 . Teachers j - !  2 !
9. Unknown 2! 1 j 1
Total..................................... j...................... 78:....................... 91 91
Second-category members
.............................................. ! Year of Appointment
Occupation.......................... [................. 1932] 1933;
L  Military.and Pol ice j 18' 50
Officers ;
2. Bureaucrats [ 44 : 27!
3. Businessmen 4 ! 1 i
4. Others i 4 ! -  \
lo ta !.........................   i......................  70] 78;
(Source) Eyi .M.urashima, Nakharin wanthana, The
pf...Modern Thai Political Parties, Tol^o, Institute of Developing 
Economics, 1991, p.134, 136. I
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